



UNIVERSITY OF
GOTHENBURG

THE QOG SOCIAL POLICY DATASET

CODEBOOK

April 4 2012 (c)

Note: Those scholars who wish to use this dataset in their research are kindly requested to both the original source (as stated in this codebook) and use the following citation :

Samanni, Marcus. Jan Teorell, Staffan Kumlin, Stefan Dahlberg, Bo Rothstein, Sören Holmberg & Richard Svensson. 2012. The QoG Social Policy Dataset, version 4Apr12. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute. <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>

A brief note on the QoG databases.

The QoG institute offers a range of datasets on indicators of quality of government and all things related. The QoG social policy dataset that this codebook relates to is available in both a Cross-Section and a Time-Series edition. In addition to these datasets we offer *The QoG Standard Dataset* which has a wide range of descriptive indicators as well as indicators of causes and effects of quality of government, there is also a basic version of the standard dataset containing the most used and qualitative indicators called *The QoG Basic Dataset*. Should you be interested in aspects of bureaucracies we recommend *The QoG Expert Survey dataset*, which is built on our own survey with over a thousand responding experts. These are all available for free downloads on our Webb page and can be easily merged as they use the same id system. On our webpage you will also find links to *a dataset* on Quality of government and corruption on a regional level within the European Union.

To help us delvelop the database we ask you to cite both the original source and the QoG dataset using the following citation: Samanni, Marcus. Jan Teorell, Staffan Kumlin, Stefan Dahlberg, Bo Rothstein, Sören Holmberg & Richard Svensson. 2012. The QoG Social Policy Dataset, version 4Apr12. University of Gothenburg:The Quality of Government Institute. <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>. Citations offers us great guidance on what indicators are being used as well as who and how the databases are used.

If you are using the database in a way that does not result in citation but you feel you want offer us feedback, you are of course more than welcome to send us any recommendations or remarks via e-mail and should you at any time encounter problems with the dataset please feel free to contact *the QoG institute data administration*.

Stefan Dahlberg PhD
Dataset Manager
stefan.dahlberg@pol.gu.se

Take me to variable overview!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VARIABLE OVERVIEWS.....	29
FUNCTIONAL VARIABLES.....	30
SOCIAL POLICY VARIABLES (1/3)	31
SOCIAL POLICY VARIABLES (2/3)	32
SOCIAL POLICY VARIABLES (3/3)	33
TAXES AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE VARIABLES.....	34
SOCIAL CONDITIONS VARIABLES (1/3)	35
SOCIAL CONDITIONS VARIABLES (2/3)	36
SOCIAL CONDITIONS VARIABLES (3/3)	37
PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLES (1/2)	38
PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLES (2/2)	39
POLITICAL INDICATORS VARIABLES (1/4)	40
POLITICAL INDICATORS VARIABLES (2/4)	41
POLITICAL INDICATORS VARIABLES (3/4)	42
POLITICAL INDICATORS VARIABLES (4/4)	43
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT VARIABLES (1/2)	44
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT VARIABLES (2/2)	45
INTRODUCTION	46
COUNTRY AND TIME COVERAGE	48
COUNTRY AND CASE IDENTIFIER CODES	50
ccode Country Code Numeric	50
ccodealp 3-letter Country Code	50
cname Country Name	50
year Year	52
ccodewb Country Code World Bank	52
ccodecow Country Code Correlates of War	52
cname_year Country Name and Year	52
ccodealp_year 3-letter Country Code and Year	52
oecd OECD member	53
eu27 EU27 member	53
eu15 EU15 member	53
eea European Economic Area	53
ht_region The Region of the Country	53
ht_region2 The Region of the Country (alternative)	53
SOCIAL POLICY.....	54
ARMINGEON ET AL – COMPARATIVE POLITICAL DATASET I & II	54
ar_source Armingeon source	54
ar_sst Social security transfers (% of GDP)	54
BOTERO, DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES & SHLEIFER – REGULATION OF LABOR	54
Social Security Laws	55
bdlls_ssli Social Security Laws Index	55
Old-Age, Disability and Death Benefits	55
bdlls_oadbi Old Age, Disability and Death Benefit Index.....	55
bdlls_coadd Coverage of Old-Age, Disability and Death	55
bdlls_drале Difference Between Retirement Age and Life Expectancy	55
bdlls_cenr Contribution/Employment for Normal Retirement.....	55
bdlls_pdoad Percentage of Salary Deducted for Old-Age and Disability Benefits	56
bdlls_pnrr Pension Net Replacement Rate	56
Sickness and Health Benefits	57

bdlls_shbi	Sickness and Health Benefits Index	57
bdlls_crs	Coverage of Risk of Sickness	57
bdlls_cesb	Contribution/Employment for Sickness Benefit	57
bdlls_pdshb	Percentage of Salary Deducted for Sickness and Health Benefits	57
bdlls_wpsb	Waiting Period for Sickness Benefits	58
bdlls_sbnrr	Sickness Benefits Net Replacement Rate	58
	Unemployment Benefits	58
bdlls_ubi	Unemployment Benefits Index	58
bdlls_crue	Coverage of Risk of Unemployment	58
bdlls_ceueb	Contribution/Employment for Unemployment Benefits	58
bdlls_pdueb	Percentage of Salary Deducted for Unemployment Benefits	59
bdlls_wpueb	Waiting Period for Unemployment Benefits	59
bdlls_uebnrr	Unemployment Benefits Net Replacement Rate	59
	Employment Laws	59
bdlls_eli	Employment Laws Index	59
bdlls_aeci	Alternative Employment Contracts Index	60
bdlls_cihw	Cost of Increasing Hour Worked	60
bdlls_cofw	Cost of Firing Workers	60
bdlls_dpi	Dismissal Procedures Index	60
	Collective Relations Laws	60
bdlls_crli	Collective Relations Laws Index	60
bdlls_lupi	Labor Union Power Index	61
bdlls_cdi	Collective Disputes Index	61
	Civil Rights	61
bdlls_cri	Civil Rights Index	61
bdlls_drace	Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Race	61
bdlls_dsex	Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Sex	61
bdlls_stoml	Statutory Duration of Maternity Leave	61
bdlls_mwa	Minimum Working Age	62
bdlls_mmw	Mandatory Minimum Wage	62
EUROSTAT		62
eu_pha	Physicians (absolute value)	62
eu_phd	Physicians/doctors (density per 100,000 population)	62
eu_dea	Dentists (absolute value)	62
eu_ded	Dentists (density per 100,000 population)	63
FRANZESE – PARTICIPATION, INEQUALITY AND TRANSFERS DATABASE		63
fr_ss	Social security benefits, grants and welfare	63
HUBER ET AL – COMPARATIVE WELFARE STATES DATA SET		63
hu_sw	Social wage	63
hu_socx	Gross public social expenditure (% of GDP)	63
hu_sst	Social security transfers (% of GDP)	64
hu_sse	Social security expenditure	64
hu_ssbe	Social security benefit expenditure	64
hu_sfbe	Social insurance and family allowance benefit expenditure	64
hu_smbe	Sickness and maternity benefit expenditure	64
hu_eibe	Employment injuries benefit expenditure	64
hu_pbe	Pensions benefit expenditure	65
hu_fabe	Family allowances benefit expenditure	65
hu_uebe	Unemployment benefit expenditure	65
hu_teh	Total expenditure on health	65
hu_peh	Public expenditure on health	65
hu_pehp	Public expenditure on health (% of total health expenditure)	65
hu_cpeh	Current public expenditure on health	66
hu_pepnc	Public expenditure on pensions (national currency)	66
hu_pepgi	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GNI)	66
hu_pepgp	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	66
hu_ocbe	Old age cash benefits expenditure (% of GDP)	66

hu_teic	Total expenditure on in-patient care.....	66
hu_peic	Public expenditure on in-patient care	67
hu_teac	Total expenditure on ambulatory care.....	67
hu_peac	Public expenditure on ambulatory care	67
hu_stmc	Share with total medical coverage	67
hu_sacc	Share with ambulatory care coverage.....	67
hu_sipc	Share with in-patient services coverage.....	67
hu_tpe	Total public expenditure.....	68
hu_ssr	Social security receipts	68
hu_sfbr	Social insurance and family allowance receipts	68
hu_wcr	Workers' contributions revenue	68
hu_ecr	Employers' contributions revenue	68
hu_stss	Special taxes allocated to social security.....	68
hu_facr	State funds and other authorities' contributions revenue.....	69
hu_rcss	Revenue from capital income to social security.....	69
hu_tpr	Total public revenue	69
hu_ggd	General government deficit	69
IVERSEN & CUSACK		69
ic_gt	Government transfers (% of GDP)	69
ic_got	Generosity of transfers.....	70
IVERSEN & SOSKICE		70
is_rg	Redistribution (change in Gini).....	70
is_rp	Redistribution (change in poverty)	70
OECD – BENEFITS AND WAGES.....		70
bw_uegr	Unemployment benefit gross replacement rate	70
OECD – FAMILY DATABASE.....		71
fd_cf	Childcare fees (% of average wage).....	71
fd_pl	Parental leave	71
fd_ftepl	FTE paid parental leave	71
fd_upl	Unpaid parental leave	71
fd_patl	Paternity leave.....	71
fd_ftep	FTE paid paternity leave	72
fd_ml	Maternity leave	72
fd_ftem	FTE paid maternity leave	72
OECD – PUBLIC SECTOR PAY AND EMPLOYMENT DATABASE.....		72
psp_tpe	Total public employment.....	72
psp_pes	Public employment share of total employment.....	72
psp_psc	Total public sector compensation costs (% of GDP)	73
OECD – THE SOCIAL EXPENDITURE DATABASE (SOCX 2007)		73
Total social expenditure		74
socx_tput	Total social expenditure, public, total	74
socx_tpuc	Total social expenditure, public, cash.....	74
socx_tpuk	Total social expenditure, public, in kind	74
socx_tmpt	Total social expenditure, mandatory private, total	74
socx_tmpc	Total social expenditure, mandatory private, cash	74
socx_tmpr	Total social expenditure, mandatory private, in kind.....	75
socx_tvpt	Total social expenditure, voluntary private, total	75
Net Total Social Expenditure		75
socx_nt	Net total social expenditure	75
socx_ntp	Net total social expenditure, public	75
socx_ntmp	Net total social expenditure, mandatory private	75
socx_ntvp	Net total social expenditure, voluntary private.....	76
Old-age		76
socx_oupt	Old age expenditure, public, total	76
socx_opuc	Old age expenditure, public, cash	76
socx_opuk	Old age expenditure, public, in kind.....	76
socx_ompt	Old age expenditure, mandatory private, total.....	76

socx_ompc	Old age expenditure, mandatory private, cash	76
socx_ompk	Old age expenditure, mandatory private, in kind.....	76
socx_ovpt	Old age expenditure, voluntary private, total	77
	Survivors expenditure	77
socx_sput	Survivors expenditure, public, total	77
socx_spuc	Survivors expenditure, public, cash.....	77
socx_spuk	Survivors expenditure, public, in kind	77
socx_smpt	Survivors expenditure, mandatory private, total	77
socx_smpc	Survivors expenditure, mandatory private, cash.....	77
socx_smpk	Survivors expenditure, mandatory private, in kind	77
	Incapacity-related benefits expenditure.....	78
socx_iput	Incapacity expenditure, public, total.....	78
socx_ipuc	Incapacity expenditure, public, cash	78
socx_ipuk	Incapacity expenditure, public, in kind.....	78
socx_impt	Incapacity expenditure, mandatory private, total.....	78
socx_impc	Incapacity expenditure, mandatory private, cash	78
socx_impk	Incapacity expenditure, mandatory private, in kind	78
socx_ivpt	Incapacity expenditure, voluntary private, total.....	79
	Health expenditure	79
socx_hput	Health expenditure, public, total.....	79
socx_hpuk	Health expenditure, public, in kind	79
socx_hmpt	Health expenditure, mandatory private, total	79
socx_hmpk	Health expenditure, mandatory private, in kind	79
socx_hvpt	Health expenditure, voluntary private, total.....	79
	Family expenditure	80
socx_fput	Family expenditure, public, total.....	80
socx_fpuc	Family expenditure, public, cash	80
socx_fpuk	Family expenditure, public, in kind.....	80
socx_fmpt	Family expenditure, mandatory private, total	80
socx_fmpc	Family expenditure, mandatory private, cash	80
socx_fmpk	Family expenditure, mandatory private, in kind	80
	Active labor market programs expenditure	81
socx_lput	Labor program expenditure, public, total	81
	Unemployment expenditure.....	81
socx_uput	Unemployment expenditure, public, total	81
socx_upuc	Unemployment expenditure, public, cash	81
socx_umpt	Unemployment expenditure, mandatory private, total.....	81
socx_umpc	Unemployment expenditure, mandatory private, cash	81
	Housing expenditure	82
socx_hoput	Housing expenditure, public, total	82
socx_hopuk	Housing expenditure, public, in kind	82
	Other Social Policy Areas.....	82
socx_otput	Other expenditure, public, total	82
socx_otpuc	Other expenditure, public, cash	82
socx_otpuk	Other expenditure, public, in kind.....	82
socx_otmpt	Other expenditure, mandatory private, total.....	83
socx_otmpc	Other expenditure, mandatory private, cash	83
socx_otmpk	Other expenditure, mandatory private, in kind	83
socx_otvpt	Other expenditure, voluntary private, total	83
	SCRUGGS – WELFARE STATE ENTITLEMENTS	83
sc_bgi	Benefit generosity index.....	84
sc_di	Decommodification index	85
	Pensions	85
sc_pg	Pensions generosity.....	85
sc_pd	Pensions decommodification	85
sc_mprrs	Net minimum pension replacement rate for single person	86
sc_mprrc	Net minimum pension replacement rate for couple.....	86

sc_sprrs	Net standard pension replacement rate for single person	86
sc_sprrc	Net standard pension replacement rate for couple	86
sc_pqp	Pension qualifying period	86
sc_pfund	Pension funding.....	87
sc_pcov	Pension coverage/take-up.....	87
sc_mret	Male retirement age.....	87
sc_fret	Female retirement age	87
Sick pay	87
sc_sg	Sickness insurance generosity	87
sc_sd	Sickness insurance decommodification.....	88
sc_srrs	Net sickness insurance replacement rate for single person	88
sc_srrf	Net sickness insurance replacement rate for dependent family.....	88
sc_sqc	Sick pay qualifying condition	88
sc_sdur	Sick pay benefit duration.....	88
sc_swait	Sick pay waiting period.....	89
sc_scov	Sick pay coverage	89
Unemployment benefits	89
sc_ueg	Unemployment insurance generosity	89
sc_ued	Unemployment insurance decommodification.....	89
sc_uerrs	Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for single person	89
sc_uerrf	Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for dependent family	90
sc_ueqc	Unemployment qualifying condition.....	90
sc_uedur	Unemployment benefit duration	90
sc_await	Unemployment benefit waiting period	90
sc_uecov	Unemployment insurance coverage.....	90
THE SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR PROGRAM	91
Pensions	91
scip_mprrs	Net minimum pension replacement rate for single person	91
scip_mprrc	Net minimum pension replacement rate for couple.....	91
scip_sprrs	Net standard pension replacement rate for single person	92
scip_sprrc	Net standard pension replacement rate for couple	92
scip_pqp	Pension qualifying period	92
scip_pcov	Pension coverage/take-up.....	92
scip_pfe	Pension financing by employer	92
scip_pfi	Pension financing by insured.....	92
scip_pfg	Pension financing by government	93
scip_pfo	Pension financing by other sources.....	93
scip_pm	Pension means test	93
Sick pay	93
scip_srrs	Net sick pay replacement rate for single person.....	93
scip_srrf	Net sick pay replacement rate for dependent family.....	93
scip_sqc	Sick pay qualifying condition	94
scip_sdur	Sick pay benefit duration.....	94
scip_swait	Sick pay waiting period.....	94
scip_scov	Sick pay coverage	94
scip_sfe	Sick pay financing by employer	94
scip_sfi	Sick pay financing by insured.....	94
scip_sfg	Sick pay financing by government	95
scip_sfo	Sick pay financing by other sources.....	95
scip_sm	Sick pay means test	95
Unemployment benefits	95
scip_uerrs	Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for single person	95
scip_uerrf	Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for dependent family	95
scip_ueqc	Unemployment benefit qualifying condition	96
scip_uedur	Unemployment benefit duration	96
Back?	96
scip_uawait	Unemployment benefit waiting period	96

scip_uecov	Unemployment insurance coverage.....	96
scip_uefe	Unemployment benefit financing by employer	96
scip_uefi	Unemployment benefit financing by insured.....	96
scip_uefg	Unemployment benefit financing by government	97
scip_uefo	Unemployment benefit financing by other sources.....	97
scip_uem	Unemployment benefit means test.....	97
Work accident insurance.....		97
scip_warrs	Net work accident insurance replacement rate for single person	97
scip_warrf	Net work accident replacement rate for dependent family.....	97
scip_waqc	Work accident insurance qualifying condition	98
scip_wadur	Work accident benefit duration	98
scip_wawait	Work accident insurance waiting period.....	98
scip_wacov	Work accident insurance coverage	98
scip_wafe	Work accident insurance financing by employer	98
scip_wafi	Work accident insurance financing by insured.....	98
scip_wafg	Work accident insurance financing by government	99
scip_wafo	Work accident insurance financing by other sources.....	99
scip_wam	Work accident insurance means test	99
UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS		99
Expenditure		99
une_toe	Total expenditure on education	99
une_puto	Public expenditure on education, total.....	100
une_pupre	Public expenditure on pre-primary education	100
une_pup	Public expenditure on primary education	100
une_pus	Public expenditure on secondary education	100
une_pute	Public expenditure on tertiary education.....	100
une_putg	Public expenditure on education (% of total government)	100
une_prto	Private expenditure on education, total	101
une_prpre	Private expenditure on pre-primary education.....	101
une_prp	Private expenditure on primary education	101
une_prs	Private expenditure on secondary education	101
une_prte	Private expenditure on tertiary education.....	101
une_ito	International expenditure on education, total.....	101
une_ppt	Public expenditure per pupil, total.....	102
une_ppp	Public expenditure per pupil, primary	102
une_pps	Public expenditure per pupil, secondary	102
une_ppte	Public expenditure per pupil, tertiary	102
Pupil-teacher ratio		102
une_ptrpre	Pupil-teacher ratio, pre-primary.....	102
une_ptrp	Pupil-teacher ratio, primary	102
une_ptrs	Pupil-teacher ratio, secondary	103
WHOSIS – WHO STATISTICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM.....		103
Health Expenditure		103
who_teh	Total expenditure on health (% of GDP).....	103
who_tehcu	Total expenditure on health per capita (USD).....	103
who_tehci	Total expenditure on health per capita (international dollars)	103
who_gehh	Government expenditure on health (% of total health).....	104
who_gehcu	Government expenditure on health per capita (USD).....	104
who_gehci	Government expenditure on health per capita (international dollars).....	104
who_peh	Private expenditure on health (% of total health).....	104
who_gehg	Government expenditure on health (% of total government)	104
who_erh	External resources for health (% of total health)	105
who_ssh	Social security expenditure on health (% of government health)	105
who_oop	Out-of-pocket expenditure on health (% of private health).....	105
who_ppp	Private prepaid plans (% of private health)	105
Health Staff		105
who_pha	Physicians (absolute value).....	105

who_phd	Physicians (density per 1000 population).....	106
who_nua	Nurses (absolute value).....	106
who_nud	Nurses (density per 1000 population).....	106
who_dea	Dentists (absolute value).....	106
who_ded	Dentists (density per 1000 population).....	106
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS.....		106
Government Expenditure.....		106
wdi_gew	Government Expenditure on Wages and Employer Contributions (% of Expense).....	106
wdi_ge	Government Expense (% of GDP).....	107
wdi_gce	Government Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP).....	107
Health Sector.....		107
wdi_hb	Hospital Beds (per 1,000 People).....	107
wdi_nam	Nurses and Midwives (per 1,000 People).....	107
wdi_the	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP).....	107
wdi_hec	Health Expenditure per Capita, PPP (Constant USD).....	108
wdi_puhegdp	Public Health Expenditure (% of GDP).....	108
wdi_puhegov	Public Health Expenditure (% of Government Expenditure).....	108
wdi_prhe	Private Health Expenditure (% of GDP).....	108
Regulation of Labor.....		108
wdi_roe	Rigidity of Employment.....	108
TAXES AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE.....		109
FRASER INSTITUTE – ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD.....		109
fi_mti	Top marginal tax rate (index).....	109
fi_mitp	Top marginal income tax rate (percent).....	109
fi_miti	Top marginal income tax rate (index).....	109
fi_mptp	Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (percent).....	109
fi_mpti	Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (index).....	110
OECD – REVENUE STATISTICS.....		110
rs_ttr	Total tax revenue.....	110
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains.....		110
rs_ipct	Income, profits and capital gains tax, total.....	110
rs_ipci	Income, profits and capital gains tax, individuals.....	110
rs_ipti	Income and profits tax, individuals.....	110
rs_cti	Capital gains tax, individuals.....	111
rs_pctc	Profits and capital gains tax, corporate.....	111
rs_ipcto	Income, profits and capital gains tax, other.....	111
Social security contributions.....		111
rs_sst	Social security contributions, total.....	111
rs_ssee	Social security contributions, employees.....	111
rs_sser	Social security contributions, employers.....	111
rs_sssn	Social security contributions, self- and non-employed.....	112
rs_sso	Social security contributions, other.....	112
Other taxes.....		112
rs_tpw	Taxes on payroll and workforce.....	112
rs_tp	Taxes on property.....	112
rs_tgs	Taxes on goods and services.....	112
OECD – TAXING WAGES STATISTICS.....		113
tw_ats	Average income tax, single (%).....	113
tw_atc	Average income tax, couple (%).....	113
tw_atcos	Average tax and contributions, single (%).....	113
tw_atcoc	Average tax and contributions, couple (%).....	113
tw_atcls	Average tax and contributions less transfers, single (%).....	114
tw_atclc	Average tax and contributions less transfers, couple (%).....	114
tw_mtcls	Marginal tax and contributions less transfers, single (%).....	114
tw_mtclc	Marginal tax and contributions less transfers, couple (%).....	114
tw_atws	Average tax wedge, single (%).....	114

