UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

THE QOG INSTITUTE

QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT

The QoG Social Policy Dataset Codebook

February 22, 2010

Note: Those scholars who wish to use this dataset in their research are kindly requested to both cite the original source (as stated in this codebook) and use the following citation:

Samanni, Marcus, Jan Teorell, Staffan Kumlin & Bo Rothstein. 2010. The QoG Social Policy Dataset, version 22Feb10. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.

The QoG Social Policy Dataset – Codebook

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

The aim of the QoG Social Policy Dataset is to promote cross-national comparative research on social policy output and its correlates, with a special focus on the connection between social policy and quality of government (QoG). To accomplish this we have compiled a number of freely available data sources, including aggregated public opinion data. The data comes in three versions: one cross-sectional dataset with global coverage pertaining to the year 2002 (or the closest year available), and two cross-sectional time-series datasets for a selection of 40 countries. The first time-series dataset (*long*) has country year as its unit of observation, spanning the time period 1946-2009. The other time-series dataset (*wide*), which is specifically tailored for the analysis of public opinion data over time, instead uses country as its unit of observation, and one variable for every 5th year from 1970-2005 (or, one per module of each public opinion data source).

The data contains six types of variables, each provided under its own heading in this code book:

▪ **Social policy variables**, such as welfare spending and replacement rates in the social security system.

▪ **Tax system variables**, such as tax rates and government income from different types of taxes.

▪ **Indicators on the structural conditions for social policy**, a broad category encompassing things like economic inequality, GDP, unemployment, educational levels, health conditions, trade openness and foreign direct investment.

▪ **Public opinion data**, including attitudes to social policy, taxes and the government in general, but also more general orientations such as left-right placement and interpersonal trust. In this category we have aggregated individual-level public opinion data from five cross-national comparative survey projects with over-time coverage: The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems; The Eurobarometer (including the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and single Candidate Countries Eurobarometers); The European Social Survey; The International Social Survey Program; and the World Value Surveys.

▪ **Political indicators**, including election results and policy positions of governments and parliaments, as well as political institutions such as forms of government and electoral systems.

▪ **Quality of government variables**, pertaining to the core areas of QoG (such as corruption, bureaucratic quality, and democracy).

This dataset was created as part of a research project titled "Quality of Government and the Conditions for Sustainable Social Policy" financed by the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (project # 2005:0493). The aim of the project is to investigate the relation between, on the one hand, trustworthy, reliable, predictable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government institutions, and, on the other hand, the possibilities to establish encompassing and universal social policies.

Country and Time Coverage

In the cross-sectional dataset we include all countries in the world recognized by the United Nations as of the year 2002, plus Serbia, Montenegro (as separate states) and Taiwan; in total 194 nations. We have thus included Serbia and Montenegro both as a unit and as two separate states. Although they were a unit in 2002 (they split in 2006), several sources have data for them as separate units. We have decided to leave these data sources as they are and from that follows that we have included Serbia and Montenegro as separate states in the cross-sectional dataset.

Regarding the year from which we have picked the data in the cross-sectional dataset, our first choice has been 2002. The reason for this is that there is a lot less data available for later years. If data for 2002 is not available, then data for 2003 is used. If 2003 is not available, we use data for 2001, and if 2001 is missing, 2004 is used and so forth. As a general rule, we do not include observations from earlier than 1995 in the cross-sectional dataset.

In the cross-sectional time-series datasets (long and wide versions) we only include a sample of 40 countries,[1] selected according to two criteria. The first criterion is relative data density, that is, the extent to which there is valid information on a country averaged across all variables in the dataset over time. Close scrutiny of the rank ordering of countries in terms of this criterion suggest that after 30 countries, the marginal gain in valid information from adding another country decreases substantively. This set of 30 countries is comprised of all OECD countries minus the Czech and Slovak Republics, but plus Israel. The second criterion, however, adds to this another dimension concerned with a particular historical process, assumed to be of relevance in the field of social policy, namely European integration. A country is thus selected to the time-series dataset if it (a) is among the 30 most data-rich countries in the global sample, or (b) is a current member of the European Union (adding another 10 countries).[2] Together these criteria imply the selection of the following 40 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and West Germany.

We thus treat West Germany and Germany after unification as distinct cases. Our data sources however vary in this regard, some treating unified Germany as a direct continuation of West Germany. As a consequence, we have **moved the data** from Germany to West Germany for these data sources, in order to be consistent with our criteria. However, if a data source provides information for West and East Germany together as one single case even before the merger, we have **not** moved the data (from the German case). To determine where to put the data for the year of the merger/split, we have relied on the "July 1st-principle" (see the Quality of Government Dataset codebook,

[1] We are however happy to provide the time-series cross-sectional dataset with global coverage upon request, although we do not take on any responsibility for keeping this version updated in the future.
[2] Another way of arriving at the same set of countries is to add all EU27 countries with the rest of the OECD countries plus Israel.

version 17June09, p. 20). If Germany in a data source is treated as a continuation of West Germany, we thus place data until and including 1990 on West Germany and leave Germany blank until and including 1990, since the unification of Germany occurred in October, *after* July 1st, 1990.

Finally, regarding Cyprus, we let this denote the Greek part of the island. Most sources probably do the same with the data that they refer to "Cyprus", but the documentation of the original data rarely specifies this. Users are urged to double check this with the original sources whenever this is possible.

For each variable or set of variables we specify the period (or year) covered as well as the following statistics:
n: Number of country-year observations
N: Number of countries covered (at any time)
$\overline{N}$: Mean number of countries per year
$\overline{T}$: Mean number of years per country.

Note that the *long* time-series dataset does not contain any purely cross-sectional variables (with the exception of very few public opinion variables), whereas the *wide* time-series dataset does.

Country and Case Identifier Codes

ccode Country Code Numeric

http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/index.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1

Numeric country code (ISO-3166-1 numeric).

ccodealp 3-letter Country Code

http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/index.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1

3-letter country code (ISO-3166-1 alpha3).

The alpha code (ccodealp) does not uniquely identify all countries, since Germany and West Germany have identical alpha codes. All the numeric country codes (ccode) are however unique and this is thus the variable best suitable to use when merging files.

cname Country Name

ccode	ccodealp	cname	ccode	ccodealp	cname
4	AFG	Afghanistan	24	AGO	Angola
8	ALB	Albania	28	ATG	Antigua and Barbuda
12	DZA	Algeria	32	ARG	Argentina
20	AND	Andorra	51	ARM	Armenia

36	AUS	Australia
40	AUT	Austria
31	AZE	Azerbaijan
44	BHS	Bahamas
48	BHR	Bahrain
50	BGD	Bangladesh
52	BRB	Barbados
112	BLR	Belarus
56	BEL	Belgium
84	BLZ	Belize
204	BEN	Benin
64	BTN	Bhutan
68	BOL	Bolivia
70	BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
72	BWA	Botswana
76	BRA	Brazil
96	BRN	Brunei
100	BGR	Bulgaria
854	BFA	Burkina Faso
108	BDI	Burundi
116	KHM	Cambodia
120	CMR	Cameroon
124	CAN	Canada
132	CPV	Cape Verde
140	CAF	Central African Republic
148	TCD	Chad
152	CHL	Chile
156	CHN	China
170	COL	Colombia
174	COM	Comoros
178	COG	Congo
180	COD	Congo, Democratic Republic
188	CRI	Costa Rica
384	CIV	Cote d'Ivoire
191	HRV	Croatia
192	CUB	Cuba
196	CYP	Cyprus
200	CSK	Czechoslovakia
203	CZE	Czech Republic
208	DNK	Denmark
262	DJI	Djibouti
212	DMA	Dominica
214	DOM	Dominican Republic
218	ECU	Ecuador
818	EGY	Egypt
222	SLV	El Salvador
226	GNQ	Equatorial Guinea
232	ERI	Eritrea
233	EST	Estonia
230	ETH	Ethiopia (-1992)
231	ETH	Ethiopia (1993-)
242	FJI	Fiji
246	FIN	Finland
250	FRA	France
266	GAB	Gabon
270	GMB	Gambia
268	GEO	Georgia
276	DEU	Germany
278	DDR	Germany, East
280	DEU	Germany, West
288	GHA	Ghana
300	GRC	Greece
308	GRD	Grenada
320	GTM	Guatemala
324	GIN	Guinea
624	GNB	Guinea-Bissau
328	GUY	Guyana
332	HTI	Haiti
340	HND	Honduras
348	HUN	Hungary
352	ISL	Iceland
356	IND	India
360	IDN	Indonesia
364	IRN	Iran
368	IRQ	Iraq
372	IRL	Ireland
376	ISR	Israel
380	ITA	Italy
388	JAM	Jamaica
392	JPN	Japan
400	JOR	Jordan
398	KAZ	Kazakhstan
404	KEN	Kenya
296	KIR	Kiribati
408	PRK	Korea, North
410	KOR	Korea, South
414	KWT	Kuwait
417	KGZ	Kyrgyzstan
418	LAO	Laos
428	LVA	Latvia
422	LBN	Lebanon
426	LSO	Lesotho
430	LBR	Liberia
434	LBY	Libya
438	LIE	Liechtenstein
440	LTU	Lithuania
442	LUX	Luxembourg
807	MKD	Macedonia
450	MDG	Madagascar
454	MWI	Malawi
458	MYS	Malaysia
462	MDV	Maldives
466	MLI	Mali
470	MLT	Malta
584	MHL	Marshall Islands
478	MRT	Mauritania
480	MUS	Mauritius
484	MEX	Mexico
583	FSM	Micronesia
498	MDA	Moldova
492	MCO	Monaco
496	MNG	Mongolia
499	MNE	Montenegro
504	MAR	Morocco
508	MOZ	Mozambique
104	MMR	Myanmar
516	NAM	Namibia
520	NRU	Nauru
524	NPL	Nepal
528	NLD	Netherlands
554	NZL	New Zealand
558	NIC	Nicaragua
562	NER	Niger
566	NGA	Nigeria

578	NOR	Norway
512	OMN	Oman
997	PAK	Pakistan (-1971)
586	PAK	Pakistan (1972-)
585	PLW	Palau
591	PAN	Panama
598	PNG	Papua New Guinea
600	PRY	Paraguay
604	PER	Peru
608	PHL	Philippines
616	POL	Poland
620	PRT	Portugal
634	QAT	Qatar
642	ROU	Romania
643	RUS	Russia
646	RWA	Rwanda
882	WSM	Samoa
674	SMR	San Marino
678	STP	Sao Tome and Principe
682	SAU	Saudi Arabia
686	SEN	Senegal
688	SRB	Serbia
891	SCG	Serbia and Montenegro
690	SYC	Seychelles
694	SLE	Sierra Leone
702	SGP	Singapore
703	SVK	Slovakia
705	SVN	Slovenia
90	SLB	Solomon Islands
706	SOM	Somalia
710	ZAF	South Africa
724	ESP	Spain
144	LKA	Sri Lanka
659	KNA	St Kitts and Nevis
662	LCA	St Lucia
670	VCT	St Vincent and the Grenadines
736	SDN	Sudan
740	SUR	Suriname
748	SWZ	Swaziland
752	SWE	Sweden
756	CHE	Switzerland
760	SYR	Syria
158	TWN	Taiwan
762	TJK	Tajikistan
834	TZA	Tanzania
764	THA	Thailand
994	XTI	Tibet
626	TLS	Timor-Leste
768	TGO	Togo
776	TON	Tonga
780	TTO	Trinidad and Tobago
788	TUN	Tunisia
792	TUR	Turkey
795	TKM	Turkmenistan
798	TUV	Tuvalu
800	UGA	Uganda
804	UKR	Ukraine
784	ARE	United Arab Emirates
826	GBR	United Kingdom
840	USA	United States
858	URY	Uruguay
810	SUN	USSR
860	UZB	Uzbekistan
548	VUT	Vanuatu
862	VEN	Venezuela
704	VNM	Vietnam
998	VNM	Vietnam, North
999	VDR	Vietnam, South
887	YEM	Yemen
886	YEM	Yemen, North
720	YMD	Yemen, South
890	YUG	Yugoslavia
995	EAZ	Zanzibar
894	ZMB	Zambia
716	ZWE	Zimbabwe

year Year

ccodewb Country Code World Bank

ccodecow Country Code Correlates of War

cname_year Country Name and Year

ccodealp_year 3-letter Country Code and Year

oecd OECD member

Equals 1 if country is a member of the OECD, and 0 otherwise.

eu27 EU27 member

Equals 1 if country is a member of the EU27, and 0 otherwise.

eu15 EU15 member

Equals 1 if country is a member of the EU15, and 0 otherwise.

eea European Economic Area

Equals 1 if country is a member of the European Economic Area, and 0 otherwise.

ht_region The Region of the Country

(Teorell and Hadenius 2005)

This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with the partial exception of category 5 below) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow:

(1) Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia)
(2) Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)
(3) North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus)
(4) Sub-Saharan Africa
(5) Western Europe and North America (including Australia & New Zeeland)
(6) East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia)
(7) South-East Asia
(8) South Asia
(9) The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zeeland)
(10) The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)

ht_region2 The Region of the Country (alternative)

(Teorell and Hadenius 2005)

To flag some of the most contested cases, we have in the alternative variable, ht_region2, coded Cyprus (considering the Greek majority of their population) as belonging to category (5), Haiti (considering their non-Spanish colonial legacy and membership in Caricom) as belonging to category (10), and Mongolia (considering their post-communist legacy) as belonging to category (1).

Social Policy

Here we present data on public and private welfare spending (both in total and divided into different sectors), replacement rates and coverage of social security systems, and also data that in some sense measures the quality of social service, like e.g. density of physicians and pupil-teacher ratios.

Armingeon et al – Comparative Political Dataset I & II

http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html
(Armingeon et al 2008; Armingeon & Careja 2006)

ar_source Armingeon source

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1698, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 53)

There are three different versions of the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS), and this variable denotes from which of these each observation comes. There are observations from 23 OECD countries from CPDS I, 28 post-communist countries from CPDS II, and data for Cyprus and Malta from CPDS III.

ar_sst Social security transfers (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 886, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 37)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Includes social assistance grants and welfare benefits paid by the general government (benefits for sickness, old-age, family allowances etc.).

Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Labor

(Cross-Section: covers the 1997-2002 period, N: 84, except where noted)
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/Regulation%20of%20Labor-All/Regulation%20of%20Labor.xls
(Botero et al 2004)

bdlls_dlp Days of annual leave with pay in manufacturing

Measures the length of the annual paid leave in manufacturing after twenty years of employment. If annual leave entails less than full pay, the number of days are discounted proportionally.

bdlls_mph Mandatory paid holidays

Measures the number of mandatory paid holidays in a year. If only half a day is granted for particular holidays, we count each as 0.5 days and round off to the nearest whole.

bdlls_otw Maximum overtime hours (per week)

(N: 38)

Measures the maximum number of overtime hours that can be worked in a week. Restrictions on overtime are coded in countries' laws with different time frames as reference (e.g. daily, weekly, monthly and yearly). If restrictions are coded with reference shorter than a week we adjust proportionally to frame the restriction as the maximum number of overtime hours that can be worked per week. If the restrictions are coded with reference to a time period longer than a week, we adjust proportionally and code it as a yearly restriction. If there are no weekly restrictions to overtime the variable is coded as missing.

bdlls_oty Maximum overtime hours (per year)

(N: 30)

Measures the maximum number of overtime hours that can be worked in a year. If there are no yearly restrictions to overtime we code this variable as missing. (See also bdlls_otw.)

bdlls_rww Maximum duration of regular work week (hours)

Measures the maximum duration of the regular work week (excluding overtime).

bdlls_dwpw Maximum days of work per week

Measures the maximum number of work days per week. Legal limits may be defined either as a number of mandatory rest days per week or as a mandatory minimum of consecutive hours of rest. If nothing is specified, it is assumed that the maximum is seven days. For limits expressed as a number of consecutive hours of rest, we code 36 or more as 2 days off, less than 36 hours but more than 12 as 1 day off and less than 12 hours as 0 days off.

bdlls_hwpw Maximum hours of work per week

Measures the maximum duration of the regular work week (excluding overtime).

bdlls_hwpd Maximum hours of work per day

Measures the maximum number of hours of work per day. Legal limits may be defined either as a mandatory maximum regular and overtime working hours per day or as mandatory minimum rest hours per day. If nothing is specified in the law, we use 24 hours. If restrictions are expressed as a number of consecutive hours of rest, we subtract this number from 24 hours. The highest observation in the sample is 24 hours and the lowest is 10 hours.

bdlls_wwy Weeks worked in a year

This variable measures the number of weeks worked in a year. It is calculated as 52 minus the number of weeks off, where the latter is calculated as the sum of bdlls_dlp and bdlls_mph divided by bdlls_dwpw.

bdlls_mhbo Maximum hours of work in a year before overtime

The maximum number of regular (no overtime) hours of work allowed over the course of a year. It is calculated as bdlls_hwpw multiplied by bdlls_wwy.

Easterly

http://go.worldbank.org/ZSQKYFU6J0
(Easterly 2001a; Easterly 2001b)

Easterly's data on government revenue and expenditure comes from IMF Government Finance Statistics. The classification of the data is described in IMF (1986; 2001).

WARNING: We have found some dubious figures in these data, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1982-1995, but decided to leave the original data as is.

Government Expenditure

ea_tge Total government expenditure (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 805, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 89)

Total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

ea_gee Government expenditure on education (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 707, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 19)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 76)

Government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP.

ea_geh Government expenditure on health (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 706, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 19)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 76)

Government expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP.

ea_gesw Government expenditure on social security and welfare (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 707, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 19)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 70)

Government expenditure on social security and welfare as a percentage of GDP.

ea_gehca Government expenditure on housing and community amenities (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 691, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 73)

Government expenditure on housing and community amenities as a percentage of GDP.

ea_gew **Government expenditure on wages, salaries and employer contributions (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 748, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 83)

Government expenditure on wages, salaries and employer contributions as a percentage of GDP.

ea_geec **Government expenditure on employer contributions (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 184, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 30)

Government expenditure on employer contributions as a percentage of GDP.

Eurostat

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
(Eurostat 2007)

eu_pha **Physicians (absolute value)**

(Time-series: 1970-2006, n: 454, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 1998-2002 (varies by country), N: 31)

Number of practicing physicians or doctors.

eu_phd **Physicians/doctors (density per 100,000 population)**

(Time-series: 1970-2005, n: 438, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 1998-2003 (varies by country), N: 31)

Density of practicing physicians or doctors per 100,000 population.

eu_dea **Dentists (absolute value)**

(Time-series: 1970-2006, n: 426, N: 25, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 1998-2002 (varies by country), N: 29)

Number of practicing dentists.

eu_ded **Dentists (density per 100,000 population)**

(Time-series: 1970-2006, n: 424, N: 25, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 1998-2003 (varies by country), N: 29)

Density of practicing dentists per 100,000 population.

Franzese – Participation, Inequality and Transfers Database

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/T&T_FullDataSet.XLS
(Franzese 1998; 2002)

fr_ss Social security benefits, grants and welfare

(Time-series: 1950-1993, n: 840, N: 21 $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 40)

Social security benefits, grants and welfare as a percentage of GDP.

Huber et al – Comparative Welfare States Data Set

http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/cws%20lis.xls
(Huber et al 2004)

hu_sw Social wage

(Time-series: 1961-1995, n: 324, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

The social wage is the percentage of former income that a median-income worker would receive if he or she stopped working. Sources of this income include unemployment compensation, general public assistance and related programs. Data from Kenworthy (1999) and OECD.

hu_socx Gross public social expenditure (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1980-1999, n: 332, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 1998-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Gross public social expenditure as a percentage of current GDP.

hu_sst Social security transfers (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 714, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 1997-2000 (varies by country), N: 17)

Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Consists of benefits for sickness, old-age, family allowances, etc., as well as social assistance grants.

hu_sse Social security expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Total social security expenditure (benefits plus administrative expenses and transfers to other schemes), in millions of national currency units.

hu_ssbe Social security benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Total social security benefit expenditure, in millions of national currency units.

hu_sfbe Social insurance and family allowance benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 535, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Total benefit expenditure relating to "Social Insurance and Assimilated Schemes" and "Family Allowance" programs, in millions of national currency units. This includes benefit expenditure on sickness and maternity, employment injuries, pensions, unemployment and family allowances. Excluded are special schemes, like benefits for war victims, public employees etc.

hu_smbe Sickness and maternity benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 535, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Benefit expenditure on sickness and maternity (including medical care and cash benefits) as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

hu_eibe Employment injuries benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 498, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 28)

Benefit expenditure on employment injuries (including medical care and cash benefits) as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

hu_pbe Pensions benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 535, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Benefit expenditure on pensions as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

hu_fabe Family allowances benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 494, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 29)

Benefit expenditure on family allowances as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

hu_uebe Unemployment benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 535, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Benefit expenditure on unemployment as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

hu_teh Total expenditure on health

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 729, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total expenditure on health in millions of national currency units.

hu_peh Public expenditure on health

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 730, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Public expenditure on health in millions of national currency units.

hu_pehp Public expenditure on health (% of total health expenditure)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 551, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 13, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Public expenditure on health as a percentage of total expenditure on health (hu_peh / hu_teh * 100).

hu_cpeh Current public expenditure on health

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 610, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 32)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 17)

Current public expenditure on health in millions of national currency units. This variable excludes investments in medical facilities, and it is thus different from hu_peh.

hu_pepnc Public expenditure on pensions (national currency)

(Time-series: 1960-1985, n: 451, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 25)

Public expenditure on age, disability and survivors pensions in national currency units (millions for all countries except Italy and Japan which are in billions).

hu_pepgi Public expenditure on pensions (% of GNI)

(Time-series: 1960-1985, n: 449, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 25)

Public expenditure on age, disability and survivors pensions as a percentage of national income.

hu_pepgp Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-1985, n: 451, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 25)

Public expenditure on age, disability and survivors pensions as a percentage of GDP.

hu_ocbe Old age cash benefits expenditure (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1980-1999, n: 332, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 1998-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Old age cash benefits as a percentage of current GDP.

hu_teic Total expenditure on in-patient care

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 568, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 14, $\overline{T}$: 32)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 14)

Total expenditure on in-patient care in millions of national currency units.

hu_peic Public expenditure on in-patient care

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 645, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 1997-2000 (varies by country), N: 16)

Public expenditure on in-patient care in millions of national currency units.

hu_teac Total expenditure on ambulatory care

(Time-series: 1960-1997, n: 451, N: 16, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 11)

Total expenditure on ambulatory care in millions of national currency units.

hu_peac Public expenditure on ambulatory care

(Time-series: 1960-1997, n: 561, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 12)

Public expenditure on ambulatory care in millions of national currency units.

hu_stmc Share with total medical coverage

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 732, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1997-2000 (varies by country), N: 18)

Share of population with total medical coverage.

hu_sacc Share with ambulatory care coverage

(Time-series: 1960-1997, n: 668, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 18)

Share of population with ambulatory care coverage.

hu_sipc Share with in-patient services coverage

(Time-series: 1960-200, n: 735, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 39)
(Cross-section: 1997-2000 (varies by country), N: 18)

Share of population in-patient services care coverage.

hu_tpe Total public expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 683, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 18)

Total public expenditure in millions of national currency units.

hu_ssr Social security receipts

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Total social security receipts (contributions, taxes, general state revenues, other state participation, capital income), in millions of national currency units.

hu_sfbr Social insurance and family allowance receipts

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Total receipts relating to "Social Insurance and Assimilated Schemes" and "Family Allowance" programs, including transfers from other programs.

hu_wcr Workers' contributions revenue

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 509, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 28)

Revenue from workers' contributions as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

hu_ecr Employers' contributions revenue

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 533, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Revenue from employers' contributions as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

hu_stss Special taxes allocated to social security

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 123, N: 9, $\overline{N}$: 4 $\overline{T}$: 14)

Revenue from special taxes allocated to social security as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

hu_facr State funds and other authorities' contributions revenue

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)

Revenue from state funds, plus contributions from other public authorities, as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

hu_rcss Revenue from capital income to social security

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 503, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 28)

Revenue from income from capital as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

hu_tpr Total public revenue

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 684, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 17)

Total public revenue in millions of national currency units.

hu_ggd General government deficit

(Time-series: 1960-1997, n: 609, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 32)
(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 18)

General government deficit in millions of national currency units.

Iversen & Cusack

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/data/deindustrialization.htm
(Iversen & Cusack 2000)

ic_gt Government transfers (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-1995, n: 572, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 334)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 13)

All government payments to the civilian household sector as a percentage of GDP, including social security transfers, government grants, public employee pensions, and transfers to non-profit institutions serving the household sector.

ic_got Generosity of transfers

(Time-series: 1960-1991, n: 512, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 30)

The percentage share of transfers in GDP (ic_gt) relative to the percentage share of the non-working population in the total population.

Iversen & Soskice

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/index_files/page0009.htm
(Iversen & Soskice 2006)

is_rg Redistribution (change in Gini)

(Time-series: 1967-1997, n: 61, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 6)

Redistribution measured as the percentage reduction in the Gini coefficient from before to after taxes and transfers, that is: (Gini before taxes and transfers - Gini after taxes and transfers) / Gini before taxes and transfers.

is_rp Redistribution (change in poverty)

(Time-series: 1967-1997, n: 61, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 6)

Redistribution measured as the percentage reduction in relative poverty rate from before to after taxes and transfers, that is: (poverty before taxes and transfers – poverty after taxes and transfers) / poverty before taxes and transfers. The relative poverty rate is defined as the percentage of households below 50 % of the median income.

OECD – Benefits and Wages

http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2825_497118_34053248_1_1_1_1,00.html

(OECD 2006c)

bw_uegr Unemployment benefit gross replacement rate

(Time-series: 1961-2003, n: 462, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 2003, N: 21)

This is a summary measure defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment.

OECD – Family Database

http://www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database
(2009b)

fd_cf Childcare fees (% of average wage)

(Cross-section: 2004, N: 31)

Childcare fees per two-year old attending accredited early-years care and education services as a percentage of an average wage.

fd_pl Parental leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 22)

Weeks of employment-protected leave of absence for employed parents, which are individual and not reserved for either the mother or the father. This includes both paid and unpaid leave.

fd_ftepl FTE paid parental leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 21)

The full-time equivalent (FTE) of the proportion of the duration of paid parental leave if it were paid at 100 % of last earnings. That is, (duration of leave in weeks) * (payment as a percentage of earnings). The calculations are based on an average production worker wage.

fd_upl Unpaid parental leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 10)

Weeks of unpaid, employment-protected, leave of absence for employed parents, which are individual and not reserved for neither the mother nor the father.

fd_patl Paternity leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 21)

Weeks of employment-protected leave of absence for employed men at the time of childbirth. This includes both paid and unpaid leave.

fd_ftep FTE paid paternity leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 21)

The full-time equivalent (FTE) of the proportion of the duration of paid paternity leave if it were paid at 100 % of last earnings (see fd_ftepl).

fd_ml Maternity leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 37)

Weeks of employment-protected leave of absence for employed women at around the time of childbirth, or adoption in some countries. This includes both paid and unpaid leave.

fd_ftem FTE paid maternity leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 37)

The full-time equivalent (FTE) of the proportion of the duration of paid maternity leave if it were paid at 100 % of last earnings (see fd_ftepl).

OECD – Public Sector Pay and Employment Database

http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en_2649_37457_2408769_1_1_1_37457,00.html
(OECD 2007a)

psp_tpe Total public employment

(Time-series: 1985-2000, n: 61, N: 13, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1998-2000 (varies by country), N: 12)

Total public employment.

psp_pes Public employment share of total employment

(Time-series: 1985-1999, n: 65, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1997-1999 (varies by country), N: 16)

Public employment as a percentage of total employment.

psp_psc Total public sector compensation costs (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1985-2000, n: 97, N: 20, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 17)

Total public sector compensation costs as a percentage of GDP.

OECD – The Social Expenditure Database (SOCX 2007)

http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG
(OECD 2007b; 2007c)

Note: All SOCX variables are listed as a percentage of GDP.

The Social Expenditure Database contains detailed statistics on expenditure in the social domain. The data is categorized according to branch (old age, health etc.), expenditure's type of source (public expenditure, mandatory private expenditure and voluntary private expenditure) and expenditure's type (cash benefits and benefits in kind/social services), and we have labeled the variables accordingly. E.g. "old age expenditure, mandatory private, cash", which means that the branch is old age, the source of the expenditure is mandatory private and that it is cash benefit. If the label was "old age expenditure, mandatory private, total" it would mean the sum of the in kind and cash expenditure for the mandatory private old age sector.

Please note that the "in kind" expenditure type basically means social service. This can be expenditure on home-help services, in-patient care, child care etc.

The distinction between public and private social protection is made on the basis of whoever controls the relevant financial flows: public institutions or private bodies. For example, sickness benefits financed by compulsory employer and employee contributions (receipts) to social insurance funds are by convention considered public. All social benefits not provided by general government are considered private.

Mandatory private social expenditure is social support stipulated by legislation but operated through the private sector, e.g. direct sickness payments by employers to their absent employees as legislated by public authorities, or benefits accruing from mandatory contributions to private insurance funds.

Voluntary private social expenditure is benefits accruing from privately operated programs that involve the redistribution of resources across households and include benefits provided by NGOs, and benefit accruing from tax advantaged individual plans and collective (often employment-related) support arrangements, such as for example, pensions, childcare support, and, in the US, employment-related health plans.

SOCX includes data on the magnitude of private social spending across the OECD, but this data is nevertheless deemed of lesser quality than information on budgetary allocations for social support.

