



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

THE QOG INSTITUTE  
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT

# CODEBOOK

QoG Time-series and Cross-section Datasets  
May 15, 2008

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## Introduction

One aim of the QoG Institute is to make publicly available cross-national comparative data on QoG and its correlates. To accomplish this objective we have compiled both a cross-sectional dataset with global coverage pertaining to the year 2002 (or the closest year available), and a cross-sectional time-series dataset with global coverage spanning the time period 1946–2006. The datasets draw on a number of freely available cross-sectional data sources, including aggregated individual-level data, and contain three types of variables:

- WII (What It Is) variables, that is, variables pertaining to the core features of QoG (such as corruption, bureaucratic quality, and democracy)
- HTG (How To Get it) variables, that is, variables posited to promote the development of QoG (such as electoral rules, forms of government, federalism, legal & colonial origin, religion and social fractionalization); and
- WYG (What You Get) variables, that is, variables pertaining to some of the posited consequences of QoG (such as economic and human development, international and domestic peace, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and satisfied, trusting & confident citizens).

Our classification of the variables into these three categories should be seen as heuristic, as the more exact causal ordering of one's variables obviously depends on the research question. We have made a particular effort to compile the best available sources for measuring the following concepts (sources indicated within parentheses):

- Democracy (Cheibub & Gandhi; Freedom House; Polity, Vanhanen; World Bank Governance Indicators; Bertelsmann Transformation Index; Economist Intelligence Unit)
- Human Rights (Cingranelli & Richards; Freedom House; Gibney & Dalton; Economist Intelligence Unit)
- Security of Contract & Property Rights (Fraser Institute; Heritage Foundation; World Bank Governance Indicators; Bertelsmann Transformation Index)
- Quality of Bureaucracy (Evans & Rauch; ICRG; World Bank Governance Indicators: Government Effectiveness; Freedom House; Global Integrity Report; Economist Intelligence Unit; Bertelsmann Transformation Index)
- Corruption (Transparency International; ICRG; World Bank Governance Indicators; Global Integrity Report; Economist Intelligence Unit; Bertelsmann Transformation Index)
- Electoral Systems (Gerring et al; Golder; IDEA; Persson & Tabellini; Database of Political Institutions; Johnson & Wallack)
- Party System Fractionalization (Database of Political Institutions; Golder; Henisz)
- Forms of Government/Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism (Cheibub & Gandhi; Gerring et al; Persson & Tabellini; Database of Political Institutions)
- Federalism vs. Unitarism (Gerring et al; Persson & Tabellini; Database of Political Institutions)
- Ethno-Linguistic and/or Religious Fractionalization (Alesina et al.; Easterly & Levine; Fearon; Roeder)

## Country and Time Coverage

In the *cross-sectional* dataset we include a total of 192 nations: all countries in the world recognized by the United Nations as of the year 2002, plus Taiwan. If data for 2002 was not available, data for 2003 is used. If 2003 was not available, we use data for 2001; and if 2001 was lacking, 2000 is used and so forth.

In the cross-sectional *time-series* dataset we include the same 192 nations, plus an addition of 13 historical countries that have ceased to exist: Tibet, Zanzibar, Pakistan pre 1972 (including East Pakistan, presently Bangladesh), North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, East and West Germany, Yugoslavia pre 1992 (the People's Republic of Yugoslavia), the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia pre 1993 (including Eritrea); this makes a total of 205 nations.

Unfortunately there exists no established international standard for how historical cases, resulting either from country mergers or country splits, should be treated in a cross-sectional time-series setting. In an effort to apply as flexible rules as possible, allowing for any particular user to make alterations in accordance with his or her preferences, we have applied the following principles:

- After a merger of two countries the new country is considered a new case, even when the new state thus formed could be considered as a continuation of one of the merging states. This rule applies to (1) Vietnam, which merged from North and South Vietnam in 1975-76, (2) Yemen, which merged from North and South Yemen in 1990, and (3) Germany, which merged from East and West Germany in 1990. Our treatment of (a) Tanzania and Zanzibar and (b) China and Tibet make two **exceptions** to the rule, as we do not treat Tanzania and Tanganyika (the official name of Tanzania before unification with Zanzibar in 1964) or China before and after the occupation of Tibet in 1950 as separate countries.
- If a country has split up, the resulting new countries are considered new cases, even when one of the new states thus formed could be considered as a continuation of the state that split up. This rule applies to (1) Pakistan, which was split into Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971, (2) the USSR, which was split into 15 post-Soviet countries in 1991, (3) Yugoslavia, which was split into Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro (until 2001 continued to be called "Yugoslavia") in 1991, (4) Czechoslovakia, which was split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, and (5) Ethiopia, which was split into Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1993. There are two **exceptions** to this rule: (a) Indonesia is considered a continuation of the country that existed before the independence of Timor-Leste in 2002 (while Timor-Leste is considered a new country), and (b) we continue to treat Serbia and Montenegro as a unit even after they split into two separate states in 2006. (This is because very few variables have data for Serbia and/or Montenegro in 2006; however, where this data exists, it has been indicated in the codebook.)
- Due to the mentioned lack of international standards, most of our data sources treat these cases of country mergers and splits differently. We have thus rearranged data from those sources that do not treat cases of split ups and mergers in accordance with our criteria above. Consequently, if a merger or a split has occurred and a data source does not treat the countries as different cases, we have **moved the data** for these countries so as to be consistent with our criteria. However, if a merger has occurred and



a data source treats the countries as the same case even before the merger, or if a split has occurred and a data source treats the countries as different cases even before the split, we have **not moved the data**, as this is consistent with our criteria above (examples are given in the following section).

▪ To determine where to put the data for the year of the merger/split, we have relied on the “July 1st-principle”. If the merger or split occurred *after* July 1st, the data for this year will belong to the historical country. This applies to Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam in 1975,<sup>1</sup> Germany in 1990, and the USSR in 1991. For mergers/splits *before* July 1st, the data for this year is recorded as belonging to the new country. This applies to Yemen in 1990, Yugoslavia in 1992, Ethiopia in 1993, and Czechoslovakia in 1993.

Thus, for **example**: If Germany in a data source is treated as a continuation of West Germany, we place data up to and including 1990 on West Germany and leave Germany blank until and including 1990, since the merger of Germany occurred in October 1990 (*after* July 1st, 1990). If, on the other hand, Serbia and Montenegro in a data source is treated as a continuation of Yugoslavia, we place the data up to and including 1991 on Yugoslavia and from 1992 and onward on Serbia and Montenegro (which is left blank until and including 1991), since the split occurred from June 1991-March 1992 (*before* July 1st, 1992).

For each variable in the cross-sectional *time-series* data we specify the period covered as well as the following statistics:

n: Number of country-year observations

N: Number of countries covered

$\bar{N}$  : Mean number of countries per year

$\bar{T}$  : Mean number of years per country.

## Country and Case Identifier Codes

**ccode**            **Country Code Numeric**

<http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/index.html>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO\\_3166-1](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1)

Numeric country code (ISO-3166-1 numeric).

5 of the ccodes are “non-ISO”:

994 – Tibet (ccodealp also “non-ISO”)

995 – Zanzibar

997 - Pakistan (pre 1972)

998 - Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North)

999 - Vietnam, Republic of (South)

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<sup>1</sup> To place a date on the merging of South and North Vietnam remains a tricky issue that has been solved in a variety of ways by our data sources. Some rely on the invasion of Saigon in April 1975, others on the official merger in July 1976. We take the “average” of these two dates, which leads to a merging “date” *after* July 1, 1975.

## **ccodealp**      **3-letter Country Code**

<http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/index.html>  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO\\_3166-1](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1)

3-letter country code (ISO-3166-1 alpha3).

The alpha code (ccodealp) does not uniquely identify all countries. The following pairs of countries have identical alpha codes: Ethiopia (-1993) and Ethiopia (1993-); Yemen Arab Republic and Yemen; Pakistan (-1971) and Pakistan (1972-); West Germany and Germany; North Vietnam and Vietnam. All the numeric country codes (ccode) are however unique and this is thus the variable best suitable to use when merging files.

## **cname**            **Country Name**

<b>ccode</b>	<b>ccodealp</b>	<b>cname</b>			
4	AFG	Afghanistan	191	HRV	Croatia
8	ALB	Albania	192	CUB	Cuba
12	DZA	Algeria	196	CYP	Cyprus
20	AND	Andorra	200	CSK	Czechoslovakia
24	AGO	Angola	203	CZE	Czech Republic
28	ATG	Antigua and Barbuda	208	DNK	Denmark
32	ARG	Argentina	262	DJI	Djibouti
51	ARM	Armenia	212	DMA	Dominica
36	AUS	Australia	214	DOM	Dominican Republic
40	AUT	Austria	218	ECU	Ecuador
31	AZE	Azerbaijan	818	EGY	Egypt
44	BHS	Bahamas	222	SLV	El Salvador
48	BHR	Bahrain	226	GNQ	Equatorial Guinea
50	BGD	Bangladesh	232	ERI	Eritrea
52	BRB	Barbados	233	EST	Estonia
112	BLR	Belarus	230	ETH	Ethiopia (-1992)
56	BEL	Belgium	231	ETH	Ethiopia (1993-)
84	BLZ	Belize	242	FJI	Fiji
204	BEN	Benin	246	FIN	Finland
64	BTN	Bhutan	250	FRA	France
68	BOL	Bolivia	266	GAB	Gabon
70	BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	270	GMB	Gambia
72	BWA	Botswana	268	GEO	Georgia
76	BRA	Brazil	276	DEU	Germany
96	BRN	Brunei	278	DDR	Germany, East
100	BGR	Bulgaria	280	DEU	Germany, West
854	BFA	Burkina Faso	288	GHA	Ghana
108	BDI	Burundi	300	GRC	Greece
116	KHM	Cambodia	308	GRD	Grenada
120	CMR	Cameroon	320	GTM	Guatemala
124	CAN	Canada	324	GIN	Guinea
132	CPV	Cape Verde	624	GNB	Guinea-Bissau
140	CAF	Central African Republic	328	GUY	Guyana
148	TCD	Chad	332	HTI	Haiti
152	CHL	Chile	340	HND	Honduras
156	CHN	China	348	HUN	Hungary
170	COL	Colombia	352	ISL	Iceland
174	COM	Comoros	356	IND	India
178	COG	Congo	360	IDN	Indonesia
180	COD	Congo, Democratic Republic	364	IRN	Iran
188	CRI	Costa Rica	368	IRQ	Iraq
384	CIV	Cote d'Ivoire	372	IRL	Ireland

376	ISR	Israel	642	ROU	Romania
380	ITA	Italy	643	RUS	Russia
388	JAM	Jamaica	646	RWA	Rwanda
392	JPN	Japan	882	WSM	Samoa
400	JOR	Jordan	674	SMR	San Marino
398	KAZ	Kazakhstan	678	STP	Sao Tome and Principe
404	KEN	Kenya	682	SAU	Saudi Arabia
296	KIR	Kiribati	686	SEN	Senegal
408	PRK	Korea, North	891	SCG	Serbia and Montenegro
410	KOR	Korea, South	690	SYC	Seychelles
414	KWT	Kuwait	694	SLE	Sierra Leone
417	KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	702	SGP	Singapore
418	LAO	Laos	703	SVK	Slovakia
428	LVA	Latvia	705	SVN	Slovenia
422	LBN	Lebanon	90	SLB	Solomon Islands
426	LSO	Lesotho	706	SOM	Somalia
430	LBR	Liberia	710	ZAF	South Africa
434	LBY	Libya	724	ESP	Spain
438	LIE	Liechtenstein	144	LKA	Sri Lanka
440	LTU	Lithuania	659	KNA	St Kitts and Nevis
442	LUX	Luxembourg	662	LCA	St Lucia
807	MKD	Macedonia	670	VCT	St Vincent and the Grenadines
450	MDG	Madagascar	736	SDN	Sudan
454	MWI	Malawi	740	SUR	Suriname
458	MYS	Malaysia	748	SWZ	Swaziland
462	MDV	Maldives	752	SWE	Sweden
466	MLI	Mali	756	CHE	Switzerland
470	MLT	Malta	760	SYR	Syria
584	MHL	Marshall Islands	158	TWN	Taiwan
478	MRT	Mauritania	762	TJK	Tajikistan
480	MUS	Mauritius	834	TZA	Tanzania
484	MEX	Mexico	764	THA	Thailand
583	FSM	Micronesia	994	XTI	Tibet
498	MDA	Moldova	626	TLS	Timor-Leste
492	MCO	Monaco	768	TGO	Togo
496	MNG	Mongolia	776	TON	Tonga
504	MAR	Morocco	780	TTO	Trinidad and Tobago
508	MOZ	Mozambique	788	TUN	Tunisia
104	MMR	Myanmar	792	TUR	Turkey
516	NAM	Namibia	795	TKM	Turkmenistan
520	NRU	Nauru	798	TUV	Tuvalu
524	NPL	Nepal	800	UGA	Uganda
528	NLD	Netherlands	804	UKR	Ukraine
554	NZL	New Zealand	784	ARE	United Arab Emirates
558	NIC	Nicaragua	826	GBR	United Kingdom
562	NER	Niger	840	USA	United States
566	NGA	Nigeria	858	URY	Uruguay
578	NOR	Norway	810	SUN	USSR
512	OMN	Oman	860	UZB	Uzbekistan
997	PAK	Pakistan (-1971)	548	VUT	Vanuatu
586	PAK	Pakistan (1972-)	862	VEN	Venezuela
585	PLW	Palau	704	VNM	Vietnam
591	PAN	Panama	998	VNM	Vietnam, North
598	PNG	Papua New Guinea	999	VDR	Vietnam, South
600	PRY	Paraguay	887	YEM	Yemen
604	PER	Peru	886	YEM	Yemen, North
608	PHL	Philippines	720	YMD	Yemen, South
616	POL	Poland	890	YUG	Yugoslavia
620	PRT	Portugal	995	EAZ	Zanzibar
634	QAT	Qatar	894	ZMB	Zambia

<b>ccodewb</b>	<b>Country Code World Bank</b>
<b>ccodecow</b>	<b>Country Code Correlates of War</b>
<b>year</b>	<b>Year</b>
<b>cname_year</b>	<b>Country Name and Year</b>
<b>ccodealp_year</b>	<b>3-letter Country Code and Year</b>

## **WII (What It Is) Variables**

### **Bertelsmann Transformation Index**

(Cross-section: 2006, N: 119)

<http://bti2006.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/>

Note: The QoG dataset does not treat Serbia and Montenegro as two separate states, which BTI does. Therefore, we have merged the data for these two states into one, weighting for the different population sizes.

### **Democracy Status**

#### **bti\_ds Democracy Status**

The score for Democracy Status is obtained by calculating the mean value of the ratings for the following variables: stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions and political and social integration.

Note: There also exists a Bertelsmann “Status Index”, which is the mean of Democracy Status (bti\_ds) and Market Economy Status (bti\_mes, listed below under “How To Get It”), which we have not included in the data.

#### **bti\_st Stateness**

The variable measures to what extent the state’s monopoly on the use of force covers the entire territory; to what extent all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate; to what extent the state’s legitimacy and its legal order is defined without inference by religious dogmas; and to what extent basic administrative structures exist.

#### **bti\_pp Political Participation**

The variable examines if rulers are determined by general, free and fair elections; if democratically elected leaders have the effective power to govern or if there are veto powers and political enclaves; if independent political and civic groups can associate freely; and to what extent citizens, organizations and the mass media can express opinions freely.

**bt\_rol            Rule of Law**

The variable measures to what extent a working separation of powers exists; to what extent an independent judiciary exists, to what extent there are legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions; and to what extent civil liberties are guaranteed and protected.

**bti\_sdi            Stability of Democratic Institutions**

The variable measures to what extent the democratic institutions, including the administrative and judicial systems, are capable of performing, and the extent to which the democratic institutions are accepted or supported by the relevant actors.

**bti\_psi            Political and Social Integration**

The variable examines to what extent there is a stable, moderate and socially rooted party system to articulate and aggregate societal interests; to what extent there is a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system; how strong citizen consent is to democratic norms and procedures; and to what extent social self-organization and the construction of social capital have advanced.

**Management Index**

**bti\_mi            Management Index**

The Management Index is based on Level of Difficulty (bti\_lod) and Management Performance (bti\_mp), as defined below. The Level of Difficulty criterion accounts for the fact that the quality transformation management is shaped by each state's unique structural conditions. The more adverse a state's structural conditions and the more limited its available resources, the higher the good governance is scored in the Management Index.

**bti\_lod            Level of Difficulty**

The variable measures to what extent structural difficulties constrain the political leadership's governance capacity; to what extent there are traditions of civil society; how serious ethnic, religious and social conflicts are; per capita GNI PPP (2005); UN Education Index as a measure of the educational level; and Stateness and Rule of Law (average of BTI variables above).

**bti\_mp            Management Performance**

The score for Management Performance is obtained by calculating the mean value of the ratings for the following criteria: Steering Capability, Resource Efficiency, Consensus-Building and International Cooperation.

**bti\_sc            Steering Capability**

The variable evaluates to what extent the political leadership sets and maintains strategic priorities; how effective the government is in implementing reform policy; how flexible and innovative the political leadership is; and if the political leadership learns from past errors.

**bti\_re            Resource Efficiency**

The variable measures to what extent the government makes efficient use of available economic and human resources; to what extent the government can coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent policy; and to what extent government successfully contains corruption.

**bti\_cb            Consensus-Building**

The variable measures to what extent the major political actors agree on a market economy and democracy as strategic long-term aims; to what extent the reformers can exclude or co-opt anti-democratic veto actors; to what extent the political leadership can manage political cleavages so that they do not escalate into irreconcilable conflicts; to what extent the political leadership enables the participation of civil society in the political process; and to what extent the political leadership can bring about reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators of past injustices.

**bti\_ic            International Cooperation**

The variable evaluates to what extent the political leadership uses the support of international partners to improve its domestic reform policies; to what extent the government acts as a credible and reliable partner in its relations with the international community; and to what extent the political leadership is willing to cooperate with neighboring countries in regional and international organizations

**Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Labor**

(Cross-Section: covers the 1997-2002 period, N: 84)

[http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working\\_papers/Regulation%20of%20Labor-All/Regulation%20of%20Labor.xls](http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/Regulation%20of%20Labor-All/Regulation%20of%20Labor.xls)

(Botero et al 2004)

Unless otherwise specified, higher values indicate higher worker protection. All dummy variables are equal to one or zero. All normalized variables lie between 0 and 1, where 0 (1) is the minimum (maximum) actual value in the sample of countries.

**Employment Laws****bdlls\_aeci        Alternative Employment Contracts Index**

Measures the existence and cost of alternatives to the standard employment contract, computed as the average of: (1) a dummy variable equal to one if part-time workers enjoy the mandatory benefits of full-time workers, (2) a dummy variable equal to one if terminating part-time workers is at least as costly as terminating full time workers, (3) a dummy variable equal to one if fixed-term contracts are only allowed for fixed-term tasks, and (4) the normalized maximum duration of fixed-term contracts.

**bdlls\_cihw        Cost of Increasing Hour Worked**

Measures the cost of increasing the number of hours worked. We start by calculating the "maximum number of hours of work in a year before overtime" per year in each country (excluding overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.). Normal hours range from 1,758 in Denmark to 2,418 in Kenya. Then we assume that firms need to increase the

hours worked by their employees from 1,758 to 2,418 hours during one year. A firm first increases the number of hours worked until it reaches the country's maximum normal hours of work, and then uses overtime. If existing employees are not allowed to increase the hours worked to 2,418 hours in a year, perhaps because overtime is capped, we assume the firm doubles its workforce and each worker is paid 1,758 hours, doubling the wage bill of the firm. The cost of increasing hours worked is computed as the ratio of the final wage bill to the initial one.

**bdlls\_cofw    Cost of Firing Workers**

Measures the cost of firing 20 percent of the firm's workers (10% are fired for redundancy and 10% without cause). The cost of firing a worker is calculated as the sum of the notice period, severance pay, and any mandatory penalties established by law or mandatory collective agreements for a worker with three years of tenure with the firm. If dismissal is illegal, we set the cost of firing equal to the annual wage. The new wage bill incorporates the normal wage of the remaining workers and the cost of firing workers. The cost of firing workers is computed as the ratio of the new wage bill to the old one.

**bdlls\_dpi    Dismissal Procedures Index**

Measures worker protection granted by law or mandatory collective agreements against dismissal. It is the average of the following seven dummy variables which equal one: (i) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing more than one worker, (ii) if the employer needs the approval of a third party prior to dismissing more than one worker, (iii) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing one redundant worker, (iv) if the employer needs the approval of a third party to dismiss one redundant worker, (v) if the employer must provide relocation or retraining alternatives for redundant employees prior to dismissal, (6) if there are priority rules applying to dismissal or lay-offs, and (7) if there are priority rules applying to re-employment.

**bdlls\_eli    Employment Laws Index**

Measures the protection of labor and employment laws as the average of: (1) Alternative employment contracts, (2) Cost of increasing hours worked, (3) Cost of firing workers, and (4) Dismissal procedures.

**Collective Relations Laws**

**bdlls\_lupi    Labor Union Power Index**

Measures the statutory protection and power of unions as the average of the following seven dummy variables which equal one: (i) if employees have the right to unionize; (ii) if employees have the right to collective bargaining; (iii) if employees have the legal duty to bargain with unions; (iv) if collective contracts are extended to third parties by law; (v) if the law allows closed shops; (6) if workers, or unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the Boards of Directors; and (7) if workers' councils are mandated by law.

**bdlls\_cdi    Collective Disputes Index**

Measures the protection of workers during collective disputes as the average of the following eight variables, (1) if wildcat, political and sympathy/solidarity/secondary

strikes are legal (legal strikes), (2) if employer lockouts are illegal, (3) if workers have the right to industrial action, (4) if there is no mandatory waiting period or notification requirement before strikes can occur, (5) if striking is legal even if there is a collective agreement in force, (6) if laws do not mandate conciliation procedures before a strike, (7) if third-party arbitration during a labor dispute is mandated by law, and (8) if it is illegal to fire or replace striking workers.

#### **bdlls\_crli      Collective Relations Laws Index**

Measures the protection of collective relations laws as the average of: (1) Labor union power and (2) Collective disputes.

### **Social Security Laws**

#### **bdlls\_oadbi    Old Age, Disability and Death Benefit Index**

Measures the level of old age, disability and death benefits as the average of the following four normalized variables: (1) the difference between retirement age and life expectancy at birth, (2) the number of months of contributions or employment required for normal retirement by law, (3) the percentage of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover old-age, disability, and death benefits, and (4) the percentage of the net pre-retirement salary covered by the net old-age cash-benefit pension.

#### **bdlls\_shbi     Sickness and Health Benefits Index**

Measures the level of sickness and health benefits as the average of the following four normalized variables: (1) the number of months of contributions or employment required to qualify for sickness benefits by law, (2) the percentage of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover sickness and health benefits, (3) the waiting period for sickness benefits, and (4) the percentage of the net salary covered by the net sickness cash benefit for a two-month sickness spell.

#### **bdlls\_ubi      Unemployment Benefits Index**

Measures the level of unemployment benefits as the average of the following four normalized variables: (1) the number of months of contributions or employment required to qualify for unemployment benefits by law, (2) the percentage of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover unemployment benefits, (3) the waiting period for unemployment benefits, and (4) the percentage of the net salary covered by the net unemployment benefits in case of a one-year unemployment spell.

#### **bdlls\_ssli      Social Security Laws Index**

Measures social security benefits as the average of: (1) Old age, disability and death benefits, (2) Sickness and health benefits, and (3) Unemployment benefits.

### **Civil Rights**

#### **bdlls\_drace    Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Race**

Equals 1 if there is an affirmative statement prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race, color or ethnicity in: (1) the constitution; (2) the labor code; (3) a law dealing



specifically with racial equality. The variable equals zero otherwise. A general statement regarding the equality of citizens is not considered an affirmative statement.

**bdlls\_dsex Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Sex**

Equals 1 if there is an affirmative statement prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sex in: (1) the constitution; (2) the labor code; (3) a law dealing specifically with the equality of the sexes. The variable equals zero otherwise. We consider an affirmative statement as one which expresses the equality of man and woman or the prohibition of discrimination based on sex or gender. A general statement regarding the equality of citizens is not considered an affirmative statement.

**bdlls\_stoml Statutory Duration of Maternity Leave**

Measures the length of the statutory duration of maternity leave for normal delivery/birth of a normal child with 100% of earnings. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean longer maternity leave (higher protection). Equals zero if maternity leave is unpaid. If payment for maternity leave is less than 100% of previous wages, the time is reduced proportionally. The highest observation in our sample is 12 months and the lowest observation is 0.

**bdlls\_mwa Minimum Working Age**

Measures the age at which a child can be employed in an apprenticeship or in a full-time, non-farm, non-hazardous, non-night time job outside of the family business without requiring the permission of a public entity. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean higher protection. The highest value in our sample is 18 years and the lowest is 12 years.