tw_atwc	Average tax wedge, couple (%)	115
tw_mtwc	Marginal tax wedge, couple (%)	115
tw_mtwc	Marginal tax wedge, single (%)	115
tw_ews	Elasticity of income after tax, gross wage, single	115
tw_ewc	Elasticity of income after tax, gross wage, couple	115
tw_els	Elasticity of income after tax, gross labor cost, single	116
tw_elc	Elasticity of income after tax, gross labor cost, couple	116
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS		116
wdi_gr	Government Revenue (% of GDP)	116
wdi_tr	Tax Revenue (% of GDP)	116
wdi_hmtri	Highest Marginal Tax Rate, Individual (%)	116
wdi_ifhmt	Income for Highest Marginal Tax (USD)	117
SOCIAL CONDITIONS		118
ARMINGEON ET AL – COMPARATIVE POLITICAL DATASET I & II		118
ar_source	Armingeon source	118
ar_ue	Unemployment rate (%)	118
BARRO & LEE		118
bl_psct25	Primary school complete (total 25+)	119
bl_ssct25	Secondary school complete (total 25+)	119
bl_hsc25	Higher school complete (total 25+)	119
bl_pscf25	Primary school complete (female 25+)	119
bl_sscf25	Secondary school complete (female 25+)	119
bl_hscf25	Higher school complete (female 25+)	119
bl_psct15	Primary school complete (total 15+)	119
bl_ssct15	Secondary school complete (total 15+)	119
bl_hsc15	Higher school complete (total 15+)	119
bl_pscf15	Primary school complete (female 15+)	119
bl_sscf15	Secondary school complete (female 15+)	120
bl_hscf15	Higher school complete (female 15+)	120
bl_asyf15	Average schooling years (female 15+)	120
bl_asyf25	Average schooling years (female 25+)	120
bl_asyt15	Average schooling years (total 15+)	120
bl_asyt25	Average schooling years (total 25+)	120
BOTERO, DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES & SHLEIFER – REGULATION OF LABOR		120
bdlls_ud	Union Density	120
DEININGER & SQUIRE		121
ds_gini	Gini Index	121
ds_yom	Year of measurement	121
DREHER – KOF INDEX OF GLOBALIZATION		121
dr_ig	Index of Globalization	121
dr_eg	Economic Globalization	122
dr_pg	Political Globalization	122
dr_sg	Social Globalization	122
EUROSTAT		122
Economic indicators		122
eu_gini	Gini index	123
eu_8020	80/20 income quintile share ratio	123
eu_grgdp	Growth of real GDP (%)	123
Unemployment and activity rates		123
eu_ue	Unemployment rate (%)	123
eu_lue	Long term unemployment (>12 months)	123
eu_vlue	Very long term unemployment (>24 months)	124
eu_lf	Labor force (%)	124
eu_lff	Female labor force (%)	124
eu_er	Employment rate (%)	124
eu_fer	Female employment rate (%)	124

Education	124
eu_use Upper secondary education completed (%)	124
eu_usew Upper secondary education completed, women (%)	125
eu_usem Upper secondary education completed, men (%)	125
Population and immigration	125
eu_pop Population on January 1	125
eu_ii Inflow of immigrants	125
eu_nmc Net migration	125
eu_crnmc Crude rate of net migration	125
eu_as Asylum seekers	126
eu_pad Positive asylum decisions	126
eu_fc Foreign citizens	126
eu_lfeu Labor force, foreign EU citizens	126
eu_eeu Employed foreign EU citizens	126
eu_ueeu Unemployed foreign EU citizens	126
eu_lfn Labor force, foreign non EU citizens	127
eu_en Employed foreign non EU citizens	127
eu_uen Unemployed foreign non EU citizens	127
Health	127
eu_hlyf Healthy life years at birth (female)	127
eu_hlym Healthy life years at birth (male)	127
HESTON, SUMMERS & ATEN – PENN WORLD TABLE	128
pwt_rgdpch Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)	128
pwt_grgdpch Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)	128
pwt_csg Consumption Share of GDP (%)	128
pwt_gsg Government Share of GDP (%)	129
pwt_isg Investment Share of GDP (%)	129
pwt_openk Openness to Trade, Constant Prices	129
pwt_openc Openness to Trade, Current Prices	129
FRANZESE – PARTICIPATION, INEQUALITY AND TRANSFERS DATABASE	129
fr_ud Union density	129
HUBER ET AL – COMPARATIVE WELFARE STATES DATA SET	130
hu_lcu Liberalization of current transactions	130
hu_lca Liberalization of capital transactions	130
hu_aatr Agreements against transaction restrictions	130
hu_wsc Wage setting coordination	130
hu_um Union members (thousands)	131
hu_aum Active union membership (thousands)	131
hu_num Net union membership (thousands)	131
IMF – WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK	131
weo_gdp GDP per capita (PPP, current international dollars)	131
weo_gbds Government budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP)	132
weo_infl Inflation (%)	132
weo_ue Unemployment (%)	132
INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH METRICS AND EVALUATION – UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON	132
Educational Levels	132
ihme_ayef Average Years of Education (Female)	132
ihme_ayem Average Years of Education (Male)	132
Child and Maternal Mortality	133
ihme_nm Neonatal Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Births)	133
ihme_pnm Postneonatal Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Births)	133
ihme_fmort Under-5 Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Live Births)	133
ihme_mmr Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 Live Births)	133
JESUIT & MAHLER – FISCAL REDISTRIBUTION DATASET	133
jm_gb Gini before taxes and transfers	134
jm_ga Gini after taxes and transfers	134
jm_ar Absolute redistribution (change in Gini)	134

jm_rr	Relative redistribution (change in Gini).....	134
jm_artr	Absolute redistribution from transfers (change in Gini)	134
jm_rrtr	Relative redistribution from transfers (change in Gini).....	134
jm_arta	Absolute redistribution from taxes (change in Gini)	134
jm_rrta	Relative redistribution from taxes (change in Gini).....	135
jm_srtr	Share of redistribution from transfers (%)	135
jm_srta	Share of redistribution from taxes (%)	135
jm_rprb	Relative poverty rate before taxes and transfers (%).....	135
jm_rpra	Relative poverty rate after taxes and transfers (%).....	135
LUXEMBOURG INCOME STUDY (LIS)		135
lis_gini	Gini index.....	135
lis_atk5	Atkinson index (epsilon=0.5)	136
lis_atk1	Atkinson index (epsilon=1)	136
lis_9010	90/10 income percentile ratio.....	136
lis_9050	90/50 income percentile ratio.....	136
lis_8020	80/20 income percentile ratio.....	136
lis_rpr40	Relative poverty rate (40%).....	136
lis_rpr50	Relative poverty rate (50%).....	137
lis_rpr60	Relative poverty rate (60%).....	137
OECD – DATABASE ON IMMIGRANTS IN OECD COUNTRIES (DIOC)		137
dioc_fbe	Foreign born employed	137
dioc_fbue	Foreign born unemployed	137
dioc_fbi	Foreign born inactive.....	137
dioc_te	Total employment	137
dioc_tue	Total unemployment	137
dioc_ti	Total inactive population.....	138
OECD – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK.....		138
oeo_grgdp	Growth of real GDP	138
OECD – THE GENDER, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT DATABASE.....		138
gid_far	Female Activity Rate (%).....	138
gid_farpm	Female Activity Rate as Percent of Male	138
gid_fptw	Female Professional and Technical Workers (%).....	139
gid_fwe	Female Wage Employment (%)	139
gid_rfmi	Ratio of Female to Male Income	139
gid_fgm	Female Government Ministers (%).....	139
gid_whp	Women in High Positions (%)	139
gid_wip	Women in Parliament (%)	140
gid_ywv	Year Women Received Right to Vote	140
gid_ywse	Year Women Received Right to Stand for Election	140
gid_yfwp	Year of First Woman in Parliament	140
OECD – HEALTH DATA 2007		140
hd_leb	Life expectancy at birth	140
hd_le65f	Life expectancy at 65 (female)	140
hd_le65m	Life expectancy at 65 (male).....	141
hd_imort	Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births).....	141
OECD – INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION STATISTICS		141
ims_if	Inflow of foreigners (thousands)	141
ims_of	Outflow of foreigners (thousands)	141
ims_sf	Stock of foreigners (thousands).....	141
ims_sfb	Stock of foreign-born (thousands).....	142
ims_as	Asylum seekers (thousands).....	142
ims_n	Naturalizations (thousands)	142
ims_ifw	Inflow of foreign workers (thousands)	142
ims_flf	Foreigners in labor force (thousands)	142
ims_fe	Foreigners employed (thousands).....	142
ims_fue	Foreigners unemployed (thousands).....	142
ims_tlf	Total labor force (thousands)	143

ims_te	Total employment (thousands)	143
ims_tue	Total unemployment (thousands)	143
OECD – MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS		143
mei_infl	Inflation (%)	143
OECD – NATIONAL ACCOUNTS		143
na_gdp	Real GDP (PPP, USD)	143
na_gdpc	Real GDP per capita (PPP, USD)	144
OECD – POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE STATISTICS		144
plf_ue	Unemployment rate (% of civilian labor force)	144
plf_lue	Long term unemployment (% of unemployment)	144
plf_flf	Female labor force (% ages 15-64)	144
plf_mlf	Male labor force (% ages 15-64)	144
plf_cer	Civilian employment rate (% ages 15-64)	145
OECD EMPLOYMENT DATABASE		145
ed_num	Net union membership (thousands)	145
ed_nud	Net union density (%)	145
TREISMAN		145
t_yot	Year Opened to Trade	145
UNDP - HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT		146
undp_gini	Gini Index (inequality measure)	146
undp_pote	Poorest 10% share of income/consumption	146
undp_potw	Poorest 20% share of income/consumption	146
undp_rite	Richest 10% share of income/consumption	146
undp_ritw	Richest 20% share of income/consumption	147
UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIVISIONS – NATIONAL ACCOUNTS		147
unna_gdp	Real GDP	147
unna_gdpc	Real GDP per Capita	147
unna_grgdp	Growth Rate of Real GDP (%)	147
unna_grgdpc	Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (%)	148
unna_otco	Openness to Trade, Constant Prices (%)	148
unna_otcu	Openness to Trade, Current Prices (%)	148
UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS		148
Enrollment		148
une_preet	Pre-primary education enrollment, total	148
une_preef	Pre-primary education enrollment, female	149
une_preem	Pre-primary education enrollment, male	149
une_pet	Primary education enrollment, total	149
une_pef	Primary education enrollment, female	149
une_pem	Primary education enrollment, male	149
une_set	Secondary education enrollment, total	149
une_sef	Secondary education enrollment, female	149
une_sem	Secondary education enrollment, male	149
une_tet	Tertiary education enrollment, total	150
une_tef	Tertiary education enrollment, female	150
une_tem	Tertiary education enrollment, male	150
une_ppepre	Percent private enrollment, pre-primary	150
une_ppep	Percent private enrollment, primary	150
une_ppes	Percent private enrollment, secondary	150
Duration		150
une_dur	Duration of compulsory education	150
UNU-WIDER – WORLD INCOME INEQUALITY DATABASE		151
uw_gini	Gini (mean)	151
uw_quality	Quality (mean)	151
uw_ngini	Gini (count)	151
uw_sdgini	Gini (standard deviation)	152
uw_yom	Year of Measurement	152
UTIP – UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS INEQUALITY PROJECT		152

utip_ehii	Estimated household income inequality	152
utip_ehii_yom	Year of measurement	152
utip_ipi	Industrial pay inequality	153
utip_ipi_yom	Year of measurement	153
VISSER – DATABASE ON INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE UNIONS, WAGE SETTING, STATE INTERVENTION AND SOCIAL PACTS (ICTWSS)		153
vi_wsc	Wage setting coordination	153
vi_giwb	Government intervention in wage bargaining	154
vi_lwb	Level of wage bargaining	154
vi_cuwb	Centralization of union wage bargaining.....	155
vi_tum	Total union membership (thousands)	155
vi_num	Net union membership (thousands)	155
vi_nud	Net union density (%)	155
vi_abc	Adjusted bargaining coverage (%)	155
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS		156
Economy		156
wdi_gdp	GDP, PPP (Constant International USD)	156
wdi_gdpgr	GDP Growth (%).....	156
wdi_gdpc	GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant International USD)	156
wdi_gdpcgr	GDP per Capita Growth (%)	156
wdi_gdpcu	GDP (current USD)	157
wdi_gni	GNI, Atlas Method (Current USD).....	157
wdi_gnipc	GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (Current USD)	157
wdi_gbds	Government budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP).....	157
wdi_cgd	Central Government Debt (% of GDP)	158
wdi_exp	Exports (% of GDP).....	158
wdi_imp	Imports (% of GDP)	158
wdi_ttr	Total Trade (% of GDP)	158
wdi_tot	Terms of Trade	158
wdi_fdi	Foreign Direct Investments, Net Inflows (% of GDP).....	159
wdi_ase	Agriculture's share of economy (% of GDP)	159
wdi_ise	Industry's share of economy (% of GDP)	159
wdi_sse	Services' share of economy (% of GDP).....	159
wdi_infl	Inflation (%)	160
Gender Equality.....		160
wdi_gris	Gender Ratio in School (%)	160
wdi_wip	Women in Parliament (%)	160
Economic Equality		160
wdi_gini	Gini Index.....	160
wdi_isl20	Income Share of Lowest 20%	161
wdi_iss20	Income Share of Second 20%	161
wdi_ist20	Income Share of Third 20%.....	161
wdi_isf20	Income Share of Fourth 20%	161
wdi_ish20	Income Share of Highest 20%.....	161
wdi_isl10	Income Share of Lowest 10%	162
wdi_ish10	Income Share of Highest 10%.....	162
Labor Force and Unemployment		162
wdi_lf	Labor Force (%).....	162
wdi_lff	Labor Force, Female (%)	162
wdi_lfm	Labor Force, Male (%).....	162
wdi_ue	Unemployment (%)	163
wdi_uef	Unemployment, Female (%)	163
wdi_uem	Unemployment, Male (%)	163
wdi_uey	Unemployment, Youth (%)	163
wdi_uefy	Unemployment, Female Youth (%)	163
wdi_uemy	Unemployment, Male Youth (%)	164
wdi_lue	Long-Term Unemployment (% of Unemployed)	164

wdi_luef	Long-Term Unemployment, Female (% of Unemployed)	164
wdi_luem	Long-Term Unemployment, Male (% of Unemployed)	164
Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates		164
wdi_lifexp	Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)	164
wdi_mort	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Live Births)	165
wdi_fmort	Mortality Rate, Under-5 (per 1,000)	165
Population and Migration		165
wdi_pop	Population	165
wdi_pop14	Population Ages 0-14 (% of Total)	165
wdi_pop1564	Population Ages 15-64 (% of Total)	165
wdi_pop65	Population Ages 65 and Above (% of Total)	166
wdi_nm	Net Migration	166
wdi_rp	Refugee Population	166
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM – GENDER GAP INDEX		166
wef_gend	Gender gap index	167
wef_ecgg	Economic gender gap	167
wef_edgg	Educational gender gap	167
wef_hgg	Health gender gap	167
wef_pegg	Political empowerment gender gap	167
PUBLIC OPINION		168
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (CSES)		168
cses_module	CSES module	168
cses_lr	Left-right self-placement	169
cses_sd	Satisfaction with democracy	169
cses_dbfg	Democracy the best form of government	170
cses_sgpg	Satisfaction with government/president: general	170
cses_sgpmi	Satisfaction with government/president: most important issue	170
cses_lef	Last election was fair	171
cses_vmd	Voting makes a difference	171
cses_hwvvr	How well are voters' views represented	172
cses_ppcpt	Political parties care what people think	172
cses_ppn	Political parties are necessary	173
cses_pkpt	Politicians know what people think	173
cses_cap	Corruption amongst politicians	174
cses_rif	Respect for individual freedom	174
EUROBAROMETER		174
eb_module	Eurobarometer module	175
eb_lr	Left-right self-placement	175
Trust in EU organs		175
eb_tcj	Trust in the European Court of Justice	176
eb_tcm	Trust in the EU Council of Ministers	176
eb_tec	Trust in the European Commission	176
eb_tecb	Trust in the European Central Bank	176
eb_teca	Trust in the European Court of Auditors	176
eb_teo	Trust in the European Ombudsman	176
eb_tep	Trust in the European Parliament	176
eb_tsec	Trust in the EU Social and Economic Committee	176
Trust in national organs		176
eb_tls	Trust in the legal system	176
eb_tp	Trust in the police	176
eb_ta	Trust in the army	176
eb_tpp	Trust in political parties	177
eb_tcs	Trust in the civil service	177
eb_tng	Trust in the national government	177
eb_tnp	Trust in national parliament	177
Satisfaction with democracy		177

eb_sd	Satisfaction with democracy in country	177
eb_sdd	Satisfaction with democracy development in country	178
eb_sdeu	Satisfaction with democracy in the EU	178
	Important problems	178
eb_ipue_1	Important problem: unemployment	179
eb_ipue_2	Important problem: unemployment	179
eb_ipue_3	Important problem: unemployment	179
eb_ipsp_1	Important problem: stable prices	179
eb_ipsp_2	Important problem: stable prices	179
eb_ipsp_3	Important problem: stable prices	179
	Things necessary to live properly	179
eb_swan	Social welfare absolutely necessary	180
eb_gean	Good education absolutely necessary	180
	Important issues	180
eb_iii	Important issue: inflation	180
eb_iit	Important issue: taxation	180
eb_iiue	Important issue: unemployment	180
eb_iih	Important issue: housing	180
eb_iihc	Important issue: health care system	180
eb_iiie	Important issue: educational system	180
eb_iip	Important issue: pensions	180
	Health care	181
eb_hcs	Health care satisfaction	181
eb_hcsty	Health care satisfaction in two years	181
eb_hctfu	Health care too frequently used	182
eb_hcrw	Health care runs well	182
eb_oehcg	Only essential health care from government	183
eb_hcie	Health care inefficient	184
	Reason that people live in need	184
eb_pini	People in need – injustice	184
eb_pinl	People in need – laziness	184
eb_pinp	People in need – part modern progress	184
eb_pinu	People in need – unlucky	185
	Poverty and income differences	185
eb_idtl	Income differences too large	185
eb_gsrld	Government should reduce income differences	185
eb_rnrp	Reduce number of rich and poor	186
eb_cep	Chance of escaping poverty	186
eb_cepcc	Chance of escaping poverty, children	187
eb_pafp	Public authorities fighting poverty	187
eb_fpws	Fighting poverty worth sacrifices	188
	Other	188
eb_suf	Society unfair	188
eb_fue	Fight unemployment	189
eb_re	Responsibility for the elderly	189
eb_ls	Life satisfaction	190
	EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY	190
ess_module	ESS module	190
ess_it	Interpersonal trust	191
ess_pf	Most people try to be fair	191
ess_ph	Most people try to be helpful	191
ess_sg	Satisfaction with government	192
ess_sd	Satisfaction with democracy	192
ess_ste	State of education	192
ess_sths	State of health services	192
ess_gsrld	Government should reduce income differences	193
ess_mdg	Member of discriminated group	193

ess_jeo	Importance of equal opportunities	193
ess_ihp	Importance of helping people	194
	Trust in national and international organs.....	194
ess_tnp	Trust in national parliament	194
ess_tls	Trust in the legal system.....	194
ess_tp	Trust in the police.....	194
ess_tplt	Trust in politicians	194
ess_tep	Trust in the European Parliament	194
ess_tun	Trust in the United Nations	194
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SURVEY PROGRAM (ISSP).....		195
issp_module	ISSP module	195
	Income differences and inequality.....	196
issp_gsrid	Government should reduce income differences.....	196
issp_gsrdrp	Government should reduce differences between rich and poor	197
issp_idtl	Income differences too large.....	197
issp_nosmp	No one studies for years unless more pay	197
issp_idnp	Income differences necessary for prosperity	198
issp_cilja	Continued inequality due to lack of joined up action.....	198
issp_iebr	Inequality exists because it benefits the rich	198
	Government measures for the economy	199
issp_cgs	Cut government spending	199
issp_gfj	Government should finance new jobs.....	199
issp_rww	Reduce work week	199
	Increase government spending.....	199
issp_igsh	Increase government spending: health.....	199
issp_igse	Increase government spending: education	200
issp_igsp	Increase government spending: pensions.....	200
issp_igsub	Increase government spending: unemployment benefits	200
	Government responsibility.....	200
issp_grjfa	Government responsibility: jobs for all	200
issp_grhc	Government responsibility: health care	200
issp_gro	Government responsibility: the old.....	201
issp_grue	Government responsibility: the unemployed	201
	Getting ahead in life.....	201
issp_gawf	Getting ahead: wealthy family	201
issp_gakrp	Getting ahead: know right people.....	201
	Taxes	201
issp_tfhi	Taxes for high incomes	202
issp_tfmi	Taxes for middle incomes.....	202
issp_tfli	Taxes for low incomes	202
issp_hlthi	Higher or lower taxes for high incomes.....	202
	Other	202
issp_rpbo	Rich parents better opportunity.....	202
issp_iou	Inflation or unemployment	203
issp_gtmp	Government too much power	203
issp_lelh	Last election: level of honesty	203
issp_lelf	Last election: level of fairness	204
WORLD VALUES SURVEY		204
wvs_module	WVS module	204
wvs_a008	Feeling of happiness	205
wvs_a009	State of health (mean).....	205
wvs_a168	Do you think most people try to take advantage of you (mean)	205
wvs_a170	How satisfied are you with your life.....	205
wvs_e035	Incomes more equal (mean)	206
wvs_e036	Private ownership of business (mean)	206
wvs_e037	Government more responsibility (mean)	206
wvs_e039	Competition is good (mean).....	206