SOCX generally excludes administration costs, i.e. the costs incurred with the provision of benefits, as these expenditures do not go directly to the beneficiary. However, regarding the provision of services such as under Active Labor Market Programs and public expenditure on health, the administration costs are included in the totals. The inclusion of these costs in the expenditures is justified as they are part of the service being provided to beneficiaries, such as job-seeker reception and counseling, or patient reception and hospital services.

Total social expenditure

The total expenditure of all branches.

socx_tput Total social expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 681, N: 31, $\overline{N}$ 26:, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_tpuc Total social expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 687, N: 31, $\overline{N}$ 26:, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_tpuk Total social expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 687, N: 31, $\overline{N}$ 26:, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_tmpt Total social expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 391, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 19)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 20)

socx_tmpc Total social expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 380, N: 20, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 19)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 19)

socx_tmpk Total social expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 84, N: 6, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 14)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 6)

socx_tvpt Total social expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 602, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Net Total Social Expenditure

Net social expenditure is expenditure minus direct and indirect taxes. Expenditure includes both cash and in kind expenditure.

socx_nt Net total social expenditure

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 26)

Total social expenditure from both private and public sources, minus taxes. (Note: This variable is not always the simple sum of public, mandatory private and voluntary private net social spending. This is because there are tax breaks for social purposes that are included in several of these variables for the same observation. As a consequence, the simple sum of them would then result in double counting the tax breaks.)

socx_ntp Net total social expenditure, public

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 26)

Total public social expenditure minus taxes.

socx_ntmp Net total social expenditure, mandatory private

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 26)

Total mandatory private social expenditure minus taxes.

socx_ntvp Net total social expenditure, voluntary private

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 26)

Total voluntary private social expenditure minus taxes.

Old-age

This category includes old-age pensions, early retirement pensions and home-help and residential services for elderly. Excluded are programs concerning early retirement for labor market reasons which are classified under unemployment.

socx_oput Old age expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 681, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_opuc Old age expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 681, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_opuk Old age expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 619, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 29)

socx_ompt Old age expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 194, N: 11, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 11)

socx_ompc Old age expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 183, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 10)

socx_ompk Old age expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 42, N: 4 $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 11)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 4)

socx_ovpt Old age expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 469, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 120)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

Survivors expenditure

This category includes expenditure on programs which prived the spouse or dependent of a deceased person with a benefit, for example pensions or funeral payments.

socx_sput Survivors expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 681, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_spuc Survivors expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 681, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_spuk Survivors expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 501, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 19)
(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 25)

socx_smpt Survivors expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 149, N: 9, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 9)

socx_smpc Survivors expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 138, N: 8, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 8)

socx_smpk Survivors expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 43, N: 3 $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 14)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 3)

Incapacity-related benefits expenditure

Cash benefits in this category comprise of cash payments on account of complete or partial inability to participate gainfully in the labor market due to disability. This includes paid sick leave, special allowances and disability related payments such as pensions, if they are related to prescribed occupational injuries and diseases. Sickness cash benefits related to loss of earning because of the temporary inability to work due to illness are also recorded.

Exclude are leave related to sickness or injury of a dependent child which is recorded under family cash benefits. Expenditure regarding the public provision of health care is recorded under health.

Benefits in kind in this category encompasses services for disabled people, such as day care and rehabilitation services, home-help services etc.

socx_iput Incapacity expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 681, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_ipuc Incapacity expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 681, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_ipuk Incapacity expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 626, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 28)

socx_impt Incapacity expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 380, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 20)

socx_impc Incapacity expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 369, N: 20, $\overline{N}$: 14, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 19)

socx_impk Incapacity expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 38, N: 3, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 13)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 3)

socx_ivpt Incapacity expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 352, N: 20, $\overline{N}$: 14, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Health expenditure

Expenditure in this category encompasses, among other things, expenditure on in-patient care, ambulatory medical services and pharmaceutical goods.

Individual health expenditure, insofar as it is not reimbursed by a public institution, is not included. As already noted, cash benefits related to sickness are recorded under incapacity-related benefits.

Voluntary private social health expenditure are estimates on the benefits to recipients that derive from private health plans which contain an element of redistribution (such private health insurance plans are often employment-based and/or tax-advantaged).

socx_hput Health expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 695, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_hpuk Health expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 699, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 23)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_hmpt Health expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 26, N: 1, $\overline{N}$:1, $\overline{T}$: 26)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 1)

socx_hmpk Health expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 26, N: 1, $\overline{N}$: 1, $\overline{T}$: 26)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 1)

socx_hvpt Health expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 486, N: 27, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 26)

Family expenditure

Includes expenditure which supports families (i.e. excluding one-person households). This expenditure is often related to the costs associated with raising children or with the support of other dependants. Expenditure related to maternity and parental leave is grouped under the family cash benefits sub-category.

socx_fput Family expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 681, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_fpuc Family expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 671, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_fpuk Family expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 647, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_fmpt Family expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 112, N: 8, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 14)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 7)

socx_fmpc Family expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 89, N: 7, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 14)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 6)

socx_fmpk Family expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 38, N: 3, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 13)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 3)

Active labor market programs expenditure

Contains all social expenditure (other than education) which is aimed at the improvement of the beneficiaries' prospect of finding gainful employment or to otherwise increase their earnings capacity. This category includes spending on public employment services and administration, labor market training, special programs for youth when in transition from school to work, labor market programs to provide or promote employment for unemployed and other persons (excluding young and disabled persons) and special programs for the disabled.

socx_lput Labor program expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 613, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Unemployment expenditure

Includes all cash expenditure to people compensating for unemployment. This includes redundancy payments out of public resources as well as pensions to beneficiaries before they reach the 'standard' pensionable age if these payments are made because they are out of work or otherwise for reasons of labor market policy

socx_uput Unemployment expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 662, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

socx_upuc Unemployment expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 662, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

socx_umpt Unemployment expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 16, N: 1, $\overline{N}$: 1, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 1)

socx_umpc Unemployment expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 16, N: 1, $\overline{N}$: 1, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 1)

Housing expenditure

Rent subsidies and other benefits to the individual to help with housing costs. This includes direct public subsidies to tenants (in some countries, e.g. Norway, homeowners living in their house) earmarked for support with the cost of housing. SOCX excludes mortgage relief (fiscal) and (capital-)subsidies towards the construction of housing. By convention, all housing benefits are classified as in-kind benefit as they are earmarked expenditures.

socx_hoput Housing expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 695, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 27)

socx_hopuk Housing expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 699, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 23)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 27)

Other Social Policy Areas

Includes social expenditure for those people who for various reasons fall outside the scope of the relevant program covering a particular contingency, or if this other benefit is insufficient to meet their needs. Social expenditure related to immigrants/refugees and indigenous people are separately recorded in this category. Finally, any social expenditure which is not attributable to other categories is included in this category.

socx_otput Other expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 677, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_otpuc Other expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 649, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 30)

socx_otpuk Other expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 566, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)

socx_otmpt Other expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 37, N: 3, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 3)

socx_otmpc Other expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 26, N: 2, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 13)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 2)

socx_otmpk Other expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 27, N: 2, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 14)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 2)

socx_otvpt Other expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1981-2005, n: 392, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 20)

Scruggs – Welfare State Entitlements

http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/cwed/cwedall12.zip
(Scruggs 2006; Scruggs 2007; Scruggs and Allan 2006; Esping-Andersen 1990)

The calculations in the Welfare State Entitlements Dataset are based on the wage of an average production worker (APW). The net replacement rates are calculated as the ratio of wage after taxes to benefits after taxes.

Following OECD convention, replacement rates for sickness and unemployment benefits are computed by annualizing the benefit for a 6 months spell of illness or unemployment. That amount is annualized (multiplied by 2). When the benefits due to the APW are a fixed amount per day or week, then that amount is multiplied by the appropriate units.

For pensions, the benefits are computed as if retirement commences on 1 January of the year. Thus, the last year of the wage history is the previous year's APW. Wherever possible, the wage history is simulated for calculating the standard pension benefit, since the treatment of past earnings can have a large effect on the pension benefit.

sc_bgi Benefit generosity index

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 574, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Scruggs & Allan's generosity index summarizes the generosity of three social insurance programs: sickness insurance, unemployment insurance and pensions. It is a revision of Esping-Andersen's (1990) decommodification index based on Scruggs and Allan's own data but with a somewhat different methodology.

Higher scores indicate a more generous social insurance system. It varies theoretically between 0 and 64.

The index is constructed as follows:

Each program is assigned a score based on its different characteristics and on its coverage of the population. The final benefit generosity score is computed as the sum of the score of each program.

For pensions, the following six indicators are considered: minimum net replacement rate for singles, minimum net replacement rate for couples, standard net replacement rate for singles, standard net replacement rate for couples, years of contribution required to receive a standard pension (scored inversely), and the individual's share of pension financing. Each of these six characteristics is then given a score of 0-4. This score is the standardized value, based on the mean value of the indicator in 1980. The upper and lower bounds of the scores are truncated to +/- 2, and then 2 is added to make the scale 0-4. Finally, the scores of the six indicators are summed and multiplied by the take-up rate (the population above the retirement age receiving a pension).

For sickness and unemployment insurances, the following five indicators are considered: the standard net replacement rate for singles, the standard net replacement rate for a dependent family, the number of weeks of employment/insurance required prior to qualification (scored inversely), the number of waiting days before benefits are paid (scored inversely), and the number of weeks for which a benefit can be received. As for pensions, each indicator is given a score of 0-4 based on the standard deviation from the mean value of each indicator in 1980. The scores of the five indicators are summed and then multiplied with the share of the labor force covered by the insurance.

Note that if a program is based on a means test, then they get the score 0 for contribution and the weight of 0.5 for population covered.

For instance, the score for unemployment insurance is:
[Single net replacement rate (0-4) + Family replacement rate (0-4) + Duration (0-4) + Waiting Days (0-4) + Qualifying period (0-4)] * Coverage

The final benefit generosity score is computed as the sum of the score of each program.

sc_di Decommodification index

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Scruggs & Allan's replication of Esping-Andersen's decommodification index based on their own data. Higher scores indicate a more generous social insurance system.

The decommodification index is similar to the benefit generosity index described above (sc_bgi). However, it differs in two important aspects:

First, the score for each indicator is not on a continuous 0-4 scale, but it is either 1, 2 or 3. The score 2 is given if the indicator is within one standard deviation of the mean value of 1980. The score 1 is given if the indicator is more than one standard deviation below the

mean value of 1980, and the score 3 is given if the indicator is more than one standard deviation above the mean value of 1980.

The second difference is that only the replacement rates for singles and not for couples/families is considered. Instead the replacement rate is multiplied by 2, since it is a very important characteristic of each program. For example, the score for unemployment insurance is:

[{Single net replacement rate (1-3)} * 2 + Duration (1-3) + Waiting Days (1-3) + Qualifying period (1-3)] * Coverage

The decommodification score is then the sum of the score of each program.

Pensions

sc_pg Pensions generosity

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

The generosity of pensions. It varies theoretically between 0 and 24, where higher scores indicate a more generous pensions system.See sc_bgi above for an explanation on how it is computed.

sc_pd Pensions decommodification

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Decommodification score for pensions. Higher values indicate a more decommodifying (generous) pensions system. See sc_di above for explaination on how it is computed.

sc_mprrs Net minimum pension replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 560, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net public pension paid to a person with no work history at retirement (beginning of year) to the net wage of a single APW.

sc_mprrc Net minimum pension replacement rate for couple

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 560, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

As for single person (see above), but this is the net rate paid to a married couple (no children) with no work history against the net wage of the family of four.

sc_sprrs Net standard pension replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 564, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net public pension paid to a person earning the APW wage during each year of their working career upon retirement.

sc_sprrc Net standard pension replacement rate for couple

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 564, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

As for standard pension for single person, but computed for a couple with a single earner (lifetime APW wage) against a family of four net wages (as described above).

sc_pqp Pension qualifying period

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 575, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Standard number of years of pension insurance to be considered fully covered. It is assumed that people work only to the age of 65 or the retirement age. Where ambiguous, such as during transition periods, it is the number of years of coverage assumed when computing the replacement rate.

sc_pfund Pension funding

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 498, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 26)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

The ratio of employees' pension contributions to employer and employees' pension contributions. This is computed as the ratio of the current pension insurance charge rates.

sc_pcov Pension coverage/take-up

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 461, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 14, $\overline{T}$: 24)
(Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country, N: 17)

Portion of those above the official retirement age who are in receipt of a public pension.

sc_mret Male retirement age

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 560, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Official retirement age for men.

sc_fret Female retirement age

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 560, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Official retirement age for women.

Sick pay

sc_sg Sickness insurance generosity

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 574, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

The generosity of the sickness insurance. It varies theoretically between 0 and 20, where higher scores indicate a more generous sickness insurance. See sc_bgi above for an explanation on how it is computed.

sc_sd Sickness insurance decommodification

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Decommodification score for the sickness insurance. Higher values indicate a more decommodifying (generous) unemployment insurance. See sc_di above for explanation on how it is computed.

sc_srrs Net sickness insurance replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 562, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net insurance benefit for general short-term illness (not workplace or occupational illness or injury) to net income for a single person earning the APW wage.

sc_srrf Net sickness insurance replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 562, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 7 and 12) against the net income of such a household with one APW in work.

sc_sqc Sick pay qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 544, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 17)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit. (Where ambiguous, the qualifying condition consistent with the coding for replacement rate and duration of benefit is used.)

sc_sdur Sick pay benefit duration

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 543, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 17)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. Periods of means-tested assistance or long-term disability/invalidity pension, where applicable, are excluded. NB: "no limit" is coded "999".

sc_swait Sick pay waiting period

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 543, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 17)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after falling ill.

sc_scov Sick pay coverage

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 513, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country, N: 16)

Percentage of the labor force with sick pay insurance. N.B: This is *not* the percentage of currently sick who are receiving sick pay benefits

Unemployment benefits

sc_ueg Unemployment insurance generosity

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

The generosity of the unemployment insurance. It varies theoretically between 0 and 20, where higher scores indicate a more generous unemployment insurance. See sc_bgi for an explanation on how it is computed.

sc_ued Unemployment insurance decommodification

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Decommodification score for the unemployment insurance. Higher values indicate a more decommodifying (generous) unemployment insurance. See sc_di for an explanation on how it is computed.

sc_uerrs Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 555, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net unemployment insurance benefit to net income for an unmarried single person earning the average production worker (APW) wage.

sc_uerrf Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 555, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an unemployed APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 7 and 12) against the net income of such a household with one APW employed.

sc_ueqc Unemployment qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 574, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit. (Where ambiguous, the qualifying condition consistent with the coding for replacement rate and duration of benefit is used.)

sc_uedur Unemployment benefit duration

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 574, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. This excludes periods of means-tested assistance. When this varies, we have assumed the worker is aged 40 years and has paid insurance for 20 years. NB: "no limit" is coded "999".

sc_uewait Unemployment benefit waiting period

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 575, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after becoming unemployed.

sc_uecov Unemployment insurance coverage

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 536, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country, N: 17)

Percentage of the labor force insured for unemployment risk. NB: This is *not* the percentage of currently unemployed who are currently receiving benefits.

The Social Citizenship Indicator Program

https://dspace.it.su.se/dspace/handle/10102/7
(Korpi & Palme 2008)

The Social Citzienship Indicator Program (SCIP) is focused on citizens' rights and duties legislated in social policy programs like old age pensions, sickness, unemployment and work accident benefits.

The calculations in SCIP are based on an Average Prodcutions Worker's (APW) wage. When calculating family benefits, the family is assumed to be a married couple with one full-time wage-earner and two children aged 2 and 7.

Following the OECD convention, the replacement rates for sickness and unemployment benefits are computed by annualizing the benefit for a 6 month long (26 weeks) period of illness or unemployment.

For pensions, the benefits are computed as if retirement commences on 1 January. Thus, the last year of the wage history is the previous year's APW. Wherever possible, the wage history is simulated for calculating the standard pension benefit, since the treatment of past earnings can have a large effect on the size of the pension benefit.

The data is given for the year 1947 and then every fifth year 1950-1995. (In the original data observations also exist for 1930, 1933 and 1939, but these years are not included in the QoG Social Policy Dataset.)

Pensions

scip_mprrs Net minimum pension replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 198, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

This is the ratio of the minimum net public pension to the net wage of a single APW. The miniumum benefit is calculated as the lowest pension possible within the major scheme that includes the standard worker. This includes means-tested benefits, but not public assistance. It is assumed that the person has no property or income from other sources.

scip_mprrc Net minimum pension replacement rate for couple

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 198, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

As for single pension (scip_mprrs), but this is the net rate paid to a married couple with two dependent children.

scip_sprrs Net standard pension replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 198, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net public pension paid to a person earning the APW wage in each year of their working career until retirement.

scip_sprrc Net standard pension replacement rate for couple

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 198, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

As for standard pension for a single person, but computed for a couple with a single earner (lifetime APW wage) against a family of four (as described above).

scip_pqp Pension qualifying period

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Number of years of contribution required to qualify for benefit.

scip_pcov Pension coverage/take-up

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 198, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Coverage ratio for the population section aged 15-65 years.

scip_pfe Pension financing by employer

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 192, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 17)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from employer contributions.

scip_pfi Pension financing by insured

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 196, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 17)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from contributions by the individuals insured.

scip_pfg Pension financing by government

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 196, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 17)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from state general revenue.

scip_pfo Pension financing by other sources

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 101, N: 14, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 4)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from other financing sources (e.g. municipalities, interest income accrued from fund reserves etc.).

scip_pm Pension means test

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Dummy variable indicating whether individual and/or household means test is applied to determine male worker's qualification for benefit. A value of 1 indicates means test and a value of 0 indicates no means test.

Sick pay

scip_srrs Net sick pay replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net insurance benefit for general illness (not work accident illness) to net income for a single person earning the APW wage.

scip_srrf Net sick pay replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 2 and 7) against the net income of such a household with one APW in work.

scip_sqc Sick pay qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit.

scip_sdur Sick pay benefit duration

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. Unlimited duration is coded as 260 weeks.

scip_swait Sick pay waiting period

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after falling ill.

scip_scov Sick pay coverage

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 17)

Percentage of the labor force with sick pay insurance. N.B: This is *not* the percentage of currently sick who are receiving sick pay benefits

scip_sfe Sick pay financing by employer

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 195, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from employer contributions.

scip_sfi Sick pay financing by insured

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 195, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from contributions by the individuals insured.

scip_sfg Sick pay financing by government

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 195, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from state general revenue.

scip_sfo Sick pay financing by other sources

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 107, N: 13, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 4)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from other financing sources (e.g. municipalities, interest income accrued from fund reserves etc.).

scip_sm Sick pay means test

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Dummy variable indicating whether individual and/or household means test is applied to determine male worker's qualification for benefit. A value of 1 indicates means test and a value of 0 indicates no means test.

Unemployment benefits

scip_uerrs Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net unemployment insurance benefit to net income for an unmarried single person earning the average production worker (APW) wage.

scip_uerrf Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an unemployed APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 2 and7) against the net income of such a household with one APW employed.

scip_ueqc Unemployment benefit qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit.

scip_uedur Unemployment benefit duration

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. Unlimited duration is coded as 260 weeks.

scip_uewait Unemployment benefit waiting period

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after becoming unemployed.

scip_uecov Unemployment insurance coverage

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 198, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Percentage of the labor force insured for unemployment risk. NB: This is *not* the percentage of currently unemployed who are currently receiving benefits.

scip_uefe Unemployment benefit financing by employer

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 196, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from employer contributions.

scip_uefi Unemployment benefit financing by insured

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 196, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from contributions by the individuals insured.

scip_uefg Unemployment benefit financing by government

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 196, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from state general revenue.

scip_uefo Unemployment benefit financing by other sources

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 80, N: 12, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 2)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from other financing sources (e.g. municipalities, interest income accrued from fund reserves etc.).

scip_uem Unemployment benefit means test

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 195, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 17)

Dummy variable indicating whether individual and/or household means test is applied to determine male worker's qualification for benefit. A value of 1 indicates means test and a value of 0 indicates no means test.

Work accident insurance

scip_warrs Net work accident insurance replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net insurance benefit for work accident illness to net income for a single person earning the APW wage.

scip_warrf Net work accident replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 2 and 7) against the net income of such a household with one APW in work.

scip_waqc Work accident insurance qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 195, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 17)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit.

scip_wadur Work accident benefit duration

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. Unlimited duration is coded as 260 weeks.

scip_wawait Work accident insurance waiting period

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after becoming injured from a work accident.

scip_wacov Work accident insurance coverage

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 198, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Percentage of the labor force with work accident insurance. N.B: This is *not* the percentage of currently sick who are receiving work accident insurance benefits

scip_wafe Work accident insurance financing by employer

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from employer contributions.

scip_wafi Work accident insurance financing by insured

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from contributions by the individuals insured.

scip_wafg Work accident insurance financing by government

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 197, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from state general revenue.

scip_wafo Work accident insurance financing by other sources

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 54, N: 9, $\overline{N}$: 1, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 2)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from other financing sources (e.g. municipalities, interest income accrued from fund reserves etc.).

scip_wam Work accident insurance means test

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 195, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 17)

Dummy variable indicating whether individual and/or household means test is applied to determine male worker's qualification for benefit. A value of 1 indicates means test and a value of 0 indicates no means test.

UNESCO Institute for Statistics

http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143&IF_Language=eng
(UNESCO 2007)

Expenditure

The data on expenditure on education includes both expenditure on educational institutions and administration.

une_toe Total expenditure on education

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 137, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 78)
Total expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. Includes expenditure from public, private and international sources

une_puto Public expenditure on education, total

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 198, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 28, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 146)

Total public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP.

une_pupre Public expenditure on pre-primary education

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 172, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 128)

Public expenditure on pre-primary education as a percentage of GDP.

une_pup Public expenditure on primary education

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 185, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 143)

Public expenditure on primary education as a percentage of GDP.

une_pus Public expenditure on secondary education

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 187, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 141)

Public expenditure on secondary education as a percentage of GDP.

une_pute Public expenditure on tertiary education

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 197, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 28, $\overline{T}$: 5
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 138)

Public expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP.

une_putg Public expenditure on education (% of total government)

(Time-series: 1991-2004, n: 164, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 136)

Public expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of total government expenditure.

une_prto Private expenditure on education, total

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 137, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 2000-2004 (varies by country), N: 70)

Total private expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP.

une_prpre Private expenditure on pre-primary education

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 125, N: 32, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 62)

Private expenditure on pre-primary education as a percentage of GDP.

une_prp Private expenditure on primary education

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 126, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 2000-2004 (varies by country), N: 62)

Private expenditure on primary education as a percentage of GDP.

une_prs Private expenditure on secondary education

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 131, N: 32, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 2000-2004 (varies by country), N: 63)

Private expenditure on secondary education as a percentage of GDP.

une_prte Private expenditure on tertiary education

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 135, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 68)

Private expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP.

une_ito International expenditure on education, total

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 91, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 13, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 72)

Total expenditure on education financed by international sources, as percentage of GDP.

une_ppt Public expenditure per pupil, total

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 181, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 122)

Public expenditure per pupil as a percentage of GDP per capita.

une_ppp Public expenditure per pupil, primary

(Time-series: 1991-2005, n: 221, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 143)

Public expenditure per pupil in primary school, as percentage of GDP per capita.

une_pps Public expenditure per pupil, secondary

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 193, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 28, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 140)

Public expenditure per pupil in secondary school, as percentage of GDP per capita.

une_ppte Public expenditure per pupil, tertiary

(Time-series: 1999-2005, n: 192, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 126)

Public expenditure per pupil in tertiary school, as percentage of GDP per capita.

Pupil-teacher ratio

Average number of pupils (students) per teacher at a specific level of education in a given school-year.

une_ptrpre Pupil-teacher ratio, pre-primary

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 232, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 171)

une_ptrp Pupil-teacher ratio, primary

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 247, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 177)

une_ptrs Pupil-teacher ratio, secondary

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 224, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 14, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 173)

WHOSIS – WHO Statistical Information System

http://www.who.int/whosis/en/
(WHO 2006, 2009)

Health Expenditure

who_teh Total expenditure on health (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

The sum of general government and private health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. It comprises the outlays earmarked for health maintenance, restoration or enhancement of the health status of the population, paid for in cash or in kind.

who_tehcu Total expenditure on health per capita (USD)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Total expenditure on health per capita in US dollars (annual average exchange rate). Note: In the original data, one of the observations had the value "<1.0". We replaced this value with 0.

who_tehci Total expenditure on health per capita (international dollars)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Total expenditure on health per capita in international dollars. (International dollars are derived by dividing local currency units by an estimate of their purchasing power parity (PPP) compared with US dollars, i.e. the measure that minimizes the consequences of differences in prices between countries.)

who_gehh Government expenditure on health (% of total health)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Government expenditure on health care services and goods as a percentage of total expenditure on health (who_teh). Expenditures on health include final consumption, subsidies to producers, and transfers to households (chiefly reimbursements for medical and pharmaceutical bills). Besides domestic funds it also includes external resources (mainly as grants passing through the government or loans channeled through the national budget).

who_gehcu Government expenditure on health per capita (USD)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2004 (varies by country), N: 191)

Government expenditure on health per capita in US dollars (annual average exchange rate). Note: In the original data, five of the observations had the value "<1.0". We replaced these values with 0.

who_gehci Government expenditure on health per capita (international dollars)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Government expenditure on health per capita in international dollars (see who_tehci). Note: In the original data, two of the observations had the value "<1.0". We replaced these values with 0.

who_peh Private expenditure on health (% of total health)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Private expenditure on health-care services and goods as a percantage of total expenditure on health (who_teh).

who_gehg Government expenditure on health (% of total government)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Government expenditure on health-care services and goods as a percentage of total government expenditure.

who_erh External resources for health (% of total health)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 446, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 37, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2004 (varies by country), N: 189)

Grants and loans for health goods and services, passing through governments or private entities, in cash or in kind, as a percentage of total expenditure on health (who_teh).

who_ssh Social security expenditure on health (% of government health)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 174)

Expenditure on health by schemes that are mandatory and controlled by government, as a percentage of total government expenditure on health (who_gehh). Such social-security schemes that apply only to a selected group of the population, such as public sector employees only, are also included here.

who_oop Out-of-pocket expenditure on health (% of private health)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 468, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 190)

The direct outlays of households, including gratuities and in-kind payments made to health practitioners and to suppliers of pharmaceuticals, therapeutic appliances and other goods and services, as a percentage of total private expenditure on health (who_peh). This includes direct payments to both public and private providers.

who_ppp Private prepaid plans (% of private health)

(Time-series: 1995-2006, n: 453, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 38, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 168)

Private insurance schemes and private social insurance schemes (with no government control over payment rates and participating providers but with broad guidelines from government), as a percentage of total private expenditure on health (who_peh).

Health Staff

who_pha Physicians (absolute value)

(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 186)

Number of physicians. Includes generalists and specialists.

who_phd Physicians (density per 1000 population)

(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 186)

Density of physicians per 1000 population.

who_nua Nurses (absolute value)

(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

Number of nurses. Includes professional nurses, auxiliary nurses, enrolled nurses and other nurses, such as dental nurses and primary care nurses.

who_nud Nurses (density per 1000 population)

(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

Density of nurses per 1000 population.

who_dea Dentists (absolute value)

(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 183)

Number of dentists. Includes dentists, dental assistants and dental technicians.

who_ded Dentists (density per 1000 population)

(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 183)

Density of dentists per 1000 population.

Taxes and Government Revenue

This section includes data on tax rates and government income from different types of taxes.

Easterly

http://go.worldbank.org/ZSQKYFU6J0
(Easterly 2001a; Easterly 2001b)

Easterly's data on government revenue and expenditure comes from the IMF Government Finance Statistics. The classification of the data is described in IMF (1986; 2001).

WARNING: We have found some dubious figures in this data, particularly for the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1982-1995, but decided to leave the original data as is.

Government Revenue

ea_tgrg Total government revenue and grants (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 805, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 89)

Total government revenue, including grants from foreign governments and international organizations, as a percentage of GDP.

ea_tgr Total government revenue (% GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 805, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 89)

Total government revenue, excluding grants, as a percentage of GDP (ea_tgrg - ea_g).

ea_tipc Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 803, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 85)

Taxes on income, profits and capital gains as a percentage of GDP.

ea_ssc Social security contributions (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 753, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 67)

Government revenue from social security contributions as a percentage of GDP.

ea_tpwf Taxes on payroll or work force (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 339, N: 20 $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 25)

This category consists of taxes that are collected from employers or the self-employed and that are not earmarked for social security schemes. Payments earmarked for social security schemes are classified as social security contributions (ea_ssc).

ea_tp Taxes on property (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 731, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 77)

Taxes on the use, ownership, or transfer of wealth as a percentage of GDP.

ea_dtgs Domestic taxes on goods and services (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 803, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 87)

Domestic taxes on goods and services as a percentage of GDP. This includes VAT, excises, profits of fiscal monopoly etc.

ea_ttt Taxes on international trade and transactions (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 724, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 81)

Taxes on international trade and transactions as a percentage of GDP.

ea_ot Other taxes (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 598, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 68)

Other taxes as a percentage of GDP.

ea_tssgr Tax and social security contributions government revenue (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 814, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 89)

Total government revenue from taxes and social security contributions as a percentage of GDP (ea_tipc + ea_ssc + ea_tpwf + ea_tp + ea_dtgs + ea_ttt + ea_ot).

ea_gcr Government capital revenue (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 678, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 78)

Revenue from government capital as a percentage of GDP.

ea_g Grants (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 630, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 18)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 71)

Noncompulsory current or capital transfers received from either another government or an international organization, as a percentage of GDP.

ea_ogr Other government revenue (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 805, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 89)

Revenue other than that from taxes, social security contributions, grants and capital, as a percentage of GDP. Included here is e.g. entrepreneurial and property income and income from administrative fees and charges.

ea_cugr Current government revenue (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 805, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 89)

Total government revenue excluding capital revenue and grants, as a percentage of GDP (ea_tgr - ea_gcr).