**bdlls\_mmw Mandatory Minimum Wage**

Equals one if: (1) there is a mandatory minimum wage defined by statute; or (2) there is a minimum wage established by mandatory (administratively extended) collective agreement, which is legally binding for most sectors of the economy. We ignore variations in the minimum wage laws stemming from: (1) reduced or sub minimum rates for youth, apprentices, students and disabled employees; (2) adjustments for regional cost of living; (3) exemptions for public employees and those serving in the armed forces; (4) the experience and marital status of the employee and; (5) specific exemptions for certain groups.

**bdlls\_cri Civil Rights Index**

Measures the degree of protection of vulnerable groups against employment discrimination as the average of the preceding five variables.

**Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow**

<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm>

(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003)

**bdm\_s Selectorate Size**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 7247, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$  : 134,  $\bar{T}$  : 37)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 170)

Selectorate is defined as the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government's leadership. This variable is measured through the breadth of the selectiveness of the members of each country's legislature. A code of 0 means that there is no legislature, 0.5 that the legislature is chosen by heredity or ascription or is simply chosen by the effective executive, and 1 that the members of the legislature are directly or indirectly selected by popular election.

Original source is Banks (1996).

**bdm\_w                      Winning Coalition Size**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 9643, N: 199,  $\bar{N}$ : 179,  $\bar{T}$ : 48)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 180)

The winning coalition is defined as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society. This variable is measured as a composite index based on whether the regime is civil or military, the openness and competition of executive recruitment, and the competitiveness of participation. The index varies from 0 (smallest) to 1 (largest winning coalition)

Original sources are Banks (1996) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

**bdm\_w\_s                  Winning Coalition Size Relative to Selectorate Size**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 7247, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$ : 134,  $\bar{T}$ : 37)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 170)

The Winning Coalition size relative to Selectorate size. W/S is transformed to avoid division by zero:  $bdm\_w / (\log((bdm\_s+1)*10)/3)$ .

**Cheibub & Gandhi**

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 7846, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$ : 138,  $\bar{T}$ : 40)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 189)

<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm>

(Cheibub and Gandhi 2004)

**chga\_regime          Type of Regime**

Coded 0 if democracy; 1 if dictatorship. A regime is considered a dictatorship if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, or there has been no alternation in power (Przeworski et al. 2000). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

**Cingranelli & Richards - Human Rights Dataset**

<http://www.humanrightsdata.org> (Dataset version: 2005.10.12)

**ciri\_assn Freedom of Assembly and Association**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3686, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 154,  $\bar{T}$  : 19)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Citizens' rights to freedom of assembly and association are:

- (0) Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens
- (1) Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for selected groups
- (2) Virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens

**ciri\_disap Disappearance**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3591, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Disappearances:

- (0) Have occurred frequently
- (1) Have occurred occasionally
- (2) Have not occurred

**ciri\_empinx Empowerment Rights Index**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3598, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

This is an additive index constructed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Worker's Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 10 (full government respect for these five rights). (Details on its construction and use can be found in Richards et al 2001).

**ciri\_kill Extrajudicial Killing**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3589, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Political or Extrajudicial Killings are:

- (0) Practiced frequently
- (1) Practiced occasionally
- (2) Have not occurred

**ciri\_move Freedom of Movement**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3608, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Domestic and foreign travel is:

- (0) Restricted
- (1) Generally unrestricted

**ciri\_physint Physical Integrity Rights Index**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3576, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 149,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

This is an additive index constructed from the Torture (ciri\_tort), Extrajudicial Killing (ciri\_kill), Political Imprisonment (ciri\_polpris), and Disappearance indicators (ciri\_disap). It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). (Details on its construction and use can be found in Cingranelli and Richards 1999).

### **ciri\_polpar Political Participation**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3606, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Political Participation is:

- (0) Very limited
- (1) Moderately free and open
- (2) Very free and open

### **ciri\_polpris Political Imprisonment**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3596, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Are there any people imprisoned because of their political, religious, or other beliefs?

- (0) Yes and many
- (1) Yes, but few
- (2) None

### **ciri\_relfre Freedom of Religion**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3607, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

There are restrictions on some religious practices by the government:

- (0) Yes
- (1) No

### **ciri\_speech Freedom of Speech**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3607, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Government censorship and/or ownership of the media (including radio, TV, Internet, and domestic news agencies) is:

- (0) Complete
- (1) Some
- (2) None

### **ciri\_tort Torture**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3594, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Torture is:

- (0) Practiced frequently
- (1) Practiced occasionally
- (2) Have not occurred

**ciri\_wecon Women's Economic Rights**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3536, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 147,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

In measuring women's economic rights we are primarily interested in two things: one, the extensiveness of flaws pertaining to women's economic rights; and two, *government practices* towards women or how effectively the government enforces the laws.

Regarding the economic equality of women:

- (0) There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women.
- (1) There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a *moderate level* of discrimination against women.
- (2) There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a *low level* of discrimination against women.
- (3) All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.

**ciri\_wopol Women's Political Rights**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3591, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Regarding the political equality of women:

- (0) None of women's political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process.
- (1) Political equality is guaranteed by law. However, there are significant limitations in practice. Women hold *less than* five percent of seats in the national legislature and in other high-ranking government positions.
- (2) Political equality is guaranteed by law. Women hold *more than* five percent but *less than* thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.
- (3) Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold *more than* thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.

**ciri\_worker Workers Rights**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3604, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Worker's rights are:

- (0) Severely restricted
- (1) Somewhat restricted
- (2) Fully protected

### **ciri\_wosoc Women's Social Rights**

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3487, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 145,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

In measuring women's social rights we are primarily interested in two things: one, the extensiveness of laws pertaining to women's social rights; and two, *government practices* towards women or how effectively the government enforces the law.

Regarding the social equality of women:

- (0) There are no social rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women.
- (1) There are some social rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a *moderate level* of discrimination against women.
- (2) There are some social rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a *low level* of discrimination against women.
- (3) All or nearly all of women's social rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.

### **Coppedge**

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 189)

<http://www.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm>

### **copp\_poly Polyarchy Scale**

The Polyarchy scale was documented in Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke, "Measuring Polyarchy," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25:1 (Spring 1990): 51-72; and used in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Inequality, Democracy, and Economic Development*, pp. 177-201 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997). This has now been updated for 2000. The scale varies between 0 and 10, with the lowest score representing the most democratic level.

### **Coppedge, Alvarez & Maldonado**

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 7322, N: 203,  $\bar{N}$  : 146,  $\bar{T}$  : 36)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 192)

<http://www.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm>

(Coppedge et al. 2008)

Robert Dahl (1971) defined two dimensions of polyarchy – contestation and inclusiveness. There is contestation when citizens have unimpaired opportunities to:

- formulate their preferences
- signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action
- have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government

Inclusiveness is variation in the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government. These data reflect an effort to measure these two dimensions of polyarchy independently on a cross-section of countries over time.

Both dimensions are measured as a principal component factor index using three overlapping samples of country years: 1950-1971, 1972-1988, and 1981-2000. Each principal component analysis is repeated in each of the three pooled samples. Then the means and standard deviations for contestation and inclusiveness are calculated by year. The standardized score on each dimension is then the original score multiplied by the annual standard deviation, plus the annual mean score. For the years with overlapping samples (1981-1988), the means and standard deviations were chained forward from the 1981 scores based on the average changes in both samples, and from the 1988 scores based on the changes in the most recent sample. Note: We have deleted some mean replacements for missing data in the original dataset.

**cam\_contest                      Contestation (standardized version)**

A principal component factor index of a number of indicators of contestation. The exact nature and data sources for these indicators vary by country year sample; see Coppedge et al. (2008) for more detailed information.

**cam\_inclusive                      Inclusiveness (standardized version)**

A principal component factor index of a number of indicators of contestation. The exact nature and data sources for these indicators vary by country year sample; see Coppedge et al. (2008) for more detailed information.

## **Economist Intelligence Unit – Index of Democracy**

(Cross-section: 2006, N: 164)

[http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY\\_INDEX\\_2007\\_v3.pdf](http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf)

(Kekic 2007)

Note: The QoG dataset does not treat Serbia and Montenegro as two separate states, which the EIU does. Therefore, we have merged the data for these two states into one, weighting for the different population sizes.

**eiui\_jod                      Index of Democracy**

The index of democracy is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped into the five following categories. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of these variables:

**ei\_u\_cl          Civil Liberties**

Civil liberties include freedom of speech, expression and the press; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to due judicial process.

**ei\_u\_dpc        Democratic Political Culture**

The Democratic Political Culture index measures the extent to which there is a societal consensus supporting democratic principles.

**ei\_u\_epp        Electoral Process and Pluralism**

This category is based on indicators relating to the condition of having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom.

**ei\_u\_fog        Functioning of Government**

The Functioning of Government category is based on indicators relating to e.g. the extent to which control over government is exercised by elected representatives, the capability of the civil service, and the pervasiveness of corruption.

**ei\_u\_pp         Political Participation**

The Political Participation index measures among other things the extent to which citizens freely choose to participate in public debate, elect representatives and join political parties.

**IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI)**

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 76)

<http://go.worldbank.org/FHNU4A23U0>

The World Bank's IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) is based on the results of the annual Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) exercise that covers the IDA eligible countries. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process. The IDA Resource Allocation Index measures the quality of a country's present policy and institutional framework. "Quality" refers to how conducive that framework is to fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of development assistance. The 16 criteria to be assessed are grouped into four clusters: Economic Management (3 criteria), Structural Policies (3 criteria), Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity (5 criteria), and Public Sector Management and Institutions (5 criteria) (see below). For each criterion, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). A 1 rating corresponds to a very weak performance, and a 6 rating to a very strong performance. Intermediate scores of 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5 may also be given (this is also known as Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Index, CPIA).

**irai\_index      IDA Resource Allocation Index**

IRAI is calculated as the mean of the score of four clusters. The index ranges between 1 (lowest) and 6 (highest).



## **Economic Management:**

### **irai\_mm      Macroeconomic Management**

This criterion assesses the quality of the monetary/exchange rate and aggregate demand policy framework. A high quality policy framework is one that is favorable to sustained medium-term economic growth. Critical components are: a monetary/exchange rate policy with clearly defined price stability objectives; aggregate demand policies that focus on maintaining short and medium-term external balance (under the current and foreseeable external environment); and avoid crowding out private investment. Fiscal issues, including sustainability, are covered in *cpia\_fp*, and debt issues are covered in *cpia\_dp*.

### **irai\_fp      Fiscal Policy**

This criterion assesses the short- and medium-term sustainability of fiscal policy (taking into account monetary and exchange rate policy and the sustainability of the public debt) and its impact on growth. Fiscal policy is not sustainable if it results in a continuous increase in the debt to GDP ratio and/or creates financing needs that cannot be adequately met by the supply of funds available to the public sector. This criterion covers the extent to which: (a) the primary balance is managed to ensure sustainability of the public finances; (b) public expenditure/revenue can be adjusted to absorb shocks if necessary; and (c) the provision of public goods, including infrastructure, is consistent with medium-term growth. Sustainability is defined inclusive of off-budget government spending items and contingent liabilities. The impact of fiscal policy on economic growth depends on the marginal productivity of government spending and on the distortions introduced by taxes collected to finance this spending.

### **irai\_dp      Debt Policy**

This criterion assesses whether the debt management strategy is conducive to minimize budgetary risks and ensure long-term debt sustainability. The criterion evaluates the extent to which external and domestic debts are contracted with a view to achieving/maintaining debt sustainability, and the degree of co-ordination between debt management and other macroeconomic policies. This criterion covers the adequacy of the debt recording systems, the timelines of the public debt data, and the effectiveness of the debt management unit.

## **Structural Policies:**

### **irai\_t      Trade**

This criterion assesses how the policy framework fosters trade in goods. Two areas are covered: (a) trade regime restrictiveness focusing on the height of tariffs barriers, the extent to which non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are used, and the transparency and predictability of the trade regime; and (b) customs and trade facilitation, including the extent to which the customs service is free of corruption, relies on risk management, processes duty collections and refunds promptly, and operates transparently. The overall score is a weighted average of the scores for the two components: (a) trade restrictiveness (0.75) and (b) customs/trade facilitation (0.25).

**irai\_fs            Financial Sector**

This criterion assesses the structure of the financial sector and the policies and regulations that affect it. Three dimensions are covered; (a) financial stability; (b) the sector's efficiency, depth, and resource mobilization strength; and (c) access to financial services. These are areas that are fundamental to support successful and sustainable reforms and development. The first dimension assesses the sector's vulnerability to shocks, the banking system's soundness, and the adequacy of relevant institutional elements, such as the degree of adherence to the Basel Core Principles and the quality of risk management and supervision. The second dimension assesses efficiency, the degree of competition, and the ownership structure of the financial system, as well as its depth and resource mobilization strength. The third dimension covers institutional factors, (such as the adequacy of payment and credit reporting systems) the regulatory framework affecting financial transactions (including collateral and bankruptcy laws and their enforcement) and the extent to which consumers and firms have access to financial services.

**irai\_bre            Business Regulatory Environment**

This criterion assesses the extent to which the legal, regulatory, and policy environment helps or hinders private business in investing, creating jobs, and becoming more productive. The emphasis is on direct regulations of business activity and regulation of goods and factor markets. Three subcomponents are measured: (a) regulations affecting entry, exit, and competition; (b) regulations of ongoing business operations; and (c) regulations of factor markets (labor and land). These three components should be considered separately and equally weighted.

**Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity:****irai\_ge            Gender Equality**

This criterion assesses the extent to which the country has enacted and put in place institutions and programs to enforce laws and policies that (a) promote equal access for men and women to human capital development; (b) promote equal access for men and women to productive and economic resources; and (c) give men and women equal status and protection under the law.

**irai\_epru            Equity of Public Resource Use**

This criterion assesses the extent to which the pattern of public expenditures and revenue collection affects the poor and is consistent with national poverty reduction priorities. The assessment of the consistency of government spending with the poverty reduction priorities takes into account the extent to which: (a) individuals, groups, or localities that are poor, vulnerable, or have unequal access to services and opportunities are identified; (b) a national development strategy with explicit interventions to assist the groups identified in (a) has been adopted; and (c) the composition and incidence of public expenditures are tracked systematically and their results feedback into subsequent resource allocation decisions. The assessment of the revenue collection dimension takes into account the incidence of major taxes, e.g., whether they are progressive or regressive, and their alignment with the poverty reduction priorities.

**irai\_bhr      Building Human Resources**

This criterion assesses the national policies and public and private sector service delivery that affect access to and quality of: (a) health and nutrition services, including population and reproductive health, (b) education, ECD, training and literacy programs, and (c) prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. ECD refers to Early Child Development programs, including both formal and non-formal programs (which may combine education, health and nutrition interventions) aimed at children aged 0-6.

**irai\_spl      Social Protection and Labor**

This criterion assesses government policies in the area of social protection and labor market regulation, which reduce the risk of becoming poor, assist those who are poor to better manage further risks, and ensure a minimal level of welfare to all people. Interventions include: social safety net programs, pension and old age savings programs; protection of basic labor standards; regulations to reduce segmentation and inequity in labor markets; active labor market programs, such as public works or job training; and community driven initiatives. In interpreting the guidelines it is important to take into account the size of the economy and its level of development. This criterion is a composite indicator of five different areas of social protection and labor policy: (a) social safety net programs; (b) protection of basic labor standards; (c) labor market regulations; (d) community driven initiatives; and (e) pension and old age savings programs.

**irai\_pies      Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability**

This criterion assesses the extent to which environmental policies foster the protection and sustainable use of natural resources and the management of pollution. Assessment of environmental sustainability requires multi-dimension criteria (i.e. for air, water, waste, conservation management, coastal zones management, natural resources management).

**Public Sector Management and Institutions:****irai\_prrg      Property Rights and Rule-based Governance**

This criterion assesses the extent to which private economic activity is facilitated by an effective legal system and rule-based governance structure in which property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced. Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) legal basis for secure property and contract rights; (b) predictability, transparency, and impartiality of laws and regulations affecting economic activity, and their enforcement by the legal and judicial system; and (c) crime and violence as an impediment to economic activity.

**irai\_qbfm      Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management**

This criterion assesses the extent to which there is: (a) a comprehensive and credible budget, linked to policy priorities; (b) effective financial management systems to ensure that the budget is implemented as intended in a controlled and predictable way; and (c) timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting, including timely and audited public accounts and effective arrangements for follow up.

**irai\_erm      Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization**

This criterion assesses the overall pattern of revenue mobilization, not only the tax structure as it exists on paper, but revenue from all sources as they are actually collected.

**irai\_qpa      Quality of Public Administration**

This criterion assesses the extent to which civilian central government staffs (including teachers, health workers, and police) are structured to design and implement government policy and deliver services effectively. Civilian central government staffs include the central executive together with all other ministries and administrative departments, including autonomous agencies. It excludes the armed forces, state-owned enterprises, and sub-national government.

**irai\_tac      Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector**

This criterion assesses the extent to which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees within the executive are required to account for the use of resources, administrative decisions, and results obtained. Both levels of accountability are enhanced by transparency in decision-making, public audit institutions, access to relevant and timely information, and public and media scrutiny. A high degree of accountability and transparency discourages corruption, or the abuse of public office for private gain. National and sub-national governments should be appropriately weighted. Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance; (b) access of civil society to information on public affairs; and (c) state capture by narrow vested interests.

**Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Entry**

(Cross-Section: 1999, N: 84)

[http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/registration\\_new.dta](http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/registration_new.dta)

(Djankov et al 2002)

**dlls\_proc      Number of Procedures**

The number of different procedures that a start-up firm has to comply with in order to obtain a legal status, i.e. to start operating as a legal entity.

**dlls\_time      Time**

The time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm, in business days. A week has five business days and a month has twenty two.

**dlls\_cost      Cost**

(Cross-Section: 1999, N: 83)

The cost to obtain legal status to operate a firm as a share of per capita GDP in 1999. Includes all identifiable official expenses (fees, costs of procedures and forms, photocopies, fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc). The company is assumed to have a start-up capital of ten times per capita GDP in 1999.

## **Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Courts**

(Cross-Section: the year vary, N: 101)

[http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/courts\\_dataset\\_july06.xls](http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/courts_dataset_july06.xls)

(Djankov et al 2003)

### **dlls1\_fie Formalism Index (Eviction)**

### **dlls1\_fic Formalism Index (Check)**

The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in two forms of judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts: the **eviction** of a residential tenant for nonpayment of rent, and the collection of a **check** returned for nonpayment. The index is formed by adding up separate indices measuring: (1) whether the resolution of the case relies on the work of professional judges and attorneys, as opposed to other types of adjudicators and lay people; (2) the number of stages carried out mostly in written (as opposed to oral) form over the total number of applicable stages; (3) the level of legal justification (use of legal language) required in the process, (4) the level of statutory control or intervention of the administration, admissibility, evaluation, and recording of evidence; (5) the level of control or intervention of the appellate (superior) court's review of the first-instance judgment; (6) the formalities required to engage someone in the procedure or to hold him/her accountable of the judgment; and (7) the normalized number of independent procedural actions, i.e. steps of the procedure, mandated by law or court regulation, that demands interaction between the parties or between them and the judge or court officer. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control or intervention in the judicial process.

### **dlls1\_tde Total Duration (Eviction)**

### **dlls1\_tdc Total Duration (Check)**

The total estimated duration in calendar days of the procedure under the factual and procedural assumptions provided. The index equals the estimated duration, in calendar days, between the moment the plaintiff files the complaint until the moment the landlord repossesses the property (for the **eviction** case) or the creditor obtains payment (for the **check** collection case).

## **Evans & Rauch**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 34)

(Cross-Section: Questions cover the 1970-1990 period, N: 34)

<http://weber.ucsd.edu/%7Ejrauch/webstate/>

(Rauch and Evans 2000)

### **er\_career Career Opportunities**

The respondents were asked to choose 'the four most important agencies in the central state bureaucracy in order of their power to shape overall economic policy'.

"Career Opportunities" is an equal-weight index, ranging from 0 to 1, of the following five questions:

- Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. appointed by the President or Chief Executive)? (“none”, “just agency chiefs”, “agency chiefs and vice-chiefs”, “all of top 2 or 3 levels”).
- Of political appointees to these positions, what proportion is likely to already be members of the higher civil service? (“less than 30%”, “30–70%”, “more than 70%”)
- Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are political appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself or its associated ministry(ies) if the agency is not itself a ministry? (“less than 50%”, “50–70%”, “70–90%”, “over 90%”)
- What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in one of these agencies during his career? (“1–5 years”, “5–10 years”, “10–20 years”, “entire career”)
- What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies through a higher civil service examination early in his / her career reasonably expect? Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between an entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency? (if respondent circled ‘if performance is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below political appointees is not an unreasonable expectation’ or ‘in at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within the civil service and then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political appointments’ and not ‘in most cases, will move up one or two levels but no more’ or ‘in most cases, will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level just below political appointees’).

#### **er\_salary      Bureaucratic Compensation**

Bureaucratic Compensation concerns the change of bureaucratic compensation relative to the private sector. It is an equal-weight index of the following two questions:

- How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or other extralegal sources of income) of higher officials in these agencies relative to those of private sector managers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities? (“less than 50%”, “50–80%”, “80–90%”, “Comparable”, “Higher”)
- Over the period in question (roughly 1970–1990) what was the movement of legal income in these agencies relative to salaries in the private sector? (“declined dramatically”, “declined slightly”, “maintained the same position”, “improved their position”).

#### **er\_merit      Meritocratic Recruitment**

Meritocratic Recruitment addresses the extent to which recruitment is meritocratic at the entry level. It is an equal-weight index of two questions, where each question and the index itself has been normalized to lie in the range 0–1.

- Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these agencies enters the civil service via a formal examination system?  
("less than 30%", "30–60%", "60–90%," "more than 90%")

- Of those that do *not* enter via examinations, what proportion has university or postgraduate degrees?  
("less than 30%", "30–60%", "60–90%," "more than 90%").

## **Freedom House**

<http://www.freedomhouse.org>

### **Freedom in the World**

(Time-series: 1972-2006, n: 5937, N: 202,  $\bar{N}$  : 175,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 192)

Note: The 1982 edition of *Freedom in the World* covers the period Jan 1981- Aug 1982 (=1981 in our dataset). The 1983-84 edition covers the period Aug 1982 – Nov 1983 (=1983 in our dataset). This leaves 1982 empty.

For 1972, South Africa was in the original data rated as "White" (fh\_cl: 3, fh\_pr: 2, fh\_status: Free) and "Black" (fh\_cl: 6, fh\_pr: 5, fh\_status: Not Free). We treat South Africa 1972 as missing.

Note: For 2006, the Freedom House "Freedom in the World" data treats Serbia and Montenegro as two separate states, which the QoG dataset does not. Therefore, we have merged the data for these two states into one, weighting for the different population sizes. This *only* applies to data from the year of 2006.

#### **fh\_cl            Civil Liberties**

Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years. For the year 2006 Freedom House has published the scores for the sub-categories (see below). Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

#### **fh\_pr            Political Rights**

Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years. For the year 2006 Freedom House has published the scores for the sub-categories (see below). Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

#### **fh\_status       Status**

- (1)    Free
- (2)    Partly Free
- (3)    Not Free

Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated “Free”; between 3.0 and 5.5 “Partly Free”, and between 5.5 and 7.0 “Not Free”. Since then, countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered “Free”, 3.0 to 5.0 “Partly Free”, and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not Free”.

### **Freedom in the World Sub-Categories: Civil Liberties**

(Cross-section: 2006, N: 192)

#### **fh\_feb          Freedom of Expression and Belief**

The variable measures the freedom and independence of the media and other cultural expressions; the freedom of religious groups to practice their faith and express themselves; the academic freedom and freedom from extensive political indoctrination in the educational system; and the ability of the people to engage in private (political) discussions without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

#### **fh\_aor          Associational and Organizational Rights**

The variable evaluates the freedom of assembly, demonstrations and open public discussion; the freedom for nongovernmental organization; and the freedom for trade unions, peasant organizations and other professional and private organizations. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

#### **fh\_rol          Rule of Law**

The variable measures the independence of the judiciary; the extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters; the existence of direct civil control over the police; the protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile and torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and the extent to which laws, policies and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

#### **fh\_pair          Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights**

The variable evaluates the extent of state control over travel, choice of residence, employment or institution of higher education; the right of citizens to own property and establish private businesses; the private business’ freedom from unduly influence by government officials, security forces, political parties or organized crime; gender equality, freedom of choice of marriage partners and size of family; equality of opportunity and absence of economic exploitation. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

### **Freedom in the World Sub-Categories: Political Rights**

(Cross-section: 2006, N: 192)

#### **fh\_ep          Electoral Process**

The variable measures to what extent the national legislative representatives and the national chief authority are elected through free and fair elections. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).