wvs_e040	Hard work doesn't bring success (mean)	207
wvs_e043	The state should be responsible for everyone's pension (mean)	207
wvs_e044	The state should be responsible for everyone's housing (mean)	207
wvs_e066	Society should be competitive rather than egalitarian (mean)	207
wvs_e067	Low taxes rather than extensive welfare (mean)	208
wvs_e111	How good is the system for governing this country (mean)	208
wvs_e117	Having a democratic political system (mean)	208
wvs_e125	Satisfaction with the people in national office (mean)	209
wvs_e131	People are poor because of an unfair society (mean)	209
wvs_e132	There is very little chance for people to escape poverty (mean)	209
wvs_e133	The government is doing too little for people in poverty (mean)	209
wvs_e196	How widespread is corruption (mean)	210
wvs_it	Interpersonal trust (mean)	210
wvs_lr	Left-right self-placement (mean)	210
wvs_sdd	Satisfaction with democracy development in country (mean)	210
Confidence		211
wvs_e069_02	Confidence: armed forces (mean)	211
wvs_e069_05	Confidence: labor unions (mean)	211
wvs_e069_06	Confidence: the police (mean)	211
wvs_e069_07	Confidence: parliament (mean)	211
wvs_e069_08	Confidence: the civil services (mean)	211
wvs_e069_09	Confidence: social security system (mean)	211
wvs_e069_11	Confidence: the government (mean)	212
wvs_e069_12	Confidence: the political parties (mean)	212
wvs_e069_16	Confidence: health care system (mean)	212
wvs_e069_17	Confidence: justice system (mean)	212
wvs_e069_18	Confidence: the European Union (mean)	212
wvs_e069_19	Confidence: NATO (mean)	212
wvs_e069_20	Confidence: the United Nations (mean)	212
Justifiable		212
wvs_f114	Justifiable: claiming government benefits (mean)	213
wvs_f115	Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (mean)	213
wvs_f116	Justifiable: cheating on taxes (mean)	213
wvs_f117	Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (mean)	213
wvs_f131	Justifiable: paying cash to avoid taxes (mean)	213
Just society		213
wvs_e146	Just society: eliminate big income inequalities (mean)	214
wvs_e147	Just society: guarantee that basic needs are met for all (mean)	214
wvs_e149	Just society give: young people equal education opportunities (mean)	214
Reason that people live in need		214
wvs_pini1	People in need - injustice	214
wvs_pinl1	People in need – laziness	214
wvs_pinp1	People in need - part modern progress	214
wvs_pinu1	People in need – unlucky	215
wvs_pini2	People in need – injustice	215
wvs_pinp2	People in need - part modern progress	215
wvs_pinl2	People in need – laziness	215
wvs_pinu2	People in need – unlucky	215

POLITICAL INDICATORS..... 216

ARMINGEON ET AL– COMPARATIVE POLITICAL DATASET I, II & III	216	
ar_source	Armingeon source	216
ar_vt	Voter turnout	216
ar_ed	Election date	216
ar_ed2	Election date	217
Election results		217
ar_vs	Votes: socialist	217

ar_vls	Votes: left-socialist	217
ar_vcom	Votes: communist.....	217
ar_va	Votes: agrarian	217
ar_vcon	Votes: conservative	218
ar_vr	Votes: religious	218
ar_vl	Votes: liberal.....	218
ar_vur	Votes: ultra-right	218
ar_vp	Votes: protest	218
ar_vg	Votes: green	218
ar_ve	Votes: ethnic.....	218
ar_vo	Votes: others	218
ar_vla	Votes: left alliance	218
ar_vca	Votes: center alliance	219
ar_vra	Votes: right alliance	219
ar_vpc	Votes: post-communist	219
ar_vna	Votes: nationalist.....	219
ar_vreg	Votes: regionalist.....	219
ar_vfe	Votes: feminist.....	219
ar_vmo	Votes: monarchic.....	219
ar_vper	Votes: personalist.....	220
ar_vind	Votes: independent	220
ar_vpen	Votes: pensioners	220
ar_vnl	Votes: no-label.....	220
ar_vini	Votes: initiative groups.....	220
ar_val	Votes: alliance	220
Legislative seats		221
ar_ls	Legislative seats: socialist	221
ar_lls	Legislative seats: left-socialist	221
ar_lcom	Legislative seats: communist	221
ar_la	Legislative seats: agrarian.....	221
ar_lcon	Legislative seats: conservative	221
ar_lr	Legislative seats: religious	221
ar_ll	Legislative seats: liberal.....	222
ar_lur	Legislative seats: ultra-right	222
ar_lp	Legislative seats: protest	222
ar_lg	Legislative seats: green.....	222
ar_le	Legislative seats: ethnic.....	222
ar_lo	Legislative seats: others	222
ar_lla	Legislative seats: left alliance	222
ar_lca	Legislative seats: center alliance	223
ar_lra	Legislative seats: right alliance	223
ar_lpc	Legislative seats: post-communist.....	223
ar_lna	Legislative seats: nationalist	223
ar_lreg	Legislative seats: regionalist	223
ar_lfe	Legislative seats: feminist.....	223
ar_lmo	Legislative seats: monarchic.....	223
ar_lper	Legislative seats: personalist	224
ar_lal	Legislative seats: alliance.....	224
ar_lind	Legislative seats: independent	224
ar_lpen	Legislative seats: pensioners	224
ar_lnl	Legislative seats: no-label.....	224
ar_lini	Legislative seats: initiative groups	224
Cabinets: OECD, Malta and Cyprus		225
ar_crw	Cabinet portfolios: right-wing	225
ar_cce	Cabinet portfolios: center.....	225
ar_cle	Cabinet portfolios: left.....	225
ar_ci	Cabinet ideology	225

ar_tg	Type of government	226
ar_chg	Changes in government.....	226
Cabinets: Post-communist countries		
ar_cs	Cabinet party composition: socialist	227
ar_cls	Cabinet party composition: left-socialist.....	227
ar_ccom	Cabinet party composition: communist	227
ar_ca	Cabinet party composition: agrarian	227
ar_ccon	Cabinet party composition: conservative.....	227
ar_cr	Cabinet party composition: religious.....	227
ar_cli	Cabinet party composition: liberal	227
ar_cur	Cabinet party composition: ultra-right.....	227
ar_cp	Cabinet party composition: protest	227
ar_cg	Cabinet party composition: green	227
ar_ce	Cabinet party composition: ethnic	227
ar_cpc	Cabinet party composition: post-communist.....	227
ar_cna	Cabinet party composition: nationalist	227
ar_creg	Cabinet party composition: regionalist	227
ar_cper	Cabinet party composition: personalist	227
ar_cal	Cabinet party composition: alliance	227
ar_cpen	Cabinet party composition: pensioners.....	228
Lijphart data on institutions		
ar_li_epd	Executives-parties dimension	228
ar_li_enp	Effective number of parties.....	228
ar_li_mc	Minimal winning, one-party majority cabinets (%)	228
ar_li_exd	Executive dominance.....	228
ar_li_eld	Electoral disproportionality (%).....	228
ar_li_igp	Interest group pluralism	229
ar_li_fud	Federal-unitary dimension	229
ar_li_f	Federalism	229
ar_li_b	Bicameralism	229
ar_li_cr	Constitutional rigidity	229
ar_li_jr	Judicial review	229
ar_li_cbi	Central bank independence	229
Political institutions, other		
ar_ie	Integrated economy	229
ar_cbi	Central bank independence	230
BOTERO, DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES & SHLEIFER – REGULATION OF LABOR		
bdlls_lcpo1	Left/Center Political Orientation 1928-1995	230
bdlls_lcpo2	Left/Center Political Orientation 1975-1995	230
bdlls_pr	Proportional Representation	230
bdlls_dg	Divided Government	231
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (CSES)		
cses_vt	Voter turnout.....	231
cses_cv	Compulsory voting.....	231
CROWE AND MEADE – CENTRAL BANK GOVERNANCE		
cm_cbi80_89	Central Bank Independence 1980-1989	232
cm_cbi80_89u	Central Bank Independence 1980-1989, unweighted	232
cm_cbi03	Central Bank Independence 2003	232
cm_cbi03u	Central Bank Independence 2003, unweighted	232
cm_cbt98	Central Bank Transparency 1998.....	233
cm_cbt06	Central Bank Transparency 2006.....	233
cm_cbgt80_89	Central Bank Governor Turnover 1980-1989	233
cm_cbgt95_04	Central Bank Governor Turnover 1995-2004	233
CUSACK – CENTER OF POLITICAL GRAVITY.....		
cu_lcpg	Legislative center of political gravity	234
cu_ccpg	Cabinet center of political gravity	234
cu_ecpg	Electoral center of political gravity.....	234

cu_ey	Election year	234
CUSACK & ENGELHARDT.....		234
ce_ccpg_cmp	Cabinet: center of political gravity (cmp)	236
ce_ccpg_ce1	Cabinet: center of political gravity (ce1)	236
ce_ccpg_ce2	Cabinet: center of political gravity (ce2)	236
ce_ccpg_ci	Cabinet: center of political gravity (ci)	236
ce_cml	Cabinet majority, lower house	236
ce_cmu	Cabinet majority, upper house	236
ce_cpsl	Cabinet: percentage of seats, lower house	236
ce_cnp	Cabinet: number of parties	237
ce_lcp_g_cmp	Lower house: center of political gravity (cmp)	237
ce_lcp_g_ce1	Lower house: center of political gravity (ce1)	237
ce_lcp_g_ce2	Lower house: center of political gravity (ce2)	237
ce_lcp_g_ci	Lower house: center of political gravity (ci)	237
ce_ccpgl_cmp	Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (cmp)	237
ce_ccpgl_ce1	Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (ce1)	237
ce_ccpgl_ce2	Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (ce2)	237
ce_ccpgl_ci	Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (ci)	237
ce_cpsu	Cabinet: percentage of seats, upper house	237
ce_ucpg_cmp	Upper house: center of political gravity (cmp)	238
ce_ucpg_ce1	Upper house: center of political gravity (ce1)	238
ce_ucpg_ce2	Upper house: center of political gravity (ce2)	238
ce_ucpg_ci	Upper house: center of political gravity (ci)	238
ce_ccpgu_cmp	Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (cmp)	238
ce_ccpgu_ce1	Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (ce1)	238
ce_ccpgu_ce2	Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (ce2)	238
ce_ccpgu_ci	Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (ci)	238
ce_lf	Lower house: fractionalization	238
ce_uf	Upper house: fractionalization	238
ce_cf	Cabinet: fractionalization	239
ce_cpv	Cabinet: percentage of votes in election	239
DATABASE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.....		239
dpi_system	Regime type	239
dpi_seats	Total Seats in the Legislature	239
dpi_gf	Government fractionalization	240
dpi_gs	Number of Government Seats	240
dpi_opf	Opposition fractionalization	240
dpi_nos	Number of Oppositional Seats	240
dpi_numul	Number of Seats non-aligned/allegiance unknown	240
dpi_tf	Total fractionalization	240
dpi_legelec	Legislative election	241
dpi_exelec	Executive election	241
dpi_mdmh	Mean district magnitude (house)	241
dpi_mdms	Mean district magnitude (senate)	241
dpi_ssh	Relative size of senate	241
dpi_plurality	Plurality	241
dpi_pr	Proportional representation	242
dpi_housesys	House: plurality or proportional?	242
dpi_sensys	Senate: plurality or proportional?	242
dpi_thresh	Vote threshold for representation	242
dpi_dhondt	D'Hondt	242
dpi_cl	Closed lists	243
dpi_auton	Autonomous regions	243
dpi_state	Election of state/province government	243
dpi_muni	Election of municipal government	243
dpi_author	Authority of sub-national governments	243
FISH AND KROENIG – THE PARLIAMENTARY POWERS INDEX		244

fk_ppi	Parliamentary Powers Index.....	244
GOLDER		244
gol_adm	Average district magnitude	244
gol_dist	Districts.....	245
gol_enep	Effective number of electoral parties	245
gol_enepo	Effective number of electoral parties (others)	245
gol_enep1	Effective number of electoral parties1.....	245
gol_enpp	Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties	245
gol_enppo	Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties (others)	246
gol_enpp1	Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties1	246
gol_enpres	Effective number of presidential candidates.....	246
gol_est	Electoral system type	246
gol_est2	Electoral system type 2	247
gol_inst	Institution	247
gol_legel	Legislative elections.....	247
gol_legro	Runoff	248
gol_maj	Majoritarian type.....	248
gol_mdm	Median district magnitude	248
gol_mix	Mixed type.....	249
gol_mt	Multi-tier type	249
gol_nos	Number of seats	250
gol_pest	Presidential electoral system type	250
gol_polreg	Political regimes	250
gol_pr	PR type.....	250
gol_preel	Presidential election	251
gol_prero	Presidential runoff.....	251
gol_upseat	Upper seats.....	252
gol_uptier	Upper tier	252
GERRING, THACKER & MORENO		252
gtm_centrip	Centripetalism	252
gtm_centrip2	Centripetalism (weighted).....	252
gtm_unit	Unitarism	253
gtm_parl	Parliamentarism	253
gtm_pr	Proportional Representation	253
HUBER ET AL – COMPARATIVE WELFARE STATES DATA SET		254
hu_vt	Voter turnout.....	254
Election results		254
hu_vl	Votes: left	254
hu_vcs	Votes: center secular	254
hu_vcch	Votes: center Christian	254
hu_vcca	Votes: center Catholic	254
hu_vrs	Votes: right secular.....	255
hu_vrch	Votes: right Christian parties	255
hu_vrca	Votes: right Catholic	255
Legislative seats		255
hu_ll	Legislative seats: left	255
hu_lcs	Legislative seats: center secular	255
hu_lcch	Legislative seats: center Christian	255
hu_lcca	Legislative seats: center Catholic.....	255
hu_lrs	Legislative seats: right secular	255
hu_lrch	Legislative seats: right Christian parties	255
hu_lrca	Legislative seats: right Catholic	255
Governments		256
hu_gl	Government parties legislative seats: left	256
hu_gl_cum	Left governments cumulative.....	256
hu_gcs	Government parties legislative seats: center secular.....	256
hu_gcs_cum	Center secular governments cumulative.....	256

hu_gcch	Government parties legislative seats: center Christian.....	256
hu_gcch_cum	Center Christian governments cumulative	256
hu_gcca	Government parties legislative seats: center Catholic	256
hu_gcca_cum	Center Catholic governments cumulative	256
hu_grs	Government parties legislative seats: right secular	256
hu_grs_cum	Right secular governments cumulative	256
hu_grch	Government parties legislative seats: right Christian parties.....	257
hu_grch_cum	Right Christian governments cumulative	257
hu_grca	Government parties legislative seats: right Catholic.....	257
hu_grca_cum	Right Catholic governments cumulative.....	257
	Political institutions.....	257
hu_federal	Federalism	257
hu_pres	Presidentialism	257
hu_est	Electoral system type	257
hu_bicameral	Bicameral system.....	257
hu_ff	Frequent referenda	258
hu_jr	Judicial review	258
IDEA (INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE).....		258
idea_parvap	Turnout in Parliamentary Elections (VAP)	258
idea_parrv	Turnout in Parliamentary Elections (RV)	258
idea_presvap	Turnout in Presidential Elections (VAP).....	259
idea_presrv	Turnout in Presidential Elections (RV)	259
INSTITUTIONS AND ELECTIONS PROJECT.....		259
	Executive-Legislature Relationship	259
iaep_evp	Executive Veto Power.....	259
iaep_lvp	Legislature Veto Power.....	260
iaep_lcre	Legislature Can Remove Executive	260
iaep_ecdl	Executive Can Dissolve Legislature	260
iaep_lrit	Legislature's Ratification of International Treaties	260
iaep_epmf	Executive Power over Military Force.....	260
iaep_eccdt	Executive Can Change Domestic Taxes	261
iaep_lap	Legislature Approves Budget.....	261
	Judiciary	261
iaep_cc	Constitutional Court	261
iaep_aecc	Appointments/Elections to Constitutional Court	261
iaep_rmcc	Removal of Members of Constitutional Court	261
iaep_wrmcc	Who Removes Members of Constitutional Court	262
iaep_alcc	Appointment for Life to Constitutional Court	262
iaep_ccrea	Constitutional Court Rules on Executive Actions	262
iaep_ccrla	Constitutional Court Rules on Legislative Actions	262
	Government Centralization.....	262
iaep_ufs	Unitary or Federal State	262
iaep_arr	Appointment of Regional Representatives.....	263
	Elections and Electoral Outcomes.....	263
iaep_nee	National Elections for an Executive	263
iaep_nel	National Elections for the Legislature	263
iaep_nr	National Referendums.....	263
	Selection of the Executive	264
iaep_eml	Executive is Member of Legislature.....	264
iaep_ise	Independence of Selection of Executive	264
iaep_ae	Appointment of Executive	264
iaep_d	Dictator.....	264
	Rules Governing Elections – the Outcome.....	265
iaep_es	Electoral System	265
iaep_ee	Election of the Executive	265
iaep_ese	Electoral System for the Executive	265
iaep_pm5p	Parties with More than 5 Percent	266

KIM & FORDING		266
kf_mvi	Median voter ideology	266
kf_pi	Parliament ideology.....	267
kf_gi1	Government ideology 1	268
kf_gi2	Government ideology 2	268
kf_gi3	Government ideology 3	268
NORRIS – DEMOCRACY TIME-SERIES DATASET.....		269
Executives		269
no_ce	Classification of Executives.....	269
no_pm	Parliamentary Monarchy	269
no_pr	Parliamentary Republic	269
no_rm	Ruling Monarchy.....	269
Electoral Systems		270
no_ef	Electoral Family	270
no_ndel	No Directly Elected Legislature.....	270
no_pes	Proportional Electoral System	270
no_ces	Combined (Mixed) Electoral System	270
no_mes	Majoritarian Electoral System	270
Decentralization		270
no_ufs	Unitary or Federal State	270
PERSSON & TABELLINI.....		271
pt_federal	Federal Political Structure	271
pt_magn	Inverse of District Magnitude	271
pt_maj	Majoritarian Electoral Systems.....	271
pt_pind	Ballot Structure 1.....	271
pt_pindo	Ballot Structure 2.....	272
pt_pres	Forms of Government	272
pt_sdm	Weighted Inverse District Magnitude	272
pt_seats	Number of Seats	272
QOG SURVEY		273
qs_proff	Professional Public Administration.....	273
qs_proff_cih	Professional Public Administration – Confidence Interval (High).....	273
qs_proff_cil	Professional Public Administration – Confidence Interval (Low)	273
qs_closed	Closed Public Administration.....	274
qs_closed_cih	Closed Public Administration – Confidence Interval (High).....	274
qs_closed_cil	Closed Public Administration – Confidence Interval (Low)	274
SWANK – COMPARATIVE PARTIES DATA SET		274
sw_ey	Election year	274
Election results		275
sw_vl	Votes: left	275
sw_vr	Votes: right	275
sw_vcd	Votes: Christian democratic	275
sw_vccd	Votes: centrist Christian democratic	275
sw_vce	Votes: Center	275
sw_vrwp	Votes: Right-wing populist	275
sw_vll	Votes: Left-libertarian votes	275
Legislative seats		275
sw_ll	Legislative seats: left	275
sw_lr	Legislative seats: right	275
sw_lcd	Legislative seats: Christian democratic.....	276
sw_lccd	Legislative seats: centrist Christian democratic	276
sw_lce	Legislative seats: center	276
sw_lrwp	Legislative seats: Right-wing populist.....	276
sw_lll	Legislative seats: Left-libertarian.....	276
Cabinets		276
sw_cl	Cabinet portfolios: left.....	276
sw_cr	Cabinet portfolios: right	276