Fraser Institute – Economic Freedom of the World

http://www.freetheworld.com/
(Gwartney and Lawson 2006)

Note: In some cases the data from Fraser Institute gives the top marginal tax rate as an interval. In these cases we have recoded the variable to the highest figure in the interval. (If, e.g., the top marginal tax rate is given as 52-59, we have recoded it to 59.)

fi_mti Top marginal tax rate (index)

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 349, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000-2004 (varies by country), N: 114)

The index ranges from 0-10, where higher marginal tax rates that take effect at lower income thresholds give a lower rating.

fi_mitp Top marginal income tax rate (percent)

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 349, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 113)

Top marginal income tax rate.

fi_miti Top marginal income tax rate (index)

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 349, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000-2004 (varies by country), N: 114)

The index ranges from 0-10, where higher marginal income tax rates that take effect at lower income thresholds give a lower rating.

fi_mptp Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (percent)

(Time-series: 1990-2004, n: 257, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 104)

Top marginal income and payroll tax rate.

fi_mpti Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (index)

(Time-series: 1990-2004, n: 257, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 105)

The index ranges from 0-10, where higher marginal income and payroll tax rates that take effect at lower income thresholds give a lower rating.

OECD – Revenue Statistics

http://caliban.sourceoecd.org/vl=1372044/cl=23/nw=1/rpsv/statistic/s19_about.htm?jnlissn=16081099
(OECD 2006b)

rs_ttr Total tax revenue

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. This includes social security contributions.

Taxes on income, profits and capital gains

rs_ipct Income, profits and capital gains tax, total

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total (both individual and corporate) income, profits and capital gains tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.

rs_ipci Income, profits and capital gains tax, individuals

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1068, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Income, profits and capital gains tax revenue from individuals as a percentage of GDP.

rs_ipti Income and profits tax, individuals

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1026, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Income and profits tax revenue from individuals, as a percentage of GDP.

rs_cti Capital gains tax, individuals

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1018, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Capital gains tax revenue from individuals, as a percentage of GDP.

rs_pctc Profits and capital gains tax, corporate

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1068, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Corporate profits and capital gains tax revenue, as a percentage of GDP.

rs_ipcto Income, profits and capital gains tax, other

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Income, profits and capital gains tax, unallocable between individuals and corporate.

Social security contributions

rs_sst Social security contributions, total

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1116, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total social security contributions, as a percentage of GDP.

rs_ssee Social security contributions, employees

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1059, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 37)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Social security contributions paid by employees, as a percentage of GDP.

rs_sser Social security contributions, employers

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1060, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 37)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Social security contributions paid by employers, as a percentage of GDP.

rs_sssn Social security contributions, self- and non-employed

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1061, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 37)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Social security contributions paid by the self- and non-employed, as a percentage of GDP.

rs_sso Social security contributions, other

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1103, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 37)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Social security contributions unallocable between employees, employers and the self- and non-employed.

Other taxes

rs_tpw Taxes on payroll and workforce

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1117, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

This includes special wage tax, general wage fees, child care fees, adult education fees etc. as a percentage of GDP.

rs_tp Taxes on property

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total taxes on property, as a percentage of GDP. Includes both individual and corporate taxes.

rs_tgs Taxes on goods and services

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total taxes on goods and services, as a percentage of GDP. This includes VAT, excises, profits of fiscal monopoly, taxes on incomes and exports etc.

OECD – Taxing Wages Statistics

http://caliban.sourceoecd.org/vl=3831743/cl=13/nw=1/rpsv/statistic/s24_about.htm?jnlissn=16081102
(OECD 2006a)

The calculations in the Taxing Wages Statistics are based on the wage of an average production worker (APW). Please note that from 1991, data on wages has been revised to only include production workers (excluding employees).

tw_ats Average income tax, single (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 507, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Average personal income tax as a percentage of gross earnings, for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

tw_atc Average income tax, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 507, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Average personal income tax as a percentage of gross earnings, for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

tw_atcos Average tax and contributions, single (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Employees' social security contributions and personal income tax as a percentage of gross earnings. Calculated for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

tw_atcoc Average tax and contributions, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atcos, but calculated for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

tw_atcls Average tax and contributions less transfers, single (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 507, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total social security contributions and personal income tax, less transfer payments, as a percentage of gross wage earnings. Calculated for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

tw_atclc Average tax and contributions less transfers, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 502, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atcls, but calculated for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

tw_mtcls Marginal tax and contributions less transfers, single (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atcls, but marginal rate instead of average rate.

tw_mtclc Marginal tax and contributions less transfers, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atclc, but marginal rate instead of average rate. Assumes a rise in gross earnings of the principal earner in the household. The outcome may differ if the wage of the spouse goes up, especially if partners are taxed individually.

tw_atws Average tax wedge, single (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 499, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Average tax rate, covering employees' and employers' social security contributions and personal income tax, less transfer payments, as a percentage of gross labor costs (gross wage + employers' social security contributions). Calculated for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

tw_atwc Average tax wedge, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 495, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atws, but calculated for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

tw_mtws Marginal tax wedge, single (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atws, but marginal rate instead of average rate.

tw_mtwc Marginal tax wedge, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atwc, but marginal rate instead of average rate. Assumes a rise in gross earnings of the principal earner in the household. The outcome may differ if the wage of the spouse goes up, especially if partners are taxed individually.

tw_ews Elasticity of income after tax, gross wage, single

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Measures the increase in net income after a 1 % increase in gross wage earnings. Net income is calculated as gross earnings minus employees' social security contributions and personal income tax plus family benefits.

The more progressive the tax system at these income levels, the lower is the elasticity. In a proportional tax system the elasticity would equal 1.

Calculated for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

tw_ewc Elasticity of income after tax, gross wage, couple

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_ews, but calculated for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

tw_els Elasticity of income after tax, gross labor cost, single

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_ews, but calculated for an increase in gross labor costs (gross wage + employers' social security contributions).

tw_elc Elasticity of income after tax, gross labor cost, couple

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_ewc, but calculated for an increase in gross labor costs (gross wage + employers' social security contributions).

Social Conditions

This is a broad category where we have tried to include data that describe the structural conditions for social policy. The category encompasses things like economic inequality, GDP, unemployment, educational levels, health conditions, gender inequality, immigration, trade openness and foreign direct investments.

Armingeon et al – Comparative Political Dataset I & II

http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html
(Armingeon et al 2008; Armingeon & Careja 2006)

ar_source Armingeon source

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1698, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 53)

There are three different versions of the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS), and this variable denotes from which of these each observation comes. There are observations from 23 OECD countries from CPDS I, 28 post-communist countries from CPDS II, and data for Cyprus and Malta from CPDS III.

ar_ue Unemployment rate (%)

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1153, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 49)

Unemployment rate in percent. Source for the OECD countries (ar_source = 1) is OECD, Employment and Labour Market Statistics. Source for the post-communist countries (ar_source = 2) is mainly Kolodko (2000).

Barro & Lee

http://go.worldbank.org/MDJHSKYEB0
(Barro & Lee 2000)

bl_psct25 Primary school complete (total 25+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

bl_ssct25 Secondary school complete (total 25+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

bl_hsct25 Higher school complete (total 25+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

bl_pscf25 Primary school complete (female 25+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

bl_sscf25 Secondary school complete (female 25+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

bl_hscf25 Higher school complete (female 25+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

bl_pscm25 Primary school complete (male 25+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

bl_sscm25 Secondary school complete (male 25+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

bl_hscm25 Higher school complete (male 25+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

bl_psct15 Primary school complete (total 15+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

bl_ssct15 Secondary school complete (total 15+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

bl_hsct15 Higher school complete (total 15+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

bl_pscf15 Primary school complete (female 15+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

bl_sscf15 Secondary school complete (female 15+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

bl_hscf15 Higher school complete (female 15+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

bl_pscm15 Primary school complete (male 15+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

bl_sscm15 Secondary school complete (male 15+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

bl_hscm15 Higher school complete (male 15+)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

bl_asyf15 Average schooling years (female)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Average schooling years in the female population aged 15 and over.

bl_asyf25 Average schooling years (female)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Average schooling years in the female population aged 25 and over.

bl_asym15 Average schooling years (male)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Average schooling years in the male population aged 15 and over.

bl_asym25 Average schooling years (male)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Average schooling years in the male population aged 25 and over.

bl_asyt15 Average schooling years (total)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 261, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Average schooling years in the total population aged 15 and over.

bl_asyt25 Average schooling years (total)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 270, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Average schooling years in the total population aged 25 and over.

Deininger & Squire

http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20699070~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
(Deininger & Squire 1996)

ds_gini Gini Index

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 342, N: 33, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 1968-1996 (varies by country), N: 108)

The variable measures the Gini index of income inequality from observations with the highest data quality (where the quality has been rated as "accept") in the original Deininger & Squire (1996) dataset (higher values indicating more inequality). The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (the society's total income accrues to only one person/household unit).

Note: Both within- and cross-country comparisons are to be handled with care since these Gini coefficients are based on varying sources of information: income or expenditure, gross or net of taxes, and using individual or household recipient units.

ds_yom Year of measurement

The latest year available for each country of the ds_gini measurement in the cross-sectional dataset.

Dreher – KOF Index of Globalization

http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/
(Dreher 2006; Dreher et al 2008)

All indexes below range between 0 and 100, where higher values indicate a higher degree of globalization.

dr_ig Index of Globalization

(Time-series: 1970-2006, n: 1313, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 155)

The overall index of globalization is the weighted average of the following variables: economic globalization, social globalization and political globalization (dr_eg, dr_sg and dr_pg). Most weight has been given to economic followed by social globalization.

dr_eg Economic Globalization

(Time-series: 1970-2006, n: 1313, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 139)

Economic globalization is here defined as the long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. It is measured by actual flows of trade and investments, and by restrictions on trade and capital such as tariff rates.

dr_pg Political Globalization

(Time-series: 1970-2006, n: 1313, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 189)

Political globalization is measured by the number of embassies and high commissions in a country, the number of international organizations of which the country is a member, the number of UN peace missions the country has participated in, and the number of international treaties that the country has signed since 1945.

dr_sg Social Globalization

(Time-series: 1970-2006, n: 1313, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 157)

Social globalization is measured by three categories of indicators. The first is personal contacts, such as telephone traffic and tourism. The second is information flows, e.g. number of Internet users. The third is cultural proximity, e.g. trade in books and number of Ikea warehouses per capita.

Easterly

http://go.worldbank.org/ZSQKYFU6J0
(Easterly 2001a; Easterly 2001b)

The sources of these data are, except when noted, Global Development Finance and the World Development Indicators (World Bank).

WARNING: We have found some dubious figures in this data, particularly for the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1982-1995, but decided to leave the original data as is.

ea_gbds Government budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 800, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 88)

Government budget deficit or surplus as a percentage of GDP. Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics.

ea_ed External debt (% GDP)

(Time-series: 1971-1999, n: 212, N: 13, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 134)

External debt as a percentage of GDP.

ea_exp Exports (% GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 1234, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 159)

Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.

ea_fdi Foreign direct investment (% GDP)

(Time-series: 1970-1999, n: 865, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 23)
(Cross-section: 1996-1999 (varies by country), N: 162)

Foreign Direct Investment as a percentage of GDP.

ea_gro GDP growth (annual %)

(Time-series: 1961-1999, n: 1305, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 33, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 174)

GDP growth, annual percent.

ea_gdp GDP, PPP (current international USD)

(Time-series: 1975-1999, n: 869, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 1996-1999 (varies by country), N: 165)

GDP at purchasing power parity (current international dollars).

ea_imp Imports (% GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 1234, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 159)

Imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.

ea_infl Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)

(Time-series: 1961-1999, n: 1248, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 32, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 158)

Increase in consumer prices (percent).

ea_pri Private investment (% GDP)

(Time-series: 1970-1998, n: 170, N: 9, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 19)
(Cross-section: 1997-1998 (varies by country), N: 50)

Private investment as a percentage of GDP.

Sources: Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators (for gross domestic investment); Pfefferman et al (1999) (for public investment and private investment).

ea_pui Public investment (% GDP)

(Time-series: 1970-1998, n: 201, N: 9, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 1997-1998 (varies by country), N: 50)

Public investment as a percentage of GDP.

Sources: Pfefferman et al (1999); Easterly et al 1994; Bruno and Easterly 1998.

ea_rir Real interest rate (%)

(Time-series: 1961-1999, n: 748, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 139)

Real interest rate, percent.

Sources: Global Development Finance; World Development Indicators, Easterly et al 1994.

ea_tr Total trade (imports+exports) (% GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 1234, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 162)

Total trade (imports plus exports) as a percentage of GDP.

ea_tot Terms of trade (goods and services, 1995=100)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 1078, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 150)

Terms of trade (goods and services, 1995 = 100)

Eurostat

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
(Eurostat 2007)

Economic indicators

When calculating the inequality indicators, the total disposable income of a household is calculated by adding together the personal income received by all of household members plus income received at household level, once corrected by within-household non-response inflation factor to compensate for non-response in individual questionnaires.

eu_gini Gini index

(Time-series: 1995-2005, n: 191, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 31)

The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (the society's total income accrues to only one household unit).

eu_8020 80/20 income quintile share ratio

(Time-series: 1995-2005, n: 198, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 31)

The ratio of the share of income of the lowest and the highest quintile.

eu_grgdp Growth of real GDP (%)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 841, N: 33, $\overline{N}$: 14, $\overline{T}$: 25)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 35)

Growth of GDP (constant prices). N.B. this is not growth of GDP per capita!

Unemployment and activity rates

The source of this data is the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS). Note that the age span when calculating the rates differs (15-74 years of age for unemployment rates, and 15-64 years for activity and employment rates).

eu_ue Unemployment rate (%)

(Time-series: 1983-2006, n: 513, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 32)

The share of unemployed persons (between 15 and 74 years of age) in the total number of active persons in the labor market. Active persons are those who are either employed or actively seeking work.

eu_lue Long term unemployment (>12 months)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 371, N: 32, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 33)

The long term unemployment rate is the share of unemployed persons (15-74 years) since 12 months or more in the total number of active persons in the labor market. Active persons are those who are either employed or actively seeking work.

eu_vlue Very long term unemployment (>24 months)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 330, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 11)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 31)

Very long term unemployment rate is the share of the unemployed persons since 24 months or more in the total number of active persons in the labor market. Active persons are those who are either employed or actively seeking work.

eu_lf Labor force (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 358, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 32)

The percentage of the population aged 15-64, who constitutes the supply of the labor market irrespective of current labor status (either employed or actively seeking work).

eu_flf Female labor force (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 358, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 32)

Same as eu_lf, but for the female population aged 15-64.

eu_er Employment rate (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 388, N: 33, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 34)

Employment rates represent employed persons as a percentage of same age total population (15 to 64 years).

eu_fer Female employment rate (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 388, N: 33, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 34)

Same as eu_er, but for the female population.

Education

eu_use Upper secondary education completed (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 343, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 11)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

Percentage of the population aged 25 to 64 having completed at least upper secondary education.

eu_usew Upper secondary education completed, women (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 343, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 11)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

Percentage of the female population aged 25 to 64 having completed at least upper secondary education.

eu_usem Upper secondary education completed, men (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 343, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 11)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

Percentage of the male population aged 25 to 64 having completed at least upper secondary education.

Population and immigration

eu_pop Population on January 1

(Time-series: 1950-2006, n: 1574, N: 32, $\overline{N}$: 28, $\overline{T}$: 49)
(Cross-section: 1996-2004 (varies by country), N: 46)

The inhabitants on 1 January of the year in question (or, in some cases, on 31 December of the previous year). Includes foreign citizens.

eu_ii Inflow of immigrants

(Time-series: 2004-2006, n: 66, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2004-2006 (varies by country), N: 37)

Inflow of immigrants.

eu_nmc Net migration

(Time-series: 1950-2006, n: 1432, N: 32, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 47)

Immigration minus emigration (including corrections)

eu_crnmc Crude rate of net migration

(Time-series: 1950-2006, n: 1432, N: 32, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 47)

Net migration per 1000 inhabitants. That is: net migration / (population * 1000).

eu_as Asylum seekers

(Time-series: 1991-2000, n: 236, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 29)

Number of asylum applications.

eu_pad Positive asylum decisions

(Time-series: 1999-2006, n: 157, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 29)

Number of positive asylum decisions. Includes: Geneva Convention status granted; humanitarian status and all other types of subsidiary protection equivalent to asylum; other positive decisions.

eu_fc Foreign citizens

(Time-series: 1985-2006, n: 374, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 1999-2003 (varies by country), N: 32)

Number of foreign citizens.

eu_lfeu Labor force, foreign EU citizens

(Time-series: 1985-2001, n: 95, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 17)

Number of foreigners that are EU citizens and part of the active population. The active population is people aged 15-64, who constitute the supply of the labor market irrespective of current labor status (either employed or actively seeking work).

eu_eeu Employed foreign EU citizens

(Time-series: 1985-2001, n: 98, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 18)

Number of employed persons that are foreigners and EU citizens.

eu_ueeu Unemployed foreign EU citizens

(Time-series: 1997-2001, n: 32, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2001 (varies by country), N: 18)

Number of unemployed persons (between 15 and 74 years of age) that are foreigners and EU citizens.

eu_lfn Labor force, foreign non EU citizens

(Time-series: 1985-2001, n: 94, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 17)

Same as eu_lfeu, but for foreign non EU citizens.

eu_en Employed foreign non EU citizens

(Time-series: 1985-2001, n: 97, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 18)

Same as eu_eeu, but for foreign non EU citizens.

eu_uen Unemployed foreign non EU citizens

(Time-series: 1997-2001, n: 29, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2001 (varies by country), N: 417)

Same as eu_ueeu, but for foreign non EU citizens.

Health

eu_hlyf Healthy life years at birth (female)

(Time-series: 1995-2003, n: 68, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 8, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 19)

Measures the number of remaining years that a person is expected to live in a healthy condition. A healthy condition is defined by the absence of limitations in functioning/disability. For more information see
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_information/indicators/lifeyears_en.htm.

eu_hlym Healthy life years at birth (male)

(Time-series: 1995-2003, n: 92, N: 20, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 20)

Same as eu_hlyf, but for men.

Heston, Summers & Aten – Penn World Table

http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php
(Heston et al 2006)

pwt_rgdpch Real GDP per capita (constant prices: chain series)

(Time-series: 1950-2004, n: 1746, N: , $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 39)
(Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country), N: 183)

Real GDP per capita (Chain) is a chain index obtained by first applying the component growth rates between each pair of consecutive years, t-l and t (t=1951 to 2000), to the current price component shares in year t-1 to obtain the DA growth rate for each year. This DA growth rate for each year t is then applied backwards and forwards from 1996, and summed to the constant price net foreign balance to obtain the Chain GDP series.

pwt_grgdpch Growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant prices: chain series)

(Time-series: 1951-2004, n: 1533, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 32, $\overline{T}$: 44)
(Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country), N: 179)

Growth rate of real GDP per capita.

pwt_openk Openness to trade

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 1756, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 32, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country), N: 183)

Exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Constant prices, reference year 1996. GDP is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, government and exports, and subtracting imports in any given year.

Franzese – Participation, Inequality and Transfers Database

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/T&T_FullDataSet.XLS
(Franzese 1998; 2002)

fr_ud Union density

(Time-series: 1947-1996, n: 1006, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 21)

Union membership as a percentage of labor force.

Huber et al – Comparative Welfare States Data Set

http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/cws%20lis.xls
(Huber et al 2004)

The sum of the three variables below (with a range from 0-14), is the measure of (international) financial openness used by Quinn (1997). The higher the value, the higher the openness of the country. For more information see Quinn (1997).

hu_lcu Liberalization of current transactions

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 718, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 1997-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Liberalization of inward and outward current account transactions. It ranges from 0-8.

hu_lca Liberalization of capital transactions

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 718, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 1997-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Liberalization of inward and outward capital account transactions. It ranges from 0-4.

hu_aatr Agreements against transaction restrictions

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 718, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 1997-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Accession to international legal agreements, such as OECD, IMF, EU, and so on, that constrain a nation's ability to restrict exchange and capital flows. It ranges from 0-2.

hu_wsc Wage setting coordination

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 39)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Wage Setting Coordination Scores. Source: Kenworthy (2001).

(1) Fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants.
(2) Bargaining mainly at industry-level with little or no pattern-setting.
(3) Industry-level bargaining with reasonably strong pattern-setting but only moderate union concentration.
(4) Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze – without a peace obligation, high degree of union concentration and extensive, regularized pattern-setting, tacit coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive pattern-setting.
(5) Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze – with a peace obligation, extremely high degree of union concentration and coordination of industry bargaining by confederation, extensive coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive pattern-setting.

hu_um Union members (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 658, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 12)

Total reported union members, in thousands.

hu_aum Active union membership (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 390, N: 12, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 10)

Active union membership, in thousands. (Gross minus retired members.)

hu_num Net union membership (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 629, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 4)

Net union membership, in thousands. (Gross minus retired and unemployed members.)

IMF – World Economic Outlook

http://imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28
(IMF 2007)

weo_gdp GDP per capita (PPP, current international dollars)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 1058, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 174)

Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita, measured in current international dollars.

weo_gbds Government budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 853, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 32)

Government budget deficit or surplus as a percentage of GDP.

weo_infl Inflation (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 1063, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 37, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 178)

Inflation as annual percentage change in consumer prices.

weo_ue Unemployment (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 854, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 32)

Unemployment as percent of total labor force.

Jesuit & Mahler – Fiscal Redistribution Dataset

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 68, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1997-2004 (varies by country), N: 12)
http://www.lisproject.org/publications/fiscalredistdata/fiscred.htm
(Jesuit & Mahler 2004, 2008; Mahler & Jesuit 2006)

The Jesuit & Mahler data is based on micro-level data from the Luxembourg Income Study (2007).

jm_gb Gini before taxes and transfers

This is what would have been the value of the Gini coefficient, had not the system of government taxes and transfers existed. It is based on the pre-government incomes of households, i.e. wages and salaries, income from property, pensions, alimony, child support and other private sources of income.

The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 1 (the society's total income accrues to only one household unit).

jm_ga Gini after taxes and transfers

Gini based on true disposable income, i.e. after government taxes and transfers.

The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 1 (the society's total income accrues to only one household unit).

jm_ar Absolute redistribution (change in Gini)

The absolute change in Gini resulting from taxes and transfers. That is jm_gb - jm_ga.

jm_rr Relative redistriubtion (change in Gini)

The percentage change in Gini resulting from taxes and transfers. That is (jm_gb – jm_ga) / jm_gb * 100.

jm_artr Absolute redistribtion from transfers (change in Gini)

The absolute change in Gini resulting from transfers. That is jm_gb minus Gini after transfers but before taxes. The variable does not take into account the effect of taxes on transfers (since the underlying data does not permit this), which means that the redistributive effect of transfers is overstated in those countries where transfers are taxed.

jm_rrtr Relative redistriubtion from transfers (change in Gini)

Same as jm_artr, but reflecting the percentage change in Gini resulting from transfers rather than absolute change.

jm_arta Absolute redistriubtion from taxes (change in Gini)

The absolute change in Gini resulting from taxes. As noted above, taxes on transfers are not taken into account and neither are indirect taxes. This means that the redistributive effect of taxes is understated.

jm_rrta Relative redistriubtion from taxes (change in Gini)

Same as jm_arta, but reflecting the percentage change in Gini resulting from taxes rather than absolute change.

jm_srtr Share of redistribution from transfers (%)

Percentage share of total redistribution resulting from transfers. That is jm_artr / jm_ar * 100.

jm_srta Share of redistribution from taxes (%)

Percentage share of total redistribution resulting from taxes. That is jm_arta / jm_ar * 100.

jm_rprb Relative poverty rate before taxes and transfers (%)

Relative poverty rate based on income before government taxes and transfers. The relative poverty rate is here defined as the percentage of the population earning less than 50% of the median income. The variable is based on the pre-government incomes of households, i.e. wages and salaries, income from property, pensions, alimony, child support and other private sources of income.

jm_rpra Relative poverty rate after taxes and transfers (%)

Relative poverty rate based on true disposable income, i.e. after government taxes and transfers. The relative poverty rate is here defined as the percentage of the population earning less than 50% of the median income.

Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)

(Time-series: 1967-2005, n: 148, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1996-2006 (varies by country), N: 35)
http://www.lisproject.org/
(Luxembourg Income Study 2007)

Note: All figures from the Luxembourg Income Study are based on disposable household income, i.e. income after taxes and transfers.

lis_gini Gini index

The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 1 (the society's total income accrues to only one household unit).

lis_atk5 Atkinson index (epsilon=0.5)

The Atkinson index is an alternative measure of economic inequality. Like the Gini index, the higher the value, the more unequal the income distribution.

The distinguishing feature of the Atkinson index is its ability to gauge movements in different segments of the income distribution. The Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to changes at the lower end of the income distribution as epsilon approaches 1. Conversely, as the level of inequality aversion falls (that is, as epsilon approaches 0) the Atkinson becomes more sensitive to changes in the upper end of the income distribution.

The Atkinson index is defined as:

$$A = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{1}{\mu}\left(\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} y_i^{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)} & \text{for } \varepsilon \in [0,1) \\ 1 - \frac{1}{\mu}\left(\prod_{i=1}^{N} y_i\right)^{1/N} & \text{for } \varepsilon = 1, \end{cases}$$

where y_i is individual income (i = 1, 2, ..., N) and μ is the mean income (Wikipedia 2008).

lis_atk1 Atkinson index (epsilon=1)

See lis_atk5.

lis_9010 90/10 income percentile ratio

The ratio of the income of the 90th percentile to the income of the 10th percentile.

lis_9050 90/50 income percentile ratio

The ratio of the income of the 90th percentile to the income of the 50th percentile.

lis_8020 80/20 income percentile ratio

The ratio of the income of the 80th percentile to the income of the 20th percentile.

lis_rpr40 Relative poverty rate (40%)

Percentage of the population earning less than 40 percent of the median income.

lis_rpr50 Relative poverty rate (50%)

Percentage of the population earning less than 50 percent of the median income.

lis_rpr60 Relative poverty rate (60%)

Percentage of the population earning less than 60 percent of the median income.

OECD – Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC)

(Cross-section: 1998-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)
http://stats.oecd.org
(OECD 2009g)

Note: Similar statistics are in included in the OECD International Migration Statistics below. However, the DIOC data concerns the *foreign born* population, while the International Migration Statistics data primarily concerns those in the population that are *foreigners*.

dioc_fbe Foreign born employed

Number of employed persons that are foreign born.

dioc_fbue Foreign born unemployed

Number of unemployed persons that are foreigners.

dioc_fbi **Foreign born inactive**

Total number of foreign born persons that are neither employed nor actively seeking any work.

dioc_te **Total employment**

Total number of unemployed persons.

dioc_tue **Total unemployment**

Total number of unemployed persons.

dioc_ti **Total inactive population**

Total number of persons that are neither employed nor actively seeking any work.

OECD – Economic Outlook

http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34109_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
(OECD 2007f)

oeo_grgdp **Growth of real GDP**

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 390, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 13)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

N.B! This is not growth of GDP per capita.

OECD – The Gender, Institutions and Development Database

(http://stats.oecd.org
OECD 2009d)

The OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database contains comparative data on gender equality. It has been compiled from secondary sources as well as from in-depth reviews of country case studies. The sources are the UNDP Human Development Report, World Bank Gender Stats, ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market and CIA World Factbook.

gid_far **Female Activity Rate (%)**

(Cross-section: 2004, N:151)

The percentage of the female population aged 15 and above who supply, or are available to supply, labor for the production of goods and services. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.)

gid_farpm **Female Activity Rate as Percent of Male**

(Cross-section: 2004, N:151)

Same as gid_far, but measured as percentage of male activity rate. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.)

gid_fptw Female Professional and Technical Workers (%)

(Cross-section: 1992-2004 (varies by country), N: 74)

Women's share of positions defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) which includes physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals (and associate professionals), life science and health professionals (and associate professionals), teaching professionals (and associate professionals) and other professionals and associate professionals. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.)

gid_fwe Female Wage Employment (%)

(Cross-section: 2006, N:112)

The share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector as a percentage of the total non-agricultural sector employment. (Source: UN Millennium Development Goal Indicators.)

gid_rfmi Ratio of Female to Male Income

(Cross-section: 1991-2004 (varies by country), N: 146)

The ratio of the estimated female to male earned income. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.)

gid_fgm Female Government Ministers (%)

(Cross-section: 1992-2004 (varies by country), N: 151)

The percentage of women in government at ministerial level. Includes vice prime ministers and ministers. Prime ministers are only included if they hold ministerial portfolios. Vice-presidents and heads of ministerial-level departments or agencies were also included when exercising a ministerial function within the government structure. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.)

gid_whp Women in High Positions (%)

(Cross-section: 1992-2004 (varies by country), N: 73)

The share of women's positions defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), which includes legislators, senior government officials, traditional chiefs and heads of villages, senior officials of special-interest organizations, corporate managers, directors and chief executives, production and operations department managers and other department and general managers. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.)

gid_wip Women in Parliament (%)

(Cross-section: 2006, N:154)

The percentage of women in parliament. The data refers to single house, or the weighted average of both upper and lower house, where relevant. (Source: UNDP Human Develoment Report.)

gid_ywv **Year Women Received Right to Vote**
(Cross-section, N: 153)

The year women received the right to vote. (Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.)

gid_ywse **Year Women Received Right to Stand for Election**
(Cross-section, N: 153)

The year women received the right to stand for election. (Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.)

gid_yfwp **Year of First Woman in Parliament**
(Cross-section, N: 153)

The year the first woman was appointed or elected to parliament. (Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.)