**fh\_ppp Political Pluralism and Participation**

This variable encompasses an examination of the right of the people to freely organize in political parties; the existence of an opposition with a realistic possibility to increase its support; the ability of the people to make political choices free from domination by the military, totalitarian parties or other powerful groups; and the existence of full political rights for all minorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

**fh\_fog Functioning of Government**

The variable examines in what extent the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government; if the government is free from pervasive corruption; and if the government is accountable to the electorate between elections and operates with openness and transparency. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

**Freedom of the Press**

**fh\_press Freedom of the press**

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 2439, N: 192,  $\bar{N}$  : 188,  $\bar{T}$  : 13)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 192)

All states, from the most democratic to the most authoritarian, are through the UN system (Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) committed to universality of information freedom – a basic human right. Freedom House recognize that cultural distinctions or economic underdevelopment may limit the volume of news flows within a country, but these and other arguments are not acceptable explanations for outright centralized control of the content of news and information. Some poor countries allow for the exchange of diverse views, while some developed countries restrict content diversity. Freedom House seek to recognize press freedom wherever it exists, in poor and rich countries as well as in countries of various ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The press freedom index is computed by adding four (three) component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls, Economic Influences and Repressive actions (the latter is since 2004 not assessed as a separate component, see below). The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

**fh\_law Laws and regulations that influence media content**

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 2437, N: 192,  $\bar{N}$  : 187,  $\bar{T}$  : 13)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 185)

The variable encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists;

and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1997-2006 from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

**fh\_pol Political pressures and controls on media content**

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 2440, N: 192,  $\bar{N}$  : 188,  $\bar{T}$  : 13)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 185)

The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1997-2001 from 0-30, and in 2002-2006 from 0-40. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

**fh\_econ Economic influences over media content**

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 2448, N: 192,  $\bar{N}$  : 187,  $\bar{T}$  : 12)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 185)

The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1997-2006 from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

**fh\_repres Repressive actions**

(Time-series: 1994-2003, n: 1679, N: 192,  $\bar{N}$  : 187,  $\bar{T}$  : 9)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 186)

This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-40, in 1997-2001 from 0-10. Since 2002 the Freedom House includes such violations within the respective fh\_pol and fh\_econ categories as cases of actual political or economic pressure on the content of information. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

## **Freedom House/Polity**

**fh\_polity2 Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)**

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 4665, N: 169,  $\bar{N}$  : 146,  $\bar{T}$  : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 157)

**fh\_ipolity2 Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity)**

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 5555, N: 202,  $\bar{N}$  : 174,  $\bar{T}$  : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 157)

Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Average of Freedom House (fh\_pr and fh\_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p\_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables are averaged into fh\_polity2. The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. Hadenius & Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.

## **Gibney & Dalton**

<http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-staff/Gibney%20Doc/Political%20Terror%20Scale%201980-2004.xls>

(Gibney and Dalton 1996)

### **gd\_ptsa Political Terror Scale – Amnesty International**

(Time-series: 1980-2004, n: 3293, N: 181,  $\bar{N}$ : 132,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 147)

### **gd\_ptss Political Terror Scale – US State Department**

(Time-series: 1980-2004, n: 4038, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$ : 162,  $\bar{T}$ : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 176)

Human rights score (1 to 5 scale):

- Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
- Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
- Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
- Level 4: The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
- Level 5: The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

## **Global Integrity Report**

(Cross-section: June 2006 to June 2007, N: 48)

<http://www.globalintegrity.org>

(Global Integrity 2007)

### **gir\_gii Global Integrity Index**

The Global Integrity Index assesses the existence, effectiveness, and citizen access to key anti-corruption mechanisms at the national level in a country. It does not measure corruption per se or perceptions of corruption. Nor does it measure governance “outputs”. Instead, the index quantitatively assesses the opposite of corruption, that is, the access that citizens and businesses have to a country’s government, their ability to monitor its behavior, and their ability to seek redress and advocate for improved governance. In-country teams of social scientists and journalists report on the *de jure* as well as *de facto* reality of corruption and anticorruption mechanisms.

The index grades countries on a 0 to 100 scale, with 0 being the worst score and 100 the best. The overall index is the average of the following six variables (which in turn are built on more than 300 indicators):

### **gir\_csmai Civil Society, Media, Access to Information**

This category examines civil society organizations working on anti-corruption issues, the media’s effectiveness in reporting on corruption (including licensing requirements), and public access to information.

### **gir\_e Elections**

This category assesses voting and elections integrity as well as regulations governing the financing of political parties and candidates.

### **gir\_ga Government Accountability**

This category explores the existence and effectiveness of conflicts of interest regulations, “cooling off” periods for former government officials, and asset disclosure requirements in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Budget transparency is also assessed.

### **gir\_acs Administration and Civil Service**

This category examines administration and civil service regulations, whistleblower protections, and transparency around government procurement and privatization.

### **gir\_or Oversight and Regulation**

This category assesses the effectiveness of the national ombudsman (or equivalent mechanism), supreme audit institution, taxes and customs agencies, transparency surrounding state-owned enterprises, and business licensing requirements.

### **gir\_acl Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law**

This category examines a country’s anti-corruption laws, the country’s anti-corruption agency (or equivalent mechanism), citizen access to justice, and law enforcement accountability.

## **IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)**

<http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm>

The total number of registered voters (Registered Voters, RV) and voting age population (Voting Age Population, VAP) can both be used as indicators for electoral turnout. Data are only given for election years.

### **idea\_parvap Turnout in Parliamentary Elections (VAP)**

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 1207, N: 169,  $\bar{N}$  : 21,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 80)

Turnout in parliamentary elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the voting age population (VAP).

### **idea\_parrv Turnout in Parliamentary Elections (RV)**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 1277, N: 171,  $\bar{N}$  : 21,  $\bar{T}$  : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 156)

Turnout in parliamentary elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the number of registered voters (RV).

### **idea\_presvap Turnout in Presidential Elections (VAP)**

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 366, N: 96,  $\bar{N}$  : 7,  $\bar{T}$  : 4)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 67)

Turnout in presidential elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the voting age population (VAP).

### **idea\_presrv Turnout in Presidential Elections (RV)**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 401, N: 103,  $\bar{N}$  : 7,  $\bar{T}$  : 4)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 162)

Turnout in presidential elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the number of registered voters (RV).

### **idea\_yoepar Year of Election (Parliamentary)**

(Cross-section: 1969-2005, N: 172)

The latest observed year of parliamentary elections available.

### **idea\_yoepre Year of Election (Presidential)**

(Cross-section: 1986-2005, N: 102)

The latest observed year of presidential elections available.

## **International Country Risk Guide – The PRS Group**

(Time-series: 1984-2003, n: 2576, N: 145,  $\bar{N}$ : 129,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 139)

<http://www.icrgonline.com>

<http://www.countrydata.com>

### **icrg\_qog ICRG indicator of Quality of Government**

The mean value of the ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy Quality”, scaled 0-1.

#### **Corruption (originally 6 points)**

This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, it introduces an inherent instability into the political process.

The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Such corruption can make it difficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases may force the withdrawal or withholding of an investment.

Although our measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. In our view these insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market.

The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, so as to provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of the country’s political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering the country ungovernable.

(Note: In the original data, the value for Iceland 1985 is “6.1667”. We have replaced this presumably incorrect value with the value “6”).

#### **Law and order (originally 6 points)**

Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating – 1 – if it suffers from a very high crime rate / if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes).

### **Bureaucracy Quality (originally 4 points)**

The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.

The component variables can be purchased at <http://www.countrydata.com>

### **Inter-Parliamentary Union**

<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world-arc.htm>

#### **ipu\_w\_lower Women in national parliament (lower house)**

(Time-series: 1997-2005 (December or latest available), n: 1508, N: 188,  $\bar{N}$  : 168,  $\bar{T}$  : 8)  
(Cross-section: Dec. 2002, N: 122)

Percentage women in single house or lower house. (Also see m\_wominpar below.)

#### **ipu\_w\_upper Women in national parliament (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1997-2005 (December or latest available), n: 552, N: 83,  $\bar{N}$  : 61,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)  
(Cross-section: Dec. 2002, N: 53)

Percentage women in upper house or senate. (Also see m\_wominpar below.)

### **Knack & Kugler**

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 180)

<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/FlagshipCourse2003/SecondGenerationIndicators.pdf>

(Knack and Kugler 2002)

#### **kk\_gg Index of Objective Indicators of Good Governance**

The Index is built on nine indicators: the regulation of entry, contract enforcement, contract intensive money, international trade tax revenue, budgetary volatility, revenue source volatility, telephone wait times, phone faults, and the percentage of revenues paid to public officials in bribes, as reported in surveys of business firms. The index is computed by first normalizing each indicator using the standard normal distribution, and then aggregating these scores through a percentile matching procedure. Larger numbers indicate better governance.

(Note: In the original data Samoa is given two different values. We do not include any of the values in our dataset.)

## **La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches & Shleifer– Judicial Independence**

[http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/jcb\\_data.xls](http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/jcb_data.xls)

(La Porta et al 2004)

### **llps\_tensc Tenure of Supreme Court Judges**

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 70)

This variable measures the tenure of Supreme Court judges (highest court in any country). The variable takes three possible values:

- (0) if tenure is less than six years
- (1) if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong
- (2) if tenure is lifelong

### **llps\_tenac Tenure of Administrative Court Judges**

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 70)

This variable measures the tenure of the highest ranked judges ruling on administrative cases. The variable takes three possible values:

- (0) if tenure is less than six years
- (1) if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong
- (2) if tenure is lifelong.

### **llps\_cl Case Law**

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 69)

This variable is a dummy taking value:

- (1) if judicial decisions in a given country are a source of law
- (0) otherwise.

### **llps\_ji Judicial Independence**

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 69)

Judicial independence is computed as the normalized sum of Tenure of Supreme Court Judges (llps\_tensc), Tenure of the Administrative Court Judges (llps\_tenac), and Case Law (llps\_cl).

### **llps\_roc Rigidity of Constitution**

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 71)

This variable measures (on a scale from 1 to 4) how hard it is to change the constitution in a given country. One point each is given if the approval of the majority of the legislature, the chief of state and a referendum is necessary in order to change the constitution. An additional point is given for each of the following: if a supermajority in the legislature (more than 66% of votes) is needed, if both houses of the legislature have to approve, if the legislature has to approve the amendment in two consecutive legislative terms or if the approval of a majority of state legislature is required.



**llps\_jr          Judicial Review**

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 71)

This variable measures the extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or Constitutional Court) have the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country. The variable takes three values: (0) if there is no review of constitutionality of laws, (1) if there is limited review of constitutionality of laws, and (2) if there is full review of constitutionality of laws.

**llps\_cr          Constitutional Review**

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 71)

Constitutional review is computed as the normalized sum of Constitutional Review (llps\_jr) and Rigidity of Constitution (llps\_roc).

**Melander**

<http://www.pcr.uu.se/personal/anstallda/melander.htm>

(Melander 2005)

**m\_femlead      Female State Leader**

(Time-series: 1965-2002, n: 5740, N: 179,  $\bar{N}$  : 151,  $\bar{T}$  : 32)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 168)

Dummy variable taking value: (1) Female leader (0) Male leader. Female leaders during the 20th century defined as “the president, prime minister, or any other decision maker who is essentially the ‘decision maker of last resort’”. Original source: Caprioli & Boyer (2001), Melander has extended the data using the information available in Schemmel (2004).

**m\_wominpar    Women in Parliament (percent)**

(Time-series: 1965-2002, n: 4767, N: 174,  $\bar{N}$  : 126,  $\bar{T}$  : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 155)

Percentage of women holding seats in the legislature. Original source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995; 2005). Note: if the parliament is not unicameral the upper house is used.

**Polity IV**

<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm>

(Marshall and Jaggers 2002)

Missing codes:

(-66) Interruption periods.

(-77) Interregnum periods.

(-88) Transition periods.

### **p\_democ Institutionalized Democracy**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 127,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high)

Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil liberties.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation (variable p\_parcomp), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables p\_xropen and p\_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (variable p\_xconst).

### **p\_autoc Institutionalized Autocracy**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 127,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high)

"Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity, but we regard this as a function of political ideology and choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness (performance) have covaried over time.

An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operational indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable p\_parcomp), the regulation of participation (variable p\_parreg), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables p\_xropen and p\_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (variable p\_xconst).

### **p\_polity Combined Polity Score**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 127,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p\_autoc score from the p\_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

### **p\_polity2 Revised Combined Polity Score**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7395, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 125,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 157)

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p\_autoc score from the p\_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The revised version of the polity variable is designed to facilitate the use of the polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual polity score by applying a simple treatment, or “fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set:

(-66) Cases of foreign “interruption” are treated as “system missing.”

(-77) Cases of “interregnum,” or anarchy, are converted to a “neutral” Polity score of “0.”

(-88) Cases of “transition” are prorated across the span of the transition.

For example, country X has a p\_polity score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follow: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

Note: Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year are converted to “system missing” values. Transitions (-88) following a year of independence, interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value “0”.

### **p\_parreg Regulation of Participation**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 127,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways; the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion, and the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion among shifting coalitions of partisan groups. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:

- (1) **Unregulated:** Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time.
- (2) **Multiple Identities:** There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level – parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected – but there are few recognized, overlapping (common) interests.
- (3) **Sectarian:** Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries).
- (4) **Restricted:** Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism, but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.
- (5) **Regulated:** Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

### **p\_parcomp The Competitiveness of Participation**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$ : 127,  $\bar{T}$ : 44)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities which are coded Unregulated (“1”) on Regulation of Participation are coded “0” (Not Applicable) for competitiveness. Competitiveness is coded on a five category scale:

- (0) **Not Applicable:** This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political Participation (variable p\_parreg).
- (1) **Repressed:** No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a Repressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition.
- (2) **Suppressed:** Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished

from Factional competition (below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are:

- i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties or no ethnic political organizations).
  - ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).
  - iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups.
- (3) **Factional:** Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularistic agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.
- (4) **Transitional:** Any transitional arrangement from Restricted or Factional patterns to fully competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.
- (5) **Competitive:** There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be restricted in the Competitive pattern.

#### **p\_xrreg      Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$ : 127,  $\bar{T}$ : 44)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

In considering recruitment, we must first determine whether there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power. Three categories are used to differentiate the extent of institutionalization:

- (1) **Unregulated:** Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power. Such caesaristic transfers of power are sometimes legitimized after the fact in noncompetitive elections or by legislative enactment. Despite these "legitimization" techniques, a polity remains unregulated until the de facto leader of the coup has been replaced as head of government either by designative or competitive modes of executive selection. However, unregulated recruitment does not include the occasional forceful ouster of a chief executive

if elections are called within a reasonable time and the previous pattern continues.

- (2) **Designational/Transitional:** Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (i.e., one-party systems or "rigged" multiparty elections). Also coded here are transitional arrangements intended to regularize future power transitions after an initial unregulated seizure of power (i.e., after constitutional legitimization of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political realm as head of the military). This category also includes polities in transition from designative to elective modes of executive selection (i.e., the period of "guided democracy" often exhibited during the transition from military to civilian rule) or vice versa (i.e., regimes ensuring electoral victory through the intimidation of oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a "state of emergency" before executive elections).
- (3) **Regulated:** Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections. Ascriptive/designative and ascriptive/elective selections (i.e., an effective king and premier) are also coded as regulated. The fundamental difference between regulated selection and unregulated recruitment is that regulated structures require the existence of institutionalized modes of executive recruitment, either through constitutional decree or lineage. Moreover, in regulated competitive systems, unlike the designational/transitional mode, the method of future executive selection is not dependent on the particular party or regime currently holding power.

#### **p\_xrcomp    Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 127,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Competitiveness refers to “the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr 1974, p.1483).” For example, selection of chief executives through popular elections involving two or more viable parties or candidates is regarded as competitive. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (“1”) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable p\_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, Competitiveness is coded “0” (Not Applicable). Four categories are used to measure this concept:

- (0) **Not Applicable:** This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p\_xrreg).
- (1) **Selection:** Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are: rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.
- (2) **Dual/Transitional:** Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.

- (3) **Election:** Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections involving two or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly.)

**p\_xropen      Openness of Executive Recruitment**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 127,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Recruitment of the chief executive is "open" to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (1) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (p\_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, Openness is coded "0" (Not Applicable). Five categories are used:

- (0) **Not Applicable:** This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p\_xrreg).
- (1) **Closed:** Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc., who assume executive powers by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded "closed" unless a relative actually succeeds him as ruler.
- (2) **Dual Executive–Designation:** Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.
- (3) **Dual Executive–Election:** Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.
- (4) **Open:** Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

**p\_xconst      Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 127,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner: "Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially "properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p.121) Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups". In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used.

- (1) **Unlimited Authority:** There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:
- i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
  - ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.
  - iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure.
  - iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
  - v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
  - vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.
- Note: If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a legislature to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is not a change to unlimited authority.
- (2) **Intermediate Category**
- (3) **Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority:** There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:
- i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
  - ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees.
  - iii. Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted.
  - iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
  - v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.
  - vi. There is an independent judiciary.
  - vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.
- (4) **Intermediate Category**
- (5) **Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority:** The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them.
- Examples:
- i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
  - ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
  - iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
  - iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.
- (6) **Intermediate Category**
- (7) **Executive Parity or Subordination:** Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity.
- Examples of evidence:
- i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
  - ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).



iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability".

**p\_durable Regime Durability**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7438, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 126,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the p\_polity score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the p\_durable value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline "year zero" (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the p\_durable variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs.

**p\_flag Tentative Coding**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7467, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$  : 127,  $\bar{T}$  : 44)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Trichotomous "flag" variable indicating confidence of codings (recent year codings only).

- (0) **Confident:** Reasonably confident coding of established authority patterns that have been "artificially smoothed" to present consistency over time between substantive polity changes.
- (1) **Tentative:** Reasonably confident coding of emerging authority patterns that have not been smoothed over time; these codes are "free floating," that is, they are based on information available in the case-year and are not tied to prior year coding(s). Codes are considered tentative for up to five years following a substantive polity change.
- (2) **Tenuous:** Best judgment coding based on limited information and/or insufficient time span since a substantive polity change and the emergence of new authority patterns.

**p\_fragment Polity Fragmentation**

(Time-series: 1978-2004, n: 817, N: 159,  $\bar{N}$  : 30,  $\bar{T}$  : 5)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

This variable codes the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive). Local autonomy arrangements voluntarily established and accepted by both central and local authorities are not considered fragmentation. A polity that cannot exercise effective authority over at least 50 percent of its established territory is necessarily considered to be in a condition of "state failure" (i.e., interruption or interregnum, see below, or civil war). Polity fragmentation may result from open warfare (active or latent) or foreign occupation and may continue in the absence of open warfare if a situation of de facto separation remains unresolved and unchallenged by the state.

- (0) **No overt fragmentation**
- (1) **Slight fragmentation:** Less than ten percent of the country's territory is effectively under local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.
- (2) **Moderate fragmentation:** Ten to twenty-five percent of the country's territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.
- (3) **Serious fragmentation:** Over twenty-five percent (and up to fifty percent) of the country's territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

**p\_sf State Failure**

(Time-series: 1949-2003, n: 133, N: 29,  $\bar{N}$  : 3,  $\bar{T}$  : 5)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Variable p\_sf is a flag variable that designates (by code "1") every year during which a Polity is considered to be in a condition of "complete collapse of central authority" or "state failure" (i.e., -77). The variable p\_sf is also coded "1" for years when a state disintegrates and when a profound revolutionary change in political authority occurs (during which the authority of the previous Polity is assumed to have collapsed completely prior to the revolutionary seizure of power and subsequent restructuring of authority). Using the p\_sf variable to select regime information will facilitate identification of periods of state failure.

**Reporters Sans Frontières**

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 135)

[http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id\\_article=4116](http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=4116)

**rsf\_pfi Press Freedom Index**

The Press Freedom index measures the amount of freedom journalists and the media have in each country and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. It does not take account of all human rights violations, only those that affect press freedom. Neither is it an indicator of the quality of a country's media. The index ranges between 0 (total press freedom) and 100 (no press freedom).

**Transparency International**

<http://www.transparency.org/>

**ti\_cpi Corruption Perceptions Index**

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 1158, N: 166,  $\bar{N}$  : 105,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 101)

The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to

perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

WARNING: Year-to-year shifts in a country's score can result not only from a changing perception of a country's performance but also from a changing sample and methodology. With differing respondents and slightly differing methodologies, a change in a country's score may also relate to the fact that different viewpoints have been collected and different questions have been asked. For a more detailed discussion of comparability over time in the CPI, see Lambsdorff 2005.

Note: In the original dataset there is no data for Serbia and Montenegro (as a unit) in the year 2006. Instead we have taken the data for Serbia and placed it on Serbia and Montenegro this year.

**ti\_cpi\_max**      **Corruption Perceptions Index – Max Range**

**ti\_cpi\_min**      **Corruption Perceptions Index – Min Range**

(Time-series: 2004-2006, n: 462, N: 165,  $\bar{N}$  : 154,  $\bar{T}$  : 3)

(Cross-section: Country constant, N: 101)

The CPI score is accompanied by a 90 confidence range determined by a bootstrap (non-parametric) methodology, which allows inferences to be drawn on the underlying precision of the results. A 90% confidence range is established, where there is 5% probability that the value is below the minimum range (ti\_cpi\_min) and 5% probability that the value is above the maximum range (ti\_cpi\_max). However, particularly when only few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%.

**ti\_cpi\_sd**      **Corruption Perceptions Index – Standard Deviation**

(Time-series: 1998-2003, n: 591, N: 134,  $\bar{N}$  : 99,  $\bar{T}$  : 4)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 101)

This is the standard deviation in the values of the sources underlying the CPI: the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources.

**Treisman**

<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/>

(Treisman 2007)

**t\_bribe**      **Have paid a bribe in any form**

[http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/gcb/2005](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2005)

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 66)

Percentage of the population who answered "Yes" to the question: "In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form?" Original source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2005).

**t\_corr      Common to pay irregular additional payments**

<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-wbes>

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 79)

Country averages of business representatives' answers to the question: "It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular 'additional payments' to get things done." (ranges from 1 = always to 6 = never). Original source: World Business Environment Survey (2000).

**t\_unicri      Bribery to Government Officials**

<http://www.bus.lsu.edu/mocan/publication.htm>

(Cross-section: 1991-1999, N: 49)

Percentage of the population that had been asked or expected to pay bribe by government officials in last year, late 1990s (if more than one year available for late 1990s, averaged). Original source: Mocan (2007).

**Vanhanen – Index of Democratization**

<http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/index.html>

(Vanhanen 2000; 2005)

**van\_index      Index of Democratization**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 8246, N: 197,  $\bar{N}$  : 140,  $\bar{T}$  : 42)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy – competition and participation – measured as the percentage of votes not cast for the largest party (Competition) times the percentage of the population who actually voted in the election (Participation). This product is divided by 100 to form an index that in principle could vary from 0 (no democracy) to 100 (full democracy). (Empirically, however, the largest value is 49.)

**van\_comp      Competition**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 8246, N: 197,  $\bar{N}$  : 140,  $\bar{T}$  : 42)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

The competition variable portrays the electoral success of smaller parties, that is, the percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections. The variable is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes won by the largest party (the party which wins most votes) in parliamentary elections or by the party of the successful candidate in presidential elections. The variable thus theoretically ranges from 0 (only one party received 100 % of votes) to 100 (each voter cast a vote for a distinct party).

**van\_part      Participation**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 8246, N: 197,  $\bar{N}$  : 140,  $\bar{T}$  : 42)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

The percentage of the total population who actually voted in the election.

### **World Bank – Governance Indicators (a.k.a KKZ)**

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4sra.html>

(Kaufmann et al 2006)

These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. These individual measures of governance are assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance. An unobserved component model is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators. Point estimates of the dimensions of governance, the margins of error as well as the number of sources are presented for each country.

The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.

Since the estimates are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) each year of measurement, they are not directly suitable for over-time comparisons within countries. Kaufmann et al. (2006) however find no systematic time-trends in a selection of indicators that do allow for comparisons over time. As a consequence, even the standardized estimates, particularly when converted to country rank-orders, can be used as time-series data if interpreted with caution.

**wbgi\_vae**      **Voice and Accountability – Estimate**  
**wbgi\_vas**      **Voice and Accountability – Standard Errors**  
**wbgi\_van**      **Voice and Accountability – Number of Sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1337, N: 192,  $\bar{N}$  : 191,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

“Voice and Accountability” includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

**wbgi\_pse**      **Political Stability - Estimate**  
**wbgi\_pss**      **Political Stability – Standard Errors**  
**wbgi\_psn**      **Political Stability – Number of sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1242, N: 192,  $\bar{N}$  : 177,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 178)

“Political Stability” combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.

**wbgi\_gee**      **Government Effectiveness - Estimate**  
**wbgi\_ges**      **Government Effectiveness – Standard Errors**  
**wbgi\_gen**      **Government Effectiveness – Number of Sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1310, N: 192,  $\bar{N}$  : 187,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

“Government Effectiveness” combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

**wbgi\_rqe**      **Regulatory Quality - Estimate**  
**wbgi\_rqs**      **Regulatory Quality – Standard Errors**  
**wbgi\_rqn**      **Regulatory Quality – Number of Sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1298, N: 188,  $\bar{N}$  : 185,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 188)

“Regulatory Quality” includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.

**wbgi\_rle**      **Rule of Law - Estimate**  
**wbgi\_rls**      **Rule of Law – Standard Errors**  
**wbgi\_rln**      **Rule of Law – Number of Sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1292, N: 192,  $\bar{N}$  : 185,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 188)

“Rule of Law” includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

**wbgi\_ccc**      **Control of Corruption - Estimate**  
**wbgi\_ccs**      **Control of Corruption – Standard Errors**  
**wbgi\_ccn**      **Control of Corruption – Number of Sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1265, N: 188,  $\bar{N}$  : 181,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 188)

“Control of Corruption” measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done”, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in “state capture”.