sw_ccd	Cabinet portfolios: Christian democratic.....	276
sw_cccd	Cabinet portfolios: centrist Christian democratic	276
sw_cce	Cabinet portfolios: center.....	276
TSEBELIS.....		277
ts_mg	Minority government	277
ts_mwc	Minimum winning coalition.....	277
ts_og	Oversized government	277
ts_vp	Veto players.....	277
Cabinet ideology		278
ts_cicm	Cabinet ideology, Castles and Mair	278
ts_cihi	Cabinet ideology, Huber and Inglehart.....	278
ts_cilh1	Cabinet ideology, Laver and Hunt	278
ts_cilh2	Cabinet ideology, Laver and Hunt	279
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT		280
BOTERO, DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES & SHLEIFER – REGULATION OF LABOR		280
bdlls_au	Autocracy.....	280
bdlls_de	Democracy.....	280
BUENO DE MESQUITA, SMITH, SIVERSON & MORROW		281
bdm_s	Selectorate Size	281
bdm_w	Winning Coalition Size.....	281
bdm_w_s	Winning Coalition Size Relative to Selectorate Size	281
CHEIBUB, GANDHI & VREELAND		282
chga_demo	Democracy.....	282
CINGRANELLI & RICHARDS - HUMAN RIGHTS DATASET.....		282
ciri_assn	Freedom of Assembly and Association.....	282
ciri_disap	Disappearance.....	282
ciri_empinx_old	Empowerment Rights Index (Old)	283
ciri_empinx_new	Empowerment Rights Index (New).....	283
ciri_kill	Extrajudicial Killing.....	283
ciri_move_old	Freedom of Movement (Old).....	283
ciri_formov	Freedom of Foreign Movement	284
ciri_dommov	Freedom of Domestic Movement	284
ciri_physint	Physical Integrity Rights Index.....	284
ciri_elecsd	Electoral Self-Determination	284
ciri_polpris	Political Imprisonment	285
ciri_relfre_old	Freedom of Religion (Old)	285
ciri_relfre_new	Freedom of Religion (New).....	285
ciri_speech	Freedom of Speech.....	285
ciri_tort	Torture.....	286
ciri_wecon	Women's Economic Rights	286
ciri_wopol	Women's Political Rights	287
ciri_worker	Workers Rights	287
ciri_wosoc	Women's Social Rights	287
ciri_injud	Independence of the Judiciary	288
DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES & SHLEIFER – REGULATION OF ENTRY		288
dlls_proc	Number of Procedures	288
dlls_time	Time.....	288
dlls_cost	Cost.....	288
DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES & SHLEIFER – COURTS.....		289
dlls1_fie	Formalism Index (Eviction)	289
dlls1_fic	Formalism Index (Check)	289
dlls1_tde	Total Duration (Eviction).....	289
dlls1_tdc	Total Duration (Check).....	289
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT – INDEX OF DEMOCRACY		290
eiu_iod	Index of Democracy.....	290
eiu_cl	Civil Liberties.....	290

eiu_dpc	Democratic Political Culture	290
eiu_epp	Electoral Process and Pluralism	290
eiu_fog	Functioning of Government	290
eiu_pp	Political Participation	290
FREEDOM HOUSE		291
Freedom in the World		291
fh_cl	Civil Liberties	291
fh_pr	Political Rights	291
fh_status	Status	291
Freedom in the World Sub-Categories: Civil Liberties		292
fh_feb	Freedom of Expression and Belief	292
fh_aor	Associational and Organizational Rights	292
fh_rol	Rule of Law	292
fh_pair	Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights	292
Freedom in the World Sub-Categories: Political Rights		293
fh_ep	Electoral Process	293
fh_ppp	Political Pluralism and Participation	293
fh_fog	Functioning of Government	293
Freedom of the Press		293
fh_press	Freedom of the press	293
fh_law	Laws and regulations that influence media content	294
fh_pol	Political pressures and controls on media content	294
fh_econ	Economic influences over media content	294
fh_repres	Repressive actions	295
FREEDOM HOUSE/POLITY		295
fh_polity2	Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)	295
fh_ipolity2	Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity)	295
GIBNEY & DALTON		295
gd_ptsa	Political Terror Scale – Amnesty International	295
gd_ptss	Political Terror Scale – US State Department	296
INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE – THE PRS GROUP		296
icrg_qog	ICRG indicator of Quality of Government	296
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION		298
ipu_w_lower	Women in national parliament (lower house)	298
ipu_w_upper	Women in national parliament (upper house)	298
KNACK & KUGLER		298
kk_gg	Index of Objective Indicators of Good Governance	298
LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES, POP-ELECHES & SHLEIFER– JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE		299
llps_tensc	Tenure of Supreme Court Judges	299
llps_tenac	Tenure of Administrative Court Judges	299
llps_cl	Case Law	299
llps_ji	Judicial Independence	299
llps_roc	Rigidity of Constitution	300
llps_jr	Judicial Review	300
llps_cr	Constitutional Review	300
MELANDER		300
m_femlead	Female State Leader	300
m_wominpar	Women in Parliament (percent)	301
POLITY IV		301
p_democ	Institutionalized Democracy	301
p_autoc	Institutionalized Autocracy	302
p_polity	Combined Polity Score	302
p_polity2	Revised Combined Polity Score	302
p_parreg	Regulation of Participation	303
p_parcomp	The Competitiveness of Participation	304
p_xrreg	Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment	305
p_xrcomp	Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment	306

p_xropen	Openness of Executive Recruitment	306
p_xconst	Executive Constraints (Decision Rules).....	307
p_durable	Regime Durability	309
p_flag	Tentative Coding.....	309
p_fragment	Polity Fragmentation	309
p_sf	State Failure.....	310
QoG SURVEY		310
qs_impar	Impartial Public Administration.....	311
qs_impar_cih	Impartial Public Administration – Confidence Interval (High).....	311
qs_impar_cil	Impartial Public Administration – Confidence Interval (Low).....	311
REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES		312
rsf_pfi	Press Freedom Index	312
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL		312
ti_cpi	Corruption Perceptions Index.....	312
ti_cpi_max	Corruption Perceptions Index – Max Range	313
ti_cpi_min	Corruption Perceptions Index – Min Range	313
ti_cpi_sd	Corruption Perceptions Index – Standard Deviation	313
TREISMAN		313
t_bribe	Have paid a bribe in any form	313
t_corr	Common to pay irregular additional payments.....	313
t_unicri	Bribery to Government Officials.....	314
VANHANEN – INDEX OF DEMOCRATIZATION		314
van_index	Index of Democratization	314
van_comp	Competition.....	314
van_part	Participation	314
WORLD BANK – GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (A.K.A KKZ)		315
wbgi_vae	Voice and Accountability – Estimate	315
wbgi_vas	Voice and Accountability – Standard Errors.....	315
wbgi_van	Voice and Accountability – Number of Sources	315
wbgi_pse	Political Stability – Estimate	316
wbgi_pss	Political Stability – Standard Errors	316
wbgi_psn	Political Stability – Number of sources.....	316
wbgi_gee	Government Effectiveness – Estimate	316
wbgi_ges	Government Effectiveness – Standard Errors	316
wbgi_gen	Government Effectiveness – Number of Sources.....	316
wbgi_rqe	Regulatory Quality – Estimate	316
wbgi_rqs	Regulatory Quality – Standard Errors.....	316
wbgi_rqn	Regulatory Quality – Number of Sources	316
wbgi_rle	Rule of Law – Estimate	317
wbgi_rls	Rule of Law – Standard Errors	317
wbgi_rln	Rule of Law – Number of Sources.....	317
wbgi_cce	Control of Corruption – Estimate	317
wbgi_ccs	Control of Corruption – Standard Errors	317
wbgi_ccn	Control of Corruption – Number of Sources	317
REFERENCES		318

VARIABLE OVERVIEWS

TAKE ME TO:

FUNCTIONAL VARIABLES ?

SOCIAL POLICY VARIABLES?

TAX AND GOVERNMENT REVENAUE VAIABLES ?

SOCIAL CONDITIONS VARIABLES?

PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLES?

POLITICAL INDICATORS VARIABLES?

QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT VARIABLES?

FUNCTIONAL VARIABLES

cocode	Country code numeric
ccodealp	3-letter country code
cname	Country name
year	Year
ccodewb	Country Code World Bank
ccodecow	Country Code Correlates of War
cname_year	Country Name and Year
ccodealp_year	3-letter Country Code and Year
oecd	OECD member
eu27	EU27 member
eu15	EU15 member
eea	European Economic Area
ht_region	The Region of the Country
ht_region2	The Region of the Country (alternative)

SOCIAL POLICY VARIABLES (1/3)

ar_source	(Armingeon source)	hu_uebe	(Unemployment benefits)
ar_sst	(Social security transfers / GDP)	hu_teh	(Total expenditure on health)
bdlls_ssli	(Social Security Laws Index)	hu_peh	(Public expenditure on health)
bdlls_oadbi	(Age & Disability Benefits)	hu_pehp	(Public expenditure on health)
bdlls_coadd	(ibid. Coverage of)	hu_cpeh	(Public expenditure on health)
bdlls_drale	(Retirement Age / Life Exp.)	hu_pepnc	(Public expenditure: pensions)
bdlls_cenr	(Contribution/ Retirement)	hu_pepgi	(Public expenditure: pensions)
bdlls_pdoad	(% Salary Age Benefits)	hu_pepgp	(Public expenditure: pensions)
bdlls_pnrr	(Pension Replacement Rate)	hu_ocbe	(Old age benefits expenditure)
bdlls_shbi	(Sick. & Health Benefits)	hu_teic	(Expenditure on in-patient care)
bdlls_crs	(Coverage of Risk of Sickness)	hu_peic	(Expenditure on in-patient care)
bdlls_cesb	(Contribution/Sickness Benefits)	hu_teac	(Expenditure, ambulatory care)
bdlls_pdshb	(% Salary for Sickness Benefits)	hu_peac	(Expenditure, ambulatory care)
bdlls_wpsb	(Waiting for Sickness Benefits)	hu_stmc	(% with total medical coverage)
bdlls_sbnrr	(Sick. Benefits Replace. Rate)	hu_sacc	(% with ambulatory care cover.)
bdlls_ubi	(Unemployment Benefits)	hu_sipc	(% with in-patient services cov.)
bdlls_crue	(Coverage of Unemployment)	hu_tpe	(Total public expenditure)
bdlls_ceueb	Contribution Unempl. Benefits)	hu_ssr	(Social security receipts)
bdlls_pdueb	(% Salary Unemployment Bene.)	hu_sfbr	(Social insurance & family)
bdlls_wpueb	(Wait. Period Unemployment)	hu_wcr	(Worker contributions revenue)
bdlls_uebnrr	(Unemp. Benefits Replace. Rate)	hu_ecr	(Employer contributions reven.)
bdlls_eli	(Employment Laws)	hu_stss	(Taxes allocated, social security)
bdlls_aeci	(Alt. Employment Contracts)	hu_facr	(State funds contributions rev.)
bdlls_cihw	(Cost of Increasing H. Worked)	hu_rcss	(Rev. capital income soc. Sec.)
bdlls_cofw	(Cost of Firing Workers)	hu_tpr	(Total public revenue)
bdlls_dpi	(Dismissal Procedures)	hu_ggd	(General government deficit)
bdlls_crli	(Collective Relations Laws)	ic_gt	(% Government transfers)
bdlls_lupi	(Labor Union Power)	ic_got	(Generosity of transfers)
bdlls_cdi	(Collective Disputes)	is_rg	(Redistribution. Δ in Gini)
bdlls_cri	(Civil Rights)	is_rp	(Redistribution. Δ in poverty)
bdlls_drace	(Discrimination: Race)	bw_uegr	(Unemploy benefit replace rate)
bdlls_dsex	(Discrimination: Sex)	fd_cf	(Childcare fees)
bdlls_stoml	(Maternity Leave)	fd_pl	(Parental leave)
bdlls_mwa	(Minimum Working Age)	fd_ftepl	(FTE paid parental leave)
bdlls_mmw	(Mandatory Minimum Wage)	fd_upl	(Unpaid parental leave)
eu_pha	(Physicians, absolute value)	fd_patl	(Paternity leave)
eu_phd	(Physicians / 100,000 pop.)	fd_ftep	(FTE paid paternity leave)
eu_dea	(Dentists, absolute value)	fd_ml	(Maternity leave)
eu_ded	(Dentists / 100,000 pop.)	fd_ftem	(FTE paid maternity leave)
fr_ss	(Social security benefits)	psp_tpe	(Total public employment)
hu_sw	(Social wage)	psp_pes	(Pub. Employ./Tot employmen.)
hu_socx	(Public social expenditure)	psp_psc	(Tot pub. sector compensation)
hu_sst	(Social security transfers)	socx_tput	(Tot. social expenditure, public)
hu_sse	(Social security expenditure)	socx_tpuc	(ibid. public, cash)
hu_ssbe	(Social security benefit)	socx_tpuk	(ibid. public, in kind)
hu_sfbe	(Social / family benefits exp.)	socx_tmpt	(ibid. mandatory private, total)
hu_smbe	(Sick. & maternity benefit exp.)	socx_tmpc	(ibid. mandatory private, cash)
hu_eibe	(Employment injuries benefits)	socx_tmpr	(ibid. mandatory private in kind)
hu_pbe	(Pensions benefit expenditure)	socx_tvpt	(ibid. voluntary private, total)
hu_fabe	(Family allowances benefits)	socx_nt	(Net total social expenditure)

SOCIAL POLICY VARIABLES (2/3)

socx_ntp	(ibid. public)	sc_pg	(Pensions generosity)
socx_ntmp	(ibid. mandatory private)	sc_pd	(Pensions decommodification)
socx_ntvp	(ibid. voluntary private)	sc_mprrs	(Net min. pension replace. rate)
socx_oput	(Old age expenditure public tot)	sc_mprrc	(Net min. pension replace. rate)
socx_opuc	(ibid. cash)	sc_sprrs	(Net std. pension replace. rate)
socx_opuk	(ibid. public, in kind)	sc_sprrc	(Net std. pension replace. rate)
socx_ompt	(ibid. mandatory private, total)	sc_pqp	(Pension qualifying period)
socx_ompc	(ibid. mandatory private, cash)	sc_pfund	(Pension funding)
socx_ompk	(ibid. mandatory private in kind)	sc_pcov	(Pension coverage/take-up)
socx_ovpt	(ibid. voluntary private, total)	sc_mret	(Male retirement age)
socx_sput	(Survivors expenditure public)	sc_fret	(Female retirement age)
socx_spuc	(ibid. cash)	sc_sg	(Sickness insurance, generosity)
socx_spuk	(ibid. in kind)	sc_sd	(ibid. decommodification)
socx_smpt	(ibid. mandatory private, total)	sc_srrs	(Sick. insurance replace. rate)
socx_smpc	(ibid. mandatory private, cash)	sc_srrf	(Net sickness insurance, ibid.)
socx_smpk	(ibid. mandatory private in kind)	sc_sqc	(Sick pay qualifying condition)
socx_iput	(Incapacity expenditure, public)	sc_sdur	(Sick pay benefit duration)
socx_ipuc	(ibid. cash)	sc_swait	(Sick pay waiting period)
socx_ipuk	(ibid. in kind)	sc_scov	(Sick pay coverage)
socx_impt	(ibid. private, total)	sc_ueg	(Unemp. insurance generosity)
socx_impc	(ibid. mandatory private, cash)	sc_ued	(Unemp. insurance decommod.)
socx_impk	(ibid. mandatory private in kind)	sc_uerrs	(Unemp. insurance replace rate)
socx_ivpt	(ibid. voluntary private, total)	sc_uerrf	(Unemp. insurance replace rate)
socx_hput	(Health expenditure, public)	sc_ueqc	(Unemp. qualifying condition)
socx_hpuk	(ibid. in kind)	sc_uedur	(Unemp. benefit duration)
socx_hmpt	(ibid. mandatory private, total)	sc_uewait	(Unemp. benefit waiting period)
socx_hmpk	(ibid. mandatory private in kind)	sc_uecov	(Unemp. insurance coverage)
socx_hvpt	(ibid. voluntary private, total)	scip_mprrs	(Min pension replacement rate)
socx_fput	(Family expenditure, public)	scip_mprrc	(Min pension replacement rate)
socx_fpuc	(ibid. public, cash)	scip_sprrs	(Std. pension replacement rate)
socx_fpuk	(ibid. public, in kind)	scip_sprrc	(Std. pension replacement rate)
socx_fmpt	(ibid. mandatory private, total)	scip_pqp	(Pension qualifying period)
socx_fmpc	(ibid. mandatory private, cash)	scip_pcov	(Pension coverage/take-up)
socx_fmpk	(ibid. mandatory private in kind)	scip_pfe	(Pension financing by employer)
socx_lput	(Labor prog. expenditure public)	scip_pfi	(Pension financing by insured)
socx_uput	(Unemploy. expenditure public)	scip_pfg	(Pension financing, by gov.)
socx_upuc	(Unemploy. expenditure public)	scip_pfo	(ibid. by other sources)
socx_umpt	(ibid. mandatory private, total)	scip_pm	(Pension means test)
socx_umpc	(ibid. mandatory private, cash)	scip_srrs	(Sick pay replacement rate)
socx_hoput	(Housing expenditure, public)	scip_srrf	(Sick pay replacement rate)
socx_hopuk	(ibid. in kind)	scip_sqc	(Sick pay qualifying condition)
socx_otput	(Other expenditure public total)	scip_sdur	(Sick pay benefit duration)
socx_otpuc	(ibid. cash)	scip_swait	(Sick pay waiting period)
socx_otpuk	(ibid. public, in kind)	scip_scov	(Sick pay coverage)
socx_otmpt	(ibid. mandatory private, total)	scip_sfe	(Sick pay financing by employer)
socx_otmpc	(ibid. mandatory private, cash)	scip_sfi	(Sick pay financing by insured)
socx_otmpk	(ibid. mandatory private in kind)	scip_sfg	(Sick pay financing by gov.)
socx_otvpt	(ibid. voluntary private, total)	scip_sfo	(ibid. by other sources)
sc_bgi	(Benefit generosity index)	scip_sm	(Sick pay means test)
sc_di	(Decommodification index)	scip_uerrs	(Unemp. insurance replace rate)

SOCIAL POLICY VARIABLES (3/3)

scip_uerrf	(Unemp. insurance replace rate)	who_ssh	(Social security expend. health)
scip_ueqc	(Unemp. benefit conditions)	who_oop	(Out-of-pocket expend. health)
scip_uedur	(Unemp. benefit duration)	who_ppp	(Private prepaid plans, health)
scip_uewait	(Unemp. benefit waiting period)	who_pha	(Physicians, absolute value)
scip_uecov	(Unemp. insurance coverage)	who_phd	(Physicians / 1000 population)
scip_uefe	(Unemp. benefit by employer)	who_nua	(Nurses (absolute value)
scip_uefi	(Unemp. benefit by insured)	who_nud	(Nurses / 1000 population)
scip_uefg	(Unemp. benefit by gov.)	who_dea	(Dentists, absolute value)
scip_uefo	(Unemp. benefit by other)	who_ded	(Dentists / 1000 population)
scip_uem	(Unemp. benefit means test)	wdi_gew	(Gov. Wages, Emp. Contribut.)
scip_warrs	(Work accident insurance, rr.)	wdi_ge	(Government Expense/ GDP)
scip_warrf	(ibid. replacement rate, rr.)	wdi_gce	(Gov. Consumption Expend.)
scip_waqc	(Ibid. qualifying condition)	wdi_hb	(Hospital Beds / 1,000)
scip_wadur	(ibid. benefit duration)	wdi_nam	(Nurses & Midwives / 1,000)
scip_wawait	(ibid. insurance waiting period)	wdi_the	(Total Health Expenditure)
scip_wacov	(ibid. coverage)	wdi_hec	(Health Expenditure per Capita)
scip_wafe	(ibid. financing by employer)	wdi_puhegdp	(Public Health Expenditure)
scip_wafi	(ibid. financing by insured)	wdi_puhegov	(ibid. / Gov. Expenditure)
scip_wafg	(ibid. financing by government)	wdi_prhe	(Private Health Expenditure)
scip_wafo	(ibid. fin. by other sources)	wdi_roe	(Rigidity of Employment)
scip_wam	(ibid. means test)		
une_toe	(Tot. expenditure on education)		
une_puto	(ibid. Public, total)		
une_pupre	(Pub. expend. pre-primary edu.)		
une_pup	(Pub. expend. primary edu.)		
une_pus	(Pub. expend. secondary edu.)		
une_pute	(Pub. expend. tertiary edu.)		
une_putg	(Pub. expend. edu / tot gov exp)		
une_prto	(Private expenditure edu. Total)		
une_prpre	(Pri. expend. pre-primary edu.)		
une_prp	(Pri. expend. primary edu.)		
une_prs	(Pri. expend. secondary edu.)		
une_prte	(Pri. expend. tertiary edu.)		
une_ito	(International expend edu. tot.)		
une_ppt	(Pub. expend. / pupil, total)		
une_ppp	(Pub. expend. / pupil, primary)		
une_pps	(Pub. expend. / pupil, second.)		
une_ppte	(Pub. expend. / pupil, tertiary)		
une_ptrpre	(Pupil / teacher, pre-primary)		
une_ptrp	(Pupil / teacher, primary)		
une_ptrs	(Pupil / teacher, secondary)		
who_teh	(Total expenditure on health)		
who_tehcu	(Total expenditure on health)		
who_tehci	(ibid. / capita)		
who_gehh	(Gov. expenditure on health)		
who_gehcu	(ibid. / capita)		
who_gehci	(ibid. / capita)		
who_peh	(Private expenditure on health)		
who_gehg	(Gov. expenditure on health)		
who_erh	(External resources for health)		