OECD – Health Data 2007

http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2825_495642_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html
(OECD 2007g)

Life expectancy at birth and age 65 is the average number of years that a person at that age can be expected to live, assuming that age-specific mortality levels remain constant.

hd_leb **Life expectancy at birth**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1201, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 39)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

hd_le65f **Life expectancy at 65 (female)**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1125, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 30)

hd_le65m **Life expectancy at 65 (male)**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1130, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 30)

hd_imort **Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1332, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 28, $\overline{T}$: 43)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

The number of deaths of children under one year of age that occurred in a given year, expressed per 1000 live births.

OECD – International Migration Statistics

http://www.sourceoecd.org
http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/0,3381,en_2649_37415_1_119656_1_1_37415,00.html
(OECD 2001, 2007h, 2009e)

There are two versions of the OECD International Migration Statistics that cover different time-series that overlap slightly. For some of the variables the values can, for unknown reasons, differ somewhat even for the same country and year. In these few cases we have replaced these observations with the mean of the values from the two different versions. This concerns the following variables: ims_as, ims_flf, ims_n, ims_of, ims_sf and ims_sfb.

ims_if Inflow of foreigners (thousands)

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 490, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 1998-2002 (varies by country), N: 29)

ims_of Outflow of foreigners (thousands)

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 336, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 13, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 20)

ims_sf Stock of foreigners (thousands)

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 427, N: 25, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 17)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 23)

ims_sfb Stock of foreign-born (thousands)

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 137, N: 23, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 23)

ims_as Asylum seekers (thousands)

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 546, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 19)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

ims_n Naturalizations (thousands)

(Time-series: 1985-2005, n: 380, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 15)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 25)

Number of foreigners gaining citizenship.

ims_ifw Inflow of foreign workers (thousands)

(Time-series: 1998-2007, n: 234, N: 25, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 25)

ims_flf Foreigners in labor force (thousands)

(Time-series: 1995-2005, n: 223, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 10)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 22)

Number of foreigners that are either employed or actively seeking work.

ims_fe **Foreigners employed (thousands)**
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 15)

Number of employed persons that are foreigners.

ims_fue **Foreigners unemployed (thousands)**
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 14)

Number of unemployed persons that are foreigners.

ims_tlf **Total labor force (thousands)**
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 15)

Total number of persons that are either employed or actively seeking work.

ims_te **Total employment (thousands)**
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 15)

Total number of unemployed persons.

ims_tue **Total unemployment (thousands)**
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 15)

Total number of unemployed persons.

OECD – Main Economic Indicators

http://www.oecd.org/std/mei
(OECD 2009c)

mei_infl **Inflation (%)**

(Time-series: 1946-2008, n: 1492, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 44)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 40)

Percentage change in consumer prices (all items) compared to the previous year.

OECD – National Accounts

http://www.oecd.org/std/national-accounts
(OECD 2009a)

na_gdp **Real GDP (PPP, USD)**

(Time-series: 1955-2008, n: 1174, N: 33, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 35)

N.B! This is not GDP per capita. In million US dollars. Constant prices, OECD standard base year 2000. Expenditure approach.

na_gdpc Real GDP per capita (PPP, USD)

(Time-series: 1959-2008, n: 1132, N: 33, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 35)

GDP per capita in US dollars. Constant prices, OECD standard base year 2000. Expenditure approach.

OECD – Population and Labor Force Statistics

http://www.oecd.org/std/labour
(OECD 2006d)

plf_ue Unemployment rate (% of civilian labor force)

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1139, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 35)

Unemployment as a percentage of the civilian labor force.

plf_lue Long term unemployment (% of unemployment)

(Time-series: 1968-2005, n: 655, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Percentage of those unemployed that have been unemployed for more than a year.

plf_flf Female labor force (% ages 15-64)

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1055, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 30)

Percentage of women aged 15-64 that are either employed or unemployed (actively seeking work).

plf_mlf Male labor force (% ages 15-64)

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1055, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 30)

Same as plf_mlf, but for men.

plf_cer Civilian employment rate (% ages 15-64)

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1183, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Employment rates represent employed persons as a percentage of same age total population (15 to 64 years).

OECD Employment Database

(OECD 2009f)
http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3343,en_2649_33927_40917154_1_1_1_1,00.html

ed_num Net union membership (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 1096, N: 31, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 29)

Total number of union members minus union members outside the employed labor force (retired, unemployed etc.).

ed_nud Net union density (%)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 981, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

Net union membership as a percentage of total wage earners in employment.

Treisman

http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/
(Treisman 2007)

t_yot Year Opened to Trade

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 134)

The year a country opened for trade according to Sachs and Warner (1995). Coded as the two last digits of the year in question (e.g. 1950 coded as 50). If the country had not opened in 1994, it is coded as 100.

A country is defined as having an open trade policy if none of the following five conditions apply:

"1. Nontariff barriers (NTBs) covering 40 percent or more of trade.
2. Average tariff rates of 40 percent or more.
3. A black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20 percent or more relative to the official exchange rate, on average, during the 1970s or 1980s.
4. A socialist economic system (as defined by Kornai).
5. A state monopoly on major exports."

(Sachs and Warner 1995, p. 22-23)

UNDP - Human Development Report

http://hdr.undp.org/
(UNDP 2004)

undp_gini Gini Index (inequality measure)

(Cross-section: 1983-2002 (varies by country), N: 126)

Measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value of 100 perfect inequality.

undp_pote Poorest 10% share of income/consumption

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 113)

The percentage of total income/consumption of the poorest 10 percent.

undp_potw Poorest 20% share of income/consumption

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 113)

The percentage of total income/consumption of the poorest 20 percent.

undp_rite Richest 10% share of income/consumption

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 113)

The percentage of total income/consumption of the richest 10 percent.

undp_ritw Richest 20% share of income/consumption

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 113)

The percentage of total income/consumption of the richest 20 percent.

United Nations Statistics Divisions – National Accounts

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/

Note: The UN Statistics Division treats Zanzibar and the Mainland of Tanzania as separate countries from the year 1990, while the QoG dataset treats them as one unit (Tanzania). The GDP variable (unna_gdp) was simply summed up for each pair of observations. The trade openness variables (unna_otco and unna_otcu) were also summed up, but weighted for the difference in population sizes.

unna_gdp Real GDP

(Time-series: 1970-2007, n: 1362, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

GDP at constant 1990 prices in US dollars.

unna_gdpc Real GDP per Capita

(Time-series: 1970-2007, n: 1362, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

GDP per capita at constant 1990 prices in US dollars. This variable was not published by the UN Statistics Division, but we constructed it by simply dividing unna_gdp with the population variable provided by the UN Statistics Divison.

unna_grgdp Growth Rate of Real GDP (%)

(Time-series: 1971-2007, n: 1323, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

The growth rate of GDP at constant prices, in percent.

unna_grgdpc Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (%)

(Time-series: 1971-2007, n: 1323, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

The growth rate of GDP per capita at constant prices, in percent.

This variable was not published by the UN Statistics Division, but we constructed it by dividing the difference in real GDP per capita compared to the last year with the real GDP per capita for the last year (and multiplying it by 100 to measure it in percent). That is: $(\text{unna\_gdpc}_{t0} - \text{unna\_gdpc}_{t-1}) / \text{unna\_gdpc}_{t-1} * 100$.

unna_otco Openness to Trade, Constant Prices (%)

(Time-series: 1970-2007, n: 1362, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 190)

Exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Measured at constant 1990 prices.

unna_otcu Openness to Trade, Current Prices (%)

(Time-series: 1970-2007, n: 1362, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

Exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Measured at current prices.

UNESCO Institute for Statistics

http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143&IF_Language=eng
(UNESCO 2007)

Enrollment

Net enrollment rate is defined as the number of pupils of the theoretical school-age group for a given level of education, expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age-group. For tertiary education, this indicator is not pertinent because of the difficulties in determining an appropriate age-group due to the wide variations in the duration of programs at this level of education.

Gross enrollment rate (GER) is defined as the number of pupils enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for the same level of education. For the tertiary level, the population used is the five-year age group following on from the secondary school leaving age. Gross enrollment rate can be over 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged pupils/students because of early or late entrants, and grade repetition. In this case, a rigorous interpretation of GER needs additional information to assess the extent of repetition, late entrants, etc.

une_preet **Net pre-primary education enrollment, total**

(Time-series: 1999-2006, n: 228, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 148)

une_preef **Net pre-primary education enrollment, female**

(Time-series: 1999-2006, n: 216, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 144)

une_preem **Net pre-primary education enrollment, male**

(Time-series: 1999-2006, n: 216, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 144)

une_pef **Net primary education enrollment, female**

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 268, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 164)

une_pem **Net primary education enrollment, male**

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 267, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

une_sef **Net secondary education enrollment, female**

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 218, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 14, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 140)

une_sem **Net secondary education enrollment, male**

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 218, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 14, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 139)

une_tef **Gross tertiary education enrollment, female**

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 299, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 162)

une_tem **Gross tertiary education enrollment, male**

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 299, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 162)

une_ppepre **Percent private enrollment, pre-primary**

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 276, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 160)

Private pre-primary school enrollment, as a percentage of total enrolment.

une_ppep **Percent private enrollment, primary**

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 283, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 168)

Private primary school enrollment, as a percentage of total enrolment.

une_ppes **Percent private enrollment, secondary**

(Time-series: 1991-2006, n: 281, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 166)

Private secondary school enrollment, as a percentage of total enrolment.

Duration

une_dur **Duration of compulsory education**

(Time-series: 1999-2006, n: 309, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 186)

Duration of the compulsory education.

UNU-WIDER – World Income Inequality Database

(United Nations University 2008)
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/

uw_gini **Gini (mean)**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 2309, N: 154, $\overline{N}$: 38, $\overline{T}$: 15)
(Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 151)

This variable measures the Gini index of income inequality as reported by UNU-WIDER (version WIID2c). The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (the society's total income accrues to only one person/household unit). In case a country in the original data has multiple observations for a given year, we include the mean of the highest quality observations (as measured by uw_quality). Both within- and cross-country comparisons are to be handled with care since these Gini coefficients are based on varying sources of information and refer to a variety of income and population concepts, sample sizes and statistical methods.

uw_quality Quality (mean)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 2309, N: 154, $\overline{N}$: 38, $\overline{T}$: 15)
(Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 151)

UNU-WIDER apply the following quality ratings of their Gini-measures, a lower value indicating higher quality:
(1) for observations a) where the underlying concepts are known, and b) where the quality of the income concept and the survey can be judged as sufficient;
(2) for observations where the quality of *either* the income concept *or* the survey is problematic or unknown or we have not been able to verify the estimates;
(3) for observations where both income concept and the survey are problematic or unknown;
(4) for observations classified as memorandum items.

uw_ngini Gini (count)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 2309, N: 154, $\overline{N}$: 38, $\overline{T}$: 15)
(Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 151)

The number of separate Gini measures supplied each year in the original data (of which uw_gini provides the average).

uw_sdgini Gini (standard deviation)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 964, N: 126, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 1958-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

The standard deviation of those possibly separate Gini measures supplied each year in the original data (only computed for years of multiple measures).

uw_yom Year of Measurement

(Cross-section: 1957-2006 (varies by country), N: 150)

The latest year available for each country in the cross-sectional dataset of the uw_gini measurement.

UTIP – University of Texas Inequality Project

http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html
(Galbraith and Kum 2003; 2004; Galbraith 2009)

utip_ehii Estimated household income inequality

(Time-series: 1963-2002, n: 1217, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 1972-2002 (varies by country), N: 146)

In order to provide a more reliable and consistent measure of household income inequality, Galbraith and Kum (2004) estimate Gini coefficients through an equation whereby the Deininger and Squire (1996) high quality dataset (ds_gini) is regressed on: a measure of manufacturing pay inequality (utip_ipi); the ratio of manufacturing employment to population; and three dummies for data sources of the Deininger and Squire (1996) measures (income vs. expenditure, gross vs. net of taxes, household vs. personal unit of analysis). Apart from providing substantially enhanced coverage, Galbraith and Kum (2004) argue that this estimated income inequality measure produces better comparability both across countries and over time.

utip_ehii_yom Year of measurement

(Cross-section: 1972-2002 (varies by country), N: 146)

The latest year available for each country in the cross-sectional dataset of the utip_ehii measurement.

utip_ipi Industrial pay inequality

(Time-series: 1963-2002, n: 1160, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 1972-2002 (varies by country), N: 148)

Based on data on pay across industrial categories in the manufacturing sector compiled by the United Nations International Development Organization (UNIDO), Galbraith and Kum (2003) compute this measure of pay inequality. The measure consists of the between-groups component of Theil's T statistic, where groups are defined using a two or three digit code of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). Larger values indicate greater manufacturing pay inequality.

utip_ipi_yom Year of measurement

(Cross-section: 1972-2002 (varies by country), N: 148)

The latest year available for each country in the cross-sectional dataset of the utip_ipi measurement.

Visser – Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS)

http://www.uva-aias.net/207
(Visser 2009)

vi_wsc Wage setting coordination

(Time-series: 1960-2008, n: 1156, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 33)

Based on Kenworthy (2001) (as is hu_wsc), but with some differences. The main difference is that except in the case of direct imposition of wage settlements or in the case of a ban on contract renewals (= score 5), Visser does not assume that the scale for government intervention in wage bargaining parallels that of wage coordination. Government intervention is taken up in a separate variable.

(5) Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze – with a peace obligation, extremely high degree of union concentration and coordination of industry bargaining by confederation, extensive coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive pattern-setting.
(4) Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze – without a peace obligation, high degree of union concentration and extensive, regularized pattern-setting, tacit coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive pattern-setting.
(3) Industry-level bargaining with reasonably strong pattern-setting but only moderate union concentration.
(2) Bargaining mainly at industry-level with little or no pattern-setting.
(1) Fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants.

vi_giwb Government internvention in wage bargaining

(Time-series: 1960-2008, n: 1156, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 33)

Based on Hassel (2006), but with some changes.

(5) The government imposes private sector wage settlements, places a ceiling on bargaining outcomes or suspends bargaining.
(4) The government participates directly in wage bargaining (tripartite bargaining, as in social pacts).
(3) The government influences wage bargaining outcomes indirectly through price-ceilings, indexation, tax measures, minimum wages, and/or public sector wages.
(2) The government influences wage bargaining by providing an institutional framework of consultation and information exchanges, by a conditional agreement to extend private sector agreements, and/or by providing a conflict

resolution mechanism that links the settlement of disputes across the economy and/or allows the intervention of state arbitrators or Parliament.
(1) None of the above.

vi_lwb Level of wage bargaining

(Time-series: 1960-2008, n: 1156, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 24, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 33)

The dominant level (or levels) at which wage bargaining takes place.

(5) National or central level
(4) National or central level, with additional sectoral / local or company bargaining
(3) Sectoral or industry level
(2) Sectoral or industry level, with additional local or company bargaining
(1) Local or company bargaining

vi_cuwb Centralization of union wage bargaining

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 919, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 27)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 33)

Summary measure of centralization and coordination of union wage bargaining, taking into account both union authority and union concentration at multiple levels. The variable weights the degree of authority or vertical coordination in the union movement with the degree of union concentration or horizontal coordination, taking into account the multiple levels at which bargaining can take place and assuming a non-zero division of union authority over different levels. For details on the construction of the variable, see the codebook available at http://www.uva-aias.net/207

Varies theoretically between 0 and 1 where higher values indicate a higher centralization.

vi_tum Total union membership (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 938, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 1996-2004 (varies by country), N: 33)

Total number of union members (thousands).

vi_num Net union membership (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 967, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 33)

Total number of union members minus union members outside the active, dependent and employed labor force (i.e. retired workers, independent workers, students, unemployed).

vi_nud Net union density (%)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 956, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 33)

Net union membership as a percentage of total wage earners in employment.

vi_abc Adjusted bargaining coverage (%)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 867, N: 32, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 27)
(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 31)

Employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a percentage of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees over the total number of dependent workers in employment).

World Bank – HNPStats (Health, Nutrition and Population data)

http://go.worldbank.org/N2N84RDV00
(World Bank 2007)

hnp_lifexp Life expectancy at birth (years)

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1477, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 32, $\overline{T}$: 37)
(Cross-section: 1997-2002 (varies by country), N: 183)

Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

Source: World Bank staff estimates from various sources, including census reports, the United Nations Population Division's World Population Prospects, national statistical offices, household surveys conducted by national agencies, and Macro International.

hnp_imort Mortality rate, infant (per 1000 live births)

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1267, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 28, $\overline{T}$: 32)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 188)

Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year.

Source: Harmonized estimates of the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the World Bank, based mainly on household surveys, censuses, and vital registration, supplemented by World Bank estimates based on household surveys and vital registration.

hnp_fmort Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1000)

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 976, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 24)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 188)

Under-5 mortality rate is the probability that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. The probability is expressed as a rate per 1,000.

Source: Harmonized estimates of the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the World Bank, based mainly on household surveys, censuses, and vital registration, supplemented by World Bank estimates based on household surveys and vital registration.

hnp_pop Population

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1833, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 188)

Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship – except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin.

Source: World Bank staff estimates from various sources, including census reports, the United Nations Population Division's World Population Prospects, national statistical offices, household surveys conducted by national agencies, and Macro International.

hnp_pop14 Population ages 0-14 (% of total)

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1833, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 176)

hnp_pop65 Population ages 65 and above (% of total)

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1833, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 176)

hnp_popden Population density (people per sq km)

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1794, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 188)

Population density is midyear population divided by land area in square kilometers.

World Development Indicators

http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40

wdi_fdi Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (Current USD)

(Time-series: 1961-2006, n: 1160, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 170)

Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of the voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. This series shows the net inflows in the reporting economy. Data are in current US dollars. Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, and World Bank, Global Development Finance.

wdi_gni GNI, Atlas Method (Current USD)

(Time-series: 1962-2007, n: 1377, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 180)

wdi_gnipc GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (Current USD)

(Time-series: 1962-2007, n: 1377, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 179)

The Atlas Method is the World Bank's official estimate of the size of economies. Data are in current US dollars converted from countries' respective national currencies using the Atlas method, which uses a three-year average of exchange rates to smooth effects of transitory exchange rate fluctuations.

wdi_gro GDP Growth (%)

(Time-series: 1961-2007, n: 1584, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 34, $\overline{T}$: 41)
(Cross-section: 2000-2003 (varies by country), N: 184)

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Sources: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

wdi_infl Inflation (%)

(Time-series: 1961-2007, n: 1583, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 34, $\overline{T}$: 41)
(Cross-section: 2000-2003 (varies by country), N: 184)

Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency.

wdi_is20 Income Share for Lowest 20%

(Time-series: 1984-2005, n: 113, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2005 (varies by country), N: 123)

Percentage share of income of the 20% of the population with the lowest income. The World Bank estimates are based on primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. Data for high-income economies are from the Luxembourg Income Study database.

wdi_pov Population below national poverty line (%)

(Time-series: 1993-2004, n: 16, N: 8, $\overline{N}$: 1, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 80)

Percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys. The World Bank estimates are based on the World Bank's country poverty assessments.

wdi_ase Agriculture's share of economy (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-2008, n: 1208, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 1995-2005 (varies by country), N: 174)

The share of the economy that comes from agricultural production, as a percentage of GDP. Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, fishing, cultivation of crops and livestock production. The variable is calculated as the net output of the sector after adding up all

outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. Sources are World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts.

wdi_ise Industry's share of economy (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-2008, n: 1213, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 1995-2005 (varies by country), N: 174)

The share of the economy that comes from industrial production, as a percentage of GDP. Industry includes mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. The variable is calculated as the net output of the sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. Sources are World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts.

wdi_sse Services' share of economy (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-2008, n: 1208, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 1995-2005 (varies by country), N: 174)

The share of the economy that comes from services, as a percentage of GDP. Services include wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and real estate services. Also included are imputed bank service charges, import duties, and any statistical discrepancies noted by national compilers as well as discrepancies arising from rescaling. The variable is calculated as the net output of the sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. Sources are World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts.

World Economic Forum – Gender Gap Index

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 128)
http://www.weforum.org/gendergap
(World Economic Forum 2007)

There are three basic concepts underlying the Gender Gap Index. First, it focuses on measuring gaps rather than levels. Second, it captures gaps in outcome variables rather than gaps in means or input variables. Third, it ranks countries according to gender equality rather than women's empowerment.

All of the index scores below are on a 0 to 1 scale (0.00= inequality, 1.00= equality) and can be roughly interpreted as the share of the gender gap that has been closed.

wef_gend Gender gap index

The overall index is a weighted average of normalized versions of the subindexes below.

wef_ecgg Economic gender gap

The following indicators are included in the economic participation and opportunity index: the ratio of female over male labor force participation; the female over male wage ratio

(for similar work); the female over male ratio of legislators senior officials and managers; the female over male ratio of professional and technical workers.

wef_edgg Educational gender gap

The following indicators are included in the educational attainment index: the female over male literacy rate; the female over male net primary education enrollment, the female over male net secondary education enrollment; the female over male gross tertiary education enrollment.

wef_hgg Health gender gap

The following indicators are included in the health and survival index: the female over male healthy life expectancy; the female over male sex ratio at birth.

wef_pegg Political empowerment gender gap

The following indicators are included in the political empowerment index: the female over male seats in parliament; the female over male number of ministers; the ratio of female over male years of head of state (last 50 years).

Public Opinion

In this section we present data on public opinion on social policy issues, like e.g. attitudes towards economic redistribution, tax financing of social services etc. Included are also data on interpersonal trust, trust in politicians and government authorities, and satisfaction with democracy and the government.

When choosing which variables to include, we have first of all prioritized those with good coverage of the countries of our primary interest (EU/OECD plus Israel). Second, we have prioritized those that were available for at least two points in time.

Since all the data in this section originally is individual level data, each observation is the mean value of the response of the individuals for that country and year.

In the *wide* version of the time-series dataset, the public opinion variables exist in one version for each module of the survey in question. A suffix denotes from which module the variable is taken. Example: cses_lr_2 means that the values of the variable are from the cses_lr variable in the second module of the CSES survey (see below). Please note however that the Eurobarometer data is exempt from this rule, due to the very large number of modules of this survey. Instead, the Eurobarometer data is provided for each year of available data. (Example: the eb_lr_1979 variable contains values for the eb_lr variable the year 1979.) For all the other, non public opinion data in the wide version of the dataset, there is one variable for every 5th year from 1970-2005.

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)

http://www.cses.org/
(Sapiro et al 2003; The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007)

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) is a collaborative program of research among election study teams from around the world conducting post-election studies. So far two rounds of CSES have been published.

Note: In a few cases the CSES survey was conducted the year after the election year. In these cases we have nevertheless placed the data on the year of the election that the survey is related to. For more information, see the CSES website (http://www.cses.org).

cses_module CSES module

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 56, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

There are two CSES modules, and this variable denotes from which module each observation comes. Module 1 was conducted in the period 1996-2002, and module 2 in 2001-2006.

Note: For some countries there were two surveys in the same module. In these cases we have given the second survey of the module the value of 1.5 or 2.5. (In the wide version of the time-series cross-section dataset, the variables have the suffixes _1_5 and _2_5.)

In the case of Portugal 2002, CSES modules 1 and 2 were part of the same election study. We have (arbitrarily) chosen to treat this observation as belonging to module 1.

cses_lr Left-right self-placement

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 54, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 39)

In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

Left Right

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

cses_sd Satisfaction with democracy

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 56, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?

(1) Very satisfied
(2) Fairly satisfied
(3) Not very satisfied
(4) Not at all satisfied

cses_dbfg Democracy the best form of government

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 30, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 37)

Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government." Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with this statement?

(1) Agree strongly
(2) Agree
(3) Disagree
(4) Disagree strongly

cses_sgpg Satisfaction with government/president: general

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 30, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 36)

Thinking about the performance of the government in [capital]/president in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government/president in [capital] has done over the past [number of years between the previous and the present election or change in government] years. Has it/he/she done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? A very bad job?

(1) Very good job
(2) Good job
(3) Bad job
(4) Very bad job

cses_sgpmi Satisfaction with government/president: most important issue

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 29, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 36)

Thinking about the most important issue facing [country] over the last [number of years that the last government was in office] years, how good or bad a job do you think the government/president in [capital] has done over the past [number of years between the previous and the present election OR change in government] years. Has it/he/she done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? A very bad job?

(1) Very good job
(2) Good job
(3) Bad job
(4) Very bad job

cses_lef Last election was fair

(Time-series: 1996-2002, n: 25, N: 23, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 29)

In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where one means that the last election was conducted fairly and five means that the last election was conducted unfairly?

(1) Last election was conducted fairly
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) Last election was conducted unfairly

cses_vmd Voting makes a difference

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 55, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and five means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself?

(1) Who people vote for won't make a difference
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5) Who people vote for can make a difference

cses_hwvvr How well are voters' views represented

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 28, N: 27, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 35)

Thinking about how elections in [country] work in practice, how well do elections ensure that the views of voters are represented by Majority Parties: very well, quite well, not very well, or not well at all?

(1) Very well
(2) Quite well
(3) Not very well
(4) Not well at all

cses_ppcpt Political parties care what people think

(Time-series: 1996-2002, n: 27, N: 25, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 32)

Some people say that political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in [country] don't care what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that political parties care about what ordinary people think, and five means that they don't care what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?

(1) Political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) Political parties in [country] don't care what ordinary people think

cses_ppn Political parties are necessary

(Time-series: 1996-2002, n: 27, N: 25, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 32)

Some people say that political parties are necessary to make our political system work in [country]. Others think that political parties are not needed in [country]. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that political parties are necessary to make our political system work, and five means that political parties are not needed in [country]), where would you place yourself?

(1) Political parties are necessary to make our political system work
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) Political parties are not needed in [country]

cses_pkpt Politicians know what people think

(Time-series: 1996-2002, n: 27, N: 25, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 23)

Some people say that members of Congress/Parliament know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of Congress/Parliament don't know much about what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that the members of Congress/Parliament know what ordinary people think, and five means that the members of Congress/Parliament don't know much about what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?

(1) Members of Congress/Parliament know what ordinary people think
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) Members of Congress/Parliament don't know what ordinary people think

cses_cap Corruption amongst politicians

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 30, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 37)

How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in [country]: very widespread, quite widespread, not very widespread, it hardly happens at all?

(1) Very widespread
(2) Quite widespread
(3) Not very widespread
(4) It hardly happens at all

cses_rif Respect for individual freedom

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 29, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$:1)
(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 36)

How much respect is there for individual freedom and human rights nowadays in [country]? Do you feel there is a lot of respect for individual freedom, some respect, not much respect, or no respect at all?

(1) A lot of respect for individual freedom
(2) Some respect
(3) Not much respect
(4) No respect at all

Eurobarometer

http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/index.htm
http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/standard_eb_trend/TrendFile.htm
(Schmitt et al 2006)
(Reif et al 1990-1997)

The Eurobarometer has been conducted by the European Commission since 1973, and primarily covers the European Union member states (including member candidates).

The Eurobarometer data has been collected from several different sources. For available variables and countries we have aggregated data from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File (Schmitt et al 2006). In addition to this we have used single Eurobarometers, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Trend File (Reif et al 1990-1997) and single Candidate Countries Eurobarometers.

eb_module Eurobarometer module

(Time-series: 1973-2005, n: 632, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$:21)
(Cross-section: 1996-2004 (varies by country), N: 39)

As mentioned above, the Eurobarometer data comes from different sources. This variable denotes which source each observation comes from. In some cases there are observations from two different sources for the same country and year, depending on which variable the observation concerns.

(1) Mannheim Trend File
(2) Standard Eurobarometer
(3) CCEB (Candidate Countries Eurobarometer)
(4) CEEB (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Trend File)
(5) Mannheim Trend File and Standard Eurobarometer
(6) Standard Eurobarometer and CCEB

eb_lr Left-right self-placement

(Time-series: 1973-2004, n: 391, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 13)
(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 29)

In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?

Left									Right
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(Sources: Mannheim Trend File, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer.)

Trust in EU organs

(Time-series: 1999-2004, n: 112, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

(The sources of the following eight variables are the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

Have you ever heard of (...)? ...and for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not to trust it.

(1) Tend to trust

(2) Tend not to trust

eb_tcj Trust in the European Court of Justice

eb_tcm Trust in the EU Council of Ministers

eb_tec Trust in the European Commission

eb_tecb Trust in the European Central Bank

eb_teca Trust in the European Court of Auditors

eb_teo Trust in the European Ombudsman

eb_tep Trust in the European Parliament

eb_tsec Trust in the EU Social and Economic Committee

Trust in national organs

(The sources of the following seven variables are the standard Eurobarometer and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?