## **HTG (How To Get It) Variables**

### **Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 79)

(Cross-section: NA, N: 79)

[http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/politics\\_data.xls](http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/politics_data.xls)

(Acemoglu et al 2001 as used in La Porta et al 2004)

### **ajr\_settmort Log Settler Mortality**

Log of the mortality rate faced by European settlers at the time of colonization.

### **Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg**

<http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls>

(Alesina et al 2003)

### **al\_ethnic Ethnic fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 189)

(Cross-section: 1979-2001 (varies by country), N: 187)

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized society. The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. The result is a higher degree of fractionalization than the commonly used ELF-index (see el\_elf60) in for example Latin America, where people of many races speak the same language.

### **al\_ethn\_yom Year of Measurement**

(Cross-section: 1979-2001 (varies by country), N: 187)

The latest year available for each country of the al\_ethnic measurement in the cross-sectional dataset.

### **al\_language Linguistic fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 182)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 181)

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same linguistic group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized society.

**al\_religion Religious fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 191)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 190)

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same religious group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized society.

**Barro & Lee**

<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html>

(Barro & Lee 2000)

**bl\_asyf15 Average Schooling Years (Female)**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 928, N: 110,  $\bar{N}$  : 103,  $\bar{T}$  : 9)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Average schooling years in the female population aged 15 and over.

**bl\_asyf25 Average Schooling Years (Female)**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 920, N: 108,  $\bar{N}$  : 102,  $\bar{T}$  : 9)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Average schooling years in the female population aged 25 and over.

**bl\_asyf15 Average Schooling Years (Male)**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 928, N: 110,  $\bar{N}$  : 103,  $\bar{T}$  : 8)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Average schooling years in the male population aged 15 and over.

**bl\_asyf25 Average Schooling Years (Male)**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 920, N: 108,  $\bar{N}$  : 102,  $\bar{T}$  : 9)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Average schooling years in the male population aged 25 and over.

**bl\_asyt15 Average Schooling Years (Total)**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 928, N: 110,  $\bar{N}$  : 103,  $\bar{T}$  : 8)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Average schooling years in the total population aged 15 and over.

**bl\_asyt25 Average Schooling Years (Total)**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 921, N: 108,  $\bar{N}$  : 102,  $\bar{T}$  : 9)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Average schooling years in the total population aged 25 and over.



## **Bertelsmann Transformation Index**

(Cross-section: 2006, N: 119)

<http://bti2006.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/>

Note: The QoG dataset does not treat Serbia and Montenegro as two separate states, which BTI does. Therefore, we have merged the data for these two states into one, weighting for the different population sizes.

### **Market Economy Status**

#### **bti\_mes      Market Economy Status**

The score for Market Economy Status is obtained by calculating the mean value of the ratings for the following criteria: socioeconomic level, market organization, currency and price stability, private property, welfare regime, economic performance and sustainability.

Note: There also exists a Bertelsmann “Status Index”, which is the mean of Market Economy Status (bti\_mes) and Democracy Status (bti\_ds, listed above under “What It Is”), which we have not included in the data.

#### **bti\_sl      Socioeconomic Level**

The variable measures to what extent significant parts of the population are fundamentally excluded from society due to poverty and inequality combined (income gaps, gender, education, religion, ethnicity).

#### **bti\_mo      Market Organization**

The variable measures to what level the fundamentals of market-based competition have developed; to what extent safeguards exist to prevent the development of economic monopolies and cartels; to what extent foreign trade has been liberalized; and to what extent a solid banking system and a capital market have been established.

#### **bti\_cps      Currency and Price Stability**

The variable measures to what extent the country pursues a consistent inflation policy and an appropriate foreign exchange policy; if there is an independent central bank; and to what extent the government’s fiscal and debt policies support macroeconomic stability.

#### **bti\_prp      Private Property**

Measures to what extent government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property and regulate the acquisition of property, and to what extent private companies are permitted; and if state companies are undergoing a process of privatization consistent with market principles.

#### **bti\_wr      Welfare Regime**

The variable measures to what extent social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment or disability, and to what extent equality of opportunity exists.

**bti\_ep Economic Performance**

Measures how the economy performs according to a set of quantitative indicators.

**bti\_su Sustainability**

The variable measures to what extent environmental concerns are taken into account in both macro- and microeconomic terms, and to what extent there are solid institutions for basic, secondary and tertiary education, as well as for research and development.

**Cheibub & Gandhi**

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 7846, N: 198,  $\bar{N}$  : 138,  $\bar{T}$  : 40)

(Cross-section 2002, N: 189)

<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm>

(Cheibub and Gandhi 2004)

**chga\_hinst Regime Institutions**

Six-fold classification of political regimes, coded:

- (0) if a Parliamentary Democracy
- (1) if a Mixed Democracy
- (2) if a Presidential Democracy
- (3) if a Civilian Dictatorship
- (4) if a Military Dictatorship
- (5) if a Monarchic Dictatorship.

**Database of Political Institutions**

<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contenMDK:20649465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html>

(Beck et al 2000; 2001; Keefer 2005)

Note: The data from the DPI refers to January 1 of each year.

**dpi\_system Regime Type**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4832, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$  : 161,  $\bar{T}$  : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 171)

The variable captures whether countries are presidential, assembly-elected presidential, or parliamentary:

- (0) Direct presidential
- (1) Strong president elected by assembly
- (2) Parliamentary

**dpi\_yio Year in Office**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4810, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$  : 160,  $\bar{T}$  : 26)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 172)

The number of years in office of the chief executive.

**dpi\_finter     Finite Term in Office**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4729, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 158,  $\bar{T}$  : 26)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 170)

Dummy variable, 1 if there is a finite term in office for the chief executive, 0 if there is no such term limit or if a limit is not explicitly stated.

**dpi\_yct        Years left in Current Term**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3684, N: 166,  $\bar{N}$  : 123,  $\bar{T}$  : 22)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 150)

The number of years left in current term of chief executive. Thus, scored 0 in an election year and  $n-1$  in the year after an election, where  $n$  is the length of the term

**dpi\_mt         Multiple Terms**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3573, N: 168,  $\bar{N}$  : 119,  $\bar{T}$  : 21)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 149)

Dummy variable, 1 if the chief executive's term is constitutionally limited ( $dpi\_finter=1$ ) and (s)he may serve additional terms following the current one, also in cases where this is not explicitly stated; and 0 if (s)he may not serve additional terms.

**dpi\_cemo      Chief Executive a Military Officer**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4798, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 160,  $\bar{T}$  : 26)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 172)

Dummy variable, 1 if the chief executive is a military officer.

**dpi\_dmno      Defense Minister a Military Officer**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4194, N: 171,  $\bar{N}$  : 140,  $\bar{T}$  : 25)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 155)

Dummy variable, 1 if the defense minister is a military officer.

**dpi\_pvfor     Votes for the President in the first/only round**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1466, N: 98,  $\bar{N}$  : 49,  $\bar{T}$  : 15)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 80)

Percentage of votes for the president in the first/only round.

**dpi\_pvfr      Votes for the President in the final round**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 305, N: 40,  $\bar{N}$  : 10,  $\bar{T}$  : 8)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 22)

Percentage of votes for the President in the final round.

**dpi\_hlio Party of Chief Executive: How Long in Office**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3785, N: 168,  $\bar{N}$  : 126,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 142)

The number of years the party of the chief executive has been in office.

**dpi\_erc Party of Chief Executive: Right, Left or Center**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 2980, N: 143,  $\bar{N}$  : 99,  $\bar{T}$  : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 99)

The variable captures whether the party is right, left or center oriented:

- (1) Right
- (2) Left
- (3) Center

Right: for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing; Left: for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing; Center: for parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist (e.g. the party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context); *not* described as centrist if competing factions “average out” to a centrist position (e.g. a party of “right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists”). The primary source of these codings is the party’s name.

**dpi\_eage Party of Chief Executive: Age**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3618, N: 164,  $\bar{N}$  : 121,  $\bar{T}$  : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 140)

Time since formation under current name of the party of the Chief Executive.

**dpi\_gf Government Fractionalization**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4076, N: 180,  $\bar{N}$  : 136,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 158)

Government fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies from among the government parties will be of different parties.

**dpi\_gs Number of Government Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5260, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$  : 175,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 175)

Number of seats in the legislature of the parties in government.

**dpi\_gps1 Largest Government Party: Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5163, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$  : 172,  $\bar{T}$  : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 173)

Number of seats in the legislature of the largest government party.

**dpi\_gprlc1 Largest Government Party: Right, Left or Center**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 2984, N: 142,  $\bar{N}$  : 100,  $\bar{T}$  : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 99)

Codes whether the largest government party is right, left or center oriented (see variable dpi\_erlc for more information).

**dpi\_gpage1 Largest Government Party: Age**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3707, N: 171,  $\bar{N}$  : 124,  $\bar{T}$  : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 148)

Time since formation under this name of largest government party.

**dpi\_gps2 2nd Largest Government Party: Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5197, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 173,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

Number of seats in the legislature of the 2nd largest government party.

**dpi\_gprlc2 2nd Largest Government Party: Right, Left or Center**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 1052, N: 94,  $\bar{N}$  : 35,  $\bar{T}$  : 11)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 44)

Codes whether the 2nd largest government party is right, left or center oriented (see variable dpi\_erlc for more information).

**dpi\_gpage2 2nd Largest Government Party: Age**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1176, N: 109,  $\bar{N}$  : 39,  $\bar{T}$  : 11)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 68)

Time since formation under this name of 2nd largest government party.

**dpi\_gps3 3rd Largest Government Party: Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5217, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 174,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

Number of seats in the legislature of the 3rd largest government party.

**dpi\_gprlc3 3rd Largest Government Party: Right, Left or Center**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 554, N: 69,  $\bar{N}$  : 19,  $\bar{T}$  : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Codes whether the 3rd largest government party is right, left or center oriented (see variable dpi\_erlc for more information).

**dpi\_gpage3 3rd Largest Government Party: Age**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 615, N: 75,  $\bar{N}$  : 21,  $\bar{T}$  : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 40)

Time since formation under this name of 3rd largest government party.

**dpi\_nogp      Number of other Government Parties**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 670, N: 81,  $\bar{N}$  : 22,  $\bar{T}$  : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Number of government parties other than the 3 largest.

**dpi\_nogps      Number of other Government Party Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5199, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 173,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 173)

Number of seats in the legislature of government parties other than the 3 largest.

**dpi\_opf      Opposition Fractionalization**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2808, N: 153,  $\bar{N}$  : 94,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 137)

Opposition fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies belonging to the parties in the opposition will be of different parties.

**dpi\_nos      Number of Oppositional Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5260, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 175,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 175)

Number of seats in the legislature of the parties in opposition.

**dpi\_slop1      Largest Opposition Party: Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5162, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 172,  $\bar{T}$  : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

Number of seats in the legislature of the largest opposition party.

**dpi\_oprlc1      Largest Opposition Party: Right, Left or Center**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 2245, N: 135,  $\bar{N}$  : 75,  $\bar{T}$  : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 96)

Codes whether the largest opposition party is right, left or center oriented (see variable dpi\_erlc for more information).

**dpi\_opage1      Largest Opposition Party: Age**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2475, N: 151,  $\bar{N}$  : 83,  $\bar{T}$  : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 126)

Time since formation under this name of largest opposition party.

**dpi\_slop2 2nd Largest Opposition Party: Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5205, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 174,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

Number of seats in the legislature of the 2nd largest opposition party.

**dpi\_slop3 3rd Largest Opposition Party: Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5224, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 174,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

Number of seats in the legislature of the 3rd largest opposition party.

**dpi\_noop Number of other Opposition Parties**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1431, N: 118,  $\bar{N}$  : 48,  $\bar{T}$  : 12)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 71)

Number of opposition parties other than the 3 largest.

**dpi\_noops Number of other Opposition Party Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5222, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 174,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

Number of seats in the legislature of opposition parties other than the 3 largest.

**dpi\_ulprty Number of Parties non-aligned/allegiance unknown**

(Time-series: 1982-2004, n: 187, N: 51,  $\bar{N}$  : 10,  $\bar{T}$  : 4)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 26)

Number of Parties non-aligned/allegiance unknown.

**dpi\_numul Number of Seats non-aligned/allegiance unknown**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 5190, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 173,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 172)

Number of Seats non-aligned/allegiance unknown.

**dpi\_tf Total Fractionalization**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4056, N: 180,  $\bar{N}$  : 135,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 158)

Total fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies in the legislature belong to different parties.

**dpi\_maj Majority Seats**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4060, N: 180,  $\bar{N}$  : 135,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 158)

Number of government seats divided by total seats in the legislature.

**dpi\_legelec    Legislative Election**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4825, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 161,  $\bar{T}$  : 27)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 171)

Dummy variable, 1 if there is a legislative election held this year.

**dpi\_exelec    Executive Election**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4826, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 161,  $\bar{T}$  : 27)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 171)

Dummy variable, 1 if there is an executive election held this year.

**dpi\_lipc        Legislative Index of Political Competitiveness**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4797, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$  : 160,  $\bar{T}$  : 26)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 171)

This variable captures the degree of political competitiveness in the legislature as follows:

- (1) No legislature
- (2) Unelected legislature
- (3) Elected legislature with single candidates (like in many Communist countries)
- (3,5) Unclear whether there is competition among elected legislators in a single-party system
- (4) Single party with multiple candidates
- (5) Multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats
- (5,5) Not clear whether multiple parties ran and only one party won or multiple parties ran and won more than 75% of the seats
- (6) Multiple parties won seats but the largest party received more than 75% of the seats
- (6,5) Multiple parties won seats but it is unclear how many the largest party got
- (7) Largest party got less than 75%

**dpi\_eipc        Executive Index of Political Competitiveness**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4797, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$  : 160,  $\bar{T}$  : 26)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 171)

Uses the same scale as the Legislative Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi\_lipc) but applies for executive elections instead.

**dpi\_mdmh    Mean District Magnitude (House)**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2782, N: 154,  $\bar{N}$  : 93,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 148)



**dpi\_mdms Mean District Magnitude (Senate)**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 716, N: 37,  $\bar{N}$  : 24,  $\bar{T}$  : 19)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

The average number of representatives elected by each electoral district in a country. If information is available, the average is weighted by constituency size.

**dpi\_ssh Relative Size of Senate**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1414, N: 76,  $\bar{N}$  : 47,  $\bar{T}$  : 19)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 47)

Number of senate seats/ (number of house seats + number of senate seats).

**dpi\_plurality Plurality**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3423, N: 165,  $\bar{N}$  : 114,  $\bar{T}$  : 21)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 148)

Dummy variable, 1 if plurality is used as electoral rule to select any candidate in any house, or if there is competition for the seats in a one-party state (dpi\_lipc=4).

**dpi\_pr Proportional Representation**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2976, N: 157,  $\bar{N}$  : 99,  $\bar{T}$  : 19)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 142)

Dummy variable, 1 if Proportional Representation (PR) is used as electoral rule to select any candidate in any house.

**dpi\_housesys House: Plurality or Proportional?**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3329, N: 162,  $\bar{N}$  : 111,  $\bar{T}$  : 21)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 145)

If Plurality and Proportional Representation - which governs the majority/all of the House seats? (1 if Plurality, 0.5 if 50% Plurality and 50% Proportional, and 0 if Proportional).

**dpi\_sensys Senate: Plurality or Proportional?**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 504, N: 26,  $\bar{N}$  : 17,  $\bar{T}$  : 19)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

If Plurality and Proportional Representation - which governs the majority/all of the Senate seats? (1 if Plurality, 0.5 if 50% Plurality and 50% Proportional, and 0 if Proportional).

**dpi\_thresh Vote Threshold for Representation**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1739, N: 92,  $\bar{N}$  : 58,  $\bar{T}$  : 19)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 80)

Records the minimum vote share that a party must obtain in order to take at least one seat in PR systems, in percent.

**dpi\_dhondt D'Hondt**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1682, N: 90,  $\bar{N}$ : 56,  $\bar{T}$ : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 83)

Dummy variable, 1 if the D'Hondt rule is used to allocate seats in a PR system.

**dpi\_cl Closed Lists**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2000, N: 104,  $\bar{N}$ : 67,  $\bar{T}$ : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 90)

Dummy variable, 1 when PR is used (dpi\_pr) and voters cannot express preferences for candidates within a party list.

**dpi\_fraud Fraud or Candidate Intimidation Affection**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3892, N: 171,  $\bar{N}$ : 130,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 153)

Dummy variable, 1 when opposition is officially legal but reported vote fraud or candidate intimidation were serious enough to affect the outcome of elections. If not an election year, or if elected government has been deposed, records to the most recent election.

**dpi\_checks Number of Veto Players**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4610, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$ : 154,  $\bar{T}$ : 26)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 165)

Equals one if the Legislative Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi\_lipc) or the Executive Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi\_eipc) is less than 5. In countries where dpi\_lipc and dpi\_eipc are greater than or equal to 5, dpi\_checks is incremented by one if there is a chief executive, by a further one if the chief executive is competitively elected (dpi\_eipc greater than six), and by a further one if the opposition controls the legislature.

In presidential systems, dpi\_checks is incremented by one for each chamber of the legislature (unless the president's party has a majority in the lower house and a closed-list system is in effect), and by one for each party coded as allied with the president's party and which has an ideological (left-right) orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the president's party.

In parliamentary systems dpi\_checks is incremented by one for every party in the government coalition as long as the parties are needed to maintain a majority, and by one for every party in the government coalition that has a position on economic issues closer to the largest opposition party than to the party of the executive. (The prime minister's party is *not* counted as a check if there is a closed rule in place.)

**dpi\_polariz Maximum Difference of Orientation**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4442, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$  : 148,  $\bar{T}$  : 25)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 149)

The maximum difference between the left-right-center orientation of the chief executive's party and the placement of the three largest government parties and the largest opposition party. Is coded (0) if the Legislative Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi\_lipc) or the Executive Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi\_eipc) are less than five (elections are not competitive), and if the chief executive's party has an absolute majority in the legislature. Ranges between 0 and 2.

**dpi\_auton Autonomous Regions**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4546, N: 177,  $\bar{N}$  : 152,  $\bar{T}$  : 26)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 155)

Dummy variable, 1 if there are autonomous regions.

**dpi\_state Election of State/Province Government**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3220, N: 148,  $\bar{N}$  : 107,  $\bar{T}$  : 22)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

One dimension of information on sub-national governments is whether state/provincial governments are locally elected. Coded zero if neither the local executive nor the local legislature are directly elected by the local population that they govern; one if either is directly elected and the other is indirectly elected (e.g., by councils at subsidiary levels of government) or appointed; and two if they are both directly and locally elected. If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, we consider the highest level as the "state/province" level.

**dpi\_muni Election of Municipal Government**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2050, N: 105,  $\bar{N}$  : 68,  $\bar{T}$  : 20)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 92)

Are the municipal governments locally elected? Coded the same as the state/provincial government, dpi\_state above (0-2). If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, the lowest level is considered as the "municipal" level.

**dpi\_author Authority of Sub-national Governments**

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1605, N: 74,  $\bar{N}$  : 54,  $\bar{T}$  : 22)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 63)

Dummy variable, 1 if Sub-national governments have extensive taxing, spending or regulatory authority.

**Deininger & Squire**

<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contenMDK:20699070~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html>

(Deininger & Squire 1996)

**ds\_gini            Gini Index**

(Time-series: 1947-1996, n: 682, N: 112,  $\bar{N}$  : 14,  $\bar{T}$  : 6)

(Cross-section: 1968-1996 (varies by country), N: 109)

The variable measures the Gini index of income inequality from observations with highest quality (quality="accept") in the original Deininger & Squire (1996) dataset (higher values indicate more inequality). The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (the society's total income accrues to only one person/household unit). Note: Both within- and cross-country comparisons should be handled with care, as these Gini coefficients are based on varying sources of information: income or expenditure, gross or net of taxes, individual or household recipient units.

**ds\_yom            Year of Measurement**

(Cross-section: 1968-1996 (varies by country), N: 109)

The latest year available for each country of the ds\_gini measurement in the cross-sectional dataset.

**Djankov, McLeish, Nenova & Shleifer – Who Owns the Media**

(Cross-section 1999, N: 97)

[http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/media\\_data\\_final.xls](http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/media_data_final.xls)

(Djankov et al 2003)

Djankov et al. (2003) measure state and private ownership of a country's top five media firms, where the top five are measured by share in the total circulation of all dailies (for newspapers) or by share of viewing (for television stations). They provide two types of measures for both newspapers and television stations: by count (where the number of private/state owned firms is divided by 5) and by weighting for market share. For example, in the Philippines the two state owned newspapers account for 22.2% and 21.3% of circulation for the top 5 newspapers respectively, so the newspapers are 40.0 % state owned when measured by count and 43.5% when measured by market share. In television, the three state owned Philippine stations account for only 17.5% of the share of viewing for the top 5 television stations, so the television market is 60.0% state owned when measured by count but only 17.5% as measured by market share. The market share variables, while more precise as a metric of state control, have the disadvantage that, in the countries with regional newspapers, such as the United States, the market share of any single firm is small. As a consequence, the variables they define are not properly compared to those in countries with national newspapers. Note: The 'other'-category (e.g. employee organizations, trade unions, political parties, churches, not-for-profit foundations, and business associations) is excluded in the original dataset, which is the reason why the percentages do not sum to 100%.

**dmns\_pbcs Press by Count (State)**

The percentage of state-owned newspapers out of the five largest daily newspapers (by circulation).

**dmns\_pbcpr Press by Count (Private)**

The percentage of private-owned newspapers out of the five largest daily newspapers (by circulation).

**dmns\_pbss Press by Share (State)**

The market share of state-owned newspapers out of the aggregate market share of the five largest daily newspapers (by circulation).

**dmns\_pbsp Press by Share (Private)**

The market share of private-owned newspapers out of the aggregate market share of the five largest daily newspapers (by circulation).

**dmns\_tbcs TV by Count (State)**

The percentage of state-owned TV stations out of the five largest TV stations (by viewership).

**dmns\_tbcpr TV by Count (Private)**

The percentage of private-owned TV stations out of the five largest TV stations (by viewership).

**dmns\_tbss TV by Share (State)**

The market share of state-owned TV stations out of the aggregate market share of the five largest TV stations (by viewership).

**dmns\_tbsp TV by Share (Private)**

The market share of private-owned TV stations out of the aggregate market share of the five largest TV stations (by viewership).

**Easterly**

<http://go.worldbank.org/ZSQKYFU6J0>

(Easterly 2001)

Easterly's data on government revenue and expenditure comes from IMF Government Finance Statistics. The classification of the data is described in IMF (1986; 2001). WARNING: We have found some dubious figures in these data, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1982-1995, but decided to leave the original data as is.

**ea\_gbds Government budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1972-2000, n: 2189, N: 125,  $\bar{N}$ : 76,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-Section: 1976-2000 (varies by country), N: 122)

**ea\_gbds\_yom Year of Measurement**

Government budget deficit or surplus as a percentage of GDP.

**Government Expenditure:**

**ea\_tge**      **Total government expenditure (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1972-2000, n: 2231, N: 125,  $\bar{N}$ : 77,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-Section: 1979-2000 (varies by country), N: 122)

**ea\_tge\_yom**   **Year of Measurement**

Total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

**ea\_gee**      **Government expenditure on education (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1972-2000, n: 1869, N: 120,  $\bar{N}$ : 65,  $\bar{T}$ : 16)

(Cross-Section: 1976-2000 (varies by country), N: 118)

**ea\_gee\_yom**   **Year of Measurement**

Government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP.

**ea\_geh**      **Government expenditure on health (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1972-2000, n: 1869, N: 121,  $\bar{N}$ : 65,  $\bar{T}$ : 16)

(Cross-Section: 1976-2000 (varies by country), N: 118)

**ea\_geh\_yom**   **Year of Measurement**

Government expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP.

**ea\_gesw**      **Government expenditure on social security and welfare (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1972-2000, n: 1785, N: 118,  $\bar{N}$ : 62,  $\bar{T}$ : 15)

(Cross-Section: 1976-2000 (varies by country), N: 115)

**ea\_gesw\_yom**   **Year of Measurement**

Government expenditure on social security and welfare as a percentage of GDP.

**Easterly & Levine**

<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contenMDK:20700002%7EpagePK:64214825%7EpiPK:64214943%7EtheSitePK:469382,0.html>

(Easterly and Levine 1997)

**el\_gunn1**      **Percentage of Population not Speaking the Official Language**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 148)

(Cross-section: 1990, N: 143)

The share of the population of each country for whom the language spoken at home is not the official language of the country.

Original source: Gunnemark (1991).

**el\_gunn2 Percentage of Population not Speaking the Most Widely Used Language**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 149)

(Cross-section: 1990, N: 144)

The share of the population not speaking the most widely used language.

Original source: Gunnemark (1991).

**el\_avelf Average Value of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 152)

(Cross-section: NA, N: 146)

Average value of el\_gunn1, el\_gunn2 and three other ethnolinguistic fractionalization variables taken from Muller (1964), Roberts (1962) and Atlas Narodov Mira (1964).