TAXES AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE VARIABLES

fi_mti	(Top marginal tax rate)	tw_atc	(Average income tax, couple)
fi_mitp	(Top marginal income tax rate)	tw_atcos	(Average tax and contributions)
fi_miti	(Top marginal income tax rate)	tw_atcoc	(Average tax and contributions)
fi_mptp	(Top income & payroll tax rate)	tw_atcls	(Average tax and contributions)
fi_mpti	(Top income & payroll tax rate)	tw_atclc	(Average tax and contributions)
rs_ttr	(Total tax revenue)	tw_mtcls	(Marginal tax and contributions)
rs_ipct	(Income, profits, capital tax)	tw_mtclc	(Marginal tax and contributions)
rs_ipci	(ibid. individuals)	tw_atws	(Average tax wedge, single)
rs_ipti	(Income and profits tax)	tw_atwc	(Average tax wedge, couple)
rs_cti	(Capital gains tax, individuals)	tw_mtws	(Marginal tax wedge, single)
rs_pctc	(Profits, capital gains tax corp)	tw_mtwc	(Marginal tax wedge, couple)
rs_ipcto	(Income, profits, capital tax)	tw_ews	(Elasticity of income after tax)
rs_sst	(Social security contributions)	tw_ewc	(Elasticity of income after tax)
rs_ssee	(ibid. employees)	tw_els	(Elasticity of income after tax)
rs_sser	(ibid. employers)	tw_elc	(Elasticity of income after tax)
rs_sssn	(ibid. self- and non-employed)	wdi_gr	(Government Revenue / GDP)
rs_sso	(ibid. other)	wdi_tr	(Tax Revenue / GDP)
rs_tpw	(Taxes on payroll & workforce)	wdi_hmtri	(Highest Marginal Tax Rate)
rs_tp	(Taxes on property)	wdi_ifhmt	(Income, Highest Marginal Tax)
rs_tgs	(Taxes on goods and services)		

SOCIAL CONDITIONS VARIABLES (1/3)

ar_source	(Armingeon source)	eu_uen	(Unemp. foreign non EU)
ar_ue	(Unemployment rate)	eu_hlyf	(Healthy life years at birth ♀)
bl_psct25	(Primary school complete, 25+)	eu_hlym	(Healthy life years at birth ♂)
bl_ssct25	(Secondary school comp. 25+)	pwt_rgdpc	(Real GDP / capita)
bl_hsct25	(Higher school comp. 25+)	pwt_grgdpc	(Growth Rate Real GDP / capita)
bl_pscf25	(Primary school comp. ♀ 25+)	pwt_csg	(Consumption Share of GDP)
bl_sscf25	(Secondary school comp ♀ 25+)	pwt_gsg	(Government Share of GDP)
bl_hscf25	(Higher school comp ♀25+)	pwt_isg	(Investment Share of GDP)
bl_psct15	(Primary school comp. 15+)	pwt_openk	(Openness to Trade)
bl_ssct15	(Secondary school comp. 15+)	pwt_openc	(Openness to Trade)
bl_hsct15	(Higher school comp. 15+)	fr_ud	(Union density)
bl_pscf15	(Primary school comp. ♀ 15+)	hu_lcu	(Liberalization current transact.)
bl_sscf15	(Secondary school comp ♀ 15+)	hu_lca	(Liberalization capital transact.)
bl_hscf15	(Higher school comp. ♀ 15+)	hu_aatr	(Against transaction restriction)
bl_asyf15	(Average schooling years ♀ 15+)	hu_wsc	(Wage setting coordination)
bl_asyf25	(Average schooling years ♀ 25+)	hu_um	(Union members)
bl_asyt15	(Average schooling years 15+)	hu_aum	(Active union membership)
bl_asyt25	(Average schooling years 25+)	hu_num	(Net union membership)
bdlls_ud	(Union Density)	weo_gdp	(GDP per capita)
ds_gini	(Gini Index)	weo_gbds	(Gov. budget deficit/surplus)
ds_yom	(Year of measurement)	weo_infl	(Inflation)
dr_ig	(Index of Globalization)	weo_ue	(Unemployment)
dr_eg	(Economic Globalization)	ihme_ayef	(Average Years of Education ♀)
dr_pg	(Political Globalization)	ihme_ayem	(Average Years of Education ♂)
dr_sg	(Social Globalization)	ihme_nm	(Neonatal Mortality Rate)
eu_gini	(Gini index)	ihme_pnm	(Postneonatal Mortality Rate)
eu_8020	(80/20 income quintile share)	ihme_fmort	(Under-5 Mortality Rate)
eu_grgdp	(Growth of real GDP)	ihme_mmr	(Maternal Mortality Ratio)
eu_ue	(Unemployment rate)	jm_gb	(Gini before taxes and transfers)
eu_lue	(Long term unemployment)	jm_ga	(Gini after taxes and transfers)
eu_vlue	(Very long term unemployment)	jm_ar	(Absolute redistribution Δ Gini)
eu_lf	(Labor force)	jm_rr	(Relative redistribtion Δ Gini)
eu_flf	(Female labor force)	jm_artr	(Absolute redistribution Δ Gini)
eu_er	(Employment rate)	jm_rrtr	(Relative redistribtion Δ Gini)
eu_fer	(Female employment rate)	jm_arta	(Absolute redistribtion Δ Gini)
eu_use	(Upper secondary education)	jm_rrta	(Relative redistribtion taxes)
eu_usew	(Upper secondary education, ♀)	jm_srtr	(Share redistribution transfers)
eu_usem	(Upper secondary education ♂)	jm_sрта	(Share of redistribution taxes)
eu_pop	(Population on January 1)	jm_rprb	(Poverty before tax & transfers)
eu_ii	(Inflow of immigrants)	jm_rpra	(Poverty after tax & transfers)
eu_nmc	(Net migration)	lis_gini	(Gini index)
eu_crnmc	(Crude rate of net migration)	lis_atk5	(Atkinson index, epsilon=0.5)
eu_as	(Asylum seekers)	lis_atk1	(Atkinson index, epsilon=1)
eu_pad	(Positive asylum decisions)	lis_9010	(90/10 income percentile ratio)
eu_fc	(Foreign citizens)	lis_9050	(90/50 income percentile ratio)
eu_lfeu	(Labor force foreign EU citizens)	lis_8020	(80/20 income percentile ratio)
eu_eeu	(Employed foreign EU citizens)	lis_rpr40	(Relative poverty rate, 40%)
eu_ueeu	(Unemp. foreign EU citizens)	lis_rpr50	(Relative poverty rate, 50%)
eu_lfn	(Labor force, foreign non EU)	lis_rpr60	(Relative poverty rate, 60%)
eu_en	(Employed foreign non EU)	dioc_fbe	(Foreign born employed)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS VARIABLES (2/3)

dioc_fbue	(Foreign born unemployed)	unna_gdp	(Real GDP)
dioc_fbi	(Foreign born inactive)	unna_gdpc	(Real GDP / Capita)
dioc_te	(Total employment)	unna_grgdp	(Growth Rate of Real GDP)
dioc_tue	(Total unemployment)	unna_grgdpc	(Growth Rate / Capita)
dioc_ti	(Total inactive population)	unna_otco	(Openness to Trade)
oao_grgdp	(Growth of real GDP)	unna_otcu	(Openness to Trade)
gid_far	(Female Activity Rate)	une_preet	(Pre-primary edu. enrollment)
gid_farpm	(Female Activity Rate / Male)	une_preef	(ibid. female)
gid_fptw	(♀ Prof. & Tech. Workers)	une_preem	(ibid. male)
gid_fwe	(Female Wage Employment)	une_pet	(Primary education enrollment)
gid_rfmi	(Ratio of Female / Male Income)	une_pef	(ibid. female)
gid_fgm	(Female Government Ministers)	une_pem	(ibid. male)
gid_whp	(Women in High Positions)	une_set	(Secondary edu. enrollment)
gid_wip	(Women in Parliament)	une_sef	(ibid. female)
gid_ywv	(Year ♀ Received Right to Vote)	une_sem	(ibid. male)
gid_ywse	(ibid. Stand for Election)	une_tet	(Tertiary education enrollment)
gid_yfwp	(Year of 1 st ♀ in Parliament)	une_tef	(ibid. female)
hd_leb	(Life expectancy at birth)	une_tem	(ibid. male)
hd_le65f	(Life expectancy at 65 ♀)	une_ppepre	(% private enroll. pre-primary)
hd_le65m	(Life expectancy at 65 ♂)	une_ppep	(% private enrollment, primary)
hd_imort	(Infant mortality rate)	une_ppes	(% private enroll. Secondary)
ims_if	(Inflow of foreigners)	une_dur	(Duration of compulsory edu.)
ims_of	(Outflow of foreigners)	uw_gini	(Gini)
ims_sf	(Stock of foreigners)	uw_quality	(Quality)
ims_sfb	(Stock of foreign-born)	uw_ngini	(Gini)
ims_as	(Asylum seekers)	uw_sdgini	(Gini, standard deviation)
ims_n	(Naturalizations)	uw_yom	(Year of Measurement)
ims_ifw	(Inflow of foreign workers)	utip_ehii	(Household income inequality)
ims_fff	(Foreigners in labor force)	utip_ehii_yom	(Year of measurement)
ims_fe	(Foreigners employed)	utip_ipi	(Industrial pay inequality)
ims_fue	(Foreigners unemployed)	utip_ipi_yom	(Year of measurement)
ims_tlf	(Total labor force)	vi_wsc	(Wage setting coordination)
ims_te	(Total employment)	vi_giwb	(Gov. intervention wages)
ims_tue	(Total unemployment)	vi_lwb	(Level of wage bargaining)
mei_infl	(Inflation)	vi_cuwb	(Central union wage bargaining)
na_gdp	(Real GDP)	vi_tum	(Total union membership)
na_gdpc	(Real GDP / capita)	vi_num	(Net union membership)
plf_ue	(Unemployment rate)	vi_nud	(Net union density)
plf_lue	(Long term unemployment)	vi_abc	(Adjusted bargaining coverage)
plf_fff	(♀ labor force, % ages 15-64)	wdi_gdp	(GDP)
plf_mlf	(♂ labor force, % ages 15-64)	wdi_gdpgr	(GDP Growth)
plf_cer	(Civilian emp. rate ages 15-64)	wdi_gdpc	(GDP / Capita)
ed_num	(Net union membership)	wdi_gdpcgr	(GDP / Capita Growth)
ed_nud	(Net union density)	wdi_gni	(GNI, Atlas Method)
t_yot	(Year Opened to Trade)	wdi_gnipc	(GNI / Capita, Atlas Method)
undp_gini	(Gini Index)	wdi_gbds	(Gov. budget deficit/surplus)
undp_pote	(Poorest 10% income/consump)	wdi_cgd	(Central Government Debt)
undp_potw	(Poorest 20% income/consump)	wdi_exp	(Exports / GDP)
undp_rite	(Richest 10% income/consump)	wdi_imp	(Imports / GDP)
undp_ritw	(Richest 20% income/consump)	wdi_ttr	(Total Trade / GDP)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS VARIABLES (3/3)

wdi_tot	(Terms of Trade)	wdi_uem	(Unemployment, Male %)
wdi_fdi	(FDI, Net Inflows / GDP)	wdi_uey	(Unemployment, Youth %)
wdi_ase	(Agriculture's / GDP)	wdi_uefy	(Unemployment, Female Youth)
wdi_ise	(Industry's / GDP)	wdi_uemy	(Unemployment, Male Youth)
wdi_sse	(Services' / GDP)	wdi_lue	(Long-Term Unemp. / Unemp.)
wdi_infl	(Inflation)	wdi_luef	(ibid. Female)
wdi_gris	(Gender Ratio in School)	wdi_luem	(ibid. Male)
wdi_wip	(Women in Parliament)	wdi_lifexp	(Life Expectancy at Birth, Years)
wdi_gini	(Gini Index)	wdi_mort	(Infant Mortality Rate)
wdi_isl20	(Income Share of Lowest 20%)	wdi_fmort	(Mortality Rate, Under-5)
wdi_iss20	(Income Share of Second 20%)	wdi_pop	(Population)
wdi_ist20	(Income Share of Third 20%)	wdi_pop14	(Population Ages 0-14 / Total)
wdi_isf20	(Income Share of Fourth 20%)	wdi_pop1564	(Population Ages 15-64 / Total)
wdi_ish20	(Income Share of Highest 20%)	wdi_pop65	(Population Ages 65+ / Total)
wdi_isl10	(Income Share of Lowest 10%)	wdi_nm	(Net Migration)
wdi_ish10	(Income Share of Highest 10%)	wdi_rp	(Refugee Population)
wdi_lf	(Labor Force, %)	wef_gend	(Gender gap index)
wdi_lff	(Labor Force, Female %)	wef_ecgg	(Economic gender gap)
wdi_lfm	(Labor Force, Male %)	wef_edgg	(Educational gender gap)
wdi_ue	(Unemployment %)	wef_hgg	(Health gender gap)
wdi_uef	(Unemployment, Female %)	wef_pegg	(Pol empowerment gender gap)

PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLES (1/2)

cses_module	(CSES module)	eb_hcsty	(Health c. satisfaction 2 years)
cses_lr	(Left-right self-placement)	eb_hctfu	(Health c. too frequently used)
cses_sd	(Satisfaction with democracy)	eb_hcrw	(Health care runs well)
cses_dbfg	(Democracy best form of gov?)	eb_oehcg	(Essential health c. from gov.)
cses_spgg	(Satisfaction: gov./president)	eb_hcie	(Health care inefficient)
cses_sgpmi	(ibid. most important issue)	eb_pini	(People in need – injustice)
cses_lef	(Last election was fair?)	eb_pinl	(People in need – laziness)
cses_vmd	(Voting makes a difference)	eb_pinp	(People in need, modern progr.)
cses_hwvvr	(Voters views are represented?)	eb_pinu	(People in need – unlucky)
cses_ppcpt	(Parties care what people think)	eb_idtl	(Income differences too large)
cses_ppn	(Political parties are necessary)	eb_gsrld	(Gov. should reduce differenc.)
cses_pkpt	(Pol. know what people think)	eb_rnrp	(Reduce # of rich and poor)
cses_cap	(Corruption amongst politicians)	eb_cep	(Chance of escaping poverty)
cses_rif	(Respect for individual freedom)	eb_cep	(Chance of escaping poverty)
eb_module	(Eurobarometer module)	eb_pafp	(Pub. authorities fight poverty)
eb_lr	(Left-right self-placement)	eb_fpw	(Fight. poverty worth sacrifices)
eb_tcj	(Trust in Euro. Court of Justice)	eb_suf	(Society unfair)
eb_tcm	(Trust in EU Council of Minist.)	eb_fue	(Fight unemployment)
eb_tec	(Trust in European Commission)	eb_re	(Responsibility for the elderly)
eb_tecb	(Trust in Euro. Central Bank)	eb_ls	(Life satisfaction)
eb_teca	(Trust in Euro. Court Auditors)	ess_module	(ESS module)
eb_teo	(Trust in Euro. Ombudsman)	ess_it	(Interpersonal trust)
eb_tep	(Trust in European Parliament.)	ess_pf	(Most people try to be fair)
eb_tsec	(Trust in EU Social & Econ. Com)	ess_ph	(Most people try to be helpful)
eb_tls	(Trust in the legal system)	ess_sg	(Satisfaction with government)
eb_tp	(Trust in the police)	ess_sd	(Satisfaction with democracy)
eb_ta	(Trust in the army)	ess_ste	(State of education)
eb_tpp	(Trust in political parties)	ess_sths	(State of health services)
eb_tcs	(Trust in the civil service)	ess_gsrld	(Gov. should reduce difference)
eb_tng	(Trust in the national gov.)	ess_mdg	(Member, discriminated group)
eb_tnp	(Trust in national parliament)	ess_ieo	(Importance: equal opportunit.)
eb_sd	(Satisfaction demo. in country)	ess_ihp	(Importance of helping people)
eb_sdd	(Satisfaction demo. develop.)	ess_tnp	(Trust in national parliament)
eb_sdeu	(Satisfaction with EU demo.)	ess_tls	(Trust in the legal system)
eb_ipue_1	(Important problem: unemp.)	ess_tp	(Trust in the police)
eb_ipue_2	(Important problem: unemp.)	ess_tplt	(Trust in politicians)
eb_ipue_3	(Important problem: unemp.)	ess_tep	(Trust in the Euro. Parliament)
eb_ipsp_1	(Important prob: stable prices)	ess_tun	(Trust in the United Nations)
eb_ipsp_2	(Important prob: stable prices)	issp_module	(ISSP module)
eb_ipsp_3	(Important prob: stable prices)	issp_gsrld	(Gov. should reduce difference)
eb_swan	(Social welfare necessary)	issp_gsrdrp	(Gov. should reduce difference)
eb_gean	(Good education necessary)	issp_idtl	(Income differences too large)
eb_iii	(Important issue: inflation)	issp_nosmp	(Why study?)
eb_iit	(Important issue: taxation)	issp_idnp	(Income diff. → prosperity)
eb_iue	(Important issue: unemp.)	issp_cilja	(Inequality due to lack of action)
eb_iih	(Important issue: housing)	issp_iebr	(Inequality due to the rich)
eb_iihc	(Important issue: health care)	issp_cgs	(Cut government spending)
eb_iie	(Important issue: education)	issp_gfj	(Gov. should finance new jobs)
eb_iip	(Important issue: pensions)	issp_rww	(Reduce work week)
eb_hcs	(Health care satisfaction)	issp_igsh	(Increase gov. spending: health)

PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLES (2/2)

issp_igse	(ibid. education)	wvs_e132	(Little chance: escape poverty)
issp_igsp	(ibid. pensions)	wvs_e133	(Gov. does too little for poverty)
issp_igsub	(ibid. unemployment. Benefits)	wvs_e196	(How widespread is corruption)
issp_grjfa	(Gov. responsibility: jobs for all)	wvs_it	(Interpersonal trust)
issp_grhc	(ibid. health care)	wvs_lr	(Left-right self-placement)
issp_gro	(ibid. the old)	wvs_sdd	(Satisfaction: demo develop.)
issp_grue	(ibid. the unemployed)	wvs_e069_02	(Confidence: armed forces)
issp_gawf	(Getting ahead: wealthy family)	wvs_e069_05	(Confidence: labor unions)
issp_gakrp	(Getting ahead: contacts)	wvs_e069_06	(Confidence: the police)
issp_tfhi	(Taxes for high incomes)	wvs_e069_07	(Confidence: parliament)
issp_tfmi	(Taxes for middle incomes)	wvs_e069_08	(Confidence: the civil services)
issp_tfli	(Taxes for low incomes)	wvs_e069_09	(Confidence: soc. security sys.)
issp_hlthi	(Higher / lower tax high income)	wvs_e069_11	(Confidence: the government)
issp_rpbo	(Rich parents → opportunity)	wvs_e069_12	(Confidence: the parties)
issp_iou	(Inflation or unemployment)	wvs_e069_16	(Confidence: health care sys.)
issp_gtmp	(Government too much power)	wvs_e069_17	(Confidence: justice sys.)
issp_lelh	(Last election: level of honesty)	wvs_e069_18	(Confidence: the EU)
issp_lelf	(Last election: level of fairness)	wvs_e069_19	(Confidence: NATO)
wvs_module	(WVS module)	wvs_e069_20	(Confidence: the UN)
wvs_a008	(Feeling of happiness)	wvs_f114	(Justifiable: claiming benefits)
wvs_a009	(State of health)	wvs_f115	(Justifiable: fare pub. transport)
wvs_a168	(People take advantage of you)	wvs_f116	(Justifiable: cheating on taxes)
wvs_a170	(Satisfied with your life?)	wvs_f117	(Justifiable: accepting a bribe)
wvs_e035	(Incomes more equal)	wvs_f131	(Justifiable: cash to avoid taxes)
wvs_e036	(Private ownership of business)	wvs_e146	(Just society: income unequal.)
wvs_e037	(Gov. more responsibility)	wvs_e147	(Just society: basic needs)
wvs_e039	(Competition is good)	wvs_e149	(Just society: edu. opportunit.)
wvs_e040	(Hard work brings success)	wvs_pini1	(People in need: injustice)
wvs_e043	(States responsibility: pension)	wvs_pinl1	(People in need: laziness)
wvs_e044	(States responsibility: housing)	wvs_pinp1	(People in need: progress)
wvs_e066	(Soc: competitive v. egalitarian)	wvs_pinu1	(People in need: unlucky)
wvs_e067	(Low tax v. extensive welfare)	wvs_pini2	(People in need: injustice)
wvs_e111	(+/- the system for governing)	wvs_pinp2	(People in need: progress)
wvs_e117	(Having a demo. pol. system?)	wvs_pinl2	(People in need: laziness)
wvs_e125	(Satisfaction: people in office)	wvs_pinu2	(People in need: unlucky)
wvs_e131	(Poor because unfair society)		