(1) Tend to trust
(2) Tend not to trust

eb_tls Trust in the legal system

(Time-series: 1997-2005, n: 185, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

eb_tp Trust in the police

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 157, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

eb_ta Trust in the army

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 157, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

eb_tpp Trust in political parties

(Time-series: 1997-2005, n: 185, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

eb_tcs Trust in the civil service

(Time-series: 1997-2003, n: 114, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 16, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

eb_tng Trust in the national government

(Time-series: 1997-2005, n: 170, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

eb_tnp Trust in national parliament

(Time-series: 1997-2005, n: 185, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 21, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

Satisfaction with democracy

eb_sd Satisfaction with democracy in country

(Time-series: 1973-2004, n: 362, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 12)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 29)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [our country]?

(1) Very satisfied
(2) Fairly satisfied
(3) Not very satisfied
(4) Not satisfied at all

(Sources: The Mannheim Trend File, the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer and the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer.)

eb_sdd Satisfaction with democracy development in country

(Time-series: 1990-1997, n: 74, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1996-1997 (varies by country), N: 20)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not satisfied at all with the way democracy is developing in [our country]?

(1) Very satisfied
(2) Fairly satisfied
(3) Not very satisfied
(4) Not satisfied at all

(Sources: The Central and Eastern Eurobarometer.)

eb_sdeu Satisfaction with democracy in the EU

(Time-series: 1993-2004, n: 145, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 5)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 29)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?

(1) Very satisfied
(2) Fairly satisfied
(3) Not very satisfied

(4) Not at all satisfied

(Sources: The Mannheim Trend File and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

Important problems

(Time-series: 1989-1994, n: 24, N: 13, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 2)

I would like to hear your views on some political issues and problems. Which issue or problem do you consider the most important? And which issue or problem do you consider the second most important? And finally, which issue or problem do you consider the third most important?

(To this question there were 12 alternative problems to choose from in 1989 and 11 alternative problems in 1994. However, we only include two of them here.)

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_ipue_1 Important problem: unemployment

(0) Not mentioned as most important problem
(1) Mentioned as most important problem

eb_ipue_2 Important problem: unemployment

(0) Not mentioned as second most important problem
(1) Mentioned as second most important problem

eb_ipue_3 Important problem: unemployment

(0) Not mentioned as third most important problem
(1) Mentioned as third most important problem

eb_ipsp_1 Important problem: stable prices

(0) Not mentioned as most important problem
(1) Mentioned as most important problem

eb_ipsp_2 Important problem: stable prices

(0) Not mentioned as second most important problem
(1) Mentioned as second most important problem

eb_ipsp_3 Important problem: stable prices

(0) Not mentioned as third most important problem
(1) Mentioned as third most important problem

Things necessary to live properly

(Time-series: 1989-1993, n: 26, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)

This question was posed in slightly different ways in 1989 and 1993 (the 1989 version listed first):

Not everybody has the same idea about what are the necessities of life. Among the following things which ones seem to you absolutely necessary to live properly today, and which ones don't seem to you to be absolutely necessary?

Not everybody has the same idea about what the necessities of life are. For each of the following, please tell me if you think it absolutely necessary to live properly nowadays or not?

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_swan Social welfare absolutely necessary

To be able to benefit from social welfare when needed, such as in the case of unemployment, sickness, handicap, old age.

(0) Not mentioned
(1) Mentioned

eb_gean Good education absolutely necessary

Having a good education.

(0) Not mentioned
(1) Mentioned

Important issues

(Time-series: 2002-2004, n: 58, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

What do you think are the two most important issues facing [our country] at the moment? (Max 2 answers possible.)

(0) Not mentioned
(1) Mentioned
(To this question there were 15 alternative issues to choose from. However, we only include seven of them here.)

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_iii Important issue: inflation

eb_iit Important issue: taxation

eb_iiue Important issue: unemployment

eb_iih Important issue: housing

eb_iihc Important issue: health care system

eb_iie Important issue: educational system

eb_iip Important issue: pensions

Health care

eb_hcs Health care satisfaction

(Time-series: 1996-2004, n: 86, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Please tell me whether you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with each of the following? [our country]'s health care system in general.

(1) Very satisfied
(2) Fairly satisfied
(3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
(4) Not very satisfied
(5) Not at all satisfied

Note: The answer option (3) was not available 1999 and in the 2002 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

eb_hcsty Health care satisfaction in two years

(Time-series: 1999-2004, n: 56, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

And please tell me whether in two years time you think you will be more satisfied, less satisfied or will there be no change with …..? [our country]'s health care system in general.

(1) More satisfied
(2) No change
(3) Less satisfied

Note: In the 2002 standard Eurobarometer the alternatives were instead: more satisfied, as satisfied and less satisfied.

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

eb_hctfu Health care too frequently used

(Time-series: 1992-2004, n: 40, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1996-2004 (varies by country), N: 28)

I am going to read out a list of statements about health and health care. For each, I would like you to tell me if you agree strongly, agree slightly, disagree slightly or disagree strongly?

People use health care facilities too frequently and therefore contribute to rising costs.

(1) Agree strongly
(2) Agree slightly
(3) Uncertain/ Neither agree nor disagree (SPONTANEOUS)
(4) Disagree slightly
(5) Disagree strongly

Note: In 2004 the question and reply options were instead:

People use health care facilities too frequently.

(1) Strongly agree
(2) Tend to agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Tend to disagree
(5) Strongly disagree

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

eb_hcrw Health care runs well

(Time-series: 1996-2004, n: 43, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 28)

Now, I will read you four statements about the way health care runs in [our country]. Which one comes closest to your own point of view?

(1) On the whole, the health care system in [our country] runs quite well.
(2) There are some good things in the way health care in [our country] runs, and only minor changes would make it work better.
(3) There are some good things in the way health care in [our country] runs, but only fundamental changes would make it work better.
(4) Health care system in [our country] runs so badly that we need to rebuild it completely.

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

eb_oehcg Only essential health care from government

(Time-series: 1992-2004, n: 70, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 28)

The government should only provide everyone with essential services such as care for serious diseases and encourage people to provide for themselves in other respects.

(1) Agree strongly
(2) Agree slightly
(3) Uncertain/ Neither agree nor disagree (SPONTANEOUS)
(4) Disagree slightly
(5) Disagree strongly

Note: There is some variation in the formulation of the question and the reply options.

In 1992 the reply option (3) was not available.

In 1998 the question was: The government and/or public health insurance [national equivalent] should provide everyone with essential services such as care for serious diseases and encourage people to provide for themselves in other respects. (Note that word "only" is left out here.)

In 2002 the question was: The government or social insurance should only provide everyone with essential services, such as care for serious diseases, and encourage people to provide for themselves in other respects.

In 2004 the question and reply options were: The government or social insurance should only provide everyone with essential services, such as care for serious diseases, and encourage people to provide for themselves in other respects.

(1) Strongly agree
(2) Tend to agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Tend to disagree
(5) Strongly disagree

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

eb_hcie Health care inefficient

(Time-series: 1992-1996, n: 27, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 15)

Health services available to the average citizen are inefficient and patients are not treated as well as they should be.

(1) Agree strongly
(2) Agree slightly
(3) Uncertain/ Neither agree nor disagree (SPONTANEOUS)
(4) Disagree slightly
(5) Disagree strongly

Note: In 1992 reply option (3) was not available.

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

Reason that people live in need

(Time-series: 1976-2002, n: 63, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)

Why in your opinion are there people who live in need? Here are four opinions – which is closest to yours?

Note: We did not create a variable for the "none of these" option, which is why the sum of the four variables sometimes is lower than 1.

eb_pini People in need – injustice

Proportion answering: Because there is much injustice in our society

eb_pinl People in need – laziness

Proportion answering: Because of laziness and lack of willpower.

eb_pinp People in need – part modern progress

Proportion answering: It's an inevitable part of modern progress. In 1993 this reply option was instead: It is an inevitable part of the way the modern world is going.

eb_pinu People in need – unlucky

Proportion answering: Because they have been unlucky.

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

Poverty and income differences

eb_idtl Income differences too large

(Time-series: 1999-2002, n: 43, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)

The differences in income in [our country] are too wide.

(1) Strongly agree
(2) Somewhat agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Somewhat disagree
(5) Strongly disagree

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_gsrid Government should reduce income differences

(Time-series: 1999-2002, n: 43, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)

It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

(1) Strongly agree
(2) Somewhat agree

(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Somewhat disagree
(5) Strongly disagree

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_rnrp Reduce number of rich and poor

(Time-series: 1976-1991, n: 53, N: 14, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 4)

Here is a list of problems the people of [country] are more or less interested in. Could you please tell me, for each problem, whether you personally consider it a very important problem, important, of little importance or not at all important?

Try and reduce the number both of very rich people and of very poor people.

(1) Very important
(2) Important
(3) Of little importance
(4) Not at all important

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_cep Chance of escaping poverty

(Time-series: 1976-1993, n: 35, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 2)

In your opinion, do the people who are in deprived circumstances have a chance of escaping from them or have they virtually no chance of escaping?

(1) They have a chance
(2) Almost no chance

In 1993 the question was instead: We are now going to talk again about people living in poverty or extreme poverty / social exclusion or total social exclusion.

In your opinion, do the people who are in such deprived circumstances have a chance of escaping from them or have they virtually no chance of getting out?

(1) A chance
(2) Virtually no chance

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_cepc Chance of escaping poverty, children

(Time-series: 1976-1993, n: 35, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 2)

(Follow-up question to eb_cep)

And do their young children have any chance of escaping?

(1) They have a chance
(2) Almost no chance

In 1989 the reply options were instead:
(1) Have an opportunity
(2) Have scarcely any opportunity

In 1993 the question was instead: And have the children of these people a chance of getting out of these circumstances?

(1) A chance
(2) Virtually no chance

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_pafp Public authorities fighting poverty

(Time-series: 1976-1993, n: 34, N: 14, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 2)

Do you think that what the authorities are doing for people in poverty is about what they should do, too much, or too little?

(1) Do too much
(2) Do what they should
(3) Do not do enough

In 1976 the reply options were instead:

(1) Too much
(2) About what they should do
(3) Too little

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_fpws Fighting poverty worth sacrifices

(Time-series: 1988-1990, n: 25, N: 13, $\overline{N}$: 8, $\overline{T}$: 2)

In your opinion, in this list which are the great causes which nowadays are worth the trouble of taking risks and making sacrifices for? (Several answers possible.)

Fight against poverty

(0) Not mentioned
(1) Mentioned

Note: The documentation states that the coding "Not mentioned" is unclear for Norway in 1990. Nevertheless, we have chosen to include that data since the Norwegian data does not differ in any obvious way compared to the data of the other countries.

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

Other

eb_suf Society unfair

(Time-series: 1976-1993, n: 35, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 2)

Taking everything into account do you yourself have the feeling that society is unfair to you?

(1) Yes
(2) That depends (volunteered)
(3) No

For the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1976 the question was instead:

Taking everything into account, do you, yourself have the feeling that society as a whole is being fair or unfair to you?

This means that the question as documented in the English language questionnaires asks for the alternative if "... society ... is being fair or unfair ...", while all other language versions explicitly ask if "... society is being unfair ...". The British questionnaire, in the version provided by the data producer, keeps the ambgiuous English language question wording ambiguous with the response options "yes" or "no". Since data apparently do not show dubious patterns across countries, subsequent textual adaptations and/or data recoding probably have occurred.

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer)

eb_fue Fight unemployment

(Time-series: 1976-1991, n: 53, N: 14, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 4)

Here is a list of problems the people of [country] are more or less interested in. Could you please tell me for each problem, whether you personally consider it a very important problem, important, of little importance or not at all important?

Fighting unemployment

(1) Very important
(2) Important
(3) Of little importance
(4) Not at all important

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_re Responsibility for the elderly

(Time-series: 1992-2001, n: 27, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 2001, N: 15)

For each of these statements about elderly people and pensions, I would like you to tell me if you agree strongly, agree slightly, disagree slightly, disagree strongly?

Those who are now working have a duty to ensure, through the contributions or taxes they pay, that elderly people have a decent standard of living.

(1) Agree strongly
(2) Agree slightly
(3) Disagree slightly
(4) Disagree strongly

Note: In 2001 the alternatives were formulated somewhat differently: strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, strongly disagree.

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_ls Life satisfaction

(Time-series: 1973-2002, n: 334, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 1995 & 2002 (varies by country), N: 16)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satsified, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead? Would you say you are ...

(1) Very satisfied
(2) Fairly satisfied
(3) Not very satisfied
(4) Not satisfied at all

Note: In two cases the question was put somewhat differently. To make the data over time as comparable as possible, we excluded these two cases. (This concerns Eurobarometer 52.1 and 56.1 in 1999 and 2001. There were additional Eurobarometers these years, where the question was put in the ordinary way, so for these years we aggregated data from these other Eurobarometers instead.)

European Social Survey

http://ess.nsd.uib.no/
(Jowell et al 2003, 2005, 2007)

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically-driven survey designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of its populations. So far four rounds of the ESS have been published.

Note: In aggregating the ESS data we have used design weights. However, for Latvia and Romania in round three and for Slovakia in round four, there does not yet exist any weights to use. We have nevertheless chosen to publish this data aggregated without weights.

ess_module ESS module

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 85, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

There exist four ESS rounds and this variable denotes from which round each observation comes. The first round of ESS was fielded in 2002-2003, the second in 2004-2006, the third in 2006-2007 and the fourth in 2008-2009.

ess_it **Interpersonal trust**

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 85, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.

You can't be too careful									Most people can be trusted	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

ess_pf **Most people try to be fair**

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 85, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

Most people try to take advantage of me									Most people try to be fair	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

ess_ph **Most people try to be helpful**

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 85, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?

People mostly look out for themselves									People mostly try to be helpful	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

ess_sg **Satisfaction with government**

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 84, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?

Extremely dissatisfied									Extremely satisfied	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

ess_sd Satisfaction with democracy

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 85, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?

Extremely dissatisfied										Extremely satisfied
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

ess_ste State of education

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 85, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Please say what you think overall about the state of education in [country] nowadays?

Extremely bad										Extremely good
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

ess_sths State of health services

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 85, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Please say what you think overall about the state of health services in [country] nowadays?

Extremely bad										Extremely good
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

ess_gsrid Government should reduce income differences

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 85, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.

(1) Agree strongly
(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Disagree strongly

ess_mdg Member of discriminated group

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 84, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?

(1) Yes

(2) No

ess_ieo Importance of equal opportunities

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 83, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 31)

Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.

(1) Very much like me
(2) Like me
(3) Somewhat like me
(4) A little like me
(5) Not like me
(6) Not like me at all

ess_ihp Importance of helping people

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 83, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 31)

Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. It's very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. She/he wants to care for their well-being.

(1) Very much like me
(2) Like me
(3) Somewhat like me
(4) A little like me
(5) Not like me
(6) Not like me at all

Trust in national and international organs

(Time-series: 2002-2009, n: 85, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.

No trust at all									Complete trust	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

ess_tnp Trust in national parliament

ess_tls Trust in the legal system

ess_tp Trust in the police

ess_tplt Trust in politicians

ess_tep Trust in the European Parliament

ess_tun Trust in the United Nations

International Social Survey Program (ISSP)

http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp
http://www.issp.org/

The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is a continuing annual program of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics relevant to social science research.

issp_module ISSP module

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 214, N: 32, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1998-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

There exist many different ISSP modules and this variable denotes from which module each observation comes. Note that the same module often was conducted in different years in different countries.

(1) Role of Government I (1985-1986)
(2) Social Inequality I (1987-1988)
(3) Work Orientations I (1989)
(4) Role of Government II (1990-1991)
(5) Religion I (1990-1991)
(6) Social Inequality II (1991-1993)
(7) Environment I (1992-1994)
(8) Role of Government III (1995-1998)
(9) Religion II (1998-1999)
(10) Social Inequality III (1998-2001)
(11) Environment II (2000-2001)
(12) Citizenship (2003-2006)
(13) Role of Government IV (2005-2008)

Please note these special cases:

The modules Role of Government II and Religion I use the same sample for Israel 1991 according to the ISSP documentation. We have chosen to treat this observation as belonging to the Role of Government II module (issp_module = 4).

In the cases of Australia and Austria 1993, the variables issp_gsrdrp and issp_grjfa come from the Religion I module (5). Since the rest of the variables come from the Role of

Government II module, we have treated these observations as belonging to this module (issp_module = 6).

In the cases of Chile, Germany and the United States 2000, there are two surveys made in the same year: Social Inequality III and Environment II. We have chosen to keep the observations from the former, since the Social Inequality III module contains more variables (issp_module = 10).

In the case of Israel in 2005, the variables issp_lelf and issp_lelh come from Citizenship I and the rest of the variables from Role of Government IV. We have treated these observations as belonging to the latter module (issp_module = 13).

Income differences and inequality

issp_gsrid Government should reduce income differences

(Time-series: 1985-2001, n: 120, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 32)

What is your opinion of the following statement:

It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

(1) Agree strongly
(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Disagree strongly

issp_gsrdrp Government should reduce differences between rich and poor

(Time-series: 1985-1999, n: 74, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1998-1999 (varies by country), N: 30)

On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to:

Reduce income differences between the rich and poor.

(1) Definitely should be
(2) Probably should be
(3) Probably should not be
(4) Definitely should not be

issp_idtl Income differences too large

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Differences in income in [respondent's country] are too large.

(1) Strongly agree
(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Strongly disagree

issp_nosmp No one studies for years unless more pay

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers.

(1) Strongly agree
(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Strongly disagree

issp_idnp Income differences necessary for prosperity

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Large differences in income are necessary for [respondent's country] prosperity.

(1) Strongly agree
(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Strongly disagree

issp_cilja Continued inequality due to lack of joined up action

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Inequality continues to exist because ordinary people don't join together to get rid of it.

(1) Strongly agree
(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Strongly disagree

issp_iebr Inequality exists because it benefits the rich

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Inequality continues to exist because it benefits the rich and the powerful.

(1) Strongly agree

(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Strongly disagree

Government measures for the economy

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 60, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Circle one number for each action to show whether you are in favor of it or against it.

Cuts in government spending.
Government financing of projects to create new jobs.
Reducing the working week to create more jobs.

(1) Strongly in favor of
(2) In favor of
(3) Neither in favor of nor against
(4) Against
(5) Strongly against

issp_cgs Cut government spending

issp_gfj Government should finance new jobs

issp_rww Reduce work week

Increase government spending

Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it.

Health.
Education.
Old age pensions.
Unemployment benefits.

(1) Spend much more
(2) Spend more
(3) Spend the same as now
(4) Spend less
(5) Spend much less

issp_igsh Increase government spending: health

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 60, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

issp_igse Increase government spending: education

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 60, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

issp_igsp Increase government spending: pensions

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 60, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

issp_igsub Increase government spending: unemployment benefits

(Time-series: 1985-1998, n: 36, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 34)

Government responsibility

On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to:

Provide a job for everyone who wants one.
Provide health care for the sick.
Provide a decent standard of living for the old.
Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed.

(1) Definitely should be
(2) Probably should be
(3) Probably should not be
(4) Definitely should not be

issp_grjfa Government responsibility: jobs for all

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 108, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1998-2008 (varies by country), N: 38)

issp_grhc Government responsibility: health care

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 61, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

issp_gro Government responsibility: the old

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 61, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

issp_grue Government responsibility: the unemployed

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 71, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

Getting ahead in life

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

We have some questions about opportunities for getting ahead. Please tick one box for each of these to show how important you think it is for getting ahead in life.

First, how important is coming from a wealthy family?

Knowing the right people – how important is it?

(1) Essential
(2) Very important
(3) Fairly important
(4) Not very important
(5) Not important at all

issp_gawf Getting ahead: wealthy family

issp_gakrp Getting ahead: know right people

Taxes

(Time-series: 1987-2008, n: 69, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

Generally, how would you describe taxes in [respondent's country] today? (We mean all taxes together, including national insurance, income tax, VAT and all the rest.)

First, for those with high incomes, are taxes ...
Next, for those with middle incomes, are taxes ...
Lastly, for those with low incomes, are taxes ...

(1) Much too high
(2) Too high
(3) About right
(4) Too low
(5) Much too low

issp_tfhi Taxes for high incomes

issp_tfmi Taxes for middle incomes

issp_tfli Taxes for low incomes

issp_hlthi Higher or lower taxes for high incomes

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 44, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Do you think that people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share?

(1) Much larger share
(2) Larger
(3) The same share
(4) Smaller
(5) Much smaller share

Other

issp_rpbo Rich parents better opportunity

(Time-series: 1985-1986, n: 6, N: 6, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 1)

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

A person whose parents are rich has a better chance of earning a lot of money than a person whose parents are poor.

(1) Agree strongly
(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Disagree strongly

issp_iou Inflation or unemployment

(Time-series: 1985-1998, n: 32, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 18)

If the government had to choose between keeping down inflation or keeping down unemployment to which do you think it should give highest priority?

(1) Keeping down inflation
(2) Keeping down unemployment

issp_gtmp Government too much power

(Time-series: 1985-1998, n: 37, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 24)

And what about the government, does it have too much power or too little power?

(In the US the question was instead: And what about the federal government, does it have too much power or too little power?)

(1) Far too much power
(2) Too much power
(3) About the right amount of power
(4) Too little power
(5) Far too little power

issp_lelh Last election: level of honesty

(Cross-section: 2003-2006 (varies by country), N: 38)

Thinking of the last national election in [respondent's country], how honest was it regarding the counting and reporting of the votes?

(1) Very honest
(2) Somewhat honest
(3) Neither honest nor dishonest

(4) Somewhat dishonest
(5) Very dishonest

Note: In Brazil, there were only two possible answers:

(2) Honest
(4) Dishonest

issp_lelf Last election: level of fairness

(Cross-section: 2003-2006 (varies by country), N: 38)

Thinking of the last national election in [respondent's country], how fair was it regarding the opportunities of the candidates and parties to campaign?

(1) Very fair
(2) Somewhat fair
(3) Neither fair nor unfair
(4) Somewhat unfair
(5) Very unfair

Note: In Brazil, there were only two possible answers:

(2) Fair
(4) Unfair

Veenhoven – World Database of Happiness

http://www2.eur.nl/fsw/research/veenhoven/

Years Lived Happy:

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective happiness, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

wdh_ylh80_83 Years Lived Happy (1980-1983)

(Cross-section: 1980-1983, N: 20)

wdh_ylh90_91 Years Lived Happy (1990-1991)

(Cross-section: 1990-1991, N: 48)

wdh_ylh90_95 Years Lived Happy (1990-1995)

(Cross-section: 1990-1995, N: 45)

wdh_ylh90_98 Years Lived Happy (1990-1998)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998, N: 61)

Years Lived Satisfied:

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective life satisfaction, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

wdh_yls80_83 Years Lived Satisfied (1980-1983)
(Cross-section: 1980-1983, N: 21)

wdh_yls90_91 Years Lived Satisfied (1990-1991)
(Cross-section: 1990-1991, N: 42)

wdh_yls90_95 Years Lived Satisfied (1990-1995)
(Cross-section: 1990-1995, N: 40)

wdh_yls90_98 Years Lived Satisfied (1990-1998)
(Cross-section: 1990-1998, N: 55)

Years in Good Mood:
Life-expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey assessments of affect balance, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

wdh_ygm80_83 Years in Good Mood (1980-1983)
(Cross-section: 1980-1983, N: 20)

wdh_ygm90_91 Years in Good Mood (1990-1991)
(Cross-section: 1990-1991, N: 39)

Mixed Measure:
Life-expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective life satisfaction (combined measure of a 10-step life satisfaction and an 11-step best-worst life), where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

wdh_lsbw95_05 Life Satisfaction combined with Best-Worst Life
(Cross-section: 1995-2005, N: 94)

World Values Survey

http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
(European and World Values Surveys 2006)

The World Values Survey (WVS) is an ongoing project by social scientists to assess the state of sociocultural, moral, religious and political values of different cultures around the world.

wvs_module WVS module

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 110, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 80)

The variable denotes from which of the four WVS waves the observation comes. Wave 1 was conducted 1981-1984, wave 2 1989-1993, wave 3 1995-1998 and wave 4 1999-2001.

wvs_a009 State of health (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 80, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 2)

(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 65)

All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is…

(1) Very good
(2) Good
(3) Fair
(4) Poor
(5) Very poor

wvs_a168 Do you think most people try to take advantage of you (mean)

(Time-series: 1999-2001, n: 8, N: 8, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 38)

Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

(1) Would take advantage
(2) Try to be fair

wvs_e035 Incomes more equal (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 81, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 76)

Incomes should be made more equal							We need larger income differences as incentives		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_e036 Private ownership of business (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 78, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 74)

Private ownership of business and industry should be increased							Government ownership of business and industry should be increased		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_e037 Government more responsibility (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 89, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 80)

People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves							The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_e039 Competition is good (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 88, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 71)

Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas									Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_e040 Hard work doesn't bring success (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-1998, n: 55, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 50)

In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life									Hard work doesn't generally bring success – it's more a matter of luck and connections
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_e043 The state should be responsible for everyone's pension (mean)

(Time-series: 1999-2001, n: 13, N: 13, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 17)

Individual responsibility for pension									State responsibility for pension
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_e044 The state should be responsible for everyone's housing (mean)

(Time-series: 1999-2001, n: 9, N: 9, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 12)

Individual responsibility for housing									State responsibility for housing
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_e066 Society should be competitive rather than egalitarian (mean)

(Time-series: 2000, n: 3, N: 3, $\overline{N}$: 1, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 2000-2003 (varies by country), N: 14)

Could you please tell me which type of society you think this country should aim to be in the future. For each pair of statements, would you prefer being closer to the first or to the second alternative?

First statement: An egalitarian society where the gap between rich and poor is small, regardless of achievement.

Second statement: A competitive society, where wealth is distributed according to ones' achievement.

(1) First
(2) Somewhat closer to first
(3) Can't say
(4) Somewhat closer to second

(5) Second

wvs_e067 Low taxes rather than extensive welfare (mean)

(Time-series: 2000, n: 3, N: 3, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$:1)
(Cross-section: 2000-2003 (varies by country), N: 14)

Could you please tell me which type of society you think this country should aim to be in the future. For each pair of statements, would you prefer being closer to the first or to the second alternative?

First statement: A society with extensive social welfare, but high taxes.

Second statement: A society where taxes are low and individuals take responsibility for themselves.

(1) First
(2) Somewhat closer to first
(3) Can't say
(4) Somewhat closer to second
(5) Second

wvs_e111 How good is the system for governing this country (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-2001, n: 50, N: 35, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 68)

People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?

Bad								Very good	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_e117 Having a democratic political system (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-2001, n: 55, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 8, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 78)

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

Having a democratic political system.

(1) Very good
(2) Fairly good
(3) Bad
(4) Very bad

wvs_e125 Satisfaction with the people in national office (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-2001, n: 31, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 63)

How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

(1) Very satisfied
(2) Fairly satisfied
(3) Fairly dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied

wvs_e131 People are poor because of an unfair society (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-1998, n: 22, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 50)

Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: Which comes closest to your view?

(1) Poor because of laziness and lack of will power
(2) Poor because of an unfair society

wvs_e132 There is very little chance for people to escape poverty (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-1998, n: 21, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 48)

In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or is there very little of chance escaping?

(1) They have a chance
(2) There is very little chance

wvs_e133 The government is doing too little for people in poverty (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-1998, n: 21, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 48)

Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little?

(1) Too much
(2) About the right amount
(3) Too little

wvs_e196 How widespread is corruption (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-1998, n: 23, N: 23, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 49)

(1) Almost no public officials engaged in it
(2) A few are
(3) Most are
(4) Almost all public officials are engaged in it

wvs_it Interpersonal trust (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 110, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 80)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

(1) Most people can be trusted
(2) Can't be too careful

wvs_lr Left-right self-placement (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 105, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 75)

In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

Left									Right
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_sdd Satisfaction with democracy development in country (mean)

(Time-series: 1996-2001, n: 37, N: 33, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 67)

On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?

(1) Very satisfied
(2) Rather satisfied
(3) Not very satisfied
(4) Not at all satisfied

Confidence

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

(1) A great deal
(2) Quite a lot
(3) Not very much
(4) None at all

wvs_e070 Confidence: armed forces (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 105, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e073 Confidence: labor unions (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 107, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e074 Confidence: the police (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 106, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e075 Confidence: parliament (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 104, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e076 Confidence: the civil services (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 104, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e077 Confidence: social security system (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n:59, N: 35, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 32)

wvs_e079 Confidence: the government (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n:35, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 64)

wvs_e080 Confidence: the political parties (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n:34, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 63)

wvs_e084 Confidence: health care system (mean)

(Time-series: 1999-2001, n: 28, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 32)

wvs_e085 Confidence: justice system (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 102, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 63)

wvs_e086 Confidence: the European Union (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 69, N: 32, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 46)

wvs_e087 Confidence: NATO (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n:51, N: 34, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1999-2003 (varies by country), N: 46)

wvs_e088 Confidence: the United Nations (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-2001, n: 56, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 8, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 77)

Justifiable

Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

Never justifiable									Always justifiable
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

wvs_f114 Justifiable: claiming government benefits (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 105, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 77)

wvs_f115 Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 93, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 72)

wvs_f116 Justifiable: cheating on taxes (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 106, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 77)

wvs_f117 Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 108, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 80)

wvs_f131 Justifiable: paying cash to avoid taxes (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 32)

Just society

In order to be considered "just", what should a society provide? Please tell me for each statement if it is important or unimportant to you. 1 means very important; 5 means not important at all.

Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens.
Guaranteeing that basic needs are met for all, in terms of food, housing, clothes, education, health.
Giving young people equal opportunity to pursue their education irrespective of family income.