**Fearon**

<http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/>

(Fearon 2003)

**fe\_etfra Ethnic Fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 161)

(Cross-section: 1990, N: 153)

Restricting attention to groups that had at least 1 percent of country population in the 1990s, Fearon identifies 822 ethnic and “ethnoreligious” groups in 160 countries. This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to different such groups. The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented).

**fe\_plural Plurality Group**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 160)

(Cross-section: 1990, N: 152)

Based on the same set of groups, this variable reflects the population share of the largest group (plurality group) in the country.

**fe\_lmin Largest Minority**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 151)

(Cross-section: 1990, N: 144)

Based on the same set of groups, this variable reflects the population share of the second largest group (largest minority)

**fe\_cultdiv Cultural Diversity**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 160)

(Cross-section: 1990, N: 152)

This measure modifies fractionalization (fe\_etfra) so as to take some account of cultural distances between groups, measured as the structural distance between languages spoken by different groups in a country. If the groups in a country speak structurally unrelated languages, their cultural diversity index will be the same as their level of ethnic fractionalization (fe\_etfra). The more similar are the languages spoken by different ethnic groups, however, the more will this measure be reduced below the level of ethnic fractionalization for that country.

**Feld & Voigt – Judicial Independence**

(Feld and Voigt 2003)

The Feld and Voigt indicators on judicial independence focus exclusively on the highest court in each country. The variables can take on values between 0 and 1, where greater values imply a higher degree of judicial independence

**fv\_jidj Judicial Independence (*de jure*)**

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 69)

The *de jure* indicator of judicial independence is solely based on the legal foundations as found in legal documents. The variable is based on up to 12 sub-variables, and fv\_jidj is the mean value of these. The sub-categories include, e.g., an evaluation of the appointment procedure of judges; judicial tenure; if terms are renewable; the salary of the judges; and the accessibility of the court and its ability to initiate proceedings.

**fv\_jidf Judicial Independence (*de facto*)**

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 60)

The *de facto* indicator of judicial independence is based on a long period, between 1960 and 2002. This means it will be very sticky compared to the *de jure* indicator. The variable is the mean value of 8 sub-variables, including: the effective average term length of the judges; how many times the number of judges has been changed since 1960; whether the income of judges have at least remained constant in real terms; whether there are frequent changes to the legal foundations of the highest court; and whether the implementation of the decisions of the highest court depend on some action of other branches of government and this cooperation is not granted.

**Fraser Institute – Economic Freedom of the World**

<http://www.freetheworld.com/>

(Gwartney and Lawson 2006)

**fi\_index Economic Freedom of the World Index (current)**

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 1193, N: 129,  $\bar{N}$ : 109,  $\bar{T}$ : 9)



(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

The index is founded upon objective components that reflect the presence (or absence) of economic freedom. The index comprises 21 components designed to identify the consistency of institutional arrangements and policies with economic freedom in five major areas:

- size of government (fi\_sog)
- legal structure and security of property rights (fi\_legprop)
- access to sound money (fi\_sm)
- freedom to trade internationally (fi\_ftradeint)
- regulation of credit, labor and business (fi\_reg)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to ‘less economic freedom’ and 10 to ‘more economic freedom’. This is the version of the index published at the current year of measurement, without taking methodological changes over time into account.

#### **fi\_clindex      Economic Freedom of the World Index (chain-linked)**

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 1174, N: 122,  $\bar{N}$  : 107,  $\bar{T}$  : 10)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

One problem with the current version of the index of economic freedom (fi\_index) is that the underlying data is more complete in recent years than in earlier years. As a result, changes in the index ratings over time may reflect the fact that some components are missing in some years but not in others. The problem of missing components threatens the comparability of the index ratings over time. In order to correct for this problem, the Fraser Institute has constructed a chain-linked summary index of economic freedom that is based on the 2000 rating as a base year. Changes to the index going backward (and forward) in time are then based only on changes in components that were present in adjacent years. The chain-linked methodology means that a country’s rating will change across time periods only when there is a change in ratings for components present during both of the over-lapping years. This is precisely what one would want when making comparisons across time periods.

#### **fi\_sog              Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises**

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 1268, N: 122,  $\bar{N}$  : 115,  $\bar{T}$  : 10)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to ‘large general government consumption’, ‘large transfer sector’, ‘many government enterprises’, and ‘high marginal tax rates and low income thresholds’, and 10 to ‘small general government consumption’, ‘small transfer sector’, ‘few government enterprises’, and ‘low marginal tax rates and high income thresholds’.

The index consists of the following indicators:

- General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption
- Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
- Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of total investment
- Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies)

### **fi\_legprop      Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights**

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 1140, N: 129,  $\bar{N}$  : 104,  $\bar{T}$  : 9)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to ‘no judicial independence’, ‘no trusted legal framework exists’, ‘no protection of intellectual property’, ‘military interference in rule of law’, and ‘no integrity of the legal system’ and 10 corresponds to ‘high judicial independence’, ‘trusted legal framework exists’, ‘protection of intellectual property’, ‘no military interference in rule of law’, and ‘integrity of the legal system’.

The index consists of the following indicators:

- Judicial independence: The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in dispute
- Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations
- Protection of intellectual property
- Military interference in rule of law and the political process
- Integrity of the legal system

### **fi\_sm              Access to Sound Money**

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 1295, N: 122,  $\bar{N}$  : 118,  $\bar{T}$  : 11)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to ‘high annual money growth’, ‘high variation in the annual rate of inflation’, ‘high inflation rate’, and ‘restricted foreign currency bank accounts’ and 10 corresponds to ‘low annual money growth’, ‘low or no variation in the annual rate of inflation’, ‘low inflation rate’, and ‘foreign currency bank accounts are permissible without restrictions’.

The index consists of the following indicators:

- Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average annual growth of real GDP in the last ten years
- Standard inflation variability in the last five years
- Recent inflation rate
- Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad

### **fi\_ftradeint      Freedom to Trade Internationally**

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 1211, N: 122,  $\bar{N}$  : 110,  $\bar{T}$  : 10)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to ‘increasing tax rate on international trade’, ‘slow import or export process’, ‘small trade sectors relative to the population and geographic size’, ‘exchange rate controls are present and a black-market exists’, and ‘restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners’ and 10 corresponds to ‘no specific taxes on international trade’, ‘swift import or export process’, ‘large trade sectors relative to the population and geographic size’, ‘no black-market exchange rate’, and ‘no restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners’.

The index consists of the following indicators:

- Taxes on international trade
- Regulatory trade barriers
- Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size
- Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate
- International capital market controls

**fi\_reg            Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business**

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 1173, N: 122,  $\bar{N}$  : 107,  $\bar{T}$  : 10)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to ‘low percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks’, ‘high foreign bank license denial rate’, ‘private sector’s share of credit is close to the base-year-minimum’, ‘deposit and lending rates is fixed by the government and real rates is persistently negative’, ‘high impact of minimum wage’, ‘widespread use of price controls throughout various sectors of the economy’, and ‘starting a new business is generally complicated’ and 10 corresponds to ‘high percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks’, ‘low foreign bank license denial rate’, ‘private sector’s share of credit is close to the base-year-maximum’, ‘interest rates is determined primarily by market forces and the real rates is positive’, ‘low impact of minimum wage’, ‘no price controls or marketing boards’, and ‘starting a new business is generally easy’.

The index consists of the following indicators:

- Credit Market Regulations
- Labor Market Regulations
- Business Regulations

**Gleditsch – Expanded Trade and GDP Data**

<http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html>

(Gleditsch, K. S. 2002)

In order to fill in gaps in the Direction of Trade (DOT) data reported by the IMF for pairs of countries in the world, Gleditsch has imputed missing data using the following techniques: drawing on an alternative source of data; substitution based on reversed trade flows; estimates of exports to another country based on imports from that country, and vice versa; linear interpolation within and extrapolation beyond available time-series; and, by assuming remaining dyads with no observed data to have a trade exchange rate of zero.

**gle\_imp            Total Import**

(Time-series: 1948-2000, n: 7633, N: 203,  $\bar{N}$  : 144,  $\bar{T}$  : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

This amounts to the total import of a country, in millions of current year US dollars, estimated as the sum of all dyadic import figures to that country using the imputation technique described above.

**gle\_exp      Total Export**

(Time-series: 1948-2000, n: 7633, N: 203,  $\bar{N}$  : 144,  $\bar{T}$  : 38)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

This amounts to the total export of a country, in millions of current year US dollars, estimated as the sum of all dyadic export figures to that country using the imputation technique described above.

**gle\_trade      Total Trade**

(Time-series: 1948-2000, n: 7633, N: 203,  $\bar{N}$  : 144,  $\bar{T}$  : 38)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

This amounts to the sum of import and export of a country, in millions of current year US dollars, estimated as the sum of all dyadic import and export figures of that country using the imputation technique described above.

**gle\_pop      Population (1000's)**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 8584, N: 205,  $\bar{N}$  : 145,  $\bar{T}$  : 42)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 192)

Size of the population in 1000's.

**gle\_rgdp      Real GDP per Capita**

(Time-series: 1950-2004, n: 8264, N: 205,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 40)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 197)

In order to fill in gaps in the Penn World Table's mark 5.6 and 6.2 data (see below: Heston, Summers & Aten), Gleditsch has imputed missing data by using an alternative source of data (the CIA *World Fact Book*), and through extrapolation beyond available time-series. This is the estimate of real GDP per Capita in constant US dollars at base year 2000.

**Golder**

<http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html>

(Golder 2005)

Golder's data cover electoral institutions used in democratic legislative (lower chamber) and presidential elections, where democracy is defined according to `gol_polreg` below. Note that data (with the exception of `gol_legel` and `gol_preel`) for 'non-democratic regimes' is coded as 'missing'. There are some countries that had two elections (legislative or presidential) in the same year: Argentina 1973, Bangladesh 1996, Denmark 1953, Greece 1989, Iceland 1959, Ireland 1982, Saint Lucia 1987, Sri Lanka 1960, Thailand 1992, and United Kingdom 1974. As a result, it is not possible to provide data for both elections that occurred in the same year in the country-year data format. In those cases where there were two elections, data is from the second election. Those interested in data for the first elections should consult Golder's original data.

**gol\_adm      Average District Magnitude**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2797, N: 122,  $\bar{N}$  : 51,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Average district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is calculated as the total number of seats allocated in the lowest tier divided by the total number of districts in that tier. For example, gol\_adm=7.94 in Denmark after 1971 since there are 135 seats allocated in the lowest tier between 17 districts.

**gol\_dist      Districts**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2795, N: 121,  $\bar{N}$  : 51,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Number of electoral districts or constituencies in the lowest electoral tier for the lower house of the legislature.

**gol\_enep      Effective Number of Electoral Parties**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2600, N: 112,  $\bar{N}$  : 47,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 99)

Effective number of electoral parties based on formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

**gol\_enepo      Effective Number of Electoral Parties (Others)**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2589, N: 113,  $\bar{N}$  : 47,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 99)

This is the percentage of the vote going to parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official electoral results.

**gol\_enep1      Effective Number of Electoral Parties1**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2584, N: 112,  $\bar{N}$  : 47,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 99)

Effective number of electoral parties once the 'other' category has been corrected for by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997). The method of bounds essentially requires, first, calculating the effective number of parties treating the 'other' category as a single party; this estimate corresponds to the minimum effective number of parties. Second, the effective number of parties is recalculated as if every vote in the 'other' category belonged to different parties; this estimate corresponds to the maximum effective number of parties. Finally, one takes the mean of these minimum and maximum estimates.

**gol\_enpp      Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2739, N: 118,  $\bar{N}$  : 50,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties constructed using the formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

**gol\_enppo Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties (Others)**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2697, N: 117,  $\bar{N}$ : 49,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

This is the percentage of the seats going to parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official electoral results.

**gol\_enpp1 Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties1**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2694, N: 116,  $\bar{N}$ : 49,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 101)

Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties once the 'other' category has been corrected for by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997).

**gol\_enpres Effective Number of Presidential Candidates**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2842, N: 123,  $\bar{N}$ : 52,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Effective number of presidential candidates based on the formula from Amorim Neto and Cox (1997).

**gol\_est Electoral System Type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2831, N: 124,  $\bar{N}$ : 52,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 107)

Variable indicating the type of electoral system used:

- (1) Majoritarian (employs plurality, absolute majority, qualified majority, limited vote, alternative vote, single non-transferable vote or modified Borda count in a single electoral tier)
- (2) Proportional (employs party list or single transferable vote in a single electoral tier)
- (3) Multi-tier (employs a single electoral formula, majoritarian or proportional, across multiple tiers)
- (4) Mixed (employs a mixture of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules in one or more electoral tiers)

**gol\_est2 Electoral System Type 2**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2831, N: 124,  $\bar{N}$ : 52,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 107)

Variable constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset indicating the type of electoral system used, where multi-tier systems are recoded as being majoritarian (only concerns Papua New Guinea and Mauritius) or proportional (concerns all others):

- (1) Majoritarian

- (2) Proportional
- (3) Mixed

**gol\_inst      Institution**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195,  $\bar{N}$  : 135,  $\bar{T}$  : 38)  
 (Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Classification of political regimes in which democracies are distinguished by the type of executive as given below:

- (0) Dictatorship
- (1) Parliamentary Democracy
- (2) Mixed Democracy
- (3) Presidential Democracy

Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges. On the criteria for determining whether a regime is a dictatorship, see Political Regimes (gol\_polreg). A presidential regime is one in which the government serves under the elected president. The president may be directly elected or indirectly elected; the important feature is that the president selects and determines the survival of the government. A parliamentary system is one in which the government serves so long as it maintains the confidence of the legislature. A system in which the government must respond to both the legislative assembly and to an elected president is classified as mixed. Typically, these mixed systems are characterized by a president who is elected for a fixed term with some executive powers and a government that serves under the direction of the legislature. This classification scheme follows the recommendations of Przeworski et al. (2000).

**gol\_legal      Legislative Elections**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7423, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$  : 135,  $\bar{T}$  : 38)  
 (Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Indicates the number of elections for the national lower chamber of the legislature held in that year. Partial elections such as those taking place in Costa Rica 1946, Poland 1989, Laos 1958, or Luxembourg 1948, 1951 are coded 0. This variable does not include elections to constituent assemblies such as those in Pakistan 1955, Nicaragua 1984, Sudan 1965, 1968, Italy 1946, or France 1946. It also excludes the 1960 election in Somalia, as this was only a legislative election for Somaliland (later to become the northern region of Somalia). 18 democratic legislative elections occur in years where gol\_polreg is coded as a dictatorship (Argentina 1962, Bolivia 1980, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Congo 1963, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Pakistan 1977, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines 1965, Sierra Leone 1967, Somalia 1969, Sri Lanka 1977, Sudan 1958, Thailand 1976). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of gol\_polreg is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic.

**gol\_legro      Runoff**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2725, N: 124,  $\bar{N}$  : 50,  $\bar{T}$  : 22)  
 (Cross-section: 2000, N: 106)

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no legislative runoff; 1 if there is.

**gol\_maj Majoritarian Type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1133, N: 56,  $\bar{N}$ : 21,  $\bar{T}$ : 20)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 42)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of majoritarian electoral system used in legislative elections as given below:

- (1) Plurality
- (2) Absolute majority
- (3) Qualified majority
- (4) Limited vote
- (5) Alternative vote
- (6) Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)
- (7) Modified Borda

**gol\_mdm Median District Magnitude**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2338, N: 116,  $\bar{N}$ : 43,  $\bar{T}$ : 20)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Median district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is the district magnitude associated with the median legislator in the lowest tier. The median legislator is determined by finding the number of legislators elected in the lower tier and dividing this figure by two. For further details on this variable, see Amorim Neto and Cox (1997).

**gol\_mix Mixed Type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 386, N: 32,  $\bar{N}$ : 7,  $\bar{T}$ : 12)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 28)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of mixed electoral system used in legislative elections as given below:

- (1) Coexistence, independent
- (2) Superposition, independent
- (3) Fusion, independent
- (4) Correction, dependent
- (5) Conditional, dependent

A dependent mixed system is one in which the application of one formula is dependent on the outcome produced by the other formula. There are three types of independent mixed systems: coexistence (where some districts use a majoritarian, while others employ a proportional formula), superposition (where two different electoral formulas are applied nationwide), and fusion (where majoritarian and proportional formulas are used within a single district) systems. An independent mixed system is one in which the two electoral formulas are implemented independently of each other. There are two types of dependent mixed systems:



correction (where seats distributed by proportional representation in one set of districts are used to correct for the distortions created by the majoritarian formula in another) and conditional (where the actual use or not of one formula depends on the outcome produced by the other) systems.

**gol\_mt      Multi-Tier Type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 596, N: 27,  $\bar{N}$  : 11,  $\bar{T}$  : 22)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 24)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of multi-tier electoral system used in legislative elections as given below:

- (1)    Linked
- (2)    Unlinked

A multi-tier system is linked whenever unused votes from one electoral tier are used at another level, or if the allocation of seats in one tier is conditional on the seats received in another tier.

**gol\_nos      Number of Seats**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2837, N: 123,  $\bar{N}$  : 52,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Total number of seats in the lower house of the legislature during the election year.

**gol\_pest      Presidential Electoral System Type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 286, N: 61,  $\bar{N}$  : 6,  $\bar{T}$  : 5)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 15)

Variable that indicates the type of electoral system used in presidential elections:

- (1)    Plurality
- (2)    Absolute majority
- (3)    Qualified majority
- (4)    Electoral College
- (5)    Single Transferable Vote (STV)

**gol\_polreg      Political Regimes**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7423, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$  : 135,  $\bar{T}$  : 38)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Transition years are coded as the regime that exists (0 Democracy, 1 Dictatorship) as of December 31st in that year. A regime is considered a dictatorship if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, or there has been no alternation in power (Przeworski et al. 2000). A regime is democratic if those who govern are selected through contested elections.

**gol\_pr      PR Type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1565, N: 60,  $\bar{N}$  : 29,  $\bar{T}$  : 26)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 55)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of proportional formula used in legislative elections:

- (1) Hare
- (2) Droop
- (3) Imperiali
- (4) Reinforced Imperiali
- (5) Modified Hare
- (6) D'Hondt
- (7) Saint-Laguë
- (8) Modified Saint-Laguë
- (9) Single Transferable Vote (STV)

**gol\_preel      Presidential Election**

(Time-series: 191946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195,  $\bar{N}$  : 135,  $\bar{T}$  : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Indicates the number of direct presidential elections held in that year. Note: This variable does not signify that the election chose either the nominal or effective head of government. For example, `gol_preel=1` if there is an election for president in mixed systems, even though the nominal and effective head of government is the prime minister. This variable does not include plebiscites or referenda as have occurred in countries like Taiwan and the Maldives.

18 democratic presidential elections occur in years where `gol_polreg` is coded as a dictatorship (Argentina 1962, Bolivia 1980, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Congo 1963, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Pakistan 1977, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines 1965, Sierra Leone 1967, Somalia 1969, Sri Lanka 1977, Sudan 1958, Thailand 1976). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of `gol_polreg` is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic.

**gol\_prero      Presidential Runoff**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2870, N: 124,  $\bar{N}$  : 52,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no presidential runoff; 1 if there is a presidential runoff. Presidential elections are coded as having runoff provisions if a successful candidate must win an absolute or qualified majority of the vote to become president.

**gol\_upseat      Upper Seats**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2701, N: 119,  $\bar{N}$  : 49,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 105)

The number of seats allocated in electoral districts or constituencies above the lowest tier. This variable may include seats allocated in several different upper tiers.

**gol\_uptier Upper Tier**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2701, N: 119,  $\bar{N}$ : 49,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 105)

Percentage of seats allocated in electoral districts above the lowest tier.

**Gerring, Thacker & Moreno**

<http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/data.htm>

(Gerring et al 2005)

Gerring, Thacker and Moreno only include country-years that obtains a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p\_polity2). (For details, see Gerring et al. 2005: p.572)

**gtm\_centrip Centripetalism**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 2981, N: 142,  $\bar{N}$ : 73,  $\bar{T}$ : 21)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 124)

Sum of Unitarism (gtm\_unit), Parliamentarism (gtm\_parl), and Proportional Representation (gtm\_pr).

**gtm\_centrip2 Centripetalism (weighted)**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 2981, N: 142,  $\bar{N}$ : 73,  $\bar{T}$ : 21)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 124)

The variable is a moving weighted sum of Unitarism (gtm\_unit), Parliamentarism (gtm\_parl), and Proportional Representation (gtm\_pr), beginning in 1901 and ending in 2000. For details, see Gerring et al (2005).

**gtm\_unit Unitarism**

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 3710, N: 161,  $\bar{N}$ : 88,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 146)

Average of Nonfederalism and Nonbicameralism:

- Nonfederalism is coded as 0 = federal (elective regional legislatures plus conditional recognition of subnational authority), 1 = semifederal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government), or 2 = nonfederal.

- Nonbicameralism is coded as 0 = strong bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power; the two houses are incongruent), 1 = weak bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power, though not necessarily a formal veto; the two houses are congruent), or 2 = unicameral (no upper house or weak upper house).

### **gtm\_parl      Parliamentarism**

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 3710, N: 161,  $\bar{N}$  : 88,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 146)

The parliamentary/presidential distinction is conceptualized as a continuum with two dimensions: (a) the *degree of separation* (independence) between president and parliament (unity = parliamentary, separation = presidential) and, if there is any separation at all, (b) the *relative power* of the two players (the more power the president possesses, the more presidential is the resulting system). This complex reality is captured with a three-part coding scheme:

- (0)      Presidential
- (1)      Semi-presidential
- (2)      Parliamentary

### **gtm\_pr          Proportional Representation**

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 3711, N: 162,  $\bar{N}$  : 88,  $\bar{T}$  : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 146)

The centripetal theory of democratic governance emphasizes the following three features of an electoral system: (a) district magnitude (M), (b) seat allocation rules (majoritarian or proportional), and (c) candidate selection rules. The centripetal ideal type is defined by  $M > 1$ , proportional seat allocation rules, and party-controlled candidate selection. This is the *closed-list-PR* electoral system. Other systems are ranked lower in this coding according to their deviation from this ideal type. Thus, the coding for the list-PR variable is as follows:

- (0)      Majoritarian or Preferential-vote
- (1)      Mixed-member majority or Block vote
- (2)      Closed-list-PR

## **Hadenius & Teorell – Types of Authoritarian Regimes**

[http://www.svet.lu.se/Dynamic/personal\\_page/Personal\\_homepage.lasso?-token.kod=JTE](http://www.svet.lu.se/Dynamic/personal_page/Personal_homepage.lasso?-token.kod=JTE)

(Hadenius & Teorell 2007)

### **ht\_regtype      Regime Type**

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 5753, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$  : 169,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

This typology of authoritarian regimes is based on a distinction between three modes of political power maintenance (probably the three most widely used throughout history): hereditary succession (lineage), corresponding to *monarchies*; the actual or threatened use of military force, corresponding to *military* regimes; and popular elections, designating electoral regimes. Among the latter we distinguish among *no-party* regimes (where all parties are prohibited), *one-party* regimes (where all but one party is prohibited), and *limited multiparty regimes* (where multiple parties are allowed but the system still does not pass as democratic); a subtype of these regimes where no parties are present, although not being prohibited, are coded as “partyless” regimes. A subtype of military regimes are coded “rebel regimes”, where a rebel

movement has taken power by military means. We also code hybrids (or amalgams) combining elements from more than one regime type, as well as several minor types of regimes: “theocracies”, “transitional” regimes, “civil war”, foreign “occupation”, and a residual “other” category. Using the mean of the Freedom House and Polity scales (*fh\_ipolity2*), the line between democracies and autocracies is drawn at 7.5. This threshold value was chosen by estimating the mean cutoff point separating democracy from autocracy in five well-known categorical measures of democracy: those of Przeworski et al. (2000), Mainwaring et al. (2001), and Reich (2002), together with Freedom House’s and Polity’s own categorical thresholds for democracy.

- |                         |                          |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) Limited Multiparty  | (17) Monarchy            |
| (2) Partyless           | (18) Rebel Regime        |
| (3) No-Party            | (19) Civil War           |
| (4) Military            | (20) Occupation          |
| (5) Military No-Party   | (21) Theocracy           |
| (6) Military Multiparty | (22) Transitional Regime |
| (7) Military One-party  | (23) No-Party Monarchy   |
| (8) One-Party           | (24) Multiparty Monarchy |
| (9) Other               | (25) Multiparty Occupied |
| (16) One-Party Monarchy | (100) Democracy          |

**ht\_regspec Regime Type (separating dominant multiparty systems)**

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 5753, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$  : 169,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)  
 (Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

*ht\_regspec* corresponds to *ht\_regtype* in every aspect apart from its separation of the dominant multiparty regime. This regime type is a subcategory for the multiparty system adhering to countries where the largest parties’ share of parliament is larger than 67% but less than 100% (i.e. *partsz*>0.67 but<1); this threshold corresponds to Geddes (1999) classification of the same.