POLITICAL INDICATORS VARIABLES (1/4)

ar_source	(Armingeon source)	ar_lmo	(Legislative seats: monarchic)
ar_vt	(Voter turnout)	ar_lper	(Legislative seats: personalist)
ar_ed	(Election date)	ar_lal	(Legislative seats: alliance)
ar_ed2	(Election date)	ar_lind	(Legislative seats: independent)
ar_vs	(Votes: socialist)	ar_lpen	(Legislative seats: pensioners)
ar_vls	(Votes: left-socialist)	ar_lnl	(Legislative seats: no-label)
ar_vcom	(Votes: communist)	ar lini	(Leg. seats: initiative groups)
ar_va	(Votes: agrarian)	ar_crw	(Cabinet portfolios: right-wing)
ar_vcon	(Votes: conservative)	ar_cce	(Cabinet portfolios: center)
ar_vr	(Votes: religious)	ar_cle	(Cabinet portfolios: left)
ar_vl	(Votes: liberal)	ar_ci	(Cabinet ideology)
ar_vur	(Votes: ultra-right)	ar_tg	(Type of government)
ar_vp	(Votes: protest)	ar_chg	(Changes in government)
ar_vg	(Votes: green)	ar_cs	(Cabinet composition: socialist)
ar_ve	(Votes: ethnic)	ar_cls	(Cabinet comp: left-socialist)
ar_vo	(Votes: others)	ar_ccom	(Cabinet comp: communist)
ar_vla	(Votes: left alliance)	ar_ca	(Cabinet comp: agrarian)
ar_vca	(Votes: center alliance)	ar_ccon	(Cabinet comp: conservative)
ar_vra	(Votes: right alliance)	ar_cr	(Cabinet comp: religious)
ar_vpc	(Votes: post-communist)	ar_cli	(Cabinet comp: liberal)
ar_vna	(Votes: nationalist)	ar_cur	(Cabinet comp: ultra-right)
ar_vreg	(Votes: regionalist)	ar_cp	(Cabinet comp: protest)
ar_vfe	(Votes: feminist)	ar_cg	(Cabinet comp: green)
ar_vmo	(Votes: monarchic)	ar_ce	(Cabinet comp: ethnic)
ar_vper	(Votes: personalist)	ar_cpc	(Cabinet comp: postcommunist)
ar_vind	(Votes: independent)	ar_cna	(Cabinet comp: nationalist)
ar_vpen	(Votes: pensioners)	ar_creg	(Cabinet comp: regionalist)
ar_vnl	(Votes: no-label)	ar_cper	(Cabinet comp: personalist)
ar_vini	(Votes: initiative groups)	ar_cal	(Cabinet comp: alliance)
ar_val	(Votes: alliance)	ar_cpen	(Cabinet comp: pensioners)
ar_ls	(Legislative seats: socialist)	ar_li_epd	(Executives-parties dimension)
ar_lls	(Legislative seats: left-socialist)	ar_li_enp	(Effective number of parties)
ar_lcom	(Legislative seats: communist)	ar_li_mc	(Min. win: one-party cabinet)
ar_la	(Legislative seats: agrarian)	ar_li_exd	(Executive dominance)
ar_lcon	(Legislative seats: conservative)	ar_li_eld	(Electoral disproportionality)
ar_lr	(Legislative seats: religious)	ar_li_igp	(Interest group pluralism)
ar_ll	(Legislative seats: liberal)	ar_li_fud	(Federal-unitary dimension)
ar_lur	(Legislative seats: ultra-right)	ar_li_f	(Federalism)
ar_lp	(Legislative seats: protest)	ar_li_b	(Bicameralism)
ar_lg	(Legislative seats: green)	ar_li_cr	(Constitutional rigidity)
ar_le	(Legislative seats: ethnic)	ar_li_jr	(Judicial review)
ar_lo	(Legislative seats: others)	ar_li_cbi	(Central bank independence)
ar_lla	(Legislative seats: left alliance)	ar_ie	(Integrated economy)
ar_lca	(Legislative seats: center)	ar_cbi	(Central bank independence)
ar_lra	(Legislative seats: right)	bdlls_lcpo1	(Left/Center Orientation 28-95)
ar_lpc	(Leg. seats: post-communist)	bdlls_lcpo2	(ibid. 1975-1995)
ar_lna	(Legislative seats: nationalist)	bdlls_pr	(Proportional Representation)
ar_lreg	(Legislative seats: regionalist)	bdlls_dg	(Divided Government)
ar_lfe	(Legislative seats: feminist)	cses_vt	(Voter turnout)

POLITICAL INDICATORS VARIABLES (2/4)

cses_cv	(Compulsory voting)	dpi_legelec	(Legislative election)
cm_cbi80_89	(Central Bank Independence)	dpi_execec	(Executive election)
cm_cbi80_89u	(ibid. 1980-1989, unweighted)	dpi_mdmh	(District magnitude, house)
cm_cbi03	(ibid. 2003)	dpi_mdms	(District magnitude, senate)
cm_cbi03u	(ibid. 2003, unweighted)	dpi_ssh	(Relative size of senate)
cm_cbt98	(Central Bank Transparency 98)	dpi_plurality	(Plurality)
cm_cbt06	(Central Bank Transparency 06)	dpi_pr	(Proportional representation)
cm_cbgt80_89	(CB Governor Turnover 80-89)	dpi_housesys	(House: plurality / proportional)
cm_cbgt95_04	(CB Governor Turnover 95-04)	dpi_sensys	(Senate: plurality/ proportional)
cu_lcpg	(Legislative center pol. gravity)	dpi_thresh	(Threshold for representation)
cu_ccpg	(Cabinet center, pol. gravity)	dpi_dhondt	(D'Hondt)
cu_ecpg	(Electoral center pol. gravity)	dpi_cl	(Closed lists)
cu_ey	(Election year)	dpi_auton	(Autonomous regions)
ce_ccpg_cmp	(Cabinet: center of pol. gravity)	dpi_state	(Election of state/province gov.)
ce_ccpg_ce1	(Cabinet: center of pol. gravity)	dpi_muni	(Election of municipal gov.)
ce_ccpg_ce2	(Cabinet: center of pol. gravity)	dpi_author	(Authority of sub-national gov.)
ce_ccpg_ci	(Cabinet: center of pol. gravity)	fk_ppi	(Parliamentary Powers Index)
ce_cml	(Cabinet majority, lower house)	gol_adm	(Average district magnitude)
ce_cmu	(Cabinet majority, upper house)	gol_dist	(Districts)
ce_cpsl	(Cabinet: % seats, lower house)	gol_enep	(Effective # of electoral parties)
ce_cnp	(Cabinet: number of parties)	gol_enepo	(Effective # of electoral parties)
ce_lcpg_cmp	(Low house: center pol. gravity)	gol_enep1	(Effective # of electoral parties)
ce_lcpg_ce1	(Low house: center pol. gravity)	gol_enpp	(ibid. parliament or legislative)
ce_lcpg_ce2	(Low house: center pol. gravity)	gol_enppo	(ibid. others)
ce_lcpg_ci	(Low house: center pol. gravity)	gol_enpp1	(ibid. parliament or legislative)
ce_ccpgl_cmp	(Cabinet: center pol. gravity LH)	gol_enpres	(Effective # president candida.)
ce_ccpgl_ce1	(Cabinet: center pol. gravity LH)	gol_est	(Electoral system type)
ce_ccpgl_ce2	(Cabinet: center pol. gravity LH)	gol_est2	(Electoral system type 2)
ce_ccpgl_ci	(Cabinet: center pol. gravity LH)	gol_inst	(Institution)
ce_cpsu	(Cabinet: % seats, upper house)	gol_legel	(Legislative elections)
ce_ucpg_cmp	(Up house: center pol. gravity)	gol_legro	(Runoff)
ce_ucpg_ce1	(Up house: center pol. gravity)	gol_maj	(Majoritarian type)
ce_ucpg_ce2	(Up house: center pol. gravity)	gol_mdm	(Median district magnitude)
ce_ucpg_ci	(Up house: center pol. gravity)	gol_mix	(Mixed type)
ce_ccpgu_cmp	(Cabinet: center pol. gravity UH)	gol_mt	(Multi-tier type)
ce_ccpgu_ce1	(Cabinet: center pol. gravity UH)	gol_nos	(Number of seats)
ce_ccpgu_ce2	(Cabinet: center pol. gravity UH)	gol_pest	(Presidential electoral system)
ce_ccpgu_ci	(Cabinet: center pol. gravity UH)	gol_polreg	(Political regimes)
ce_lf	(Lower house: fractionalization)	gol_pr	(PR type)
ce_uf	(Upper house: fractionalization)	gol_preeel	(Presidential election)
ce_cf	(Cabinet: fractionalization)	gol_prero	(Presidential runoff)
ce_cpv	(Cabinet: % of votes in election)	gol_upseat	(Upper seats)
dpi_system	(Regime type)	gol_uptier	(Upper tier)
dpi_seats	(Total Seats in the Legislature)	gtm_centrip	(Centripetalism)
dpi_gf	(Government fractionalization)	gtm_centrip2	(Centripetalism, weighted)
dpi_gs	(Number of Government Seats)	gtm_unit	(Unitarism)
dpi_opf	(Opposition fractionalization)	gtm_parl	(Parliamentarism)
dpi_nos	(Number of Oppositional Seats)	gtm_pr	(Proportional Representation)
dpi_numul	(# of Seats non-aligned/ ?)	hu_vt	(Voter turnout)
dpi_tf	(Total fractionalization)	hu_vl	(Votes: left)

POLITICAL INDICATORS VARIABLES (3/4)

hu_vcs	(Votes: center secular)	iaep_ccrea	(C. Court Rules on Exe. Actions)
hu_vcch	(Votes: center Christian)	iaep_ccrla	(C. Court Rules on Leg. Actions)
hu_vcca	(Votes: center Catholic)	iaep_ufs	(Unitary or Federal State)
hu_vrs	(Votes: right secular)	iaep_arr	(Appoint of Regional Rep's)
hu_vrch	(Votes: right Christian parties)	iaep_nee	(National Elections: Executive)
hu_vrca	(Votes: right Catholic)	iaep_nel	(National Elections: Legislature)
hu_ll	(Legislative seats: left)	iaep_nr	(National Referendums)
hu_lcs	(Legislative seat: center secular)	iaep_eml	(Exe. is Member of Legislature)
hu_lcch	(ibid: center Christian)	iaep_ise	(Indep of Selection of Executive)
hu_lcca	(ibid: center Catholic)	iaep_ae	(Appointment of Executive)
hu_lrs	(Legislative seats: right secular)	iaep_d	(Dictator)
hu_lrch	(ibid: right Christian parties)	iaep_es	(Electoral System)
hu_lrca	(Legislative seats: right Catholic)	iaep_ee	(Election of the Executive)
hu_gl	(Gov. parties leg. seats: left)	iaep_ese	(Electoral Sys. for the Executive)
hu_gl_cum	(Left governments cumulative)	iaep_pm5p	(Parties with More than 5 %)
hu_gcs	(Gov. legislative: center secular)	kf_mvi	(Median voter ideology)
hu_gcs_cum	(Center secular gov. cumulative)	kf_pi	(Parliament ideology)
hu_gcch	(Gov. legislative: cent. Christian)	kf_gi1	(Government ideology 1)
hu_gcch_cum	(Center Christian gov. cumula.)	kf_gi2	(Government ideology 2)
hu_gcca	(Gov. parties seats: Catholic)	kf_gi3	(Government ideology 3)
hu_gcca_cum	(Center Catholic gov. cumulati.)	no_ce	(Classification of Executives)
hu_grs	(Gov. parties seat: right secular)	no_pm	(Parliamentary Monarchy)
hu_grs_cum	(Right secular gov. cumulative)	no_pr	(Parliamentary Republic)
hu_grch	(Gov. legislative: right Christian)	no_rm	(Ruling Monarchy)
hu_grch_cum	(Right Christian gov. cumulativ.)	no_ef	(Electoral Family)
hu_grca	(Gov. leg. seats: right Catholic)	no_ndel	(No Directly Elected Legislature)
hu_grca_cum	(Right Catholic gov. cumulative)	no_pes	(Proportional Electoral System)
hu_federal	(Federalism)	no_ces	(Comb. / Mixed Electoral Sys.)
hu_pres	(Presidentialism)	no_mes	(Majoritarian Electoral System)
hu_est	(Electoral system type)	no_ufs	(Unitary or Federal State)
hu_bicameral	(Bicameral system)	pt_federal	(Federal Political Structure)
hu_ff	(Frequent referenda)	pt_magn	(Inverse of District Magnitude)
hu_jr	(Judicial review)	pt_maj	(Majoritarian Electoral Systems)
idea_parvap	(Turnout: Parliament Elections)	pt_pind	(Ballot Structure 1)
idea_parrv	(Turnout:Parliament Elections)	pt_pindo	(Ballot Structure 2)
idea_presvap	(Turnout: Presidential Elections)	pt_pres	(Forms of Government)
idea_presrv	(Turnout: Presidential Elections)	pt_sdm	(Weighted Inverse District Mag)
iaep_ev	(Executive Veto Power)	pt_seats	(Number of Seats)
iaep_lvp	(Legislature Veto Power)	qs_proff	(Professional Pub. Admin.)
iaep_lcre	(Legislature: Remo. Executive?)	qs_proff_cih	(Professional Pub. Admin.)
iaep_ecdl	(Executive: Dissolve Legislature)	qs_proff_cil	(Professional Pub. Admin.)
iaep_lrit	(Leg: Ratification Int. Treaties)	qs_closed	(Closed Pub. Administration)
iaep_epmf	(Executive Power: Military)	qs_closed_cih	(Closed Pub. Administration)
iaep_eccdt	(Executive: Δ Domestic Taxes)	qs_closed_cil	(Closed Pub. Administration)
iaep_lap	(Legislature Approves Budget)	sw_ey	(Election year)
iaep_cc	(Constitutional Court)	sw_vl	(Votes: left)
iaep_aecc	(Appoint/Elect: Constitu. Court)	sw_vr	(Votes: right)
iaep_rmcc	(Removal: Constitutional Court)	sw_vcd	(Votes: Christian democratic)
iaep_wrmcc	(Removal: Constitutional Court)	sw_vccd	(Votes: centrist Christian demo.)
iaep_alcc	(Life appointment: Const. Court)	sw_vce	(Votes: Center)

POLITICAL INDICATORS VARIABLES (4/4)

sw_vrwp	(Votes: Right-wing populist)
sw_vll	(Votes: Left-libertarian votes)
sw_ll	(Legislative seats: left)
sw_lr	(Legislative seats: right)
sw_lcd	(Leg. seats: Christian demo.)
sw_lccd	(Leg. seats: centrist Christian)
sw_lce	(Legislative seats: center)
sw_lrwp	(Leg. seats: Right-wing populist)
sw_lll	(Leg. seats: Left-libertarian)
sw_cl	(Cabinet portfolios: left)
sw_cr	(Cabinet portfolios: right)
sw_ccd	(Cabinet portfolios: Christian D)
sw_cccd	(ibid: centrist Christian D)
sw_cce	(Cabinet portfolios: center)
ts_mg	(Minority government)
ts_mwc	(Minimum winning coalition)
ts_og	(Oversized government)
ts_vp	(Veto players)
ts_cicm	(Cabinet ideo. Castles & Mair)
ts_cihi	(ibid. Huber & Inglehart)
ts_cilh1	(ibid. Laver and Hunt)
ts_cilh2	(ibid. Laver and Hunt)

QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT VARIABLES (1/2)

bdlls_au	(Autocracy)	fh_law	(Laws & regulations: media)
bdlls_de	(Democracy)	fh_pol	(Political pressure & ctrl: media)
bdm_s	(Selectorate Size)	fh_econ	(Economic influences: media)
bdm_w	(Winning Coalition Size)	fh_repres	(Repressive actions)
bdm_w_s	(Win. Coalition / Selectorate)	fh_polity2	(Demo: Freedom House/Polity)
chga_demo	(Democracy)	fh_ipolity2	(Demo: Freedom House/ Polity)
ciri_assn	(Freedom Assembly & Assoc)	gd_ptsa	(Political Terror Scale: Amnesty)
ciri_disap	(Disappearance)	gd_ptss	(Terror Scale: US State Dep.)
ciri_empinx_old	(Empowerment Rights, Old)	icrg_qog	(ICRG indicator of QoG)
ciri_empinx_new	(Empowerment Rights, New)	ipu_w_lower	(♀ in parliament lower house)
ciri_kill	(Extrajudicial Killing)	ipu_w_upper	(♀ in parliament upper house)
ciri_move_old	(Freedom of Movement, Old)	kk_gg	(Objective: Good Governance)
ciri_formov	(Freedom: Foreign Movement)	llps_tensc	(Tenure: Supreme Court Judges)
ciri_dommov	(Freedom: Domestic Move)	llps_tenac	(Tenure: Admin Court Judges)
ciri_physint	(Physical Integrity Rights Index)	llps_cl	(Case Law)
ciri_elecsd	(Electoral Self-Determination)	llps_ji	(Judicial Independence)
ciri_polpris	(Political Imprisonment)	llps_roc	(Rigidity of Constitution)
ciri_relfre_old	(Freedom of Religion, Old)	llps_jr	(Judicial Review)
ciri_relfre_new	(Freedom of Religion, New)	llps_cr	(Constitutional Review)
ciri_speech	(Freedom of Speech)	m_femlead	(Female State Leader)
ciri_tort	(Torture)	m_wominpar	(♀ in Parliament %)
ciri_wecon	(Women's Economic Rights)	p_democ	(Institutionalized Democracy)
ciri_wopol	(Women's Political Rights)	p_autoc	(Institutionalized Autocracy)
ciri_worker	(Workers Rights)	p_polity	(Combined Polity Score)
ciri_wosoc	(Women's Social Rights)	p_polity2	(Revised Combined Polity Score)
ciri_injud	(Independence of the Judiciary)	p_parreg	(Regulation of Participation)
dlls_proc	(Number of Procedures)	p_parcomp	(Competitiveness: Participation)
dlls_time	(Time)	p_xrreg	(Regulation: Chief Exe. Recruit)
dlls_cost	(Cost)	p_xrcomp	(Competitiveness: Exe. Recruit)
dlls1_fie	(Formalism Index, Eviction)	p_xropen	(Openness: Exe. Recruitment)
dlls1_fic	(Formalism Index, Check)	p_xconst	(Executive Constraints)
dlls1_tde	(Total Duration, Eviction)	p_durable	(Regime Durability)
dlls1_tdc	(Total Duration, Check)	p_flag	(Tentative Coding)
eiu_iod	(Index of Democracy)	p_fragment	(Polity Fragmentation)
eiu_cl	(Civil Liberties)	p_sf	(State Failure)
eiu_dpc	(Democratic Political Culture)	qs_impar	(Impartial Public Administra.)
eiu_epp	(Electoral Process & Pluralism)	qs_impar_cih	(Impartial Public Administra.)
eiu_fog	(Functioning of Government)	qs_impar_cil	(Impartial Public Administra.)
eiu_pp	(Political Participation)	rsf_pfi	(Press Freedom Index)
fh_cl	(Civil Liberties)	ti_cpi	(Corruption Perceptions Index)
fh_pr	(Political Rights)	ti_cpi_max	(Corruption Perceptions Index)
fh_status	(Status)	ti_cpi_min	(Corruption Perceptions Index)
fh_feb	(Freedom: Expression & Belief)	ti_cpi_sd	(Corruption Perceptions Index)
fh_aor	(Associational & Org. Rights)	t_bribe	(Have paid a bribe in any form)
fh_rol	(Rule of Law)	t_corr	(ibid: Common to pay)
fh_pair	(Pers. Autonomy & Ind. Rights)	t_unicri	(Bribery to Gov. Officials)
fh_ep	(Electoral Process)	van_index	(Index of Democratization)
fh_ppp	(Political Plural. & Participation)	van_comp	(Competition)
fh_fog	(Functioning of Government)	van_part	(Participation)
fh_press	(Freedom of the press)	wbgi_vae	(Voice and Accountability)

QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT VARIABLES (2/2)

wbgi_vas	(Voice and Accountability)	wbgi_rqn	(Regulatory Quality)
wbgi_van	(Voice and Accountability)	wbgi_rle	(Rule of Law)
wbgi_pse	(Political Stability)	wbgi_rls	(Rule of Law)
wbgi_pss	(Political Stability)	wbgi_rln	(Rule of Law)
wbgi_psn	(Political Stability)	wbgi_cce	(Control of Corruption)
wbgi_gee	(Government Effectiveness)	wbgi_ccs	(Control of Corruption)
wbgi_ges	(Government Effectiveness)	wbgi_ccn	(Control of Corruption)
wbgi_gen	(Government Effectiveness)		
wbgi_rqe	(Regulatory Quality)		
wbgi_rqs	(Regulatory Quality)		

Introduction

The aim of the QoG Social Policy Dataset is to promote cross-national comparative research on social policy output and its correlates, with a special focus on the connection between social policy and quality of government (QoG). To accomplish this we have compiled a number of freely available data sources, including aggregated public opinion data. The data comes in three versions: one cross-sectional dataset with global coverage pertaining to the year 2002 (or the closest year available), and two cross-sectional time-series datasets for a selection of 40 countries. The first time-series dataset (long) has country year as its unit of observation, spanning the time period 1946-2009. The other time-series dataset (wide), which is specifically tailored for the analysis of public opinion data over time, instead uses country as its unit of observation, and one variable for every 5th year from 1970-2005 (or, one per module of each public opinion data source).

The data contains six types of variables, each provided under its own heading in this code book:

- **Social policy variables**, such as welfare spending and replacement rates in the social security system.
- **Tax system variables**, such as tax rates and government income from different types of taxes.
- **Indicators on the structural conditions for social policy**, a broad category encompassing things like economic inequality, GDP, unemployment, educational levels, health conditions, trade openness and foreign direct investment.
- **Public opinion data**, including attitudes to social policy, taxes and the government in general, but also more general orientations such as left-right placement and interpersonal trust. In this category we have aggregated individual-level public opinion data from five cross-national comparative survey projects with over-time coverage: The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems; The Eurobarometer (including the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and single Candidate Countries Eurobarometers); The European Social Survey; The International Social Survey Program; and the World Value Surveys.
- **Political indicators**, including election results and policy positions of governments and parliaments, as well as political institutions such as forms of government and electoral systems.
- **Quality of government variables**, pertaining to the core areas of QoG (such as corruption, bureaucratic quality, and democracy).