(1) Very important
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) Not at all important

wvs_e146 Just society: eliminate big income inequalities (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 31)

wvs_e147 Just society: guarantee that basic needs are met for all (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 31)

wvs_e149 Just society give: young people equal education opportunities (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 15)

Reason that people live in need

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 59, N: 35, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1999-2003 (varies by country), N: 32)

Why are there people in this country who live in need? Here are four possible reasons. Which one reason do you consider to be most important?

wvs_pini1 People in need - injustice

Proportion answering "injustice in society" as their first choice.

wvs_pinl1 People in need – laziness

Proportion answering "laziness or lack of willpower" as their first choice.

wvs_pinp1 People in need - part modern progress

Proportion answering "part modern progress" as their first choice.

wvs_pinu1 People in need – unlucky

Proportion answering "unlucky" as their first choice.

wvs_pini2 People in need – injustice

Proportion answering "injustice in society" as their second choice.

wvs_pinp2 People in need - part modern progress

Proportion answering "part modern progress" as their second choice.

wvs_pinl2 People in need – laziness

Proportion answering "laziness or lack of willpower" as their second choice.

wvs_pinu2 People in need – unlucky

Proportion answering "unlucky" as their second choice.

How many of compatriots do the following

According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following?

Claiming state benefits to which they are not entitled.
Cheating on tax if they have the chance.
Paying cash for services to avoid taxes.
Accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.

(1) Almost all
(2) Many
(3) Some
(4) Almost none

wvs_f145 Compatriots do: claiming state benefits (mean)

(Time-series: 1999-2001, n: 26, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 30)

wvs_f146 Compatriots do: cheat on taxes (mean)

(Time-series: 1999-2001, n: 26, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 30)

wvs_f147 Compatriots do: paying in cash to avoid taxes

(Time-series: 1999-2001, n: 26, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 30)

wvs_f155 Compatriots do: accepting a bribe (mean)

(Time-series: 1999-2001, n: 11, N: 11, $\overline{N}$: 4, $\overline{T}$: 1)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 15)

Political Indicators

This section includes data on policy positions of governments and parliaments based on election results, expert judgments of party positions and the study of party manifestos. Included is also data on political institutions such as forms of government and electoral systems.

Armingeon et al– Comparative Political Dataset I, II & III

(Armingon et al 2007; Armingeon & Careja 2006; Armingeon et al 2008)
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html

ar_source Armingeon source

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1698, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 53)

There are three different versions of the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS), and this variable denotes from which of these each observation comes. There are observations from 23 OECD countries from CPDS I, 28 post-communist countries from CPDS II, and data for Cyprus and Malta from CPDS III.

The definition of some variables varies slightly depending on the source. Such cases are noted in the codebook under each variable.

ar_vt Voter turnout

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1209, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 53)

Voter turnout in election.

ar_ed Election date

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 315, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 7, $\overline{T}$: 12)

Date of election of national parliament. (If there were two elections in a year, the date of the second is given.)

ar_ed2 Election date

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 99, N: 27, $\overline{N}$: 6, $\overline{T}$: 4)

Same as ar_ed, except that the source is CPDS II (i.e., ar_source = 2). The reason we have entered this as a separate variable is that ar_ed2 is in string format, while ar_ed is in numerical format.

Election results

Percentage of votes gained for each group of parties in the last election.

Armingeon et al. follow Lane, McKay & Newton (1997) to a large extent and group parties into 11 different families. A few more groups have been added, including party coalition alliances. Only parties reaching at least 2 percent of the votes in an election are counted as a part of each respective group. Parties which got less then 2 percent of the votes are instead counted in the "others" category.

The grouping of parties differs somewhat between CPDS I, II and III (ar_source = 1, 2 or 3). When categories don't apply to all three sources this is noted below.

ar_vs **Votes: socialist**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_vls **Votes: left-socialist**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_vcom **Votes: communist**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_va **Votes: agrarian**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_vcon **Votes: conservative**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_vr **Votes: religious**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_vl **Votes: liberal**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_vur **Votes: ultra-right**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_vp **Votes: protest**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_vg **Votes: green**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_ve **Votes: ethnic**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_vo **Votes: others**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

Residual category for those parties which got less then 2 percent of the votes.

The following three variables only apply to observations from CPDS I (ar_source = 1).

ar_vla **Votes: left alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1019, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

ar_vca **Votes: center alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1019, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

ar_vra **Votes: right alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1019, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

The following eleven variables only apply to observations from CPDS III (ar_source = 3).

ar_vpc **Votes: post-communist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_vna **Votes: nationalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Parties focusing their discourse or program on the notion of recovering the past greatness of the nation or of fighting for or maintaining independence from the former Soviet Union.

ar_vreg **Votes: regionalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_vfe **Votes: feminist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_vmo **Votes: monarchic**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_vper **Votes: personalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

The personalist label designates parties created to support one candidate and cannot be assigned an ideological label.

ar_vind **Votes: independent**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 147, N: 9, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 19)

Unaffiliated candidates.

ar_vpen **Votes: pensioners**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Parties of pensioners and persons with special needs.

ar_vnl **Votes: no-label**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_vini **Votes: initiative groups**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_val **Votes: alliance**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Coalition between several parties or groupings. Most commonly such an alliance is formed to strengthen members' chances of passing the threshold for a seat and obtaining a larger number of seats in parliament.

Legislative seats

Percentage of total parliamentary seats for each group of parties.

Armingeon et al. follow Lane, McKay & Newton (1997) to a large extent and group parties into 11 different families. A few more groups have been added, including party coalition alliances. Only parties reaching at least 2 percent of the votes in an election are counted as a part of each respective group. Parties which got less then 2 percent of the votes are instead counted in the "others" category.

The grouping of parties differs somewhat between CPDS I & III (ar_source = 1 or 3) on the one hand, and CPDS II (ar_source = 2) on the other hand. When categories don't apply to all three sources this is noted below.

ar_ls **Legislative seats: socialist**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_lls **Legislative seats: left-socialist**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_lcom **Legislative seats: communist**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_la **Legislative seats: agrarian**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_lcon **Legislative seats: conservative**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_lr **Legislative seats: religious**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_ll **Legislative seats: liberal**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_lur **Legislative seats: ultra-right**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_lp **Legislative seats: protest**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_lg **Legislative seats: green**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_le **Legislative seats: ethnic**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1211, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

ar_lo **Legislative seats: others**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1173, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 52)

Residual category for those parties which got less then 2 percent of the votes. Note: 38 observations in the time-series data had a negative value. We replaced those observations with a missing value.

The following three variables only apply to observations from CPDS I (ar_source = 1).

ar_lla **Legislative seats: left alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1019, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

ar_lca **Legislative seats: center alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1019, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

ar_lra **Legislative seats: right alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1019, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

The following eleven variables only apply to observations from CPDS II (ar_source = 2).

ar_lpc **Legislative seats: post-communist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_lna **Legislative seats: nationalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Parties focusing their discourse or program on the notion of recovering the past greatness of the nation or of fighting for or maintaining independence from the former Soviet Union.

ar_lreg **Legislative seats: regionalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_lfe **Legislative seats: feminist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_lmo **Legislative seats: monarchic**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_lper **Legislative seats: personalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

The personalist label designates parties created to support one candidate and cannot be assigned an ideological label.

ar_lal **Legislative seats: alliance**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Coalition between several parties or groupings. Most commonly such an alliance is formed to strengthen members' chances of passing the threshold for a seat and obtaining a larger number of seats in parliament.

ar_lind **Legislative seats: independent**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 19)

Unaffiliated candidates.

ar_lpen **Legislative seats: pensioners**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Parties of pensioners and persons with special needs.

ar_lnl **Legislative seats: no-label**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

ar_lini **Legislative seats: initiative groups**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Cabinets: OECD, Malta and Cyprus

The following six variables only have data from CPDS I and III (ar_source = 1 or 3).

ar_crw **Cabinet portfolios: right-wing**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1047, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 40)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Right party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by the days the government was in office in a given year.

ar_cce **Cabinet portfolios: center**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1047, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 40)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Center party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by the days the government was in office in a given year.

ar_cle Cabinet portfolios: left

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1047, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 40)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Left party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by the days the government was in office in a given year.

ar_ci Cabinet ideology

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1046, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 10, $\overline{T}$: 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

This variable is based on the proportion of left party cabinet portfolios (ar_cle):
(1) Hegemony of right-wing parties (ar_cle = 0)
(2) Dominance of right-wing and center parties (ar_cle < 33.3)
(3) Standoff between left and right (33.33 < ar_cle < 66.6)
(4) Dominance of social-democratic and other left parties (ar_cle > 66.6)
(5) Hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties (ar_cle = 100)

Note however these two exceptions, both due to many non-partisans in government: Italy 1996 is coded as a stand-off between left and right (3), even though the percentage of left parties in government is less than 33 %. Portugal 2001 is coded as dominance of social-democratic and other left parties (4), even though the percentage of left parties in government is less than 66 %.

ar_tg Type of government

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 996, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

(1) Single party majority government
(2) Minimum winning coalition
(3) Surplus coalition
(4) Single party minority government
(5) Multi party minority government
(6) Caretaker government

The indicator refers to the type of government that was in office for the longest period each year.

ar_chg Changes in government

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1047, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 40)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Number of changes in government per year, due to elections, resignation of the prime minister, dissension within government, lack of parliamentary support, or intervention by the head of state.

Cabinets: Post-communist countries

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 144, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 14)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 14)

The following 17 variables only have data from 28 post-communist countries in CPDS II (ar_source = 2).

The variables give the proportion of legislative seats for each group of parties in government, relative to the total parliamentary seats of all parties in government. The variables are also weighted for the number of days each government was in office. The formula is thus:

(share of parliamentary seats of group * 100 * number of days in office) / (total share of seats for all parties in government * number of days in given year)

Only parties which were part of the government are taken into consideration, and not parties that offered parliamentary support without governmental portfolios.

For the first governments after independence or fall of communist rule the total weight does not amount to 100, since the governments did not commence their time in office at the beginning of the calendar year.

Note: In the original data there were two different observations for Bulgaria 2005. We have therefore replaced Bulgaria 2005 as missing.

ar_cs Cabinet party composition: socialist

ar_cls Cabinet party composition: left-socialist

ar_ccom Cabinet party composition: communist

ar_ca Cabinet party composition: agrarian

ar_ccon Cabinet party composition: conservative

ar_cr Cabinet party composition: religious

ar_cli Cabinet party composition: liberal

ar_cur Cabinet party composition: ultra-right

ar_cp Cabinet party composition: protest

ar_cg Cabinet party composition: green

ar_ce Cabinet party composition: ethnic

ar_cpc Cabinet party composition: post-communist

ar_cna Cabinet party composition: nationalist

Parties focusing their discourse or program on the notion of recovering the past greatness of the nation or of fighting for or maintaining independence from the former Soviet Union.

ar_creg Cabinet party composition: regionalist

ar_cper Cabinet party composition: personalist

The personalist label designates parties created to support one candidate and cannot be assigned an ideological label.

ar_cal Cabinet party composition: alliance

Coalition between several parties or groupings. Most commonly such an alliance is formed to strengthen members' chances of passing the threshold for a seat and obtaining a larger number of seats in parliament.

ar_cpen Cabinet party composition: pensioners

Parties of pensioners and persons with special needs.

Lijphart data on institutions

(Time-series: 1946-1996, n: 1124, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 23)

The following variables originally come from Lijphart (1999). The variables have two values for each country: one representing the period 1945-1970, and the other value representing the period 1971-1996. For some observations, two variables are exempt from this rule: ar_li_cr and ar_li_eld are calculated for each year for the 28 post-communist countries in CPDS II (i.e., when ar_source = 2).

ar_li_epd Executives-parties dimension

Higher values indicate a democracy more towards the "consensus" model and lower values indicates a democracy more towards the "majoritarian" model in the executives-parties dimension (Lijphart 1999:5). The index is based on the following five variables.

ar_li_enp Effective number of parties

Effective number of parliamentary parties.

ar_li_mc Minimal winning, one-party majority cabinets (%)

The mean of the percentage of cabinets that are one-party majority and the percentage of cabinets that are minimal winning coalitions.

ar_li_exd Executive dominance

Index that measures the balance of power between the executive and the parliament. The higher the value the more executive dominance.

ar_li_eld Electoral disproportionality (%)

Gallagher's index of disproportionality. The higher the value the more disproportionate the electoral system. The formula is:

$$G = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}\sum (v_i - s_i)^2}$$

where *v* is vote percentages and *s* is seat percentages. See also Lijphart (1999:158).

ar_li_igp Interest group pluralism

Index of interest group pluralism. Lower values indicate corporatist systems and higher values pluralist systems. Based on Siaroff (1999).

ar_li_fud Federal-unitary dimension

Higher values indicate a democracy more towards the "consensus" model and lower values indicates a democracy more towards the "majoritarian" model in the federal-unitary dimension (Lijphart 1999:5). The index is based on the following five variables.

ar_li_f Federalism

Index of federalism and decentralization. Lower values indicate unitary and centralized states, and higher values federal and decentralized states.

ar_li_b Bicameralism

Index of concentration/division of legislative power. Higher values indicate more division of legislative power.

ar_li_cr Constitutional rigidity

Index of constitutional rigidity. Higher values indicate that the constitution is harder to amend.

ar_li_jr Judicial review

Index of judicial review. Higher values indicate stronger judicial review.

ar_li_cbi Central bank independence

Index of central bank independence. Higher values indicate a more independent central bank.

Political institutions, other

ar_ie Integrated economy

(Time-series: 1970-1995, n: 86, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 3, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1995, N: 23)

Siaroff (1999) index of integrated economy, where 5 indicates greatest integration and 1 the least integration. The Siaroff index can be considered as a proxy for corporatism.

ar_cbi Central bank independence

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 770, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 1998, N: 21)

Index of central bank independence constructed by Freitag (1999). The index ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 indicates maximum central bank independence, and 3 maximum central bank dependence.

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)

http://www.cses.org/
(Sapiro et al 2003; The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007)

The variables below on voter turnout and compulsory voting have been provided by the CSES research teams (unlike the CSES "Public Opinion" data above, which is aggregated individual level survey data).

Note: In a few cases the CSES survey was conducted the year after the election year. In these cases we have nevertheless placed the data on the year of the election that the survey is related to. For more information, see the CSES documentation.

cses_vt Voter turnout

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 56, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

Percentage of voting age population who cast ballots.

cses_cv Compulsory voting

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 56, N: 30, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 39)

(1) Compulsory voting with strictly enforced sanctions.
(2) Compulsory voting with weakly enforced sanctions.
(3) Compulsory voting with limited enforcement.
(4) Compulsory voting without sanction for violation.
(5) No compulsory voting.

Crowe and Meade – Central Bank Governance

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/data/wp08119.zip
(Crowe and Meade 2007, 2008; Cukierman et al 1992)

cm_cbi80_89 Central Bank Independence 1980-1989

(Cross-section (1980-1989), N: 72)

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank independence.

The variable is based on central bank laws from the years 1980-1989. Sixteen legal characteristics are considered and they relate to the following areas: the central bank management's insulation from political pressure by secure tenure and independent appointment for the head of the bank; the government's ability to participate or overturn the bank's policy decisions; the clarity of the defined objective for monetary policy specified in the central bank's legal mandate; restrictions that limit lending to the government.

Each legal characteristic was scored according to the authors' numerical coding on a range from zero (least independent) to one (most independent). The characteristics were then weighted to obtain an overall independence measure.

For more information, see Cukierman et al (1992).

cm_cbi80_89u Central Bank Independence 1980-1989, unweighted

(Cross-section (1980-1989), N: 72)

Same as cm_cbi80_89, but the unweighted instead of the weighted average.

cm_cbi03 Central Bank Independence 2003

(Cross-section (2003), N: 96)

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank independence.

The variable is based on IMF data pertaining to the year 2003. It is a replication done by Crowe and Meade using the methodology from Cukierman et al (1992). See the description of cmi_cbi80_89.

cm_cbi03u Central Bank Independence 2003, unweighted

(Cross-section (2003), N: 96)

Same as cm_cbi03, but the unweighted instead of the weighted average.

cm_cbt98 Central Bank Transparency 1998

(Cross-section (1998), N: 87)

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank transparency.

The variable is based on information from 1998. It is constructed as the unweighted average of ten indicators from five categories: the clarity of the central bank's legal mandate; the publication of the data used by the central bank as basis for its decisions; the communication of the explicit policy strategy and information on the decision-making process; timely announcements on policy actions and indications of likely future actions; discussion of economic disturbances and policy errors.

cm_cbt06 Central Bank Transparency 2006

(Cross-section (2006), N: 39)

Same as cm_cbt98, but based on data from 2006.

cm_cbgt80_89 Central Bank Governor Turnover 1980-1989

(Cross-section (1980-1989), N: 71)

This is the average number of changes of the central bank's governor per year from 1980 to 1989. Higher values indicate *lower* independence of the central bank.

The turnover rate is sometimes considered to be a better measure of the de facto bank independence than the legal measures above. "The reasoning is that with higher turnover, the central bank governor's term in office would shorten relative to that of the executive making the governor more susceptible to political interference from the government and reducing the independence of the central bank." (Crowe and Meade 2008: 75).

cm_cbgt95_04 Central Bank Governor Turnover 1995-2004

(Cross-section (1995-2004), N: 114)

Same as cm_cbgt80_89, but for the period 1995-2004.

Cusack – Center of Political Gravity

http://www.wzb.eu/alt/ism/people/misc/cusack/d_sets.en.htm
(Cusack 1997)

Cusack's center of political gravity measures are based on Gross & Sigelman's (1984) index, using data on electoral results, legislative seat distribution, and cabinet seat distribution data (drawn from a variety of sources), as well as data on ideological position of parties based on Castles & Mair's (1984) expert survey data. Each of the indexes range from 1 (far left) to 5 (far right). For an explanation of how the center of political gravity is computed, see under Cusack & Engelhardt below.

cu_lcpg Legislative center of political gravity

(Time-series: 1950-1996, n: 873, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 17)

Center of political gravity of the lower house.

cu_ccpg Cabinet center of political gravity

(Time-series: 1950-1996, n: 861, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 41)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 16)

Center of political gravity of the cabinet.

cu_ecpg Electoral center of political gravity

(Time-series: 1950-1996, n: 868, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 41)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 16)

Center of political gravity of the electorate at most recent election.

cu_ey Election year

(Time-series: 1950-1996, n: 940, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 20)

Equals 1 if election year and 0 otherwise. (Refers to lower house elections, except for the United States where years of presidential elections are given.)

Cusack & Engelhardt

http://www.wzb.eu/alt/ism/people/misc/cusack/d_sets.en.htm
(Cusack & Engelhardt 2003)

The basis for Cusack & Engelhardt's (2003) data is the analysis of political manifestos from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and to some extent expert judgments of parties' ideologies (see Klingemann et al 2006). By combining the CMP data and expert judgments with data on election results and government composition, Cusack & Engelhardt (2003) have produced data on, among other things, the ideological composition of cabinets and parliaments.

Many of the indices in the Cusack & Engelhardt data are based on a concept called the center of political gravity. This index is a summation across all parties of each party's ideological position weighted by its relative strength (see Gross & Sigelman 1984):

$$CPG = \sum_{i=1}^{n} T_i C_i$$

where:

T_i = party i's decimal share of seats/votes

C_i = party i's position on the ideological dimension

The ideological variables all come in four versions, distinguished by the suffixes cmp, ce1, ce2 and ci. Three of these are different ways of aggregating the CMP data to overall ideological measurements on the left-right scale. The fourth is a composite index based on different expert judgments. The four versions are:

cmp: CMPs own left-right index. It is constructed by counting 13 categories of pro-right and 13 categories of pro-left sentences in political manifestos, and then subtracting the percentage of pro-left sentences from the percentage of pro-right sentences. Thus, higher

values indicate ideological positions more to the right. It varies theoretically between -100 and 100. For more information, see Cusack & Engelhardt (2003) or Budge et al (2001).

ce1: Index constructed by Cusack & Engelhardt (2003). Higher values indicate ideological positions more to the right. It is constructed by counting sentences in political manifestos. Cusack & Engelhardt sum the percentage of sentences positive to free enterprise, economic orthodoxy and governmental and administrative efficiency, and from these subtract the percentage of sentences positive to market regulation, economic planning, controlled economy, social justice and welfare state expansion.

The variable varies theoretically between -100 and 100.

ce2: Index constructed by Cusack & Engelhardt (2003). Higher values indicate ideological positions more to the right. It is constructed by counting sentences in political manifestos. Cusack & Engelhardt first sum the percentage of sentences positive to free enterprise, economic orthodoxy and governmental and administrative efficiency, and from these subtract the percentage of sentences positive to market regulation, economic planning, Keynesian demand management, controlled economy, nationalization, social justice and welfare state expansion. They then divide this difference with the total sum of percentage of sentences counted, and finally multiply it with 100.

The variable varies theoretically between -100 and +100.

ci: Composite ideology index based on the expert surveys in Castles & Mair (1984), Huber & Inglehart (1995) and Laver & Hunt (1992). Where needed Cusack & Engelhardt (2003) have fitted values from the equation estimating ce1 (see below).

The variable varies theoretically between -100 (far left) to 100 (far right).

ce_ccpg_cmp Cabinet: center of political gravity (cmp)

ce_ccpg_ce1 Cabinet: center of political gravity (ce1)

ce_ccpg_ce2 Cabinet: center of political gravity (ce2)

ce_ccpg_ci Cabinet: center of political gravity (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1110, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 22)

The center of political gravity of the cabinet.

ce_cml Cabinet majority, lower house

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Describes whether the cabinet coalition has a minority (1), equal (2) or majority position (3) in the lower house.

ce_cmu Cabinet majority, upper house

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 686, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 40)

(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 14)

Describes whether the cabinet coalition has a minority (1), equal (2) or majority position (3) in the upper house.

ce_cpsl Cabinet: percentage of seats, lower house

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Percentage of seats in lower house held by the government.

ce_cnp Cabinet: number of parties

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Number of parties in cabinet.

ce_lcpg_cmp Lower house: center of political gravity (cmp)

ce_lcpg_ce1 Lower house: center of political gravity (ce1)

ce_lcpg_ce2 Lower house: center of political gravity (ce2)

ce_lcpg_ci Lower house: center of political gravity (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1118, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

The overall center of political gravity in the lower house.

ce_ccpgl_cmp Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (cmp)

ce_ccpgl_ce1 Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (ce1)

ce_ccpgl_ce2 Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (ce2)

ce_ccpgl_ci Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1111, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 22)

The center of political gravity of the government parties in the lower house.

ce_cpsu Cabinet: percentage of seats, upper house

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 686, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 40)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Percentage of seats in upper house held by the government.

ce_ucpg_cmp Upper house: center of political gravity (cmp)

ce_ucpg_ce1 Upper house: center of political gravity (ce1)

ce_ucpg_ce2 Upper house: center of political gravity (ce2)

ce_ucpg_ci Upper house: center of political gravity (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 684, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 40)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 14)

The overall center of political gravity in the upper house.

ce_ccpgu_cmp Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (cmp)

ce_ccpgu_ce1 Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (ce1)

ce_ccpgu_ce2 Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (ce2)

ce_ccpgu_ci Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 681 N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 12, $\overline{T}$: 40)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 13)

The center of political gravity of the government parties in the upper house.

ce_lf Lower house: fractionalization

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Fractionalization of lower house as a whole.

The convention for splitting parties into two categories, left and right, used by Cusack & Engelhard (2003) is to treat a party as being on the left if its ideological score is less than 0, and to treat all other parties as being on the right, including those few ambiguous cases where the ideological score was exactly 0.

ce_uf Upper house: fractionalization

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 636, N: 15, $\overline{N}$: 11, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 13)

Fractionalization of upper house as a whole. See ce_lf for more information.

ce_cf Cabinet: fractionalization

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Fractionalization of the cabinet. See ce_lf for more information.

ce_cpv Cabinet: percentage of votes in election

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Government parties' share of votes in election.

Database of Political Institutions

http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40
(Beck et al 2000; 2001; Keefer 2008)

Note: The data from the DPI refers to January 1 of each year.

dpi_system Regime type

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1146, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 175)

The variable captures whether countries are presidential, assembly-elected presidential, or parliamentary:
(0) Direct presidential
(1) Strong president elected by assembly
(2) Parliamentary

dpi_gf Government fractionalization

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1116, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 167)

Government fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies from among the government parties will be of different parties.

dpi_gs Number of Government Seats

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1232, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 175)

Number of seats in the legislature of the parties in government.

dpi_opf Opposition fractionalization

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1044, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 33, $\overline{T}$: 26)
(Cross-section: 1996-2006 (varies by country), N: 153)

Opposition fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies belonging to the parties in the opposition will be of different parties.

dpi_nos Number of Oppositional Seats

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1232, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 175)

Number of seats in the legislature of the parties in opposition.

dpi_numul Number of Seats non-aligned/allegiance unknown

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1232, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 31)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 175)

Number of seats in the legislature of parties that are non-aligned/allegiance unknown.

dpi_tf Total fractionalization

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1116, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 167)

Total fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies in the legislature belong to different parties.

dpi_legelec Legislative election

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1145, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 174)

Dummy variable, 1 if there is a legislative election held this year.

dpi_exelec Executive election

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1146, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 29)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 174)

Dummy variable, 1 if there is an executive election held this year.

dpi_mdmh Mean district magnitude (house)

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1023, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 32, $\overline{T}$: 26)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 164)

dpi_mdms Mean district magnitude (senate)

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 489, N: 18, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 27)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 50)

The average number of representatives elected by each electoral district in a country. If information is available, the average is weighted by constituency size.

dpi_ssh Relative size of senate

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 575, N: 23, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 25)
(Cross-section: 1995-2006 (varies by country), N: 73)

Number of senate seats / (number of house seats + number of senate seats).

dpi_plurality Plurality

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1110, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 161)

Dummy variable, 1 if plurality is used as electoral rule to select any candidate in any house, or if there is competition for the seats in a one-party state (dpi_lipc=4).

dpi_pr Proportional representation

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1064, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 33, $\overline{T}$: 27)
(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 154)

Dummy variable, 1 if Proportional Representation (PR) is used as electoral rule to select any candidate in any house.

dpi_housesys House: plurality or proportional?

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1105, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 159)

If both Plurality and Proportional Representation are used as electoral rules, which governs the majority/all of the House seats? Dummy variable, 1 if Plurality, 0.5 if 50% Plurality and 50% Proportional, and 0 if Proportional.

dpi_sensys Senate: plurality or proportional?

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 272, N: 11, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 25)
(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 28)

If both Plurality and Proportional Representation are used as electoral rules, which governs the majority/all of the Senate seats? Dummy variable, 1 if Plurality, 0.5 if 50% Plurality and 50% Proportional, and 0 if Proportional.

dpi_thresh Vote threshold for representation

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 761, N: 33, $\overline{N}$: 25, $\overline{T}$: 23)
(Cross-section: 1996-2004 (varies by country), N: 86)

Records the minimum vote share that a party must obtain in order to take at least one seat in PR systems, in percent.

dpi_dhondt D'Hondt

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 874, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 27, $\overline{T}$: 24)
(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 89)

Dummy variable, 1 if the D'Hondt rule is used to allocate seats in a PR system.

dpi_cl Closed lists

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 912, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 25)
(Cross-section: 1996-2006 (varies by country), N: 98)

Dummy variable, 1 when PR is used (dpi_pr) and voters cannot express preferences for candidates within a party list.

dpi_auton Autonomous regions

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 1122, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 168)

Dummy variable, 1 if there are autonomous regions.

dpi_state Election of state/province government

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 922, N: 35, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 26)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 129)

One dimension of information on sub-national governments is whether state/provincial governments are locally elected. Coded 0 if neither the local executive nor the local legislature are directly elected by the local population that they govern; 1 if either is directly elected and the other is indirectly elected (e.g., by councils at subsidiary levels of government) or appointed; and 2 if they are both directly and locally elected. If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, we consider the highest level as the "state/province" level.

dpi_muni Election of municipal government

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 624, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 95)

Are the municipal governments locally elected? Coded the same as the state/provincial government, dpi_state above (0-2). If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, the lowest level is considered as the "municipal" level.

dpi_author Authority of sub-national governments

(Time-series: 1975-2006, n: 478, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 25)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 66)

Dummy variable, 1 if sub-national governments have extensive taxing, spending or regulatory authority.

Fish and Kroenig – The Parliamentary Powers Index

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 158)
http://polisci.berkeley.edu/faculty/bio/permanent/Fish,M
(Fish and Kroenig 2009)

fk_ppi Parliamentary Powers Index

The Parliamentary Powers Index assesses the strength of the national legislature. The index, based on 32 underlying dummy variables, gauges the legislature's sway of the executive, its institutional autonomy, its authority in specific areas, and its institutional capacity. (For a complete list of the variables, see Fish and Kroenig 2009 or http://polisci.berkeley.edu/faculty/bio/permanent/Fish,M.)

The data was generated by means of an international survey of experts, a study of secondary sources, and analyses of constitutions and other relevant documents.