- |                         |                          |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) Limited Multiparty  | (18) Rebel Regime        |
| (2) Partyless           | (19) Civil War           |
| (3) No-Party            | (20) Occupation          |
| (4) Military            | (21) Theocracy           |
| (5) Military No-Party   | (22) Transitional Regime |
| (6) Military Multiparty | (23) No-Party Monarchy   |
| (7) Military One-party  | (24) Multiparty Monarchy |
| (8) One-Party           | (25) Dominant Multiparty |
| (9) Other               | (26) Multiparty Occupied |
| (16) One-Party Monarchy | (100) Democracy          |
| (17) Monarchy           |                          |

**ht\_regtype1 Regime Type (collapsed)**

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 5753, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$  : 169,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)  
 (Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

A simplified, collapsed version of *ht\_regtype*, where all monarchical regimes with amalgams [*ht\_regtype* =16, 17, 23 or 24] are treated as monarchies, all military regimes with sub-types and amalgams [*ht\_regtype*=4, 5, 6, 7 or 18] are treated as military regimes, and multiparty regimes with sub-types are treated as multiparty regimes [*ht\_regtype*=1 or 2]. Only pure noparty [*ht\_regtype*=3] and one-party [*ht\_regtype*=8] regimes are treated as no-party and one-party regimes, respectively. The minor types [*ht\_regtype*=9, 19, 20, 21, 22 or 25] are treated as other.

- (1) Monarchy
- (2) Military
- (3) One party
- (4) Multi-party
- (9) No-party
- (99) Other
- (100) Democracy

**ht\_partsz      Size of Largest Party in Legislature (in fractions)**

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 5727, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$  : 168,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)  
 (Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

Counts the largest parties' number of seats divided by the legislative assemblies' total number of seats expressed in fractions. In countries with a two-chamber parliament the lower house is counted.

**ht\_partsz1      Size of Largest Party (in fractions), zero for One-Party Regimes**

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 5727, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$  : 168,  $\bar{T}$  : 29)  
 (Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

Codes all one-party regimes as 0 instead of 1 as is done in *ht\_partsz*, otherwise this variable corresponds to the former variable *ht\_partsz*. When the degree of "dominantness" of the largest party *within multiparty regimes* is to be controlled for, this variable should be used.

**Hadenius & Teorell – Region and Colonial Origin**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 205)  
 (Cross-section: NA, N: 192)  
 (Teorell and Hadenius 2005)

**ht\_region      The Region of the Country**

This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with the partial exception of category 5 below) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow:

- (1) Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia)
- (2) Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)
- (3) North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus)

- (4) Sub-Saharan Africa
- (5) Western Europe and North America (including Australia & New Zealand)
- (6) East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia)
- (7) South-East Asia
- (8) South Asia
- (9) The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zealand)
- (10) The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)

**ht\_region2 The Region of the Country (alternative)**

To flag some of the most contested cases, we have in the alternative variable, ht\_region2, coded Cyprus (considering the Greek majority of their population) as belonging to category (5), Haiti (considering their non-Spanish colonial legacy and membership in Caricom) as belonging to category (10), and Mongolia (considering their post-communist legacy) as belonging to category (1).

**ht\_colonial Colonial Origin**

This is a tenfold classification of the former colonial ruler of the country. Following Bernard et al (2004), we have excluded the British settler colonies (the US, Canada, Australia, Israel and New Zealand), and exclusively focused on "Western overseas" colonialism. This implies that only Western colonizers (e.g. excluding Japanese colonialism), and only countries located in the non-Western hemisphere "overseas" (e.g. excluding Ireland & Malta), have been coded. Each country that has been colonized since 1700 is coded. In cases of several colonial powers, the last one is counted, if it lasted for 10 years or longer. The categories are the following:

- (0) Never colonized by a Western overseas colonial power
- (1) Dutch
- (2) Spanish
- (3) Italian
- (4) US
- (5) British
- (6) French
- (7) Portuguese
- (8) Belgian
- (9) British-French
- (10) Australian

**Henisz – The Political Constraints Index (POLCON)**

[http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/\\_vti\\_bin/shtml.dll/POLCON/ContactInfo.html](http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/_vti_bin/shtml.dll/POLCON/ContactInfo.html)

(Henisz 2000; 2002)

**h\_polcon3 Political Constraints Index III**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7880, N: 196,  $\bar{N}$  : 134,  $\bar{T}$  : 40)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 182)

This index measures the feasibility of policy change, i.e. the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. The index is composed from the following information: the number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, counting the executive and the presence of an effective lower and upper house in the legislature (more branches leading to more constraint); the extent of party alignment across branches of government, measured as the extent to which the same party or coalition of parties control each branch (decreasing the level of constraint); and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch, measured as legislative fractionalization in the relevant house (increasing constraint for aligned executives, decreasing it for opposed executives). The index scores are derived from a simple spatial model and theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and thus less feasibility of policy change. Note that the coding reflects information as of January 1 in any given year. Henisz (2002) uses this index to demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure.

#### **h\_polcon5 Political Constraints Index V**

(Time-series: 1960-2004, n: 6485, N: 182,  $\bar{N}$  : 144,  $\bar{T}$  : 36)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 167)

This index follows the same logic as Political Constraints Index III (h\_polcon3) but also includes two additional veto points: the judiciary and sub-federal entities. Note that the coding reflects information as of January 1 in any given year. Henisz (2000) uses this index to measure the impact on cross-national growth rates of a government's ability to provide credible commitment.

#### **h\_11 Legislative Chamber**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 8362, N: 200,  $\bar{N}$  : 142,  $\bar{T}$  : 42)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 188)

Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an effective legislative chamber (based on information from Polity's Executive Constraints, p\_xconst).

#### **h\_12 2nd Legislative Chamber**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 8182, N: 194,  $\bar{N}$  : 139,  $\bar{T}$  : 42)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 182)

Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an effective second legislative chamber, namely, where h\_11=1 and records on the composition of a second chamber exist - where that chamber is elected under a distinct electoral system *and* has a substantive (not merely delaying) role in the implementation of fiscal policy.

#### **h\_j Independent Judiciary**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 6575, N: 179,  $\bar{N}$  : 111,  $\bar{T}$  : 37)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 166)



Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an independent judiciary (based on information from Polity's Executive Constraints,  $p\_xconst$ ) and - where available - on ICRG's index of Law & Order).

**h\_f Independent Sub-Federal Unit**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 6870, N: 189,  $\bar{N}$ : 116,  $\bar{T}$ : 36)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 177)

Dummy variable coded 1 if there are independent sub-federal units (states, provinces, regions etc.) that impose substantive constraints on national fiscal policy.

**h\_align1 Alignment Executive/Legislative Chamber (lower)**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 5216, N: 176,  $\bar{N}$ : 88,  $\bar{T}$ : 30)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 150)

Dummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the lower legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the lower legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.

**h\_align2 Alignment Executive/Legislative Chamber (upper)**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 1381, N: 57,  $\bar{N}$ : 24,  $\bar{T}$ : 24)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 33)

Dummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the upper legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the upper legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.

**h\_align112 Alignment Lower/Upper Legislative Chamber**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 1381, N: 57,  $\bar{N}$ : 24,  $\bar{T}$ : 24)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 33)

Dummy variable indicating alignment between the legislative chambers, coded 1 when the same party or a coalition of parties (when available) control a majority in both legislative chambers.

**h\_iflo Legislative Fractionalization (lower)**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 6125, N: 190,  $\bar{N}$ : 104,  $\bar{T}$ : 32)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 171)

Legislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the lower legislative chamber will be from different parties.

**h\_ifup Legislative Fractionalization (upper)**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 1565, N: 67,  $\bar{N}$ : 27,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 33)

Legislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the upper legislative chamber will be from different parties.

## **Heritage Foundation**

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 1949, N: 163,  $\bar{N}$ : 150,  $\bar{T}$ : 12)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 154)

<http://www.heritage.org/index/>

### **hf\_efiscore Economic Freedom Index**

The Economic Freedom index uses 10 specific freedoms, some as composites of even further detailed and quantifiable components:

- Business freedom (hf\_business)
- Trade freedom (hf\_trade)
- Fiscal freedom (hf\_fiscal)
- Freedom from government (hf\_govt)
- Monetary freedom (hf\_monetary)
- Investment freedom (hf\_invest)
- Financial freedom (hf\_financ)
- Property rights (hf\_prights)
- Freedom from corruption (hf\_corrupt)
- Labor freedom (hf\_labor)

Each of these freedoms is weighted equally and turned into an index ranging from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum economic freedom. Although changes in methodology have been undertaken throughout the measurement period, continuous backtracking has been used to maximize comparability over time.

### **hf\_business Business Freedom**

The business freedom score encompasses 10 components, all weighted equally, based on objective data from the World Bank's *Doing Business* study (in 2005-2006; previously other data sources were being used):

- Starting a business - procedures (number)
- Starting a business - time (days)
- Starting a business - cost (% of income per capita)
- Starting a business - minimum capital (% of income per capita)
- Obtaining a license - procedures (number)
- Obtaining a license - time (days)
- Obtaining a license - cost (% of income per capita)
- Closing a business - time (years)
- Closing a business - cost (% of estate)
- Closing a business - recovery rate (cents on the dollar)

Each of these raw components is converted into a scale graded from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of business freedom.

### **hf\_trade Trade Freedom**

The trade freedom score is based on two inputs:

- The trade-weighted average tariff rate

- Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)

Weighted average tariffs is a purely quantitative measure and accounts for the basic calculation of the score. The presence of NTBs in a country affects its trade freedom score by incurring a penalty of up to 20 percentage points, or one-fifth of the maximum score. The country's trade freedom ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of trade freedom.

#### **hf\_fiscal      Fiscal Freedom**

Fiscal freedom is composed of three quantitative components in equal measure:

- The top tax rate on individual income
- The top tax rate on corporate income
- Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP

In scoring the fiscal freedom factor, each of these numerical variables is weighted equally as one-third of the factor. This equal weighting allows a country to achieve a score as high as 67 percent based on two of the components even if it receives a score of 0 percent on the third. The country's fiscal freedom ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of fiscal freedom.

#### **hf\_govt      Freedom from Government**

Scoring of the freedom from government factor is based on two components:

- Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP
- Revenues generated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and property as a percentage of total government revenue.

Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is weighted as two-thirds of the freedom from government factor score, and revenue from SOEs is weighted as one-third. In cases where SOE data does not exist, the data is excluded from the factor score. The country's freedom from government ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of freedom from government.

#### **hf\_monetary      Monetary Freedom**

The score for the monetary freedom factor is based on two components:

- The weighted average inflation rate for the three most recent years
- Price controls.

The weighted average inflation (WAI) rate for the three most recent years serves as the primary input into an equation that generates the base score for monetary freedom (MF). The extent of price controls is then assessed as a penalty of up to 20 percent subtracted from the base score. The country's monetary freedom ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of monetary freedom.

#### **hf\_invest      Investment Freedom**

This factor scrutinizes each country's policies toward foreign investment, as well as its policies toward capital flows internally, in order to determine its overall investment climate. The country's investment freedom ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of investment freedom.

### **hf\_financ      Financial Freedom**

The financial freedom factor measures the relative openness of each country's banking and financial system by determining: the extent of government regulation of financial services; the extent of state intervention in banks and other financial services; the difficulty of opening and operating financial services firms (for both domestic and foreign individuals); and government influence on the allocation of credit. The country's financial climate is measured as an overall score between 0 and 100, where 100 represent the maximum degree of financial freedom.

### **hf\_prights      Property Rights**

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 1949, N: 163,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 12)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 155)

This factor scores the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also accounts for the possibility that private property will be expropriated. In addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The less certain the legal protection of property is and the greater the chances of government expropriation of property are, the higher a country's score is. The country's property rights score ranges from 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of protection of property rights.

### **hf\_corrupt      Freedom from Corruption**

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 1949, N: 163,  $\bar{N}$  : 150,  $\bar{T}$  : 12)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 154)

This factor relies on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which measures the level of corruption in 152 countries, to determine the freedom from corruption scores of countries that are also listed in the *Index of Economic Freedom*. The CPI is based on a 10-point scale in which a score of 10 indicates very little corruption and a score of 0 indicates a very corrupt government. In scoring freedom from corruption, the authors convert each of these raw CPI data to a 0-100 scale by multiplying the CPI scores by 10.

### **hf\_labor      Labor Freedom**

(Time-series: 2004-2006, n: 466, N: 156,  $\bar{N}$  : 155,  $\bar{T}$  : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 153)

The new labor freedom factor is a quantitative factor based on objective data from the World Bank's *Doing Business* study. It provides reliable cross-country data on regulations concerning minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoffs, severance requirements, and measurable regulatory burdens on hiring, hours, and so on. Specifically, four quantitative components are equally weighted as 25 percent of the labor freedom factor:

- Minimum wage
- Rigidity of hours
- Difficulty of firing redundant employees
- Cost of firing redundant employees

The country's labor freedom score ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of labor freedom.

### **Heston, Summers & Aten – Penn World Table**

[http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php\\_site/pwt\\_index.php](http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php)

(Heston et al 2002)

#### **pwt\_rgdph Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)**

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 5728, N: 164,  $\bar{N}$  : 112,  $\bar{T}$  : 35)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 131)

Real GDP per capita (Chain) is a chain index obtained by first applying the component growth rates between each pair of consecutive years, t-1 and t (t=1951 to 2000), to the current price component shares in year t-1 to obtain the domestic absorption (DA) growth rate for each year. This DA growth rate for each year t is then applied backwards and forwards from 1996, and summed to the constant price net foreign balance to obtain the Chain GDP series.

### **IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)**

<http://www.idea.int/esd/index.cfm>

#### **idea\_esd Electoral System Design**

(Cross-section: 1969-2001 (varies by country), N: 191)

The ESD-categories are the following:

- (1) Alternative Vote (AV)
- (2) Borda Count (BC)
- (3) Block Vote (BV)
- (4) First Past The Post (FPTP)
- (5) List Proportional Representation (List PR)
- (6) Mixed Member Proportional System (MMP)
- (7) No provisions for direct elections (N)
- (8) Party Block Vote (PBV)
- (9) Parallel Systems
- (10) Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)
- (11) Single Transferable Vote (STV)
- (12) Two-Round System (TRS)
- (13) Limited Vote (LV)

### **Johnson & Wallack**

<http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jwjohnso/espv.htm>

(Johnson & Wallack 2006)

This database updates, expands and (to some extent) corrects the electoral systems coding presented in Wallack et al. (2003). As in the original database, the underlying rationale for coding is derived from Carey & Shugart (1995) and it takes into account four dimensions of the electoral system: ballot, vote, pool, and district magnitude.

### **Summary indices:**

#### **jw\_persr      Personalistic Tier**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2267, N: 127,  $\bar{N}$ : 81,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

This variable ranks countries in increasing order of incentives to cultivate a personal vote according to their more personalistic tier (or tier with the greater incentives to cultivate a personal vote). The variable varies from 1 to 13, corresponding to the thirteen positions in Carey & Shugart's (1995) ranking. For example, a country with a ranking of 13 would have a tier with the highest possible rank of incentives to cultivate a personal vote, although that tier may only account for a minority or small fraction of its members.

#### **jw\_domr      Dominant or Populous Tier**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2237, N: 126,  $\bar{N}$ : 80,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 121)

This variable ranks countries in increasing order of incentives to cultivate a personal vote according to their most dominant or populous tier (or tier with the greater number of legislators). The variable varies from 1 to 13, corresponding to the thirteen positions in Carey & Shugart's (1995) ranking. For example, a country with a ranking of 1 would have a tier with the lowest possible rank of personal vote incentives, and that tier would account for the majority of the members in the assembly.

### **Ballot variables:**

The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

- (0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order);
- (1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list);
- (2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

**jw\_smdballot Party Control over Ballot – SMD (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 1086, N: 71,  $\bar{N}$ : 39,  $\bar{T}$ : 15)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 66)

Ballot (coded as above) for single-member district tiers in elections to the lower house.

**jw\_smdballot2 Party Control over Ballot – SMD (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 129, N: 8,  $\bar{N}$ : 5,  $\bar{T}$ : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 7)

Ballot (coded as above) for single-member district tiers in elections to the upper house.

**jw\_mmdballot Party Control over Ballot – MMD (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 1621, N: 94,  $\bar{N}$ : 58,  $\bar{T}$ : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 89)

Ballot (coded as above) for multi-member district tiers in elections to the lower house.

**jw\_mmdballot2 Party Control over Ballot – MMD (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 298, N: 16,  $\bar{N}$ : 11,  $\bar{T}$ : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 14)

Ballot (coded as above) for multi-member district tiers in elections to the upper house.

**jw\_avgballot Party Control over Ballot (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2369, N: 133,  $\bar{N}$ : 85,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 127)

Country-level weighted averages of Party Control over Ballot – SMD (lower/only house) (jw\_smdballot) and Party Control over Ballot – MMD (lower/only house) (jw\_mmdballot), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of ballots for the average member sitting in the lower house.

**jw\_avgballot2 Party Control over Ballot (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 473, N: 24,  $\bar{N}$ : 17,  $\bar{T}$ : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

Country-level weighted averages of Party Control over Ballot – SMD (upper house) (jw\_smdballot2) and Party Control over Ballot – MMD (upper house) (jw\_mmdballot2), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of ballots for the average member sitting in the upper house.

**jw\_indy Ballot Access for Independent Candidates (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 1989, N: 106,  $\bar{N}$ : 71,  $\bar{T}$ : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 103)

Equals 1 wherever independent candidates are legally allowed (even where the legal requirements are strict), and 0 otherwise. This complements the cases where the ballot variables above equal 1 or 2, since they are adjusted to capture *de facto* practice. *jw\_indy* instead captures the *de jure* rules. A user could adjust the ballot variables above to be *de jure* if (s)he replaced values of 2 with values of 1 when *jw\_indy* = 0. Refers to lower house elections.

***jw\_indy2* Ballot Access for Independent Candidates (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 424, N: 21,  $\bar{N}$  : 15,  $\bar{T}$  : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 20)

Same as *jw\_indy*, but for upper house elections.

**Vote Variables:**

The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

- (0) where voters have only one vote for a party;
- (1) where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts);
- (2) where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

***jw\_smdvote* Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – SMD (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 1111, N: 73,  $\bar{N}$  : 40,  $\bar{T}$  : 15)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 68)

Vote (coded as above) for single-member district tiers in elections to the lower house.

***jw\_smdvote2* Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – SMD (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 129, N: 8,  $\bar{N}$  : 5,  $\bar{T}$  : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 7)

Vote (coded as above) for single-member district tiers in elections to the upper house.

***jw\_mmdvote* Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – MMD (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 1574, N: 90,  $\bar{N}$  : 56,  $\bar{T}$  : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 86)

Vote (coded as above) for multi-member district tiers in elections to the lower house.

***jw\_mmdvote2* Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – MMD (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 298, N: 16,  $\bar{N}$  : 11,  $\bar{T}$  : 19)



(Cross-section: 2002, N: 14)

Vote (coded as above) for multi-member district tiers in elections to the upper house.

**jw\_avgvote Candidate- or Party-specific Voting (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2347, N: 131,  $\bar{N}$  : 84,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 126)

Country-level weighted averages of Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – SMD (lower/only house) (jw\_smdvote) and Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – MMD (lower/only house) (jw\_mmdvote), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of votes for the average member sitting in the lower house.

**jw\_avgvote2 Candidate- or Party-specific Voting (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 473, N: 24,  $\bar{N}$  : 17,  $\bar{T}$  : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

Country-level weighted averages of Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – SMD (upper house) (jw\_smdvote2) and Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – MMD (upper house) (jw\_mmdvote2), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of votes for the average member sitting in the upper house.

**Pool Variables:**

The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

- (0) where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district;
- (1) where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5% or less of a legislature's membership;
- (2) where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

**jw\_smdpool Sharing of Votes among Candidates – SMD (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 1111, N: 73,  $\bar{N}$  : 40,  $\bar{T}$  : 15)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 68)

Pool (coded as above) for single-member district tiers in elections to the lower house.

**jw\_smdpool2 Sharing of Votes among Candidates – SMD (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 129, N: 8,  $\bar{N}$  : 5,  $\bar{T}$  : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 7)

Pool (coded as above) for single-member district tiers in elections to the upper house.

**jw\_mmdpool Sharing of Votes among Candidates – MMD (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 1601, N: 94,  $\bar{N}$  : 57,  $\bar{T}$  : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 88)

Pool (coded as above) for multi-member district tiers in elections to the lower house.

**jw\_mmdpool2 Sharing of Votes among Candidates – MMD (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 304, N: 17,  $\bar{N}$  : 11,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 15)

Pool (coded as above) for multi-member district tiers in elections to the upper house.

**jw\_avgpool Sharing of Votes among Candidates (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2374, N: 135,  $\bar{N}$  : 85,  $\bar{T}$  : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 128)

Country-level weighted averages of Sharing of Votes among Candidates – SMD (lower/only house) (jw\_smdpool) and Sharing of Votes among Candidates – MMD (lower/only house) (jw\_mmdpool), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of the pooling of votes for the average member sitting in the lower house.

**jw\_avgpool2 Sharing of Votes among Candidates (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 473, N: 24,  $\bar{N}$  : 17,  $\bar{T}$  : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

Country-level weighted averages of Sharing of Votes among Candidates – SMD (upper house) (jw\_smdpool2) and Sharing of Votes among Candidates – MMD (upper house) (jw\_mmdpool2), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of the pooling of votes for the average member sitting in the upper house.

**District Magnitude Variables:**

**jw\_mcand District Magnitude of Average Legislator (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2138, N: 124,  $\bar{N}$  : 76,  $\bar{T}$  : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 103)

In keeping with the emphasis on the incentives faced by individual legislators, this variable measures the district magnitude considering the viewpoint of the average legislator in the lower house. It is scored as a weighted average of the various district sizes, where weights are computed as the number of legislators running in the district of each magnitude divided by the total number of seats. For example: A country with 300 seats divided among one national district with 200 members and 100 single-member districts has a magnitude for the average legislator of  $[(200*200) + (100*1)]/300$ , which yields a figure of 133.67.

**jw\_mcand2 District Magnitude of Average Legislator (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 654, N: 43,  $\bar{N}$ : 23,  $\bar{T}$ : 15)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 21)

This is the district magnitude of the average legislator in the upper house.

**jw\_mdist Average District Magnitude (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 3100, N: 161,  $\bar{N}$ : 111,  $\bar{T}$ : 19)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 147)

This is the standard magnitude of the average district in the lower house. For example: A country with 300 seats divided among one national district with 200 members and 100 single-member districts would have an average district magnitude (jw\_mdist) of 2.97 (i.e., 300/101).

**jw\_mdist2 Average District Magnitude (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 567, N: 29,  $\bar{N}$ : 20,  $\bar{T}$ : 20)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 26)

This is the average district magnitude in the upper house.

**General characteristics:**

**jw\_bicameral Bicameral System**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 3729, N: 172,  $\bar{N}$ : 133,  $\bar{T}$ : 22)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 163)

Dummy variable, 1 if bicameral system.

**jw\_election Year of Election (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2274, N: 152,  $\bar{N}$ : 81,  $\bar{T}$ : 15)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 127)

Dummy variable, 1 if year of election to lower house.

**jw\_election2 Year of Election (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 421, N: 26,  $\bar{N}$ : 15,  $\bar{T}$ : 16)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

Dummy variable, 1 if year of election to upper house.

**jw\_legsize Number of Coded Legislators (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2709, N: 155,  $\bar{N}$ : 97,  $\bar{T}$ : 17)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 147)

**jw\_legsize2 Number of Coded Legislators (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 557, N: 32,  $\bar{N}$ : 20,  $\bar{T}$ : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

The number of legislators coded in the dataset. These may not account for the total number of legislators if there are appointed legislators that have no electoral rules to code.

### **jw\_multiround Runoff Elections**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2089, N: 111,  $\bar{N}$ : 75,  $\bar{T}$ : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 108)

The variable indicates whether there are run-off elections. These are usually for SMDs with absolute majority requirements. Where *jw\_multiround* is equal to 1, voters have more than a single vote to cast, albeit votes occur on separate election days.

### **jw\_multitier Multi Tier (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2420, N: 138,  $\bar{N}$ : 86,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 131)

### **jw\_multitier2 Multi Tier (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 493, N: 28,  $\bar{N}$ : 18,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Equals 1 wherever there are multiple allocation tiers, regardless of whether they are the result of mixed member systems that incorporate different members under different rules, or systems that have upper tiers within a single electoral system to compensate for disproportionality in lower tiers.

### **jw\_oneparty Single Party System**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 3484, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$ : 124,  $\bar{T}$ : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 135)

Dummy variable, 1 if single-party system.

### **jw\_parallel Tiers allocated in Parallel**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 257, N: 21,  $\bar{N}$ : 9,  $\bar{T}$ : 12)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 20)

Coded 1 if multiple tiers are elected in parallel fashion, 0 when they are elected in (at least somewhat) compensatory fashion. Is coded only when *jw\_multitier* = 1.

### **jw\_propn Seats from a National District (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 3425, N: 170,  $\bar{N}$ : 122,  $\bar{T}$ : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 129)

### **jw\_propn2 Seats from a National District (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 1106, N: 67,  $\bar{N}$ : 40,  $\bar{T}$ : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

This is the proportion of coded legislators that are elected via a national tier. This is often (but not always) similar to the proportion elected via multi-member districts (`jw_propmmd`): some electoral systems have proportional representation based on regional multimember districts as well as national tiers (e.g. Hungary).