This dataset was created as part of a research project titled “Quality of Government and the Conditions for Sustainable Social Policy” financed by the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (project # 2005:0493). The aim of the project is to investigate the relation between, on the one hand, trustworthy, reliable, predictable, impartial, uncorrupted and

competent government institutions, and, on the other hand, the possibilities to establish encompassing and universal social policies.

Country and Time Coverage

In the cross-sectional dataset we include all countries in the world recognized by the United Nations as of the year 2002, plus Serbia, Montenegro (as separate states) and Taiwan; in total 194 nations. We have thus included Serbia and Montenegro both as a unit and as two separate states. Although they were a unit in 2002 (they split in 2006), several sources have data for them as separate units. We have decided to leave these data sources as they are and from that follows that we have included Serbia and Montenegro as separate states in the cross-sectional dataset.

Regarding the year from which we have picked the data in the cross-sectional dataset, our first choice has been 2002. The reason for this is that there is a lot less data available for later years. If data for 2002 is not available, then data for 2003 is used. If 2003 is not available, we use data for 2001, and if 2001 is missing, 2004 is used and so forth. As a general rule, we do not include observations from earlier than 1995 in the cross-sectional dataset.

In the cross-sectional time-series datasets (long and wide versions) we only include a sample of 40 countries,¹ selected according to two criteria. The first criterion is relative data density, that is, the extent to which there is valid information on a country averaged across all variables in the dataset over time. Close scrutiny of the rank ordering of countries in terms of this criterion suggest that after 30 countries, the marginal gain in valid information from adding another country decreases substantively. This set of 30 countries is comprised of all OECD countries minus the Czech and Slovak Republics, but plus Israel. The second criterion, however, adds to this another dimension concerned with a particular historical process, assumed to be of relevance in the field of social policy, namely European integration. A country is thus selected to the time-series dataset if it (a) is among the 30 most data-rich countries in the global sample, or (b) is a current member of the European Union (adding another 10 countries).² Together these criteria imply the selection of the following 40 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and West Germany.

¹ We are however happy to provide the time-series cross-sectional dataset with global coverage upon request, although we do not take on any responsibility for keeping this version updated in the future.

² Another way of arriving at the same set of countries is to add all EU27 countries with the rest of the OECD countries plus Israel.

We thus treat West Germany and Germany after unification as distinct cases. Our data sources however vary in this regard, some treating unified Germany as a direct continuation of West Germany. As a consequence, we have **moved the data** from Germany to West Germany for these data sources, in order to be consistent with our criteria. However, if a data source provides information for West and East Germany together as one single case even before the merger, we have **not** moved the data (from the German case). To determine where to put the data for the year of the merger/split, we have relied on the “July 1st-principle” (see the Quality of Government Dataset codebook, version 17June09, p. 20). If Germany in a data source is treated as a continuation of West Germany, we thus place data until and including 1990 on West Germany and leave Germany blank until and including 1990, since the unification of Germany occurred in October, after July 1st, 1990.

Finally, regarding Cyprus, we let this denote the Greek part of the island. Most sources probably do the same with the data that they refer to “Cyprus”, but the documentation of the original data rarely specifies this. Users are urged to double check this with the original sources whenever this is possible.

For each variable or set of variables we specify the period (or year) covered as well as the following statistics:

n : Number of country-year observations

N : Number of countries covered (at any time)

\bar{N} : Mean number of countries per year

\bar{T} : Mean number of years per country.

Note that the long time-series dataset does not contain any purely cross-sectional variables (with the exception of very few public opinion variables), whereas the wide time-series dataset does.

Country and Case Identifier Codes

ccode **Country Code Numeric**

<http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/index.html>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1

Numeric country code (ISO-3166-1 numeric).

[Back?](#)

ccodealp **3-letter Country Code**

<http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/index.html>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1

3-letter country code (ISO-3166-1 alpha3).

The alpha code (ccodealp) does not uniquely identify all countries, since Germany and West Germany have identical alpha codes. All the numeric country codes (ccode) are however unique and this is thus the variable best suitable to use when merging files.

[Back?](#)

cname	Country Name	ccode	ccodealp	cname
4	AFG Afghanistan	72	BWA	Botswana
8	ALB Albania	76	BRA	Brazil
12	DZA Algeria	96	BRN	Brunei
20	AND Andorra	100	BGR	Bulgaria
24	AGO Angola	854	BFA	Burkina Faso
28	ATG Antigua and Barbuda	108	BDI	Burundi
32	ARG Argentina	116	KHM	Cambodia
51	ARM Armenia	120	CMR	Cameroon
36	AUS Australia	124	CAN	Canada
40	AUT Austria	132	CPV	Cape Verde
31	AZE Azerbaijan	140	CAF	Central African Republic
44	BHS Bahamas	148	TCD	Chad
48	BHR Bahrain	152	CHL	Chile
50	BGD Bangladesh	156	CHN	China
52	BRB Barbados	170	COL	Colombia
112	BLR Belarus	174	COM	Comoros
56	BEL Belgium	178	COG	Congo
84	BLZ Belize	180	COD	Congo, Democratic
204	BEN Benin		Republic	
64	BTN Bhutan	188	CRI	Costa Rica
68	BOL Bolivia	384	CIV	Cote d'Ivoire
70	BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina	191	HRV	Croatia

192	CUB	Cuba	398	KAZ	Kazakhstan
196	CYP	Cyprus	404	KEN	Kenya
200	CSK	Czechoslovakia	296	KIR	Kiribati
203	CZE	Czech Republic	408	PRK	Korea, North
208	DNK	Denmark	410	KOR	Korea, South
262	DJI	Djibouti	414	KWT	Kuwait
212	DMA	Dominica	417	KGZ	Kyrgyzstan
214	DOM	Dominican Republic	418	LAO	Laos
218	ECU	Ecuador	428	LVA	Latvia
818	EGY	Egypt	422	LBN	Lebanon
222	SLV	El Salvador	426	LSO	Lesotho
226	GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	430	LBR	Liberia
232	ERI	Eritrea	434	LBY	Libya
233	EST	Estonia	438	LIE	Liechtenstein
230	ETH	Ethiopia (-1992)	440	LTU	Lithuania
231	ETH	Ethiopia (1993-)	442	LUX	Luxembourg
242	FJI	Fiji	807	MKD	Macedonia
246	FIN	Finland	450	MDG	Madagascar
250	FRA	France	454	MWI	Malawi
266	GAB	Gabon	458	MYS	Malaysia
270	GMB	Gambia	462	MDV	Maldives
268	GEO	Georgia	466	MLI	Mali
276	DEU	Germany	470	MLT	Malta
278	DDR	Germany, East	584	MHL	Marshall Islands
280	DEU	Germany, West	478	MRT	Mauritania
288	GHA	Ghana	480	MUS	Mauritius
300	GRC	Greece	484	MEX	Mexico
308	GRD	Grenada	583	FSM	Micronesia
320	GTM	Guatemala	498	MDA	Moldova
324	GIN	Guinea	492	MCO	Monaco
624	GNB	Guinea-Bissau	496	MNG	Mongolia
328	GUY	Guyana	499	MNE	Montenegro
332	HTI	Haiti	504	MAR	Morocco
340	HND	Honduras	508	MOZ	Mozambique
348	HUN	Hungary	104	MMR	Myanmar
352	ISL	Iceland	516	NAM	Namibia
356	IND	India	520	NRU	Nauru
360	IDN	Indonesia	524	NPL	Nepal
364	IRN	Iran	528	NLD	Netherlands
368	IRQ	Iraq	554	NZL	New Zealand
372	IRL	Ireland	558	NIC	Nicaragua
376	ISR	Israel	562	NER	Niger
380	ITA	Italy	566	NGA	Nigeria
388	JAM	Jamaica	578	NOR	Norway
392	JPN	Japan	512	OMN	Oman
400	JOR	Jordan	997	PAK	Pakistan (-1971)

586	PAK	Pakistan (1972-)	752	SWE	Sweden
585	PLW	Palau	756	CHE	Switzerland
591	PAN	Panama	760	SYR	Syria
598	PNG	Papua New Guinea	158	TWN	Taiwan
600	PRY	Paraguay	762	TJK	Tajikistan
604	PER	Peru	834	TZA	Tanzania
608	PHL	Philippines	764	THA	Thailand
616	POL	Poland	994	XTI	Tibet
620	PRT	Portugal	626	TLS	Timor-Leste
634	QAT	Qatar	768	TGO	Togo
642	ROU	Romania	776	TON	Tonga
643	RUS	Russia	780	TTO	Trinidad and Tobago
646	RWA	Rwanda	788	TUN	Tunisia
882	WSM	Samoa	792	TUR	Turkey
674	SMR	San Marino	795	TKM	Turkmenistan
678	STP	Sao Tome and Principe	798	TUV	Tuvalu
682	SAU	Saudi Arabia	800	UGA	Uganda
686	SEN	Senegal	804	UKR	Ukraine
688	SRB	Serbia	784	ARE	United Arab Emirates
891	SCG	Serbia and Montenegro	826	GBR	United Kingdom
690	SYC	Seychelles	840	USA	United States
694	SLE	Sierra Leone	858	URY	Uruguay
702	SGP	Singapore	810	SUN	USSR
703	SVK	Slovakia	860	UZB	Uzbekistan
705	SVN	Slovenia	548	VUT	Vanuatu
90	SLB	Solomon Islands	862	VEN	Venezuela
706	SOM	Somalia	704	VNM	Vietnam
710	ZAF	South Africa	998	VNM	Vietnam, North
724	ESP	Spain	999	VDR	Vietnam, South
144	LKA	Sri Lanka	887	YEM	Yemen
659	KNA	St Kitts and Nevis	886	YEM	Yemen, North
662	LCA	St Lucia	720	YMD	Yemen, South
670	VCT	St Vincent and the Grenadines	890	YUG	Yugoslavia
736	SDN	Sudan	995	EAZ	Zanzibar
740	SUR	Suriname	894	ZMB	Zambia
748	SWZ	Swaziland	716	ZWE	Zimbabwe

Back?

year **Year**
ccodewb **Country Code World Bank**
ccodecow **Country Code Correlates of War**
cname_year **Country Name and Year**
ccodealp_year **3-letter Country Code and Year**

oecd **OECD member**

Equals 1 if country is a member of the OECD, and 0 otherwise.

eu27 **EU27 member**

Equals 1 if country is a member of the EU27, and 0 otherwise.

eu15 **EU15 member**

Equals 1 if country is a member of the EU15, and 0 otherwise.

eea **European Economic Area**

Equals 1 if country is a member of the European Economic Area, and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

ht_region **The Region of the Country**

(Teorell and Hadenius 2005)

This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with the partial exception of category 5 below) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow:

- (1) Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia)
- (2) Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)
- (3) North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus)
- (4) Sub-Saharan Africa
- (5) Western Europe and North America (including Australia & New Zealand)
- (6) East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia)
- (7) South-East Asia
- (8) South Asia
- (9) The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zealand)
- (10) The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)

[Back?](#)

ht_region2 **The Region of the Country (alternative)**

(Teorell and Hadenius 2005)

To flag some of the most contested cases, we have in the alternative variable, **ht_region2**, coded Cyprus (considering the Greek majority of their population) as belonging to category (5), Haiti (considering their non-Spanish colonial legacy and membership in Caricom) as belonging to category (10), and Mongolia (considering their post-communist legacy) as belonging to category (1).

[Back?](#)

Social Policy

Here we present data on public and private welfare spending (both in total and divided into different sectors), replacement rates and coverage of social security systems, and also data that in some sense measures the quality of social service, like e.g. density of physicians and pupil-teacher ratios.

Armingeon et al – Comparative Political Dataset I & II

http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html

(Armingeon et al 2008; Armingeon & Careja 2006)

ar_source **Armingeon source**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1370, N: 35, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 39)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 53)

There are three different versions of the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS), and this variable denotes from which of these each observation comes. There are observations from 23 OECD countries from CPDS I, 28 post-communist countries from CPDS II, and data for Cyprus and Malta from CPDS III.

[Back?](#)

ar_sst **Social security transfers (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1143, N: 25, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Includes social assistance grants and welfare benefits paid by the general government (benefits for sickness, old-age, family allowances etc.).

[Back?](#)

Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Labor

(Cross-Section: covers the 1997-2002 period, N: 84, except where noted)

http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/Regulation%20of%20Labor-All/Regulation%20of%20Labor.xls

(Botero et al. 2004)

Please note: Botero et al. measure the formal legal rules, not how social policy is implemented in practice. Since enforcement of formal rules varies between countries, the data should be interpreted with caution.

Unless otherwise specified, higher values indicate higher worker protection. All dummy

variables are equal to one or zero. All normalized variables lie between 0 and 1, where 0 (1) is the minimum (maximum) actual value in the sample of countries.

Social Security Laws

bdlls_ssli Social Security Laws Index

Measures social security benefits as the average of: (1) Old age, disability and death benefits (bdlls_oadbi); (2) Sickness and health benefits (bdlls_shbi); and (3) Unemployment benefits (bdlls_ubi).

[Back?](#)

Old-Age, Disability and Death Benefits

bdlls_oadbi Old Age, Disability and Death Benefit Index

Measures the level of old age, disability and death benefits as the average of bdlls_drale, bdlls_cenr, bdlls_pdoad and bdlls_ppscp. (Thus excluding bdlls_coadd.)

[Back?](#)

bdlls_coadd Coverage of Old-Age, Disability and Death

Equals one if the social security system covers the risk of old age, disability and death, and zero otherwise.

[Back?](#)

bdlls_drale Difference Between Retirement Age and Life Expectancy

(N: 83)

Measures the difference between the minimum legal age for normal retirement and the country's life expectancy at birth. This variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean higher post-retirement life expectancy (higher protection). Normal retirement is the legally defined age for retirement with standard pension, and it excludes voluntary early or late retirement schemes. Equals zero if life expectancy is lower than retirement age. The highest observation in the sample is 23.8 years and the lowest is 0. Source: constructed using data from the laws of each country and the Human Development Report (1997).

[Back?](#)

bdlls_cenr Contribution/Employment for Normal Retirement

(N: 83)

Measures the number of months of contributions or employment legally required for normal retirement. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean less contribution (higher protection). The highest observation in the sample is 540 months and the lowest is 0 months. Normal retirement is the legally defined age for retirement with standard pension, and it excludes voluntary early or late retirement

schemes. If the law requires the worker to have a combination of certain number of months of work and a different number of months of contributions, the higher of the two figures is used since this is the one that is binding. Lump-sum and private pension systems do not define the number of months of contributions for normal retirement by law. In such cases, the amount of the pension solely depends on the number of months of contributions, thus Botero et al. assume twenty years of contributions for normal retirement.

[Back?](#)

bdlls_pdoad Percentage of Salary Deducted for Old-Age and Disability Benefits

(N: 83)

Measures the share of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover old-age, disability, and death benefits. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean lower deductions (higher protection). If the risk of disability and death is not included in the contribution for old-age pension, the individual components were added. The highest observation in the sample is 20% and the lowest is 0%. In some countries the social security contribution for old-age, disability and death benefits also covers sickness and health benefits and/or unemployment benefits. In such cases, Botero et al. calculated the share of contributions for each benefit for the average country in the sample, and apportioned the total contribution among the several risks covered accordingly.

[Back?](#)

bdlls_pnrr Pension Net Replacement Rate

This variable is the percentage of the net pre-retirement salary covered by the net old-age cash-benefit pension. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean higher benefits (higher protection). The highest observation in the sample is 93.41% and the lowest is 0%. For the countries that provide workers with more than 12 pension payments a year, the amount of all the payments is added up and divided by 12 to get the equivalent "monthly" cash benefit pension. The gross pre-retirement salary is assumed to be equal to the country's GNP per worker. For each country Botero et al. consider the relevant deductions and tax rates to transform gross income to net income. For lump-sum systems, where at the time of retirement a one-time payment is made equal to the worker's contributions plus accrued interest, the monthly old-age cash-benefit pension is calculated using the lump-sum payment divided by the difference between the average life expectancy and retirement age in months. The interest used in the calculation is the average monthly Libor rate over the previous ten years. The same methodology as in the lump-sum systems is applied to the private pension systems. If there are more than 12 pension payments per year Botero et al. adjust the percentage accordingly.

[Back?](#)

Sickness and Health Benefits

bdlls_shbi **Sickness and Health Benefits Index**

Measures the level of sickness and health benefits as the average of the following four normalized variables bdlls_cesb, bdlls_pdsh, bdlls_wpsb, bdlls_sbnrr. (Thus excluding bdlls_crs.)

Back?

bdlls_crs **Coverage of Risk of Sickness**

Equals one if the social security system covers the risk of sickness and zero otherwise.

Back?

bdlls_cesb **Contribution/Employment for Sickness Benefit**

Measures the number of months of contributions or employment legally required to qualify for sickness benefits. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean less contribution (higher protection). If the law requires the worker to have a combination of a certain number of months of work and a different number of months of contributions, Botero et al. use the higher of the two figures since this is the one that is binding. The highest observation in the sample is 12 months and the lowest is 0 months.

Back?

bdlls_pdshb **Percentage of Salary Deducted for Sickness and Health Benefits**

(N: 68)

Measures the share of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover sickness and health benefits. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean lower deductions (higher protection). If the risks of sickness and health demand separate contributions, the individual components are added. The highest observation in the sample is 11.8% and the lowest observation is 0. In some countries the social security contribution for old age, disability and death benefits also covers sickness and health benefits and/or unemployment benefits. In such cases, Botero et al. calculate the share of contributions for each benefit for the average country in the sample, and apportion the total contribution among the several risks covered accordingly.

Back?

bdlls_wpsb Waiting Period for Sickness Benefits

(N: 67)

Measures the waiting period for obtaining sickness cash benefits from the first day of sickness. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean lower waiting periods (higher protection). The waiting period is the number of days before a person is legally entitled to receive sickness benefits. The highest observation in the sample is 42 days and the lowest observation is 0 days.

Back?

bdlls_sbnrr Sickness Benefits Net Replacement Rate

Measures the percentage of the net salary covered by the net sickness cash benefit for a two-month sickness spell. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean higher percentage of net salary covered (higher protection). The highest observation in the sample is 100% and the lowest observation is 0. If sickness benefits last less than 2 months, the percentage of the benefits is discounted proportionally. For each country Botero et al. consider the relevant deductions and tax rates to transform gross income to net income. Sickness cash benefits are in some countries defined as a fixed amount in local currency, rather than as a percentage of previous earnings. In such cases, the percentage of the net salary covered is calculated based on a salary equal to the country's net GNP per worker.

Back?

Unemployment Benefits

bdlls_ubi Unemployment Benefits Index

Measures the level of unemployment benefits as the average of bdlls_ceueb, bdlls_pdueb, bdlls_wpueb and bdlls_uebnrr. (Thus excluding bdlls_crue.)

Back?

bdlls_crue Coverage of Risk of Unemployment

Equals one if the social security system covers the risk of unemployment, and zero otherwise.

Back?

bdlls_ceueb Contribution/Employment for Unemployment Benefits

(N: 52)

Measures the number of months of contributions or employment legally required to qualify for unemployment benefits. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean less contribution (higher protection). If the law requires the worker to have a combination of a certain number of months of work and a different number of months of contributions, Botero et al. use the higher of the two figures since this is the one that is binding. The highest observation in the sample is 120 months and the lowest observation is 0 months.

Back?

bdlls_pdueb Percentage of Salary Deducted for Unemployment Benefits

(N: 52)

Measures the share of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover unemployment benefits. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean lower deductions (higher protection). The highest observation in the sample is 6.1% and the lowest observation is 0%. In some countries the social security contribution for old-age, disability and death benefits also covers sickness and health benefits and/or unemployment benefits. In such cases, Botero et al. calculate the share of contributions for each benefit for the average country in the sample, and apportion the total contribution among the several risks covered.

[Back?](#)

bdlls_wpueb Waiting Period for Unemployment Benefits

(N: 52)

Measures the waiting period for obtaining unemployment benefits from the first day of unemployment. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean lower waiting periods (higher protection). The waiting period is the number of days before a person is legally entitled to receive unemployment benefits. The highest observation in the sample is 70 days and the lowest observation is 0 days.

[Back?](#)

bdlls_uebnrr Unemployment Benefits Net Replacement Rate

(N: 50)

Measures the percentage of the net salary covered by net unemployment benefits in the case of a one-year unemployment spell. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean a higher percentage of net salary covered (higher protection). The highest observation in the sample is 81.49% and the lowest observation is 5.53%. If the maximum duration of benefits is less than a year, the percentage of the annual benefits is discounted proportionally. For each country Botero et al. consider the relevant deductions and tax rates to transform gross income to net income. Unemployment benefits are defined in some countries as a fixed amount in local currency, rather than as a percentage of previous earnings. In such cases, the percentage of the net salary covered is calculated based on a salary equal to the country's net GNP per worker.

[Back?](#)

Employment Laws

bdlls_eli Employment Laws Index

Measures the protection of labor and employment laws as the average of the four variables following below.

[Back?](#)

bdlls_aeci Alternative Employment Contracts Index

Measures the existence and cost of alternatives to the standard employment contract, computed as the average of: (1) a dummy variable equal to one if part-time workers enjoy the mandatory benefits of full-time workers, (2) a dummy variable equal to one if terminating part-time workers is at least as costly as terminating full time workers, (3) a dummy variable equal to one if fixed-term contracts are only allowed for fixed-term tasks, and (4) the normalized maximum duration of fixed-term contracts.