The variable ranges from 0 (least powerful) to 1 (most powerful). The score is calculated by summing up the number of powers that the national legislature possesses and dividing it by 32. For example, a country with a national legislature that possesses 16 of the 32 parliamentary powers has a PPI of .50

Golder

http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html
(Golder 2005)

Golder's data cover electoral institutions used in democratic legislative (lower chamber) and presidential elections, where democracy is defined according to gol_polreg below. Note that data (with the exception of gol_legel and gol_preel) for 'non-democratic regimes' is coded as 'missing'. There are some countries that had two elections (legislative or presidential) in the same year: Argentina 1973, Bangladesh 1996, Denmark 1953, Greece 1989, Iceland 1959, Ireland 1982, Saint Lucia 1987, Sri Lanka 1960, Thailand 1992, and United Kingdom 1974. As a result, it is not possible to provide data for both elections that occurred in the same year in the country-year data format. In those cases where there were two elections, data is from the second election. Those interested in data for the first elections should consult Golder's original data.

gol_adm Average district magnitude

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1431, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Average district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is calculated as the total number of seats allocated in the lowest tier divided by the total number of districts in that tier. For example, gol_adm=7.94 in Denmark after 1971 since there are 135 seats allocated in the lowest tier between 17 districts.

gol_dist Districts

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1431, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Number of electoral districts or constituencies in the lowest electoral tier for the lower house of the legislature.

gol_enep Effective number of electoral parties

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1421, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 103)

Effective number of electoral parties based on formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

gol_enepo Effective number of electoral parties (others)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1420, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 103)

This is the percentage of the vote going to parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official electoral results.

gol_enep1 Effective number of electoral parties1

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1420, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 103)

Effective number of electoral parties once the 'other' category has been corrected for by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997). The method of bounds essentially requires, first, calculating the effective number of parties treating the 'other' category as a single party; this estimate corresponds to the minimum effective number of parties. Second, the effective number of parties is recalculated as if every vote in the 'other' category belonged to different parties; this estimate corresponds to the maximum effective number of parties. Finally, one takes the mean of these minimum and maximum estimates.

gol_enpp Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1431, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 107)

Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties constructed using the formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

gol_enppo Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties (others)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 106)

This is the percentage of the seats going to parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official electoral results.

gol_enpp1 Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties1

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 106)

Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties once the 'other' category has been corrected for by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997).

gol_enpres Effective number of presidential candidates

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1432, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Effective number of presidential candidates based on the formula from Amorim Neto and Cox (1997).

gol_est Electoral system type

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Variable indicating the type of electoral system used:
(1) Majoritarian (employs plurality, absolute majority, qualified majority, limited vote, alternative vote, single non-transferable vote or modified Borda count in a single electoral tier)
(2) Proportional (employs party list or single transferable vote in a single electoral tier)
(3) Multi-tier (employs a single electoral formula, majoritarian or proportional, across multiple tiers)

(4) Mixed (employs a mixture of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules in one or more electoral tiers)

gol_est2 Electoral system type 2

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Variable constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset indicating the type of electoral system used, where multi-tier systems are recoded as being majoritarian (only concerns Papua New Guinea and Mauritius) or proportional (concerns all others):
(1) Majoritarian
(2) Proportional
(3) Mixed

gol_inst Institution

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1831, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 33, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 189)

Classification of political regimes in which democracies are distinguished by the type of executive as given below:
(0) Dictatorship
(1) Parliamentary Democracy
(2) Mixed Democracy
(3) Presidential Democracy

Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges. On the criteria for determining whether a regime is a dictatorship, see Political Regimes (gol_polreg). A presidential regime is one in which the government serves under the elected president. The president may be directly elected or indirectly elected; the important feature is that the president selects and determines the survival of the government. A parliamentary system is one in which the government serves so long as it maintains the confidence of the legislature. A system in which the government must respond to both the legislative assembly and to an elected president is classified as mixed. Typically, these mixed systems are characterized by a president who is elected for a fixed term with some executive powers and a government that serves under the direction of the legislature. This classification scheme follows the recommendations of Przeworski et al. (2000).

gol_legel Legislative elections

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1831, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 33, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 189)

Indicates the number of elections for the national lower chamber of the legislature held in that year. Partial elections such as those taking place in Costa Rica 1946, Poland 1989, Laos 1958, or Luxembourg 1948, 1951 are coded 0. This variable does not include elections to constituent assemblies such as those in Pakistan 1955, Nicaragua 1984, Sudan 1965, 1968, Italy 1946, or France 1946. It also excludes the 1960 election in Somalia, as this was only a legislative election for Somaliland (later to become the northern region of Somalia). 18 democratic legislative elections occur in years where gol_polreg is coded as a dictatorship (Argentina 1962, Bolivia 1980, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Congo 1963, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Pakistan 1977, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines

1965, Sierra Leone 1967, Somalia 1969, Sri Lanka 1977, Sudan 1958, Thailand 1976). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of gol_polreg is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic.

gol_legro Runoff

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no legislative runoff; 1 if there is.

gol_maj Majoritarian type

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 420, N: 10, $\overline{N}$: 8, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 45)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of majoritarian electoral system used in legislative elections as given below:

(1) Plurality
(2) Absolute majority
(3) Qualified majority
(4) Limited vote
(5) Alternative vote
(6) Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)
(7) Modified Borda

gol_mdm Median district magnitude

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1205, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 108)

Median district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is the district magnitude associated with the median legislator in the lowest tier. The median legislator is determined by finding the number of legislators elected in the lower tier and dividing this figure by two. For further details on this variable, see Amorim Neto and Cox (1997).

gol_mix Mixed type

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 285, N: 14, $\overline{N}$: 5, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 29)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of mixed electoral system used in legislative elections as given below:

(1) Coexistence, independent
(2) Superposition, independent
(3) Fusion, independent
(4) Correction, dependent
(5) Conditional, dependent

A dependent mixed system is one in which the application of one formula is dependent on the outcome produced by the other formula. There are three types of independent mixed

systems: coexistence (where some districts use a majoritarian, while others employ a proportional formula), superposition (where two different electoral formulas are applied nationwide), and fusion (where majoritarian and proportional formulas are used within a single district) systems. An independent mixed system is one in which the two electoral formulas are implemented independently of each other. There are two types of dependent mixed systems: correction (where seats distributed by proportional representation in one set of districts are used to correct for the distortions created by the majoritarian formula in another) and conditional (where the actual use or not of one formula depends on the outcome produced by the other) systems.

gol_mt Multi-tier type

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 466, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 8, $\overline{T}$: 27)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 25)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of multi-tier electoral system used in legislative elections as given below:
(1) Linked
(2) Unlinked

A multi-tier system is linked whenever unused votes from one electoral tier are used at another level, or if the allocation of seats in one tier is conditional on the seats received in another tier.

gol_nos Number of seats

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1432, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 111)

Total number of seats in the lower house of the legislature during the election year.

gol_pest Presidential electoral system type

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 91, N: 16, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 56)

Variable that indicates the type of electoral system used in presidential elections:
(1) Plurality
(2) Absolute majority
(3) Qualified majority
(4) Electoral College
(5) Single Transferable Vote (STV)

gol_polreg Political regimes

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1831, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 33, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 189)

Transition years are coded as the regime that exists (0 Democracy, 1 Dictatorship) as of December 31st in that year. A regime is considered a dictatorship if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, or there has been no alternation in power (Przeworski et al. 2000). A regime is democratic if those who govern are selected through contested elections.

gol_pr PR type

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1009, N: 28, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 56)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of proportional formula used in legislative elections:

(1) Hare
(2) Droop
(3) Imperiali
(4) Reinforced Imperiali
(5) Modified Hare
(6) D'Hondt
(7) Saint-Laguë
(8) Modified Saint-Laguë
(9) Single Transferable Vote (STV)

gol_preel Presidential election

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1831, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 33, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 2000 (varies by country), N: 188)

Indicates the number of direct presidential elections held in that year. Note: This variable does not signify that the election chose either the nominal or effective head of government. For example, gol_preel=1 if there is an election for president in mixed systems, even though the nominal and effective head of government is the prime minister. This variable does not include plebiscites or referenda as have occurred in countries like Taiwan and the Maldives.

18 democratic presidential elections occur in years where gol_polreg is coded as a dictatorship (Argentina 1962, Bolivia 1980, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Congo 1963, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Pakistan 1977, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines 1965, Sierra Leone 1967, Somalia 1969, Sri Lanka 1977, Sudan 1958, Thailand 1976). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of gol_polreg is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic.

gol_prero Presidential runoff

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1433, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no presidential runoff; 1 if there is a presidential runoff. Presidential elections are coded as having runoff provisions if a successful candidate must win an absolute or qualified majority of the vote to become president.

gol_upseat Upper seats

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1308, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 24 $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 109)

The number of seats allocated in electoral districts or constituencies above the lowest tier. This variable may include seats allocated in several different upper tiers.

gol_uptier Upper tier

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1308, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 24 $\overline{T}$: 35)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 109)

Percentage of seats allocated in electoral districts above the lowest tier.

Gerring, Thacker & Moreno

http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/data.htm
(Gerring et al 2005)

Gerring, Thacker and Moreno only include country-years that obtain a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p_polity2). (For details, see Gerring et al. 2005: p.572)

gtm_centrip Centripetalism

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 1193, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 132)

Sum of Unitarism (gtm_unit), Parliamentarism (gtm_parl), and Proportional Representation (gtm_pr).

gtm_centrip2 Centripetalism (weighted)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 1193, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 132)

The variable is a moving weighted sum of Unitarism (gtm_unit), Parliamentarism (gtm_parl), and Proportional Representation (gtm_pr), beginning in 1901 and ending in 2000. For details, see Gerring et al (2005).

gtm_unit Unitarism

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 1267, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 32)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 150)

Average of Nonfederalism and Nonbicameralism:

- Nonfederalism is coded as 0 = federal (elective regional legislatures plus conditional recognition of subnational authority), 1 = semifederal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government), or 2 = nonfederal.

- Nonbicameralism is coded as 0 = strong bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power; the two houses are incongruent), 1 = weak bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power, though not necessarily a formal veto; the two houses are congruent), or 2 = unicameral (no upper house or weak upper house).

gtm_parl Parliamentarism

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 1267, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 32)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 150)

The parliamentary/presidential distinction is conceptualized as a continuum with two dimensions: (a) the *degree of separation* (independence) between president and parliament (unity = parliamentary, separation = presidential) and, if there is any separation at all, (b) the *relative power* of the two players (the more power the president possesses, the more presidential is the resulting system). This complex reality is captured with a three-part coding scheme:
(0) Presidential
(1) Semi-presidential
(2) Parliamentary

gtm_pr Proportional Representation

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 1267, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 30, $\overline{T}$: 32)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 151)

The centripetal theory of democratic governance emphasizes the following three features of an electoral system: (a) district magnitude (M), (b) seat allocation rules (majoritarian or proportional), and (c) candidate selection rules. The centripetal ideal type is defined by M>1, proportional seat allocation rules, and party-controlled candidate selection. This is the *closed-list-PR* electoral system. Other systems are ranked lower in this coding according to their deviation from this ideal type. Thus, the coding for the list-PR variable is as follows:
(0) Majoritarian or Preferential-vote
(1) Mixed-member majority or Block vote
(2) Closed-list-PR

Huber et al – Comparative Welfare States Data Set

http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/cws%20lis.xls
(Huber et al 2004)

Note: Huber et al (2004) code Christian parties which combine Catholic and Protestant forces (such as the Dutch Christian Democrats after the merger, or the German Christian Democrats) as either center or right "Christian".

hu_vt Voter turnout

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 733, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 39)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Voter turnout in election (percentage of total electorate who cast a ballot).

Election results

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 39)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

hu_vl Votes: left

Percentage of total votes for left parties.

hu_vcs Votes: center secular

Percentage of total votes for center secular parties.

hu_vcch Votes: center Christian

Percentage of total votes for center Christian parties.

hu_vcca Votes: center Catholic

Percentage of total votes for center Catholic parties.

hu_vrs Votes: right secular

Percentage of total votes for right secular parties.

hu_vrch Votes: right Christian parties

Percentage of total votes for right Christian parties.

hu_vrca Votes: right Catholic

Percentage of total votes for right Catholic parties.

Legislative seats

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 39)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

hu_ll Legislative seats: left

Percentage of total seats in parliament for left parties.

hu_lcs Legislative seats: center secular

Percentage of total seats in parliament for center secular parties.

hu_lcch Legislative seats: center Christian

Percentage of total seats in parliament for center Christian parties.

hu_lcca Legislative seats: center Catholic

Percentage of total seats in parliament for center Catholic parties.

hu_lrs Legislative seats: right secular

Percentage of total seats in parliament for right secular parties.

hu_lrch Legislative seats: right Christian parties

Percentage of total seats in parliament for right Christian parties.

hu_lrca Legislative seats: right Catholic

Percentage of total seats in parliament for right Catholic parties.

Governments

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 39)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

For each group of parties there is one variable that shows the legislative seats of that group as a share of all seats held by all government parties, given that parties from this group are included in the government. There is also another variable (ending with _cum) which is the cumulative score from 1946 to the year of the observation. For example, the score of hu_gl_cum the year 1960 is the score of hu_gl of 1946 + hu_gl 1947 + hu_gl 1948 and so on until 1960.

hu_gl **Government parties legislative seats: left**

hu_gl_cum **Left governments cumulative**

Left seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

hu_gcs **Government parties legislative seats: center secular**

hu_gcs_cum **Center secular governments cumulative**

Center secular seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

hu_gcch **Government parties legislative seats: center Christian**

hu_gcch_cum **Center Christian governments cumulative**

Center Christian seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

hu_gcca **Government parties legislative seats: center Catholic**

hu_gcca_cum **Center Catholic governments cumulative**

Center Catholic seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

hu_grs **Government parties legislative seats: right secular**

hu_grs_cum **Right secular governments cumulative**

Right secular seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

hu_grch **Government parties legislative seats: right Christian parties**

hu_grch_cum **Right Christian governments cumulative**

Right Christian seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

hu_grca **Government parties legislative seats: right Catholic**

hu_grca_cum **Right Catholic governments cumulative**

Right Catholic seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

Political institutions

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 39)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

The following variables use Lijphart (1984) and Lijphart (1999) as a base for their coding.

hu_federal Federalism

(0) Not federal
(1) Weak federalism
(2) Strong federalism

hu_pres Presidentialism

(0) Parliamentary system
(1) President or collegial executive

hu_est Electoral system type

(0) Proportional representation
(1) Modified proportional representation
(2) Single member, simple plurality systems

hu_bicameral Bicameral system

(0) No second chamber or, second chamber with very weak powers
(1) Weak bicameralism
(2) Strong bicameralism

hu_ff Frequent referenda

(0) None or infrequent referenda
(1) Frequent referenda

hu_jr Judicial review

(0) No judicial review
(1) Judicial review

IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)

http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm

The total number of registered voters (Registered Voters, RV) and voting age population (Voting Age Population, VAP) can both be used as indicators for electoral turnout. Data is only given for election years.

Please note that we for the cross-sectional dataset for each country pick the observation of 2002, and if 2002 is not available then 2003 is used, and if 2003 is not available then 2001 is used and so forth. We do not include observations from elections held earlier than 1995 in the cross-sectional dataset.

Kommentar [PO1]: Fundera på om det kan stå "for" eller "from" här istället.

idea_parvap Turnout in Parliamentary Elections (VAP)

(Time-series: 1946-2008, n: 563, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 14)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 179)

Turnout in parliamentary elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the voting age population (VAP).

Note: We have observed a dubious value of over 1000 percent. This concern the Democratic Republic of Congo in the cross-sectional version of our data. We have nevertheless chosen to leave the data as it is.

idea_parrv Turnout in Parliamentary Elections (RV)

(Time-series: 1946-2009 n: 552, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 9, $\overline{T}$: 14)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 180)

Turnout in parliamentary elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the number of registered voters (RV).

idea_presvap Turnout in Presidential Elections (VAP)

(Time-series: 1946-2008, n: 104, N: 16, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 7)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 102)

Turnout in presidential elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the voting age population (VAP).

Note: We have observed a dubious value of nearly 1000 percent. This concerns the Democratic Republic of Congo in the cross-sectional version of our data. We have nevertheless chosen to leave the data as it is.

idea_presrv Turnout in Presidential Elections (RV)

(Time-series: 1950-2009, n: 97, N: 16, $\overline{N}$: 2, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 102)

Turnout in presidential elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the number of registered voters (RV).

Kim & Fording

http://heeminkimfsu.googlepages.com/datasetsandsolutionconceptsicreated
(Kim & Fording 1998; 2002; 2003; 2008)

The basis for Kim & Fording's data is the analysis of political manifestos from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, see e.g. Klingemann et al 2006). By combining the CMP data with data on election results and government composition, Kim & Fording have produced ideology scores on the left-right scale for parliaments and governments (as captured by parties' vote shares).

The first step is to compute the ideology score for each party in each election. Kim & Fording use 26 categories from the CMP data; 13 of the categories demonstrate pro-left tendencies in the manifestos analyzed and 13 demonstrate pro-right tendencies. (See Kim & Fording 2008, p. 3 for a list of these categories.) The score is computed by subtracting the number of rightist statements from the number of leftist statements, and then dividing by the total number of rightist and leftist statements. Thus:

$$\text{Party ideology} = \frac{\sum \text{left statements} - \sum \text{right statements}}{\sum \text{left statements} + \sum \text{right statements}}$$

This results in a measure of party ideology ranging from -1 to 1, which is then transformed to take on a possible range of 0 to 100, where lower scores indicate right ideology, and higher scores left ideology.

kf_mvi Median voter ideology

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 1341, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 23, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Median voter ideology on a 0 to 100 scale, where lower scores indicate right ideology and higher scores left ideology.

To estimate the median ideological position within the electorate of each country at each election, Kim & Fording proceed in a series of three steps. First they obtain the ideology scores for each party in each election (see above) and place the parties on an ideological dimension by their scores. Second, they find an interval for each party where its supporters are located. This interval is found by calculating a midpoint between this party and the one immediately to the left of it and another midpoint between this party and the one immediately to the right of it. It is then assumed that those voting for this party fall into the interval between these two midpoints. Third, the percentage of the vote received by each party is used to transform the data into a grouped frequency distribution, estimating the median position by using the following formula:

$M = L + [(50 – C) / F] * W$

Where:
M = Median voter position (ideological score).
L = The lower end (ideological score) of the interval containing the median.
C = The cumulative frequency (vote share) up to but not including the interval containing the median.
F = The frequency (vote share) in the interval containing the median.
W = The width of the interval containing the median.

By using data on election dates, a monthly series of voter ideology scores was computed using linear interpolation. Finally, the yearly series of voter ideology scores is the average of the monthly scores each year.

kf_pi Parliament ideology

(Time-series: 1946-1998, n: 1159, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 24)

Parliament ideology on a 0 to 100 scale, where lower scores indicate right ideology and higher scores left ideology.

For each election, parliament ideology is computed as a weighted average of the ideology of the parties in the parliament:

$$\text{Parliament ideology} = \sum[\text{Ideology}_i * (\#\text{Seats}_i / \text{Total Seats})]$$

Where:
Ideology_i = the ideology of party i
$\#\text{Seats}_i$ = the total number of parliamentary seats controlled by party i
Total Seats = the total number of parliamentary seats.

Based on the month of the election, Kim & Fording then interpolated the data across months within each country, and finally computed the average score for each year in each country.

For the computation of party ideology, see above.

kf_gi1 Government ideology 1

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 1166, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 23)

kf_gi2 Government ideology 2

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 1230, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 25)

kf_gi3 Government ideology 3

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 1230, N: 26, $\overline{N}$: 22, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 25)

Government ideology on a 0 to 100 scale, where lower scores indicate right ideology and higher scores left ideology.

The variable comes in three versions that differ in how they handle those cases in which there is no CMP data for one or more of the parties that were part of the government. One type of missing data is treated in the same way in all three versions: In those cases where a party never appears in the manifesto data, Kim & Fording estimated the missing scores by assuming that the ideology of these ministers were equal to the average ideology of all ministers for which they were able to observe ideology scores within that government. (Most of these missing values originate from non-partisan ministers.)

Another type of missing data is when a party's ideology was not coded for the most recent election, but they were coded for other elections in the CMP data. In these cases Kim & Fording used two different strategies. The first, resulting in the kf_gi2 variable, was to use the most recent (past) party score to estimate the missing scores. In case there was no data from earlier elections, Kim & Fording instead used the most proximate future score. The other strategy, resulting in the kf_gi3 variable, was to use the average party ideology score across all elections for which the party's ideology was observed across the entire CMP dataset.

Note: in a few cases Kim & Fording report data for several governments for the same year in the same country. In these cases we have only kept the data of the *last* government of that year.

The variable is a weighted average of the ideology of the parties in government:

$$\text{Government ideology} = \sum[\text{Ideology}_i * (\#\text{Posts}_i / \text{Total Posts})]$$

Where:
Ideology_i = the ideology of party i
$\#\text{Posts}_i$ = the total number of cabinet posts controlled by party i
Total Posts = the total number of cabinet posts

For the computation of party ideology, see above.

Persson & Tabellini

http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=1169&tbn=albero&id_folder=177
(Persson & Tabellini 2003)

Persson and Tabellini only include countries of democratic rule in their sample. To be included in the cross-section, an average of the Freedom House indexes for civil liberties and political rights (fh_cl and fh_pr) lower than an average of 5 for the 1990-1998 period is required. For the 1960-1998 panel data, Persson and Tabellini include country-years that obtain a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p_polity2) (For details, see Persson and Tabellini 2003, 74-77.)

pt_federal Federal Political Structure

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 1060, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 60, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 60)

Dummy variable, 1 if the country has a federal political structure and 0 otherwise.

pt_magn Inverse of District Magnitude

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 84)

Inverse of district magnitude, defined as districts (the number of electoral districts in a country, including the number of primary as well as secondary and tertiary districts if applicable) over the number of seats (pt_seats).

pt_maj Majoritarian Electoral Systems

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 2179, N: 61, $\overline{N}$: 56, $\overline{T}$: 36)
(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 60)

Dummy variable, 1 if the lower house is selected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered.

pt_pind Ballot Structure 1

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Continuous measure of the ballot structure defined as the proportion of legislators elected by plurality rule via a vote on individuals (as opposed to party lists). Computed as 1 – list/pt_seats, where list is the number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems.

pt_pindo Ballot Structure 2

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Continuous measure of the ballot structure defined as the proportion of legislators in the lower house elected individually or on open lists. Computed as 1 – list/pt_seats*clist, where list is the number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems and clist is a dummy variable for closed party lists.

pt_pres Forms of Government

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 1092, N: 29, $\overline{N}$: 38, $\overline{T}$: 38)
(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 60)

Dummy variable, 1 for presidential regimes and 0 otherwise. Only regimes in which the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in power (even if an elected president is not the chief executive, or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes. Most semi-presidential and premier-presidential systems are classified as parliamentary.

pt_sdm Weighted Inverse District Magnitude

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 77)

Inverse of district magnitude, where the weight on each district is the share of legislators running in districts of that size.

pt_seats Number of Seats

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

The number of seats in lower or single chambers for the last legislature of each country. It is also related to the number of districts in which primary elections are held.

Swank – Comparative Parties Data Set

(Time-series: 1950-2002, n: 1037, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 20, $\overline{T}$: 47)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 21)
http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/Swank.htm
(Swank 2008a, b)

Swank's classification of parties for the most part corresponds with those of Castles & Mair (1984). See Swank (2008b) for exceptions.

sw_ey Election year

Dummy variable coded 1 for years in which lower house elections occurred, and 0 otherwise. For the United States, both congressional and presidential election years are coded as 1, and for the French Fifth Republic both presidential and national assembly elections are coded as 1.

Election results

sw_vl **Votes: left**

Left party votes as a percentage of total votes.

sw_vr **Votes: right**

Right party votes as a percentage of total votes.

sw_vcd **Votes: Christian democratic**

Total Christian democratic party votes as a percentage of total votes.

sw_vccd **Votes: centrist Christian democratic**

Centrist Christian democratic party votes as a percentage of total votes.

sw_vce **Votes: Center**

Center party votes as a percentage of total votes.

sw_vrwp **Votes: Right-wing populist**

Percentage of national vote for right-wing populist parties in elections to lower chamber.

sw_vll **Votes: Left-libertarian votes**

Percentage of national vote for left-libertarian parties in elections to lower chamber.

Legislative seats

sw_ll **Legislative seats: left**

Left party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats. (For the United States, non-southern Democratic seats are reported as left seats.)

sw_lr **Legislative seats: right**

Right party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats.

sw_lcd **Legislative seats: Christian democratic**

Total Christian democratic party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats.

sw_lccd **Legislative seats: centrist Christian democratic**

Centrist Christian democratic party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats.

sw_lce **Legislative seats: center**

Center party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats.

sw_lrwp **Legislative seats: Right-wing populist**

Percentage of seats in lower chamber of national parliament held by right-wing populist parties.

sw_lll **Legislative seats: Left-libertarian**

Percentage of seats in lower chamber of national parliament held by left-libertarian parties.

Cabinets

sw_cl **Cabinet portfolios: left**

Left party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.

sw_cr **Cabinet portfolios: right**

Right party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.

sw_ccd **Cabinet portfolios: Christian democratic**

Total Christian democratic party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.

sw_cccd **Cabinet portfolios: centrist Christian democratic**

Centrist Christian democratic party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.

sw_cce **Cabinet portfolios: center**

Center party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.

Tsebelis

http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/veto_players_data
(Tsebelis 1999; 2008)

ts_mg **Minority government**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 999, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 48)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 20)

Varies between 0 and 1. If there are two (or more) different governments the same year, the value is a weighted average of the two (hence the variable will sometimes be a decimal value).

ts_mwc **Minimum winning coalition**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 999, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 48)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 20)

Single party or multiple party minimum winning coalition. Varies between 0 and 1. If there are two (or more) different governments the same year, the value is a weighted average of the two (hence the variable will sometimes be a decimal value).

ts_og **Oversized government**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 999, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 48)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 20)

Government larger than minimum winning coalition.Varies between 0 and 1. If there are two (or more) different governments the same year, the value is a weighted average of the two (hence the variable will sometimes be a decimal value).

ts_vp Veto players

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1018, N: 22, $\overline{N}$: 19, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 21)

A veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo. In a parliamentary system, veto players are the parties in government as well as other actors endowed with veto powers.

The only possible veto players other than government parties are the upper house and the head of state. However, these will only count as veto players under special circumstances. In the case of the upper house, it must have the power to veto legislation *and* be controlled by other parties than the government. In the case of the head of state, it must have veto power *and* not share the same political preferences as the parties in government.

Tsebelis does not count parties outside government as veto players, even if the government is a minority government. He argues that they "are equipped with significant positional and institutional weapons that enable them (most of the time) to impose their will on parliament, just as majority governments do." (Tsebelis 1999: 594)

Cabinet ideology

The following variables were constructed by Tsebelis through combining data from expert rankings of the ideology of parties with data on government participation. For the years when there is no new government, Tsebelis uses interpolation based on the value of the last new government and the next new government.

ts_cicm Cabinet ideology, Castles and Mair

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 775, N: 17, $\overline{N}$: 14, $\overline{T}$: 46)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 15)

A left-right scale from 0-10, where higher values indicate governments more to the right. The variable is based on Castles & Mair's (1995) expert survey.

ts_cihi Cabinet ideology, Huber and Inglehart

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 839, N: 20 $\overline{N}$: 15, $\overline{T}$: 42)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 17)

A left-right scale from 1-10, where higher values indicate governments more to the right. The variable is based on Huber & Inglehart's (1995) expert survey.

Note: There are some dubious figures in the data. This concerns Belgium 1978 and the Netherlands 1960-1964, 1968-1972, 1978-1981 and 1983-1989. In these cases the value is over 10, which shouldn't be possible.

ts_cilh1 Cabinet ideology, Laver and Hunt

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 947, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 19)

The scale is from 1-20, where 1 means "promote raising taxes to increase public service" and 20 means "promote cutting public services to cut taxes". The variable is based on Laver & Hunt's (1993) expert survey.

Note: There is a dubious value in the data. Denmark 1993 has the value of 0, which shouldn't be possible.

ts_cilh2 Cabinet ideology, Laver and Hunt

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 947, N: 21, $\overline{N}$: 17, $\overline{T}$: 45)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 19)

The scale is from 1-20, where 1 means "promote development of friendly relations with Soviet Union" and 20 means "oppose development of friendly relations with Soviet Union". The variable is based on Laver & Hunt's (1993) expert survey.

Quality of Government

In this section we include data on the core areas of the quality of government compound, such as corruption, bureaucratic quality, political and civil rights and democracy.

Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm
(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003)

bdm_s Selectorate Size

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 7247, N: 196, $\overline{N}$: 134, $\overline{T}$: 37)
(Cross-section: 1999, N: 182)

Selectorate is defined as the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government's leadership. This variable is measured through the breadth of the selectiveness of the members of each country's legislature. A code of 0 means that there is no legislature, 0.5 that the legislature is chosen by heredity or ascription or is simply chosen by the effective executive, and 1 that the members of the legislature are directly or indirectly selected by popular election.

Original source is Banks (1996).

bdm_w Winning Coalition Size

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 9643, N: 199, $\overline{N}$: 179, $\overline{T}$: 48)
(Cross-section: 1999, N: 187)

The winning coalition is defined as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society. This variable is measured as a composite index based on whether the regime is civil or military, the openness and competition of executive recruitment, and the competitiveness of participation. The index varies from 0 (smallest) to 1 (largest winning coalition)

Original sources are Banks (1996) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

bdm_w_s Winning Coalition Size Relative to Selectorate Size

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 7247, N: 196, $\overline{N}$: 134, $\overline{T}$: 37)
(Cross-section: 1999, N: 182)

The Winning Coalition size relative to Selectorate size. W/S is transformed to avoid division by zero: bdm_w/(log((bdm_s+1)*10)/3).