**`jw_propsmmd` Seats from Single-Member Districts (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2705, N: 155,  $\bar{N}$ : 97,  $\bar{T}$ : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 146)

**`jw_propsmmd2` Seats from Single-Member Districts (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 422, N: 23,  $\bar{N}$ : 15,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 21)

This is the proportion of coded legislators elected in single-member districts. (Note: In the original data for Kyrgyzstan `propsmmd2=60` in 1997-1999 and `propsmmd2=45` 2000-2004. We have replaced these figures with missing values.)

**`jw_propmmd` Seats from Multi-Member Districts (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2760, N: 156,  $\bar{N}$ : 99,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 147)

**`jw_propmmd2` Seats from Multi-Member Districts (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 479, N: 26,  $\bar{N}$ : 17,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 24)

This is the proportion of coded legislators elected in multi-member districts.

**`jw_propcoded` Proportion Coded Legislators (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 3545, N: 171,  $\bar{N}$ : 127,  $\bar{T}$ : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 142)

**`jw_propcoded2` Proportion Coded Legislators (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 874, N: 52,  $\bar{N}$ : 31,  $\bar{T}$ : 17)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

This is the proportion of the total number of legislators (elected and non-elected) that are coded.

**`jw_tiervote` Tiervote (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 2143, N: 111,  $\bar{N}$ : 77,  $\bar{T}$ : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 109)

**`jw_tiervote2` Tiervote (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 364, N: 18,  $\bar{N}$ : 13,  $\bar{T}$ : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 17)

Equals 1 when citizens are given a separate vote for deputies in each legislative tier.

**jw\_rank Rank Vote (lower/only house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 1785, N: 90,  $\bar{N}$  : 64,  $\bar{T}$  : 20)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 88)

Equals 1 in two circumstances: where voters may rank order candidates according to preference, or where citizens have multiple preference votes for multiple candidates, even if they may not specifically rank the candidates. Otherwise, jw\_rank is equal to zero. Refers to lower house elections.

**jw\_rank2 Rank Vote (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1978-2005, n: 424, N: 21,  $\bar{N}$  : 15,  $\bar{T}$  : 20)  
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 20)

Same as jw\_rank, but for upper house elections.

**La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny**

<http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications/LaPorta%20PD%20Papers-ALL/Quality%20of%20Govt-All/Quality%20of%20Govt.xls>

(La Porta et al 1999)

**lp\_legor Legal origin**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 190)  
(Cross-section: NA, N: 189)

Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial code of each country. There are five possible origins:

- (1) English Common Law
- (2) French Commercial Code
- (3) Socialist/Communist Laws
- (4) German Commercial Code
- (5) Scandinavian Commercial Code

**lp\_lat\_abst Latitude**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 187)  
(Cross-section: NA, N: 187)

The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 1).

**Religion**

Original sources: Barrett (1982), Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (1995), Statistical Abstract of the World (1995), United Nations (1995) and CIA (1996).

**lp\_cath080 Religion: Catholic**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 187)  
(Cross-section: 1980 (1990-1995 for countries of recent formation), N: 187)

Catholics as percentage of population in 1980.

**lp\_muslim80 Religion: Muslim**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 187)

(Cross-section: 1980 (1990-1995 for countries of recent formation), N: 187)

Muslims as percentage of population in 1980.

**lp\_protmg80 Religion: Protestant**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 184)

(Cross-section: 1980 (1990-1995 for countries of recent formation), N: 184)

Protestants as percentage of population in 1980.

**lp\_no\_cpm80 Religion: Other Denomination**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 184)

(Cross-section: 1980 (1990-1995 for countries of recent formation), N: 184)

Percentage of population belonging to other denominations in 1980. Defined as  $100 - lp\_catho80 - lp\_muslim80 - lp\_protmg80$ .

**Maddison**

<http://www.ggd.net/maddison/>

(Maddison 2003)

**mad\_pop Population (thousand)**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 11304, N: 197,  $\bar{N}$ : 185,  $\bar{T}$ : 57)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 190)

Population (1000's at mid-year).

Note: Although Serbia and Montenegro split into two separate states in 2006, Maddison's dataset considers the population for the two states combined.

**mad\_gdp GDP levels (million)**

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7875, N: 162,  $\bar{N}$ : 136,  $\bar{T}$ : 49)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 155)

GDP levels in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. (The Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time.)

**mad\_gdppc GDP per Capita**

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7871, N: 162,  $\bar{N}$ : 136,  $\bar{T}$ : 49)

(Cross-section: 1500, 1600, 1700, 1820, 1900, 2002, N: 154)

GDP per Capita in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. (The Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time.)

Maddison provides historical GDP data back to year 1 A.D. In the cross-section version of the QoG dataset, we include data from the years 1500, 1600, 1700, 1820, 1900 and 2002 (one variable for each year).

## **Persson & Tabellini**

[http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=1169&tbn=albero&id\\_folder=177](http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=1169&tbn=albero&id_folder=177)

(Persson and Tabellini 2003)

Persson and Tabellini only include countries of democratic rule in their sample. To be included in the cross-section, an average of the Freedom House indices for civil liberties and political rights (fh\_cl and fh\_pr) lower than an average of 5 for the 1990-1998 period is required. For the 1960-1998 panel data, Persson and Tabellini include country-years that obtain a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p\_polity2) (For details, see Persson and Tabellini 2003, 74-77.)

### **pt\_federal Federal Political Structure**

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 2340, N: 61,  $\bar{N}$ : 60,  $\bar{T}$ : 38)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 83)

Dummy variable, 1 if the country has a federal political structure and 0 otherwise.

### **pt\_magn Inverse of District Magnitude**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 84)

Inverse of district magnitude, defined as districts (the number of electoral districts in a country, including the number of primary as well as secondary and tertiary districts if applicable) over the number of seats (pt\_seats).

### **pt\_maj Majoritarian Electoral Systems**

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 2179, N: 61,  $\bar{N}$ : 56,  $\bar{T}$ : 36)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Dummy variable, 1 if the lower house is selected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered.

### **pt\_pind Ballot Structure 1**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Continuous measure of the ballot structure defined as the proportion of legislators elected by plurality rule via a vote on individuals (as opposed to party lists). Computed as  $1 - \text{list}/\text{pt\_seats}$ , where list is the number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems.

### **pt\_pindo Ballot Structure 2**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)



Continuous measure of the ballot structure defined as the proportion of legislators in the lower house elected individually or on open lists. Computed as  $1 - \text{list}/\text{pt\_seats} * \text{clist}$ , where list is the number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems and clist is a dummy variable for closed party lists.

**pt\_pres      Forms of Government**

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 2340, N: 61,  $\bar{N}$  : 60,  $\bar{T}$  : 38)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Dummy variable, 1 for presidential regimes and 0 otherwise. Only regimes in which the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in power (even if an elected president is not the chief executive, or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes. Most semi-presidential and premier-presidential systems are classified as parliamentary.

**pt\_sdm      Weighted Inverse District Magnitude**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 77)

Inverse of district magnitude, where the weight on each district is the share of legislators running in districts of that size.

**pt\_seats      Number of Seats**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 84)

The number of seats in lower or single chambers for the last legislature of each country. It is also related to the number of districts in which primary elections are held.

**Roeder**

<http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm>

(Roeder 2001)

**r\_roberts      Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 53)

(Cross-section: Year unknown, N: 49)

Measures probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Reprint from the index published in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274).

Original source: Roberts (1962).

**r\_muller      Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 108)

(Cross-section: Year unknown, N: 101)

Measures probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Reprint from the index published in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274).

Original source: Muller (1964).

**r\_atlas      Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 129)

(Cross-section: 1960, N: 121)

Measures probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Reprint from the index published in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274).

Original source: Atlas Narodov Mira (1964).

**r\_elf61      Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1961.**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 150)

(Cross-section: 1961, N: 139)

**r\_elf85      Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1985.**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 179)

(Cross-section: 1985, N: 171)

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group, where the latter is defined without collapsing any sub-groups in the sources. (For original sources, see Roeder 2001.)

**Sachs – Malaria Risk**

(Cross-section: 1994, N: 160)

<http://www.nber.org/papers/w9490.pdf>

(Sachs 2003)

**sa\_mr      Malaria Risk**

The proportion of the population living with risk of malaria transmission. The variable is measured by combining the 1994 WHO world map of malaria risk with a map of the world population.

**sa\_fmnr      Fatal Malaria Risk**

The proportion of the population living with risk of fatal malaria transmission. The variable is based on sa\_mr, multiplied by an estimate of the proportion of malaria cases that involve the fatal species (*Plasmodium falciparum*).

**Treisman**

<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/>

(Treisman 2007)

**t\_demyrs      Years of Democracy**

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 173)

The number of consecutive years since 1930 the system had been democratic as of 2000, as classified by Beck et al. (2001). Note this is adapted from Beck et al.'s variable "tensys", which just measured tenure of the system, whether democratic or

authoritarian. Democracies are those with a 6 or higher on Beck et al.'s Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (dpi\_eipc).

**t\_alldem Democratic All Year from 1930 to 1995**

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 175)

Countries democratic all years from 1930 to 1995, by classification of Beck et al. 2001, coded 1 (0 otherwise). Democracies are those with a 6 or higher on Beck et al.'s Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (dpi\_eipc).

**t\_paper Newspaper per 1000 inhabitants in 1996**

(Cross-section: 1996, N: 135)

Newspapers per 1000 inhabitants, as of 1996. Original source: UNESCO.

**t\_tvsets Television sets per 1000 inhabitants in 1997**

(Cross-section: 1997, N: 141)

Television sets per 1000 inhabitants, as of 1997. Original source: World Bank.

**t\_fed Classified as a Federation**

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 191)

Countries classified as federations by Elazar (1995) plus Ethiopia, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which became federal after the article, coded 1 (0 otherwise).

**t\_subrev Subnational share of Revenues**

(Cross-section: 1995-2000, N: 60)

Subnational share of revenues, average for 1995-2000 as percent of total revenues. Original source: IMF Government Finance Statistics.

**t\_subexp Subnational share of Expenditures**

(Cross-section: 1995-2000, N: 61)

Subnational share of expenditures, average for 1995-2000, available years, as percent of total expenditures. Original source: IMF Government Finance Statistics.

**t\_fuel Mineral Fuels in Manufacturing Exports**

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 142)

Percentage of mineral fuels in manufacturing exports as of 2000. Original source: World Bank.

**UNDP - Human Development Report**

<http://hdr.undp.org/>

(UNDP 2004)

**undp\_gini    Gini Index (inequality measure)**

(Cross-section: 1983-2002 (varies by country), N: 126)

Measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini Index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value of 100 perfect inequalities.

**undp\_gdp    GDP/Capita PPP in Constant USD**

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

The sum of value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated capital assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Value added is the net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs.

\* PPP (purchasing power parity) = A rate of exchange that accounts for price differences across countries, allowing international comparisons of real output and incomes. At the PPP US\$ rate, PPP US\$1 has the same purchasing power in the domestic economy as \$1 has in the United States.

**UNU-WIDER – World Income Inequality Database**

<http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm>

**uw\_gini    Gini (mean)**

(Time-series: 1946-2005, n: 2115, N: 155,  $\bar{N}$ : 35,  $\bar{T}$ : 14)

(Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 149)

This variable measures the Gini index of income inequality as reported by UNU-WIDER (version WIID2b). The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (the society's total income accrues to only one person/household unit). In case a country in the original data has multiple observations for a given year, we include the mean of the highest quality observations (as measured by uw\_quality). Note: Both within- and cross-country comparisons are to be handled with care as these Gini coefficients are based on varying sources of information and refer to a variety of income and population concepts, sample sizes and statistical methods.

**uw\_quality    Quality (mean)**

(Time-series: 1946-2005, n: 2115, N: 155,  $\bar{N}$ : 35,  $\bar{T}$ : 14)

(Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 149)

The UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database applies the following quality ratings of its GINI-measures, where a lower value indicates higher quality:

- (1) for observations where a) the underlying concepts are known, and b) where the quality of the income concept and the survey can be judged as sufficient;
- (2) for observations where the quality of *either* the income concept *or* the survey is problematic or unknown or the estimates have not been possible to verify;
- (3) for observations where both the income concept and the survey are problematic or unknown;
- (4) for observations classified as memorandum items.

**uw\_ngini      Gini (count)**

(Time-series: 1946-2005, n: 2115, N: 155,  $\bar{N}$  : 35,  $\bar{T}$  : 14)  
 (Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 149)

The number of separate GINI measures supplied each year in the original data (of which uw\_gini provides the average).

**uw\_sdgini      Gini (standard deviation)**

(Time-series: 1951-2005, n: 896, N: 128,  $\bar{N}$  : 15,  $\bar{T}$  : 7)  
 (Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 33)

The standard deviation of those possibly separate GINI measures supplied each year in the original data (only computed for years of multiple measures).

**uw\_yom      Year of Measurement**

(Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 149)

The latest year available for each country in the cross-sectional dataset of the uw\_gini measurement.

**UTIP – University of Texas Inequality Project**

<http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html>

(Galbraith and Kum 2003; 2004)

**utip\_ehii      Estimated Household Income Inequality**

(Time-series: 1963-1999, n: 3116, N: 151,  $\bar{N}$  : 84,  $\bar{T}$  : 21)  
 (Cross-section: 1972-1999 (varies by country), N: 145)

In order to provide a more reliable and consistent measure of household income inequality, Galbraith and Kum (2004) estimate GINI coefficients through an equation whereby the Deininger and Squire (1996) high quality dataset (ds\_gini) is regressed on: a measure of manufacturing pay inequality (utip\_ipi); the ratio of manufacturing employment to population; and three dummies for data sources of the Deininger and Squire (1996) measures (income vs. expenditure, gross vs. net of taxes, household vs. personal unit of analysis). Apart from providing substantially enhanced coverage, Galbraith and Kum (2004) argue that this estimated income inequality measure produces better comparability both across countries and over time.

**utip\_yom      Year of Measurement - EHII**

(Cross-section: 1972-1999 (varies by country), N: 145)

The latest year available for each country in the cross-sectional dataset of the utip\_ehii measurement.

**utip\_ipi Industrial Pay Inequality**

(Time-series: 1963-1999, n: 3131, N: 153,  $\bar{N}$ : 85,  $\bar{T}$ : 21)

(Cross-section: 1972-1999 (varies by country), N: 146)

Based on data on pay across industrial categories in the manufacturing sector compiled by the United Nations International Development Organization (UNIDO), Galbraith and Kum (2003) compute this measure of pay inequality. The measure consists of the between-groups component of Theil's T statistic, where groups are defined using a two or three digit code of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). Larger values indicate greater manufacturing pay inequality.

**utip\_yom2 Year of Measurement - IPI**

(Cross-section: 1972-1999 (varies by country), N: 146)

The latest year available for each country in the cross-sectional dataset of the utip\_ipi measurement.

**Vanhanen – Index of Power Resources**

<http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1216/meF1216e.html>

(Vanhanen 2003a; 2003b)

The data underlying Vanhanen's indicators of power resource distribution has been taken from the beginning of each decade. In accordance with this, we have included them in our time-series dataset as decennial constants (1946-49, 1950-59, 1960-69 and so on up until 1990-99). This means that the data included in the cross-sectional dataset is from 1990 or around 1990.

**van\_urban Urban Population (%)**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 6645, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$ : 123,  $\bar{T}$ : 36)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

Urban population as a percentage of total population. Note that comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with caution as the concept of urbanity has changed over time and to some extent varies from country to country.

**van\_nagric Non-Agricultural Population (%)**

(Time-series: 1948-1998, n: 708, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$ : 118,  $\bar{T}$ : 4)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

Non-agricultural population as a percentage of total population (derived by subtracting the percentage of agricultural population from 100). Note that comparisons across time must be interpreted with caution as the population concept has to some extent changed over time.

### **van\_occup Index of Occupational Diversification**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 6645, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 123,  $\bar{T}$  : 36)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

The arithmetic mean of Urban Population % (van\_urban) and Non-Agricultural Population % (van\_nagric).

### **van\_students Students**

(Time-series: 1948-1998, n: 708, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 118,  $\bar{T}$  : 4)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

The number of students at universities or other higher education institutions per 100,000 inhabitants of the country. For the data covering 1946-79, Vanhanen has applied a time lag of one decade, which means that the data for the 1960s, for example, actually concerns the 1950s. For this time period, the lack of statistical data also means that the number of students has had to be estimated in numerous cases. Moreover, the concept of higher education has become wider over time, including other types of educational institutions than universities. The data covering 1980-99 is more reliable, although the definitions of 'universities and other degree-granting institutions' vary. In other words, comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with caution.

### **van\_studentsp Students (%)**

(Time-series: 1948-1998, n: 708, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 118,  $\bar{T}$  : 4)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

The percentage of Students (%) has been calculated in two different ways: before the year 1980 the value 1000 of van\_students is set equivalent to 100%, whereas between the years 1980-1999 the value 5000 of the same variable is set equivalent to 100%. This means that since 1980 five times more students have been needed to reach the same percentage as in the period 1946-79. In combination with the comments made above (see van\_student), comparisons across time and space must obviously be interpreted with caution.

### **van\_literates Literates (%)**

(Time-series: 1948-1998, n: 708, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 118,  $\bar{T}$  : 4)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

Literates as a percentage of adult population. Note that comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with caution as the concept of literacy has changed over time and to some extent varies from country to country.

### **van\_knowdist Index of Knowledge Distribution**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 6645, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 123,  $\bar{T}$  : 36)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

The arithmetic mean of Students % (van\_studentsp) and Literates % (van\_literates).

**van\_familyf Family Farms (%)**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 6645, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$ : 123,  $\bar{T}$ : 36)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

The area of family farms as a percentage of total cultivated area or total area of holdings. Family farms refer to holdings that are mainly cultivated by the holder family and that are owned by the cultivator family or held in owner-like possession. The upper hectare limit and other criteria of family farms vary from country to country and over time. Moreover, the data for the 1980s is based on information from 1960-80, and for the 1990s mostly from 1980 but also from the 1970s and the 1960s. In other words, comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with great caution.

**van\_decent Decentralization of Non-Agricultural Economic Resources**

(Time-series: 1980-1999, n: 3186, N: 181,  $\bar{N}$ : 159,  $\bar{T}$ : 18)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

This indicator, theoretically ranging from 0 (minimum) to 100 (maximum decentralization), has been measured in two ways. For the 1980s, it is based on a combination of the public sector's, foreign-owned enterprises' and big private enterprises' share of productive capacity or of employment in the nonagricultural sectors of the economy (or in its most important sector); the indicator is then computed as the inverse of this combined percentage. For the 1990s, another measure was used: first each country's economic system was categorized as being centrally planned, public sector dominated, market oriented with concentrated ownership, or market oriented with diversified ownership; then the degree of concentration of ownership within each category was determined. Both measurement approaches are in large part based on Vanhanen's own estimations. In other words, comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with great caution.

**van\_distec Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources**

(Time-series: 1948-1998, n: 708, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$ : 118,  $\bar{T}$ : 4)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

The arithmetic mean of Family Farms % (van\_familyf) and Decentralization of Non-Agricultural Economic Resources (van\_decent).

**van\_powres Index of Power Resources (multiplicative)**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 6645, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$ : 123,  $\bar{T}$ : 36)

(Cross-section: ~1990, N: 171)

Measures the level of dispersion of economic, intellectual, and organizational—or, for short, power—resources in society. Computed as the product of Index of Occupational Diversification (van\_occup), Index of Knowledge Distribution (van\_knowdist) and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (van\_distec), divided by 10.000, to range from 0 (low) to 100 (high relative distribution of power resources).



**van\_mean Index of Power Resources (additive)**

(Time-series: 1948-1998, n: 708, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$ : 118,  $\bar{T}$ : 4)  
(Cross-section: ~1998, N: 171)

Same as Index of Power Resources (multiplicative) (van\_powres), but instead computed as the arithmetic mean of Index of Occupational Diversification (van\_occup), Index of Knowledge Distribution (van\_knowdist) and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (van\_distec), to range from 0 (low) to 100 (high relative distribution of power resources).

## **World Development Indicators**

<http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005/>

**wdi\_gni GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$).**

(Cross-Section: 2002, N: 171)

**wdi\_inet Internet users (per 1,000 people).**

(Cross-Section: 2002, N: 152)

Source: International Telecommunication Union.

## **WYG (What You Get) Variables**

### **Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow**

<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm>

(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003)

#### **Hobbes-index**

This index reflects an attempt to measure how far nations have come from the state of nature, which Hobbes (in Leviathan, 1651) describes as a state where life is short, nasty, solitary, poor and brutish. To capture these miseries of life, the Hobbes index ranges from 0 to 100 by combining cross-national indicators of the number of deaths per capita (short), the presence of civil liberties (nasty), media communications (solitary), national income (poor), and the annual experience with civil war, revolution, and international war (brutish). Higher values indicate a longer distance from the state of nature.

#### **bdm\_hobbes Hobbes Index**

(Time-series: 1972-1997, n: 1865, N: 145,  $\bar{N}$ : 72,  $\bar{T}$ : 13)  
(Cross-section: 1997, N: 142)

#### **bdm\_short Short**

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 2982, N: 184,  $\bar{N}$ : 107,  $\bar{T}$ : 16)  
(Cross-section: 1997, N: 179)

The yearly number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants.

**bdm\_nasty Nasty**

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 4061, N: 167,  $\bar{N}$ : 145,  $\bar{T}$ : 24)  
(Cross-section: 1997, N: 158)

The Freedom House index of civil liberties.

**bdm\_solitary Solitary**

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 4603, N: 191,  $\bar{N}$ : 164,  $\bar{T}$ : 24)  
(Cross-section: 1997, N: 181)

The number of Radios per capita.

**bdm\_poor Poor**

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 4007, N: 172,  $\bar{N}$ : 143,  $\bar{T}$ : 23)  
(Cross-section: 1997, N: 166)

The logarithm of per capita income.

**bdm\_brute Brutish**

(Time-series: 1972-1997, n: 4984, N: 197,  $\bar{N}$ : 192,  $\bar{T}$ : 25)  
(Cross-section: 1997, N: 187)

The annual experience with civil war, revolution, and international war.

**Fund for Peace - Failed States Index**

[http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366](http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366)

**ffp\_fsi Failed States Index**

(Cross-Section: 2006, N: 176)

The Failed States Index includes an examination of the pressures on a state, the ability of the state to cope (the Core Five Institutions) and the specific investment risk factor in a country. The country rankings are based on the total scores of 12 indicators: *Social Indicators* – (1) Mounting Demographic Pressures; (2) Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies; (3) Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia; and (4) Chronic and Sustained Human Flight. *Economic Indicators* – (5) Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines; and (6) Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline. *Political Indicators* – (7) Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State; (8) Progressive Deterioration of Public Services; (9) Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights; (10) Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"; (11) Rise of Factionalized Elites; and (12) Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors.

For each indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0-120 (Note: the Serbia and Montenegro value of 71.9 is the population-weighted index of Serbia and of Montenegro using a population of 9,5 millions for Serbia and 0,6 millions for Montenegro).

## **Environmental Sustainability Index**

<http://www.yale.edu/esi/>

(Esty et al 2005)

### **esi Environmental Sustainability Index**

(Cross-section: 1991-2004 (MRYA - Most Recent Year Available for the stated range), N: 146)

The ESI is a composite index tracking a diverse set of socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional indicators that characterize and influence environmental sustainability at the national scale. The indicators are: Air Quality, Biodiversity, Land, Water Quality, Water Quantity, Reducing Air Pollution, Reducing Ecosystem Stress, Reducing Population Pressure, Reducing Waste & Consumption Pressures, Reducing Water Stress, Natural Resource Management, Environmental Health, Basic Human Sustenance, Exposure to Natural Disasters, Environmental Governance<sup>2</sup>, Eco-efficiency, Private Sector Responsiveness, Science and Technology, Participation in International Collaborative Efforts, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Reductions in Transboundary Environmental Pressures. Each indicator consists of up to 12 variables. The higher a country's ESI score, the better positioned it is to maintain favorable environmental conditions into the future.

### **esi\_sysair Air Quality**

(Cross-Section: 1993-2004 (MRYA), N: 146)

Consists of four indicators:

- Urban population weighted NO<sub>2</sub> concentration
- Urban population weighted SO<sub>2</sub> concentration
- Urban population weighted TSP concentration
- Indoor air pollution from solid fuel use

### **esi\_syswql Water Quality**

(Cross-Section: 1994-2003 (MRYA), N: 146)

Consists of four indicators:

- Dissolved oxygen concentration

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<sup>2</sup>The indicator Environmental Governance includes the following variables: Percentage of total land area under protected status, Ratio of gasoline price to world average, Percentage of variables missing from the CGSDI "Rio to Joburg Dashboard", Knowledge creation in environmental science, technology, and policy, IUCN member organizations per million population, Local Agenda 21 initiatives per million inhabitants, Corruption measure, Rule of law, Civil and Political Liberties, World Economic Forum Survey on environmental governance, Government effectiveness and Democracy measure.

- Electrical conductivity
- Phosphorus concentration
- Suspended solids

**esi\_watsup Percentage of population with access to improved drinking water source**

(Cross-Section: 1991-2004 (MRYA), N: 166)

Percentage of population with access to improved drinking water source.