Cheibub & Gandhi

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 1909, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 33, $\overline{T}$: 48)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 189)
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm
(Cheibub and Gandhi 2004)

chga_regime Type of Regime

Coded 0 if democracy; 1 if dictatorship. A regime is considered a dictatorship if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, or there has been no alternation in power (Przeworski et al. 2000). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

Cingranelli & Richards - Human Rights Dataset

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 847, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 192)

http://www.humanrightsdata.org (Dataset version: 2005.10.12)

ciri_assn Freedom of Assembly and Association

Citizens' rights to freedom of assembly and association are:
(0) Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens
(1) Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for selected groups
(2) Virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens

ciri_disap Disappearance

Disappearances:
(0) Have occurred frequently
(1) Have occurred occasionally
(2) Have not occurred

ciri_empinx Empowerment Rights Index

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 840, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 192)

This is an additive index constructed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Worker's Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 10 (full government respect for these five rights). (Details on its construction and use can be found in Richards et al 2001).

ciri_kill Extrajudicial Killing

Political or extrajudicial killings are:
(0) Practiced frequently
(1) Practiced occasionally
(2) Have not occurred

ciri_move Freedom of Movement

Domestic and foreign travel is:
(0) Restricted
(1) Generally unrestricted

ciri_physint Physical Integrity Rights Index

This is an additive index constructed from the Torture (ciri_tort), Extrajudicial Killing (ciri_kill), Political Imprisonment (ciri_polpris), and Disappearance indicators (ciri_disap). It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). (Details on its construction and use can be found in Cingranelli and Richards 1999).

ciri_polpar Political Participation

Political Participation is:
(0) Very limited
(1) Moderately free and open
(2) Very free and open

ciri_polpris Political Imprisonment

Are there any people imprisoned because of their political, religious, or other beliefs?
(0) Yes and many
(1) Yes, but few
(2) None

ciri_relfre Freedom of Religion

Are there restrictions on some religious practices by the government?
(0) Yes
(1) No

ciri_speech Freedom of Speech

Government censorship and/or ownership of the media (including radio, TV, Internet, and domestic news agencies) is:
(0) Complete
(1) Some
(2) None

ciri_tort Torture

Torture is:
(0) Practiced frequently
(1) Practiced occasionally
(2) Not practiced

ciri_wecon Women's Economic Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 843, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 21)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 192)

In measuring women's economic rights we are primarily interested in two things: one, the extensiveness of flaws pertaining to women's economic rights; and two, *government practices* towards women or how effectively the government enforces the laws.

Regarding the economic equality of women:
(0) There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women.
(1) There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a *moderate level* of discrimination against women.
(2) There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a *low level* of discrimination against women.
(3) All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.

ciri_wopol Women's Political Rights

Regarding the political equality of women:
(0) None of women's political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process.
(1) Political equality is guaranteed by law. However, there are significant limitations in practice. Women hold *less than* five percent of seats in the national legislature and in other high-ranking government positions.
(2) Political equality is guaranteed by law. Women hold *more than* five percent but *less than* thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.
(3) Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold *more than* thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.

ciri_worker Workers Rights

Workers' rights are:
(0) Severely restricted
(1) Somewhat restricted
(2) Fully protected

ciri_wosoc Women's Social Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 813, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 34, $\overline{T}$: 20)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 192)

In measuring women's social rights we are primarily interested in two things: one, the extensiveness of laws pertaining to women's social rights; and two, *government practices* towards women or how effectively the government enforces the law.

Regarding the social equality of women:
(0) There are no social rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women.
(1) There are some social rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a *moderate level* of discrimination against women.

(2) There are some social rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a *low level* of discrimination against women.
(3) All or nearly all of women's social rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.

Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Entry

(Cross-Section: 1999, N: 84)
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/registration_new.dta
(Djankov et al 2002)

dlls_proc Number of Procedures

The number of different procedures that a start-up firm has to comply with in order to obtain a legal status, i.e. to start operating as a legal entity.

dlls_time Time

The time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm, in business days. A week has five business days and a month has twenty-two.

dlls_cost Cost

(Cross-Section: 1999, N: 83)

The cost to obtain legal status to operate a firm as a share of per capita GDP in 1999. Includes all identifiable official expenses (fees, costs of procedures and forms, photocopies, fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc). The company is assumed to have a start-up capital of ten times per capita GDP in 1999.

Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Courts

(Cross-Section: the year varies, N: 101)
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/courts_dataset_july06.xls
(Djankov et al 2003)

dlls1_fie Formalism Index (Eviction)

dlls1_fic Formalism Index (Check)

The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in two forms of judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts: the **eviction** of a residential tenant for nonpayment of rent, and the collection of a **check** returned for nonpayment. The index is formed by adding up separate indexes measuring: (1) whether the resolution of the case relies on the work of professional judges and attorneys, as opposed to other types of adjudicators and lay people; (2) the number of stages carried out mostly in written (as opposed to oral) form over the total number of applicable stages; (3) the level of legal justification (use of legal language) required in the process, (4) the level of statutory control or intervention of the administration, admissibility, evaluation, and recording of evidence; (5) the level of control or intervention of the appellate (superior) court's review of the first-instance judgment; (6) the formalities required to engage someone in the procedure or

to hold him/her accountable of the judgment; and (7) the normalized number of independent procedural actions, i.e. steps of the procedure, mandated by law or court regulation, that demand interaction between the parties or between them and the judge or court officer. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control or intervention in the judicial process.

dlls1_tde Total Duration (Eviction)

dlls1_tdc Total Duration (Check)

The total estimated duration in calendar days of the procedure under the factual and procedural assumptions provided. The index equals the estimated duration, in calendar days, between the moment the plaintiff files the complaint until the moment the landlord repossesses the property (for the **eviction** case) or the creditor obtains payment (for the **check** collection case).

Economist Intelligence Unit – Index of Democracy

(Cross-section: 2006, N: 164)
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf
(Kekic 2007)

eiu_iod Index of Democracy

The index of democracy is based on the ratings of 60 indicators grouped into the following five categories. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of these variables:

eiu_cl Civil Liberties

Civil liberties include freedom of speech, expression and the press; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to due judicial process.

eiu_dpc Democratic Political Culture

The Democratic Political Culture index measures the extent to which there is a societal consensus supporting democratic principles.

eiu_epp Electoral Process and Pluralism

This category is based on indicators relating to the condition of having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom.

eiu_fog Functioning of Government

The Functioning of Government category is based on indicators relating to e.g. the extent to which control over government is exercised by elected representatives, the capabilities of the civil service to implement government policies, and the pervasiveness of corruption.

eiu_pp Political Participation

The Political Participation index measures among other things the adult literacy rate, the amount of women in parliament, and the extent to which citizens freely choose to elect representatives and join political parties.

Freedom House

http://www.freedomhouse.org

Freedom in the World

(Time-series: 1972-2006, n: 1214, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 194)

Note: The 1982 edition of *Freedom in the World* covers the period Jan 1981- Aug 1982 (=1981 in our dataset). The 1983-84 edition covers the period Aug 1982 – Nov 1983 (=1983 in our dataset). This leaves 1982 empty.

For 1972, South Africa was in the original data rated as "White" (fh_cl: 3, fh_pr: 2, fh_status: Free) and "Black" (fh_cl: 6, fh_pr: 5, fh_status: Not Free). We treat South Africa 1972 as missing.

fh_cl Civil Liberties

Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years. For the year 2006 Freedom House has published the scores for the sub-categories (see below). Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

fh_pr Political Rights

Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years. For the year 2006 Freedom House has published the scores for the sub-categories (see below). Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

fh_status Status

(1) Free
(2) Partly Free
(3) Not Free

Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "Partly Free", and between 5.5 and 7.0 "Not Free". Since then, countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered "Free", 3.0 to 5.0 "Partly Free", and 5.5 to 7.0 "Not Free".

Freedom in the World Sub-Categories: Civil Liberties

(Cross-section: 2005-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

fh_feb Freedom of Expression and Belief

The variable measures the freedom and independence of the media and other cultural expressions; the freedom of religious groups to practice their faith and express themselves; the academic freedom and freedom from extensive political indoctrination in the educational system; and the ability of the people to engage in private (political) discussions

without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

fh_aor Associational and Organizational Rights

The variable evaluates the freedom of assembly, demonstrations and open public discussion; the freedom for nongovernmental organizations; and the freedom for trade unions, peasant organizations and other professional and private organizations. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

fh_rol Rule of Law

The variable measures the independence of the judiciary; the extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters; the existence of direct civil control over the police; the protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile and torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and the extent to which laws, policies and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

fh_pair Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

The variable evaluates the extent of state control over travel, choice of residence, employment or institutions of higher education; the right of citizens to own property and establish private businesses; private businesses' freedom from undue influence by government officials, security forces, political parties or organized crime; gender equality, freedom of choice of marriage partners and size of family; equality of opportunity and absence of economic exploitation. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

Freedom in the World Sub-Categories: Political Rights

(Cross-section: 2005-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

fh_ep Electoral Process

The variable measures the extent to which the national legislative representatives and the national chief authority are elected through free and fair elections. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

fh_ppp Political Pluralism and Participation

This variable encompasses an examination of the right of the people to freely organize in political parties; the existence of an opposition with a realistic possibility to increase its support; the ability of the people to make political choices free from domination by the military, totalitarian parties or other powerful groups; and the existence of full political rights for all minorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

fh_fog Functioning of Government

The variable examines the extent to which the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government; if the government is free from pervasive corruption; and if the government is accountable to the electorate between elections and operates with openness and transparency. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

Freedom of the Press

fh_press Freedom of the press

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 507, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 13)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 192)

All states, from the most democratic to the most authoritarian, are through the UN system (Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) committed to universality of information freedom – a basic human right. Freedom House recognizes that cultural distinctions or economic underdevelopment may limit the volume of news flows within a country, but these and other arguments are not acceptable explanations for outright centralized control of the content of news and information. Some poor countries allow for the exchange of diverse views, while some developed countries restrict content diversity. Freedom House seeks to recognize press freedom wherever it exists, in poor and rich countries as well as in countries of various ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The press freedom index is computed by adding four (three) component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls, Economic Influences, and Repressive actions (the latter is since 2004 not assessed as a separate component, see below). The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

fh_law Laws and regulations that influence media content

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 507, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 13)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 192)

The variable encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1997-2006 from 0-30. 0 indicates *most* freedom.

fh_pol Political pressures and controls on media content

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 507, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 13)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 192)

The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1997-2001 from 0-30, and in 2002-2006 from 0-40. 0 indicates *most* freedom.

fh_econ Economic influences over media content

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 507, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 13)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 192)

The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1997-2006 from 0-30. 0 indicates *most* freedom.

fh_repres Repressive actions

(Time-series: 1994-2001, n: 312, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2001 (varies by country), N: 186)

This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-40, in 1997-2001 from 0-10. Since 2002 Freedom House includes such violations within the respective fh_pol and fh_econ categories as cases of actual political or economic pressures on the content of information. 0 indicates *most* freedom.

Freedom House/Polity

fh_polity2 Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)

(Time-series: 1972-2007, n: 1148, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 32, $\overline{T}$: 31)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 160)

fh_ipolity2 Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity)

(Time-series: 1972-2008, n: 1292, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 32)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. The average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2. The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. Hadenius & Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.

Gibney & Dalton

http://www.politicalterrorscale.org
(Gibney et al 2009; Gibney and Dalton 1996)

gd_ptsa Political Terror Scale – Amnesty International

(Time-series: 1976-2007, n: 824, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 26, $\overline{T}$: 21)

(Cross-section: 1995-2006 (varies by country), N: 170)

gd_ptss Political Terror Scale – US State Department

(Time-series: 1976-2007, n: 1104, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 28)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 177)

Human rights score (1 to 5 scale):
- Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
- Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
- Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
- Level 4: The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
- Level 5: The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

International Country Risk Guide – The PRS Group

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 893, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 22)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 140)
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx
http://www.prsgroup.com/CountryData.aspx

icrg_qog ICRG indicator of Quality of Government

The mean value of the ICRG variables "Corruption", "Law and Order" and "Bureaucracy Quality", scaled 0-1. Higher values indicate higher quality of government.

Corruption (originally 6 points)
This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, it introduces an inherent instability into the political process.

The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Such corruption can make it difficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases my force the withdrawal or withholding of an investment.

Although our measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations,

'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. In our view these insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market.

The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, so as to provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering the country ungovernable.

(Note: In the original data, the value for Iceland 1985 is "6.1667". We have replaced this presumably incorrect value with the value "6").

Law and order (originally 6 points)
Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating – 1 – if it suffers from a very high crime rate / if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes).

Bureaucracy Quality (originally 4 points)
The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.

The component variables can be purchased at http://www.countrydata.com

Inter-Parliamentary Union

http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world-arc.htm

ipu_w_lower Women in national parliament (lower house)

(Time-series: 1997-2005 (December or latest available), n: 342, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 38, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 188)

Percentage of women in single house or lower house. (Also see m_wominpar below.)

ipu_w_upper Women in national parliament (upper house)

(Time-series: 1997-2005 (December or latest available), n: 163, N: 20, $\overline{N}$: 18, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 83)

Percentage of women in upper house or senate. (Also see m_wominpar below.)

Knack & Kugler

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 180)
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/FlagshipCourse2003/SecondGenerationIndicators.pdf
(Knack and Kugler 2002)

kk_gg Index of Objective Indicators of Good Governance

The Index is built on nine indicators: the regulation of entry, contract enforcement, contract intensive money, international trade tax revenue, budgetary volatility, revenue source volatility, telephone wait times, phone faults, and the percentage of revenues paid to public officials in bribes, as reported in surveys of business firms. The index is computed by first normalizing each indicator using the standard normal distribution, and then aggregating these scores through a percentile matching procedure. Larger numbers indicate better governance.

(Note: In the original data Samoa is given two different values. We do not include any of the values in our dataset.)

La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches & Shleifer– Judicial Independence

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/jcb_data.xls
(La Porta et al 2004)

llps_tensc Tenure of Supreme Court Judges

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 70)

This variable measures the tenure of Supreme Court judges (highest court in any country). The variable takes three possible values:
(0) if tenure is less than six years
(1) if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong
(2) if tenure is lifelong

llps_tenac Tenure of Administrative Court Judges

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 70)

This variable measures the tenure of the highest ranked judges ruling on administrative cases. The variable takes three possible values:
(0) if tenure is less than six years
(1) if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong
(2) if tenure is lifelong.

llps_cl Case Law

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 69)

This variable is a dummy taking value:

(1) if judicial decisions in a given country are a source of law
(0) otherwise.

llps_ji Judicial Independence

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 69)

Judicial independence is computed as the normalized sum of Tenure of Supreme Court Judges (llps_tensc), Tenure of the Administrative Court Judges (llps_tenac), and Case Law (llps_cl).

llps_roc Rigidity of Constitution

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 71)

This variable measures (on a scale from 1 to 4) how hard it is to change the constitution in a given country. One point each is given if the approval of the majority of the legislature, the chief of state and a referendum is necessary in order to change the constitution. An additional point is given for each of the following: if a supermajority in the legislature (more than 66% of votes) is needed, if the approval of both houses of the legislature is required, if the legislature has to approve the amendment in two consecutive legislative terms, or if the approval of a majority of state legislatures is required.

llps_jr Judicial Review

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 71)

This variable measures the extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or Constitutional Court) have the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country. The variable takes three values: (0) if there is no review of constitutionality of laws, (1) if there is limited review of constitutionality of laws, and (2) if there is full review of constitutionality of laws.

llps_cr Constitutional Review

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 71)

Constitutional review is computed as the normalized sum of Constitutional Review (llps_jr) and Rigidity of Constitution (llps_roc).

Melander

http://www.pcr.uu.se/personal/anstallda/melander.htm
(Melander 2005)

m_femlead Female State Leader

(Time-series: 1965-2002, n: 1316, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 35, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 169)

Dummy variable taking value: (1) Female leader (0) Male leader. Female leaders during the 20th century defined as "the president, prime minister, or any other decision maker who is essentially the 'decision maker of last resort'". Original source: Caprioli & Boyer (2001), Melander has extended the data using the information available in Schemmel (2004).

m_wominpar Women in Parliament (percent)

(Time-series: 1965-2002, n: 1304, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 34, $\overline{T}$: 33)
(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 162)

Percentage of women holding seats in the legislature. Original source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995; 2005). Note: if the parliament is not unicameral the upper house is used.

Polity IV

http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002)

Missing codes:
(-66) Interruption periods.
(-77) Interregnum periods.
(-88) Transition periods.

p_democ Institutionalized Democracy

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1909, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 161)

Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high)

Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil liberties.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation (p_parcomp), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (p_xropen and p_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (p_xconst) variables.

p_autoc Institutionalized Autocracy

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1909, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 161)

Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high)

"Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized

process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity, but we regard this as a function of political ideology and choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness (performance) have covaried over time.

An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operational indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (p_parcomp), the regulation of participation (p_parreg), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (p_xropen and p_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (p_xconst) variables.

p_polity Combined Polity Score

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1941, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

p_polity2 Revised Combined Polity Score

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1931, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 162)

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The revised version of the polity variable is designed to facilitate the use of the polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual polity score by applying a simple treatment, or ""fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set:
(-66) Cases of foreign "interruption" are treated as "system missing."
(-77) Cases of "interregnum," or anarchy, are converted to a "neutral" Polity score of "0."
(-88) Cases of "transition" are prorated across the span of the transition.

For example, country X has a p_polity score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follow: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.
Note: Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year are converted to "system missing" values. Transitions (-88) following a year of independence, interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value "0".

p_parreg Regulation of Participation

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1941, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways; the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion, and the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion among shifting coalitions of partisan groups. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:

(1) **Unregulated**: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time.
(2) **Multiple Identities**: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level – parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected – but there are few recognized, overlapping (common) interests.
(3) **Sectarian**: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries).
(4) **Restricted**: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism, but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.
(5) **Regulated**: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

p_parcomp The Competitiveness of Participation

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1941, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities which are coded Unregulated ("1") on Regulation of Participation are coded "0" (Not Applicable) for competitiveness. Competitiveness is coded on a five category scale:

(0) **Not Applicable**: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political Participation (variable p_parreg).
(1) **Repressed**: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these

structures is not sufficient for a Repressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition.

(2) **Suppressed**: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished from Factional competition (below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are:

i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties or no ethnic political organizations).

ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).

iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups.

(3) **Factional**: Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularistic agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.

(4) **Transitional**: Any transitional arrangement from Restricted or Factional patterns to fully competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.

(5) **Competitive**: There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be restricted in the Competitive pattern.

p_xrreg Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1941, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

In considering recruitment, we must first determine whether there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power. Three categories are used to differentiate the extent of institutionalization:

(1) **Unregulated**: Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power. Such caesaristic transfers of power are sometimes legitimized after the fact in noncompetitive elections or by legislative enactment. Despite these "legitimization" techniques, a polity remains unregulated until the de facto leader of the coup has been replaced as head of government either by designative or competitive modes of executive selection. However, unregulated recruitment does not include the occasional forceful

ouster of a chief executive if elections are called within a reasonable time and the previous pattern continues.
(2) **Designational/Transitional**: Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (i.e., one-party systems or ”rigged” multiparty elections). Also coded here are transitional arrangements intended to regularize future power transitions after an initial unregulated seizure of power (i.e., after constitutional legitimization of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political realm as head of the military). This category also includes polities in transition from designative to elective modes of executive selection (i.e., the period of ”guided democracy” often exhibited during the transition from military to civilian rule) or vice versa (i.e., regimes ensuring electoral victory through the intimidation of oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a ”state of emergency” before executive elections).
(3) **Regulated**: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections. Ascriptive/designative and ascriptive/elective selections (i.e., an effective king and premier) are also coded as regulated. The fundamental difference between regulated selection and unregulated recruitment is that regulated structures require the existence of institutionalized modes of executive recruitment, either through constitutional decree or lineage. Moreover, in regulated competitive systems, unlike the designational/transitional mode, the method of future executive selection is not dependent on the particular party or regime currently holding power.

p_xrcomp Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1941, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country, N: 163)

Competitiveness refers to “the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr 1974, p.1483).” For example, selection of chief executives through popular elections involving two or more viable parties or candidates is regarded as competitive. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (“1”) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, Competitiveness is coded “0” (Not Applicable). Four categories are used to measure this concept:

(0) **Not Applicable**: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg).
(1) **Selection**: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are: rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.
(2) **Dual/Transitional**: Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.
(3) **Election**: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections involving two or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly.)

p_xropen Openness of Executive Recruitment

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1941, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

Recruitment of the chief executive is ”open” to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (1) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (p_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, Openness is coded “0” (Not Applicable). Five categories are used:

(0) **Not Applicable**: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg).
(1) **Closed**: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc., who assume executive powers by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded ”closed” unless a relative actually succeeds him as ruler.
(2) **Dual Executive–Designation**: Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.
(3) **Dual Executive–Election**: Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.
(4) **Open**: Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

p_xconst Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1941, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner: ”Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially ”properly” concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken.” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p.121) Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any ”accountability groups”. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used.

(1) **Unlimited Authority**: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:
i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.
iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure.

iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.
Note: If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a legislature to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is not a change to unlimited authority.
(2) Intermediate Category
(3) **Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority**: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:
i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees.
iii. Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted.
iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.
vi. There is an independent judiciary.
vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.
(4) Intermediate Category
(5) **Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority**: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them.
Examples:
i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.
(6) Intermediate Category
(7) **Executive Parity or Subordination**: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence:
i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).
iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability".

p_durable Regime Durability

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1941, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the p_polity score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the p_durable value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline "year zero" (value = 0) and each subsequent

year adds one to the value of the p_durable variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs.

p_flag Tentative Coding

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1941, N: 37, $\overline{N}$: 31, $\overline{T}$: 52)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006, N: 163)

Trichotomous "flag" variable indicating confidence of codings (recent year codings only).

(0) **Confident**: Reasonably confident coding of established authority patterns that have been "artificially smoothed" to present consistency over time between substantive polity changes.
(1) **Tentative**: Reasonably confident coding of emerging authority patterns that have not been smoothed over time; these codes are "free floating," that is, they are based on information available in the case-year and are not tied to prior year coding(s). Codes are considered tentative for up to five years following a substantive polity change.
(2) **Tenuous**: Best judgment coding based on limited information and/or insufficient time span since a substantive polity change and the emergence of new authority patterns.

p_fragment Polity Fragmentation

(Time-series: 2000-2007, n: 288, N: 36, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 8)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

This variable codes the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive). Local autonomy arrangements voluntarily established and accepted by both central and local authorities are not considered fragmentation. A polity that cannot exercise effective authority over at least 50 percent of its established territory is necessarily considered to be in a condition of "state failure" (i.e., interruption or interregnum, see below, or civil war). Polity fragmentation may result from open warfare (active or latent) or foreign occupation and may continue in the absence of open warfare if a situation of de facto separation remains unresolved and unchallenged by the state.

(0) No overt fragmentation
(1) **Slight fragmentation**: Less than ten percent of the country's territory is effectively under local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.
(2) **Moderate fragmentation**: Ten to twenty-five percent of the country's territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.
(3) **Serious fragmentation**: Over twenty-five percent (and up to fifty percent) of the country's territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

p_sf State Failure

(Time-series: 1956-1968, n: 7, N: 2, $\overline{N}$: 1, $\overline{T}$: 4)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 13)

Variable p_sf is a flag variable that designates (by code "1") every year during which a Polity is considered to be in a condition of "complete collapse of central authority" or "state failure" (i.e., -77). The variable p_sf is also coded "1" for years when a state disintegrates and when a profound revolutionary change in political authority occurs (during which the authority of the previous Polity is assumed to have collapsed completely prior to the revolutionary seizure of power and subsequent restructuring of authority). Using the p_sf variable to select regime information will facilitate identification of periods of state failure.

Reporters Sans Frontières

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 134)
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=4116

rsf_pfi Press Freedom Index

The Press Freedom index measures the amount of freedom journalists and the media have in each country and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. It does not take account of all human rights violations, only those that affect press freedom. Neither is it an indicator of the quality of a country's media. The index ranges between 0 (total press freedom) and 100 (no press freedom).

Transparency International

http://www.transparency.org/

ti_cpi Corruption Perceptions Index

(Time-series: 1995-2008, n: 500, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 36, $\overline{T}$: 13)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 180)

The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

WARNING: Year-to-year shifts in a country's score can result not only from a changing perception of a country's performance but also from a changing sample and methodology. With differing respondents and slightly differing methodologies, a change in a country's score may also relate to the fact that different viewpoints have been collected and different questions have been asked. For a more detailed discussion of comparability over time in the CPI, see Lambsdorff 2005.

ti_cpi_max Corruption Perceptions Index – Max Range

ti_cpi_min Corruption Perceptions Index – Min Range

(Time-series: 2004-2008, n: 195, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 39, $\overline{T}$: 5)

(Cross-section: 2004-2007 (varies by country), N: 180)

The CPI score is accompanied by a 90 confidence range determined by a bootstrap (non-parametric) methodology, which allows inferences to be drawn on the underlying precision of the results. A 90% confidence range is established, where there is a 5% probability that the value is below the minimum range (ti_cpi_min) and a 5% probability that the value is above the maximum range (ti_cpi_max). However, particularly when only a few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%.

ti_cpi_sd Corruption Perceptions Index – Standard Deviation

(Time-series: 1998-2003, n: 221, N: 38, $\overline{N}$: 37, $\overline{T}$: 6)
(Cross-section: 1999-2003 (varies by country), N: 133)

This is the standard deviation of the values of the sources underlying the CPI: the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources.

Treisman

http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/
(Treisman 2007)

t_bribe Have paid a bribe in any form

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2005
(Cross-section: 2005, N: 66)

Percentage of the population who answered "Yes" to the question: "In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form?" Original source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2005).

t_corr Common to pay irregular additional payments

http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-wbes
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 79)

Country averages of business representatives' answers to the question: "It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular 'additional payments' to get things done." (ranges from 1 = always to 6 = never). Original source: World Business Environment Survey (2000).

t_unicri Bribery to Government Officials

http://www.bus.lsu.edu/mocan/publication.htm
(Cross-section: 1991-1999, N: 49)

Percentage of the population that had been asked by - or expected to pay a bribe to - government officials in the past year for the period of late 1990s (if more than one year available for late 1990s, averaged). Original source: Mocan (2007).

Vanhanen – Index of Democratization

http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/index.html
(Vanhanen 2000; 2005)

van_index Index of Democratization

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 1988, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 34, $\overline{T}$: 50)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy – competition and participation – measured as the percentage of votes not cast for the largest party (Competition) times the percentage of the population who actually voted in the election (Participation). This product is divided by 100 to form an index that in principle could vary from 0 (no democracy) to 100 (full democracy). (Empirically, however, the largest value is 49.)

van_comp Competition

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 1988, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 34, $\overline{T}$: 50)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

The competition variable portrays the electoral success of smaller parties, that is, the percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections. The variable is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes won by the largest party (the party which wins most votes) in parliamentary elections or by the party of the successful candidate in presidential elections. The variable thus theoretically ranges from 0 (only one party received 100 % of votes) to 100 (each voter cast a vote for a distinct party).

van_part Participation

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 1988, N: 40, $\overline{N}$: 34, $\overline{T}$: 50)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

The percentage of the total population who actually voted in the election.

World Bank – Governance Indicators (a.k.a KKZ)

http://www.govindicators.org
(Kaufmann et al 2008)

These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. These individual measures of governance are assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance. An unobserved component model is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators. Point estimates of the dimensions of governance, the margins of error as well as the number of sources are presented for each country.

The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.

Since the estimates are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) each year of measurement, they are not directly suitable for over-time comparisons within countries. Kaufmann et al. (2006) however find no systematic time-trends in a selection of indicators that do allow for comparisons over time. As a consequence, even the standardized estimates, particularly when converted to country rank-orders, can be used as time-series data if interpreted with caution.

wbgi_vae **Voice and Accountability – Estimate**

wbgi_vas **Voice and Accountability – Standard Errors**

wbgi_van **Voice and Accountability – Number of Sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2007, n: 351, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

"Voice and Accountability" includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

wbgi_pse **Political Stability – Estimate**

wbgi_pss **Political Stability – Standard Errors**

wbgi_psn **Political Stability – Number of sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2007, n: 351, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

"Political Stability" combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.

wbgi_gee **Government Effectiveness – Estimate**

wbgi_ges **Government Effectiveness – Standard Errors**

wbgi_gen **Government Effectiveness – Number of Sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2007, n: 351, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

"Government Effectiveness" combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on "inputs" required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

wbgi_rqe Regulatory Quality – Estimate

wbgi_rqs Regulatory Quality – Standard Errors

wbgi_rqn Regulatory Quality – Number of Sources

(Time-series: 1996-2007, n: 351, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 191)

"Regulatory Quality" includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.

wbgi_rle Rule of Law – Estimate

wbgi_rls Rule of Law – Standard Errors

wbgi_rln Rule of Law – Number of Sources

(Time-series: 1996-2007, n: 351, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

"Rule of Law" includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

wbgi_cce Control of Corruption – Estimate

wbgi_ccs Control of Corruption – Standard Errors

wbgi_ccn Control of Corruption – Number of Sources

(Time-series: 1996-2007, n: 351, N: 39, $\overline{N}$: 29, $\overline{T}$: 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 191)

"Control of Corruption" measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of "additional payments to get things done", to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring "grand corruption" in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in "state capture".

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