**esi\_co2pc Carbon emissions per capita**

(Cross-Section: 2001, N: 181)

Carbon emissions per capita.

**Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations**

(Cross-section: 1990-2000, N: 173)

[www.fao.org/forestry/site/24690/en](http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/24690/en)

(FAO 2005)

**fao\_fcc90\_00 Forest Cover Change 1990-2000**

Average annual rate of change (%) 1990-2000 of forest cover and other wooded land.

**Globalbarometer/Eurobarometer**

Globalbarometer (2001-2003): <http://www.globalbarometer.net>

Eurobarometer (no. 56, oct-nov 2001):

[http://europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm)

Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2002.2):

[http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion/cceb\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm)

(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 71)

**gbar\_satdem Satisfied with Democracy – %**

Percentage of population answering ‘very satisfied’ or ‘fairly satisfied’ on the following question:

“In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [your country]?”

The question was asked in the Global Barometer Surveys as well as the Eurobarometer and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer. Several countries participate in both the Global Barometer and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer. For those countries, the values from the Global Barometer have been chosen. (The countries are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). There are country variations in the possible answers. Answers such as ‘Don’t Know’ and ‘No answer’ are not included in the percentage base.

## Heston, Summers & Aten – Penn World Table

[http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php\\_site/pwt\\_index.php](http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php)

(Heston et al 2002)

### **pwt\_openk**    **Openness to Trade**

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 5765, N: 164,  $\bar{N}$ : 113,  $\bar{T}$ : 35)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 133)

Total trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP. Constant prices, reference year 1996. GDP is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, government and exports, and subtracting imports in any given year.

### **pwt\_pop**    **Population**

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 5751, N: 164,  $\bar{N}$ : 113,  $\bar{T}$ : 35)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 134)

Population, thousands.

### **pwt\_grgdpc** **Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)**

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 5563, N: 151,  $\bar{N}$ : 111,  $\bar{T}$ : 37)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 130)

Growth rate of Real GDP per Capita.

## Holmberg – The Good Society Index

(Cross-section: 1999-2003, N: 71)

[http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working\\_papers/2007\\_6\\_Holmberg.pdf](http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working_papers/2007_6_Holmberg.pdf)

(Holmberg 2007)

### **hg\_gsi**    **Good Society Index**

The Good Society Index builds on three basic premises. First, the index consists of birth and deaths of human beings as well as the quality of life of people. The second premise is that the Good Society Index should adhere to *lex parsimoniae*, that is to the principle of Ockham's razor, meaning that a model should use a minimum number of explanatory variables. Third, the index measures subjective as well as objective characteristics. Subjective and objective indicators need to be combined, neither is sufficient as of its own.

Given these three premises the Good Society Index is operationally constructed using:

- Infant mortality data from the WHO
- Life expectancy data from the WHO
- Life satisfaction data from the World Values Survey

The three indicators all carry the same weight. Furthermore, the index is based on ranks, not on rates, which means that the countries' rank orders are utilized to build the composite index. The rank orders of each country have been summed and divided by three to yield an index value that in theory can vary between 1 (top nation on the

Good Society Index) and 71 (bottom country). A top index value of 1 and a bottom value of 71 thus tell us that these specific countries are closest and furthest away respectively from the good society among the investigated nations. But the figures do not tell how close or how far away from the maximum good society the countries are. The index is not continuous, it is a rank order scale.

### **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 3-2005)**

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7889, N: 183,  $\bar{N}$  : 134,  $\bar{T}$  : 43

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 171)

<http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict>

(Gleditsch et al. 2002)

The UCDP/PRIO Conflict Database is a free resource of information on armed conflicts of the world. The project records all armed conflicts following the definitions of Uppsala Conflict Data Program. All variables in the database follow strict definitions presented in a codebook (see <http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php>).

Classifications of armed conflicts:

- Minor armed conflict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period.
- Intermediate armed conflict: More than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle-related deaths, but fewer than 1000 per year.
- War: At least 1000 battle-related deaths per year.

#### **ucdp\_type1 Extrasystemic armed conflict**

These conflicts occur between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory.

- (0) No extra-state conflict
- (1) Extra-state minor armed conflict
- (2) Extra-state intermediate armed conflict
- (3) Extra-state war

#### **ucdp\_type2 Interstate armed conflict**

These conflicts occur between two or more states.

- (0) No interstate conflict
- (1) Interstate minor armed conflict
- (2) Interstate intermediate armed conflict
- (3) Interstate war

#### **ucdp\_type3 Internal armed conflict**

These conflicts occur between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states.

- (0) No internal conflict
- (1) Internal minor armed conflict
- (2) Internal intermediate armed conflict
- (3) Internal war

**ucdp\_type4 Internationalized internal armed conflict**

These conflicts occur between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention from other states.

- (0) No internationalized internal conflict
- (1) Internationalized internal minor armed conflict
- (2) Internationalized internal intermediate armed conflict
- (3) Internationalized internal war.

**ucdp\_count Number of Conflicts**

The number of conflicts in which the government of the country is involved.

**ucdp\_loc Conflict Location**

Consists of four indicators:

- (0) Country is not listed as location of a conflict
- (1) Country is listed as location of a minor armed conflict
- (2) Country is listed as location of an intermediate armed conflict
- (3) Country is listed as location of a war

**UNDP - Human Development Report**

<http://hdr.undp.org/>

(UNDP 2004)

**undp\_hdi Human Development Index**

(Time-series: 1975-2003, n: 1079, N: 177,  $\bar{N}$  : 135,  $\bar{T}$  : 6)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 175)

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars\*.

**undp\_gem Gender Empowerment Measure**

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 78)

A composite index measuring gender inequality in three basic dimensions of empowerment: economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making and power over economic resources. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, where a higher value indicates a higher level of gender empowerment.

**Veenhoven – World Database of Happiness**

<http://www2.eur.nl/fsw/research/veenhoven/>

**Years Lived Happy:**

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective happiness, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

**wdh\_ylh80\_83      Years Lived Happy (1980-1983)**

(Cross-section: 1980-1983, N: 20)

**wdh\_ylh90\_91      Years Lived Happy (1990-1991)**

(Cross-section: 1990-1991, N: 48)

**wdh\_ylh90\_95      Years Lived Happy (1990-1995)**

(Cross-section: 1990-1995, N: 45)

**wdh\_ylh90\_98      Years Lived Happy (1990-1998)**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998, N: 61)

**Years Lived Satisfied:**

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective life satisfaction, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

**wdh\_yls80\_83      Years Lived Satisfied (1980-1983)**

(Cross-section: 1980-1983, N: 21)

**wdh\_yls90\_91      Years Lived Satisfied (1990-1991)**

(Cross-section: 1990-1991, N: 42)

**wdh\_yls90\_95      Years Lived Satisfied (1990-1995)**

(Cross-section: 1990-1995, N: 40)

**wdh\_yls90\_98      Years Lived Satisfied (1990-1998)**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998, N: 55)

**Years in Good Mood:**

Life-expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey assessments of affect balance, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

**wdh\_ygm80\_83      Years in Good Mood (1980-1983)**

(Cross-section: 1980-1983, N: 20)

**wdh\_ygm90\_91      Years in Good Mood (1990-1991)**

(Cross-section: 1990-1991, N: 39)

**Mixed Measure:**

Life-expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective life satisfaction (combined measure of 10-step life satisfaction and 11-step best-worst life), where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1. (Note: the Serbia and Montenegro value of 33.0 is the population-weighted measure of Serbia and of Montenegro using a population of 9,5 millions for Serbia and 0,6 millions for Montenegro.)



**wdh\_lsbw95\_05**      **Life Satisfaction combined with Best-Worst Life**  
(Cross-section: 1995-2005, N: 94)

## **World Development Indicators**

<http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005/>

**wdi\_lifexp**      **Life expectancy at birth, total (years).**  
(Cross-Section: 2002, N: 180)

**wdi\_mort**      **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births).**  
(Cross-section: 2003, N: 181)

**wdi\_hiv**      **Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population aged 15-49).**  
(Cross-section: 2003, N: 148)

## **World Economic Forum**

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 128)

<http://www.weforum.org/gendergap>

**wef\_gend**      **Gender Gap Index**

All scores are reported on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1 representing maximum gender equality. The study measures the extent to which women have achieved full equality with men in five critical areas:

- Economic participation
- Economic opportunity
- Political empowerment
- Educational Attainment
- Health and well-being

## **World Resources Institute**

(Cross-section: 2004, N: 181)

[http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable\\_db/index.php?theme=7](http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.php?theme=7)

**wri\_pa16**      **Protected Areas: Percentage of Total Land Area**

Protected areas: IUCN Categories I-IV and other, percentage of total land area. The proportion of a country or region's total land area that is assigned terrestrial protected area status by the World Conservation Union (IUCN). Both IUCN categories I-VI and terrestrial protected areas that are not assigned to a category by IUCN are included here. A protected area is defined by IUCN as "an area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means." See <http://www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/> for more information on the IUCN categories.

Original source: UNEP-WCMC (2004)

## World Values Survey

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: Varies by variable, see below)

<http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/03975.xml>

(European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. EUROPEAN AND WORLD VALUES SURVEYS INTEGRATED DATA FILE, 1999-2002, RELEASE I [Computer file]. 2nd ICPSR version)

**Answers in *italics* are included in the percentage.**

**wvs\_a008m** **Feeling of happiness (mean).**

**wvs\_a008p** ***Feeling of happiness (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?

- (1) *Very happy*
- (2) *Quite happy*
- (3) *Not very happy*
- (4) *Not at all happy*

**wvs\_a009m** **State of health (mean).**

**wvs\_a009p** ***State of health (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 45)

All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is...

- (1) *Very good*
- (2) *Good*
- (3) *Fair*
- (4) *Poor*
- (5) *Very poor*

**wvs\_a062m** **How often political matters discussed (mean).**

**wvs\_a062p** ***How often political matters discussed (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?

- (1) *Frequently*
- (2) *Occasionally*
- (3) *Never*

**wvs\_a165p** ***Most people can be trusted (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

- (1) *Most people can be trusted*
- (2) *Need to be very careful*

**wvs\_a168p** *Do you think most people try to take advantage of you (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 35)

Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

- (1) *Would take advantage*
- (2) *Try to be fair*

**wvs\_a170m** **How satisfied are you with your life (mean).**

**wvs\_a170p** *How satisfied are you with your life (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

- (1) *Dissatisfied*
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) *Satisfied*

**wvs\_a173m** **How much freedom you feel (mean).**

**wvs\_a173p** *How much freedom you feel (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means none at all and 10 means a great deal to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.

- (1) *Not at all*
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)

(9)

(10) *A great deal*

**wvs\_c006m** **Satisfaction with the financial situation of household (mean).**

**wvs\_c006p** *Satisfaction with the financial situation of household (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 47)

How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?

(1) Dissatisfied

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10) *Satisfied*

**wvs\_e023m** **Interested in politics (mean).**

**wvs\_e023p** *Interested in politics (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 70)

How interested would you say you are in politics?

(1) *Very interested*

(2) *Somewhat interested*

(3) Not very interested

(4) Not at all interested

**wvs\_e150m** **How often follows politics in the news (mean).**

**wvs\_e150p** *How often follows politics in the news (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 58)

How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers?

(1) *Every day*

(2) *Several times a week*

(3) Once or twice a week

(4) Less often

(5) Never

## Ideology

**wvs\_e033m Self positioning in political scale (mean).**

**wvs\_e033p *Self positioning in political scale (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

In political matters, people talk of the left and the right. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

- (1) Left
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) Right

Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

**wvs\_e035m Incomes more equal (mean).**

**wvs\_e035p *Incomes more equal (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 69)

Incomes should be made more equal

We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

**wvs\_e036m Private ownership of business (mean).**

**wvs\_e036p *Private ownership of business (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 65)

Private ownership of business and industry should be increased

Government ownership of business and industry should be increased

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

**wvs\_e037m Government more responsibility (mean).**

**wvs\_e037p *Government more responsibility (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

The Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for

People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

**wvs\_e039m**    **Competition is good (mean).**

**wvs\_e039p**    ***Competition is good (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 69)

Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas

Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

### **Confidence**

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

- (1)    *A great deal*
- (2)    *Quite a lot*
- (3)    *Not very much*
- (4)    *None at all*

**wvs\_e069m**    **Confidence: churches (mean).**

**wvs\_e069p**    ***Confidence: churches (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

**wvs\_e070m**    **Confidence: armed forces (mean).**

**wvs\_e070p**    ***Confidence: armed forces (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

**wvs\_e072m**    **Confidence: the press (mean).**

**wvs\_e072p**    ***Confidence: the press (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

**wvs\_e073m**    **Confidence: labor unions (mean).**

**wvs\_e073p**    ***Confidence: labor unions (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

**wvs\_e074m**    **Confidence: the police (mean).**

**wvs\_e074p**    ***Confidence: the police (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

**wvs\_e075m Confidence: parliament (mean).**  
**wvs\_e075p Confidence: parliament (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

**wvs\_e076m Confidence: the civil services (mean).**  
**wvs\_e076p Confidence: the civil services (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

**wvs\_e077m Confidence: social security system (mean).**  
**wvs\_e077p Confidence: social security system (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 32)

**wvs\_e078m Confidence: television (mean).**  
**wvs\_e078p Confidence: television (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 46)

**wvs\_e079m Confidence: the government (mean).**  
**wvs\_e079p Confidence: the government (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 46)

**wvs\_e080m Confidence: the political parties (mean).**  
**wvs\_e080p Confidence: the political parties (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 46)

**wvs\_e081m Confidence: major companies (mean).**  
**wvs\_e081p Confidence: major companies (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 62)

**wvs\_e082m Confidence: the environmental protection movement (mean).**  
**wvs\_e082p Confidence: the environmental protection movement (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 45)

**wvs\_e083m Confidence: the women's movement (mean).**  
**wvs\_e083p Confidence: the women's movement (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 45)

**wvs\_e086m Confidence: the European Union (mean).**  
**wvs\_e086p Confidence: the European Union (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 46)

**wvs\_e087m Confidence: NATO (mean).**  
**wvs\_e087p Confidence: NATO (%).**  
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 45)

**wvs\_e088m Confidence: the United Nations (mean).**

**wvs\_e088p Confidence: the United Nations (%).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

**wvs\_e110m Democracy is developing in our country\* (mean).**

**wvs\_e110p Democracy is developing in our country\* (%).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 66)

On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?

- (1) *Very satisfied*
- (2) *Rather satisfied*
- (3) *Not very satisfied*
- (4) *Not at all satisfied*

\*In Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia the question was: "How satisfied are you with democracy in your country? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?"

### **Political system**

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

- (1) *Very good*
- (2) *Fairly good*
- (3) *Bad*
- (4) *Very bad*

**wvs\_e114m Having a strong leader (mean).**

**wvs\_e114p Having a strong leader (%).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

**wvs\_e115m Having experts make decisions (mean).**

**wvs\_e115p Having experts make decisions (%).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

**wvs\_e116m Having the army rule (mean).**

**wvs\_e116p Having the army rule (%).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

**wvs\_e117m Having a democratic political system (mean).**

**wvs\_e117p Having a democratic political system (%).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)



## Democracy

I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly after I read each one of them?

- (1) *Agree strongly*
- (2) *Agree*
- (3) *Disagree*
- (4) *Strongly disagree*

**wvs\_e120m** In democracy, the economic system runs badly (mean).

**wvs\_e120p** *In democracy, the economic system runs badly (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 74)

**wvs\_e121m** Democracies are indecisive (mean).

**wvs\_e121p** *Democracies are indecisive (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 74)

**wvs\_e122m** Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (mean).

**wvs\_e122p** *Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

**wvs\_e123m** Democracy may have problems but is better (mean).

**wvs\_e123p** *Democracy may have problems but is better (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 74)

**wvs\_e124m** Respect for individual human rights (mean).

**wvs\_e124p** *Respect for individual human rights (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 66)

How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays (in our country)? Do you feel there is:

- (1) *A lot of respect for individual human rights*
- (2) *Some respect*
- (3) *Not much respect*
- (4) *Not respect at all*

## Regime

**wvs\_e125m** Satisfaction with the people in national office (mean).

**wvs\_e125p** *Satisfaction with the people in national office (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 47)

How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

- (1) *Very satisfied*
- (2) *Fairly satisfied*
- (3) *Fairly dissatisfied*
- (4) *Very dissatisfied*

**wvs\_e128p** *Country is run by big interest vs. all people (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 47)

Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

- (1) *Run by few big interests*
- (2) *Run for all people*

### **Justifiable**

Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

- (1) *Never justifiable*
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) *Always justifiable*

**wvs\_f114m** **Justifiable: claiming government benefits (mean).**

**wvs\_f114p** *Justifiable: claiming government benefits (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

**wvs\_f115m** **Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (mean).**

**wvs\_f115p** *Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 62)

**wvs\_f116m** **Justifiable: cheating on taxes (mean).**

**wvs\_f116p** *Justifiable: cheating on taxes (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

**wvs\_f117m** **Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (mean).**

**wvs\_f117p** *Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

## **WVS - indices**

**wvs\_supm**    **Support for democracy (mean).**

**wvs\_supp**    **Support for democracy (% solid democrats).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 73)

Democracy-scale according to Klingemann (1999): In the first step, we added up respondent's support of the statements "Having a democratic political system" and "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government". Support for these statements could be expressed in four categories: "very good" (code 3), "fairly good" (code 2), "fairly bad" (code 1) and "very bad" (code 0) in the first statement and "agree strongly" (code 3), "agree" (code 2), "disagree" (code 1) and "disagree strongly" (code 0) in the latter. People's support for these statements has been added up to a 0-to-6 scale, with 6 representing the highest support for democracy. In the second step, we added up people's support of the statements "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" and "Having the army rule". Analogous to the first step, this creates a 0-to-6 scale of support for autocracy. In the third step, we subtracted the "support for autocracy" scale from the "support for democracy" scale to create an overall index of "autocratic versus democratic support", ranging from -6 (maximum autocratic support) to +6 (maximum democratic support). In the fourth step, we calculated for each country the percentage of people scoring on at least +4 on this index (since from +4 onward you are closer to the maximum democratic support (+6) than to the neutral point (0)). Hence, we obtain the percentage of "solid democrats" for each country.

**wvs\_orgm**    **Belong to organizations (mean).**

**wvs\_volm**    **Voluntary work for organizations (mean).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 56 (volm), 58 (orgm)).

Average number of organizations (0-14).

Which of the following organizations do you belong to or do voluntary work for?

- social welfare service for elderly
- church organization
- cultural activities
- labor unions
- political parties
- local political
- third world development or human rights
- conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights
- professional associations
- youth work
- sports or recreation
- women's group
- peace movement
- organizations concerned with health

**wvs\_theo**    **Support for theocracy (mean).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 60)

Support for theocracy is a 0-1 scale composed of four items.

“How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following”:

- “Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office” (agree coded high).
- “Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections” (agree coded low).
- “It would be better for [this country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office” (agree coded high).
- “Religious leaders should not influence government decisions” (agree coded low).

**wvs\_actm Political Action (mean).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

Average number of the following political actions that the respondents actually have carried out (0-5):

- Signing a petition
- Joining in boycotts
- Attending lawful demonstrations
- Joining unofficial strikes
- Occupying buildings or factories

**wvs\_pm4 Post-Materialism 4-item index**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

The Post-Materialism indices measure the extent to which the respondent gives top priority to economic and physical security, on the one hand; or to autonomy and self-expression on the other. The Post-Materialism 4-item index is based on the respondent’s first and second choices in the following questions:

“People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the second most important?”

	<b>1st choice</b>	<b>2nd choice</b>
I. Maintaining the order of the nation	1	1
II. Giving people more say in important government decisions	2	2
III. Fighting rising prices	3	3
IV. Protecting freedom of speech	4	4

The first and third options tap materialist priorities, while the second and fourth options tap postmaterialist priorities. If both materialist items are given high priority, the score is “1”; if both postmaterialist items are given high priority, the score is “3”; if one materialist item and one postmaterialism item are given high priority the score is “2”.

- (1) Materialist
- (2) Mixed
- (3) Postmaterialist

**wvs\_pm4mp Percent materialists.**

**wvs\_pm4pmp Percent postmaterialists.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

**wvs\_pm12 Post-Materialism 12-item index**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 47)

The Post-Materialism 12-item index is based on the respondents' views on what the aims of their country should be for the next ten years. The following items are postmaterialist priorities drawn from three questions. The score is the average number of these postmaterialist items that are given priority.

- Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities.
- Giving people more say in important government decisions.
- Protecting freedom of speech.
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society.
- Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money.

- (0) Materialist
- (1)
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5) Postmaterialist

**wvs\_genm Gender Equality Scale (mean).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

(Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Gender Equality Scale is a 0-100 scale composed of five items:

- "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do," (agree coded low).
- "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women," (agree coded low).
- "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl," (agree coded low).
- "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?" (agree coded low).
- "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?" (disapprove coded low).

**wvs\_relm Religiosity Scale (mean).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

(Inglehart and Norris 2003)

Religiosity Scale is a 0-100 scale composed of six items:

- "Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are...a religious person, not a religious person, or a convinced atheist?" (% religious).
- "Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?" (% once a week or more).

- “How important is God in your life?” (% “very” scaled 6-10)
- “Do you believe in God?” (% Yes).
- “Do you believe in life after death?” (% Yes).
- “Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion?”

### **Factor indices**

#### **wvs\_selfexp1 Self-expression values I**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 72)  
(Inglehart and Welzel 2003)

Principal components factor index based on wvs\_tol, wvs\_pet, wvs\_lib, wvs\_trust and wvs\_lifsat.

WARNING: Some inconsistencies found in the original data regarding wvs\_tol (see below).

#### **wvs\_selfexp2 Self-expression values II**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 72)  
(Welzel et al 2003)

Principal components factor index based on wvs\_tol, wvs\_pet, wvs\_lib, wvs\_trust, wvs\_lifsat and wvs\_rel.

WARNING: Some inconsistencies found in the original data regarding wvs\_tol (see below).

#### **wvs\_selfexp3 Self-expression values III**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 74)  
(Inglehart and Baker 2000)

Principal components factor index based on wvs\_pet, wvs\_lib, wvs\_trust, wvs\_happy and wvs\_homo.

#### **wvs\_secrat Secular-rational values**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)  
(Inglehart and Baker 2000)

Principal components factor index based on wvs\_rel, wvs\_auton, wvs\_abort, wvs\_proud and wvs\_auth.

### **Factor indices items**

Please tell me for each of the following statements (abortion/homosexuality) whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

- (1) Never justifiable
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)

- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) Always justifiable

**wvs\_abort Abortion is justifiable**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

**wvs\_homo Homosexuality is justifiable**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

wvs\_homo is dichotomized as follows:

- (0) Not justifiable (1 above)
- (1) Justifiable (2-10 above)

**wvs\_auth Respect for authority**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?. Greater respect for authority.

- (1) Good
- (2) Don't mind
- (3) Bad

**wvs\_auton Autonomy index**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?

- A. Independence.
- B. Determination
- C. Religious faith
- D. Obedience

- (0) Not mentioned
- (1) Important

Autonomy index is computed as  $(A+B)-(C+D)$ , generating the following five-point scale:

- (-2) Obedience/Religious Faith
- (-1)
- (0)
- (1)
- (2) Determination, perseverance/Independence

**wvs\_happy Happiness**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

See variable wvs\_a008m above.

- (0) Not very happy/ Not at all happy
- (1) Very happy/ Quite happy

**wvs\_lib Liberty and participation**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (Rank first and second choice).

- Maintaining order in the nation
- Give people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech

Respondents first and second priorities for “giving people more say in important government decisions” and “protecting freedom of speech” added to a four-point index, assigning 3 points for both items on first and second rank, 2 points for one of these items on first rank, 1 point for one of these items on second rank and 0 for none of these items on first or second rank.

**wvs\_lifsat Life satisfaction**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

10-point rating scale for life satisfaction (=wvs\_a170m).

**wvs\_pet Public self-expression**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances, do it:

Signing a petition.

- Have done
- Might do
- Would never do

“Have done” coded (1) and dichotomized against (0).

**wvs\_proud National pride**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

How proud are you to be (NATIONALITY)?

- (1) Very proud
- (2) Quite proud
- (3) Not very proud



(4) Not at all proud

**wvs\_rel Religiousness**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate - 1 means very important and 10 means not at all important.

- (1) Very
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) Not at all

(In the original question (1) is not at all important and (10) very important).

**wvs\_tol Tolerance of diversity**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?

- A. People who have AIDS.
- B. Homosexuals

- (0) Mentioned
- (1) Not mentioned

Scores added for neighbors with AIDS and homosexual neighbors to create a 0-2 scale (where 2 means tolerant).

WARNING: Some inconsistencies found in the original data. Two examples: In Jordan 95.5 percent mentioned that they would not like to have people with AIDS as neighbors compared to only 1.7 percent in Egypt. 98.4 percent of the people in Jordan would not like homosexuals as neighbors, but only 0.9 percent of the Iranians say the same.

**wvs\_trust Interpersonal trust**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

- (0) Need to be very careful
- (1) Most people can be trusted

(=wvs\_a165p recoded).

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