Back?

bdlls_cihw Cost of Increasing Hour Worked

Measures the cost of increasing the number of hours worked. Botero et al. first calculate the "maximum number of hours of work in a year before overtime" per year in each country (excluding overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.). Normal hours range from 1,758 in Denmark to 2,418 in Kenya. Then Botero et al. assume that firms need to increase the hours worked by their employees from 1,758 to 2,418 hours during one year. A firm first increases the number of hours worked until it reaches the country's maximum normal hours of work, and then uses overtime. If existing employees are not allowed to increase the hours worked to 2,418 hours in a year, perhaps because overtime is capped, Botero et al. assume that the firm doubles its workforce and each worker is paid 1,758 hours, doubling the wage bill of the firm. The cost of increasing hours worked is computed as the ratio of the final wage bill to the initial one.

Back?

bdlls_cofw Cost of Firing Workers

Measures the cost of firing 20 percent of the firm's workers (10% are fired for redundancy and 10% without cause). The cost of firing a worker is calculated as the sum of the notice period, severance pay, and any mandatory penalties established by law or mandatory collective agreements for a worker with three years of tenure with the firm. If dismissal is illegal, Botero et al. set the cost of firing equal to the annual wage. The new wage bill incorporates the normal wage of the remaining workers and the cost of firing workers. The cost of firing workers is computed as the ratio of the new wage bill to the old one.

Back?

bdlls_dpi Dismissal Procedures Index

Measures worker protection granted by law or mandatory collective agreements against dismissal. It is the average of the following seven dummy variables which equal one: (1) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing more than one worker, (2) if the employer needs the approval of a third party prior to dismissing more than one worker, (3) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing one redundant worker, (4) if the employer needs the approval of a third party to dismiss one redundant worker, (5) if the employer must provide relocation or retraining alternatives for redundant employees prior to dismissal, (6) if there are priority rules applying to dismissal or lay-offs, and (7) if there are priority rules applying to re-employment.

Back?

Collective Relations Laws

bdlls_crls Collective Relations Laws Index

Measures the protection of collective relations laws as the average of the two variables following below.

Back?

bdlls_lupi Labor Union Power Index

Measures the statutory protection and power of unions as the average of the following seven dummy variables which equal one: (1) if employees have the right to unionize; (2) if employees have the right to collective bargaining; (3) if employees have the legal duty to bargain with unions; (4) if collective contracts are extended to third parties by law; (5) if the law allows closed shops; (6) if workers, or unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the Boards of Directors; and (7) if workers' councils are mandated by law.

Back?

bdlls_cdi Collective Disputes Index

Measures the protection of workers during collective disputes as the average of the following eight variables, (1) if wildcat, political and sympathy/solidarity/secondary strikes are legal (legal strikes), (2) if employer lockouts are illegal, (3) if workers have the right to industrial action, (4) if there is no mandatory waiting period or notification requirement before strikes can occur, (5) if striking is legal even if there is a collective agreement in force, (6) if laws do not mandate conciliation procedures before a strike, (7) if third-party arbitration during a labor dispute is mandated by law, and (8) if it is illegal to fire or replace striking workers.

Back?

Civil Rights

bdlls_cri Civil Rights Index

Measures the degree of protection of vulnerable groups against employment discrimination as the average of the five variables following below.

Back?

bdlls_drace Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Race

Equals 1 if there is an affirmative statement prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race, color or ethnicity in: (1) the constitution; (2) the labor code; (3) a law dealing specifically with racial equality. The variable equals zero otherwise. A general statement regarding the equality of citizens is not considered an affirmative statement.

Back?

bdlls_dsex Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Sex

Equals 1 if there is an affirmative statement prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sex in: (1) the constitution; (2) the labor code; (3) a law dealing specifically with the equality of the sexes. The variable equals zero otherwise. We consider an affirmative statement as one which expresses the equality of man and woman or the prohibition of discrimination based on sex or gender. A general statement regarding the equality of citizens is not considered an affirmative statement.

Back?

bdlls_stoml Statutory Duration of Maternity Leave

Measures the length of the statutory duration of maternity leave for normal delivery/birth of a normal child with 100% of earnings. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean longer maternity leave (higher protection). Equals zero if maternity leave is unpaid. If payment for maternity leave is less than 100% of previous wages, the time is reduced proportionally. The highest observation in our sample is 12 months and the lowest observation is 0 months.

Back?

bdlls_mwa Minimum Working Age

Measures the age at which a child can be employed in an apprenticeship or in a full-time, non-farm, non-hazardous, non-night time job outside of the family business without requiring the permission of a public entity. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean higher protection. The highest value in our sample is 18 years and the lowest is 12 years.

Back?

bdlls_mmw Mandatory Minimum Wage

Equals one if: (1) there is a mandatory minimum wage defined by statute; or (2) there is a minimum wage established by mandatory (administratively extended) collective agreement, which is legally binding for most sectors of the economy. We ignore variations in the minimum wage laws stemming from: (1) reduced or sub minimum rates for youth, apprentices, students and disabled employees; (2) adjustments for regional cost of living; (3) exemptions for public employees and those serving in the armed forces; (4) the experience and marital status of the employee and; (5) specific exemptions for certain groups.

Back?

Eurostat

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>
(Eurostat 2007)

eu_pha Physicians (absolute value)

(Time-series: 2001-2010, n: 231, N: 28, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 1998-2002 (varies by country), N: 31)

Number of practicing physicians or doctors.

Back?

eu_phd Physicians/doctors (density per 100,000 population)

(Time-series: 1999-2010, n: 242, N: 25, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 10)
(Cross-section: 1998-2003 (varies by country), N: 31)

Density of practicing physicians or doctors per 100,000 population.

Back?

eu_dea Dentists (absolute value)

(Time-series: 1970-2006, n: 426, N: 25, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 1998-2002 (varies by country), N: 29)

Number of practicing dentists.

Back?

eu_ded Dentists (density per 100,000 population)

(Time-series: 1999-2010, n: 226, N: 23, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 10)

(Cross-section: 1998-2003 (varies by country), N: 29)

Density of practicing dentists per 100,000 population.

Back?

Franzese – Participation, Inequality and Transfers Database

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/T&T_FullDataSet.XLS

(Franzese 1998; 2002)

fr_ss Social security benefits, grants and welfare

(Time-series: 1950-1993, n: 840, N: 21 \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 40)

Social security benefits, grants and welfare as a percentage of GDP.

Back?

Huber et al – Comparative Welfare States Data Set

<http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/cws%20lis.xls>

(Huber et al 2004)

hu_sw Social wage

(Time-series: 1961-1995, n: 324, N: 18, \bar{N} : 9, \bar{T} : 17)

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 18)

The social wage is the percentage of former income that a median-income worker would receive if he or she stopped working. Sources of this income include unemployment compensation, general public assistance and related programs. Data from Kenworthy (1999) and OECD.

Back?

hu_socx Gross public social expenditure (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1980-1999, n: 332, N: 19, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 17)

(Cross-section: 1998-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Gross public social expenditure as a percentage of current GDP.

Back?

hu_sst Social security transfers (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 714, N: 19, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 1997-2000 (varies by country), N: 17)

Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Consists of benefits for sickness, old-age, family allowances, etc., as well as social assistance grants.

[Back?](#)

hu_sse Social security expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Total social security expenditure (benefits plus administrative expenses and transfers to other schemes), in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_ssbe Social security benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Total social security benefit expenditure, in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_sfbe Social insurance and family allowance benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 535, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Total benefit expenditure relating to "Social Insurance and Assimilated Schemes" and "Family Allowance" programs, in millions of national currency units. This includes benefit expenditure on sickness and maternity, employment injuries, pensions, unemployment and family allowances. Excluded are special schemes, like benefits for war victims, public employees etc.

[Back?](#)

hu_smbe Sickness and maternity benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 535, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Benefit expenditure on sickness and maternity (including medical care and cash benefits) as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

[Back?](#)

hu_eibe Employment injuries benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 498, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 28)

Benefit expenditure on employment injuries (including medical care and cash benefits) as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

[Back?](#)

hu_pbe Pensions benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 535, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Benefit expenditure on pensions as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

[Back?](#)

hu_fabe Family allowances benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 494, N: 17, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 29)

Benefit expenditure on family allowances as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

[Back?](#)

hu_uebe Unemployment benefit expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 535, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Benefit expenditure on unemployment as a percentage of total social insurance benefit expenditure (hu_sfbe).

[Back?](#)

hu_teh Total expenditure on health

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 729, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total expenditure on health in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_peh Public expenditure on health

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 730, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Public expenditure on health in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_pehp Public expenditure on health (% of total health expenditure)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 551, N: 19, \bar{N} : 13, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Public expenditure on health as a percentage of total expenditure on health (hu_peh / hu_teh * 100).

[Back?](#)

hu_cpeh Current public expenditure on health

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 610, N: 19, \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 32)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 17)

Current public expenditure on health in millions of national currency units. This variable excludes investments in medical facilities, and it is thus different from hu_peh.

[Back?](#)

hu_pegnc Public expenditure on pensions (national currency)

(Time-series: 1960-1985, n: 451, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 25)

Public expenditure on age, disability and survivors pensions in national currency units (millions for all countries except Italy and Japan which are in billions).

[Back?](#)

hu_peggi Public expenditure on pensions (% of GNI)

(Time-series: 1960-1985, n: 449, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 25)

Public expenditure on age, disability and survivors pensions as a percentage of national income.

[Back?](#)

hu_peggp Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-1985, n: 451, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 25)

Public expenditure on age, disability and survivors pensions as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

hu_ocbe Old age cash benefits expenditure (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1980-1999, n: 332, N: 19, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 1998-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Old age cash benefits as a percentage of current GDP.

[Back?](#)

hu_teic Total expenditure on in-patient care

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 568, N: 18, \bar{N} : 14, \bar{T} : 32)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 14)

Total expenditure on in-patient care in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_peic **Public expenditure on in-patient care**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 645, N: 19, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 1997-2000 (varies by country), N: 16)

Public expenditure on in-patient care in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_teac **Total expenditure on ambulatory care**

(Time-series: 1960-1997, n: 451, N: 16, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 11)

Total expenditure on ambulatory care in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_peac **Public expenditure on ambulatory care**

(Time-series: 1960-1997, n: 561, N: 19, \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 12)

Public expenditure on ambulatory care in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_stmc **Share with total medical coverage**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 732, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1997-2000 (varies by country), N: 18)

Share of population with total medical coverage.

[Back?](#)

hu_sacc **Share with ambulatory care coverage**

(Time-series: 1960-1997, n: 668, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 18)

Share of population with ambulatory care coverage.

[Back?](#)

hu_sipc **Share with in-patient services coverage**

(Time-series: 1960-200, n: 735, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 39)

(Cross-section: 1997-2000 (varies by country), N: 18)

Share of population in-patient services care coverage.

[Back?](#)

hu_tpe Total public expenditure

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 683, N: 19, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 18)

Total public expenditure in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_ssr Social security receipts

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Total social security receipts (contributions, taxes, general state revenues, other state participation, capital income), in millions of national currency units.

[Back?](#)

hu_sfbr Social insurance and family allowance receipts

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Total receipts relating to “Social Insurance and Assimilated Schemes” and “Family Allowance” programs, including transfers from other programs.

[Back?](#)

hu_wcr Workers’ contributions revenue

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 509, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 28)

Revenue from workers’ contributions as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

[Back?](#)

hu_ecr Employers’ contributions revenue

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 533, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Revenue from employers’ contributions as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

[Back?](#)

hu_stss Special taxes allocated to social security

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 123, N: 9, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 14)

Revenue from special taxes allocated to social security as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

[Back?](#)

hu_facr State funds and other authorities' contributions revenue

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 536, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

Revenue from state funds, plus contributions from other public authorities, as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

Back?

hu_rcss Revenue from capital income to social security

(Time-series: 1960-1989, n: 503, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 28)

Revenue from income from capital as a percentage of total social insurance revenue (hu_sfbr).

Back?

hu_tpr Total public revenue

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 684, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 17)

Total public revenue in millions of national currency units.

Back?

hu_ggd General government deficit

(Time-series: 1960-1997, n: 609, N: 19, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 32)

(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 18)

General government deficit in millions of national currency units.

Back?

Iversen & Cusack

<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/data/deindustrialization.htm>
(Iversen & Cusack 2000)

ic_gt Government transfers (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-1995, n: 572, N: 17, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 334)

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 13)

All government payments to the civilian household sector as a percentage of GDP, including social security transfers, government grants, public employee pensions, and transfers to non-profit institutions serving the household sector.

Back?

ic_got Generosity of transfers

(Time-series: 1960-1991, n: 512, N: 17, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 30)

The percentage share of transfers in GDP (ic_gt) relative to the percentage share of the non-working population in the total population.

[Back?](#)

Iversen & Soskice

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/index_files/page0009.htm

(Iversen & Soskice 2006)

is_rg Redistribution (change in Gini)

(Time-series: 1967-1997, n: 61, N: 15, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 6)

Redistribution measured as the percentage reduction in the Gini coefficient from before to after taxes and transfers, that is: (Gini before taxes and transfers - Gini after taxes and transfers) / Gini before taxes and transfers.

[Back?](#)

is_rp Redistribution (change in poverty)

(Time-series: 1967-1997, n: 61, N: 15, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 1995-1997 (varies by country), N: 6)

Redistribution measured as the percentage reduction in relative poverty rate from before to after taxes and transfers, that is: (poverty before taxes and transfers – poverty after taxes and transfers) / poverty before taxes and transfers. The relative poverty rate is defined as the percentage of households below 50 % of the median income.

[Back?](#)

OECD – Benefits and Wages

http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2825_497118_34053248_1_1_1_1,00.html

(OECD 2006c)

bw_uegr Unemployment benefit gross replacement rate

(Time-series: 1961-2003, n: 462, N: 22, \bar{N} : 11, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 2003, N: 21)

This is a summary measure defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment.

[Back?](#)

OECD – Family Database

<http://www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database>
(2009b)

fd_cf **Childcare fees (% of average wage)**

(Cross-section: 2004, N: 31)

Childcare fees per two-year old attending accredited early-years care and education services as a percentage of an average wage.

[Back?](#)

fd_pl **Parental leave**

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 22)

Weeks of employment-protected leave of absence for employed parents, which are individual and not reserved for either the mother or the father. This includes both paid and unpaid leave.

[Back?](#)

fd_ftepl **FTE paid parental leave**

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 21)

The full-time equivalent (FTE) of the proportion of the duration of paid parental leave if it were paid at 100 % of last earnings. That is, (duration of leave in weeks) * (payment as a percentage of earnings). The calculations are based on an average production worker wage.

[Back?](#)

fd_upl **Unpaid parental leave**

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 10)

Weeks of unpaid, employment-protected, leave of absence for employed parents, which are individual and not reserved for neither the mother nor the father.

[Back?](#)

fd_patl **Paternity leave**

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 21)

Weeks of employment-protected leave of absence for employed men at the time of childbirth. This includes both paid and unpaid leave.

[Back?](#)

fd_ftep FTE paid paternity leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 21)

The full-time equivalent (FTE) of the proportion of the duration of paid paternity leave if it were paid at 100 % of last earnings (see fd_ftepl).

Back?

fd_ml Maternity leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 37)

Weeks of employment-protected leave of absence for employed women at around the time of childbirth, or adoption in some countries. This includes both paid and unpaid leave.

Back?

fd_ftem FTE paid maternity leave

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 37)

The full-time equivalent (FTE) of the proportion of the duration of paid maternity leave if it were paid at 100 % of last earnings (see fd_ftepl).

Back?

OECD – Public Sector Pay and Employment Database

http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en_2649_37457_2408769_1_1_1_37457,00.html

(OECD 2007a)

psp_tpe Total public employment

(Time-series: 1985-2000, n: 61, N: 13, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 5)

(Cross-section: 1998-2000 (varies by country), N: 12)

Total public employment.

Back?

psp_pes Public employment share of total employment

(Time-series: 1985-1999, n: 65, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 1997-1999 (varies by country), N: 16)

Public employment as a percentage of total employment.

Back?

psp_psc Total public sector compensation costs (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1985-2000, n: 97, N: 20, \bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 5)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 17)

Total public sector compensation costs as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

OECD – The Social Expenditure Database (SOCX 2007)

http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG

(OECD 2007b; 2007c)

Note: All SOCX variables are listed as a percentage of GDP.

The Social Expenditure Database contains detailed statistics on expenditure in the social domain. The data is categorized according to branch (old age, health etc.), expenditure's type of source (public expenditure, mandatory private expenditure and voluntary private expenditure) and expenditure's type (cash benefits and benefits in kind/social services), and we have labeled the variables accordingly. E.g. "old age expenditure, mandatory private, cash", which means that the branch is old age, the source of the expenditure is mandatory private and that it is cash benefit. If the label was "old age expenditure, mandatory private, total" it would mean the sum of the in kind and cash expenditure for the mandatory private old age sector.

Please note that the "in kind" expenditure type basically means social service. This can be expenditure on home-help services, in-patient care, child care etc.

The distinction between public and private social protection is made on the basis of whoever controls the relevant financial flows: public institutions or private bodies. For example, sickness benefits financed by compulsory employer and employee contributions (receipts) to social insurance funds are by convention considered public. All social benefits not provided by general government are considered private.

Mandatory private social expenditure is social support stipulated by legislation but operated through the private sector, e.g. direct sickness payments by employers to their absent employees as legislated by public authorities, or benefits accruing from mandatory contributions to private insurance funds.

Voluntary private social expenditure is benefits accruing from privately operated programs that involve the redistribution of resources across households and include benefits provided by NGOs, and benefit accruing from tax advantaged individual plans and collective (often employment-related) support arrangements, such as for example, pensions, childcare support, and, in the US, employment-related health plans.

SOCX includes data on the magnitude of private social spending across the OECD, but this data is nevertheless deemed of lesser quality than information on budgetary allocations for social support.

SOCX generally excludes administration costs, i.e. the costs incurred with the provision of benefits, as these expenditures do not go directly to the beneficiary. However, regarding the provision of services such as under Active Labor Market Programs and public expenditure on health, the administration costs are included in the totals. The inclusion of these costs in the expenditures is justified as they are part of the service being provided to beneficiaries, such as job-seeker reception and counseling, or patient reception and hospital services.

Total social expenditure

The total expenditure of all branches.

socx_tput Total social expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 788, N: 33, \bar{N} 28:, \bar{T} : 24)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_tpuc Total social expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 794, N: 33, \bar{N} 28:, \bar{T} : 24)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_tpuk Total social expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 794, N: 33, \bar{N} 28:, \bar{T} : 24)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_tmpt Total social expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 432, N: 20, \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 22)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 20)

[Back?](#)

socx_tmpe Total social expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 419, N: 19, \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 22)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 19)

[Back?](#)

socx_tmpk Total social expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 90, N: 5, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 6)

[Back?](#)

socx_tvpt Total social expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 689, N: 32, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

[Back?](#)

Net Total Social Expenditure

Net social expenditure is expenditure minus direct and indirect taxes. Expenditure includes both cash and in kind expenditure.

[Back?](#)

socx_nt Net total social expenditure

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 26)

Total social expenditure from both private and public sources, minus taxes. (Note: This variable is not always the simple sum of public, mandatory private and voluntary private net social spending. This is because there are tax breaks for social purposes that are included in several of these variables for the same observation. As a consequence, the simple sum of them would then result in double counting the tax breaks.)

[Back?](#)

socx_ntp Net total social expenditure, public

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 26)

Total public social expenditure minus taxes.

[Back?](#)

socx_ntmp Net total social expenditure, mandatory private

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 26)

Total mandatory private social expenditure minus taxes.

[Back?](#)

socx_ntvp Net total social expenditure, voluntary private

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 26)

Total voluntary private social expenditure minus taxes.

[Back?](#)

Old-age

This category includes old-age pensions, early retirement pensions and home-help and residential services for elderly. Excluded are programs concerning early retirement for labor market reasons which are classified under unemployment.

socx_oput Old age expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 775, N: 33, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_opuc Old age expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 775, N: 33, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_opuk Old age expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 709, N: 32, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 29)

[Back?](#)

socx_ompt Old age expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 216, N: 11, \bar{N} : 8, \bar{T} : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 11)

[Back?](#)

socx_ompc Old age expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 203, N: 10, \bar{N} : 7, \bar{T} : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 10)

[Back?](#)

socx_ompk Old age expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1990-2007, n: 44, N: 3, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 4)

[Back?](#)

socx_ovpt Old age expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 528, N: 24, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

[Back?](#)

Survivors expenditure

This category includes expenditure on programs which prived the spouse or dependent of a deceased person with a benefit, for example pensions or funeral payments.

[Back?](#)

socx_sput Survivors expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 775, N: 33, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_spuc Survivors expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 775, N: 33, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_spuk Survivors expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 583, N: 28, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 25)

[Back?](#)

socx_smpt Survivors expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 165, N: 9, \bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 9)

[Back?](#)

socx_smpc Survivors expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 152, N: 8, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 8)

[Back?](#)

socx_smpk Survivors expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1990-2007, n: 49, N: 3, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 3)

[Back?](#)

Incapacity-related benefits expenditure

Cash benefits in this category comprise of cash payments on account of complete or partial inability to participate gainfully in the labor market due to disability. This includes paid sick leave, special allowances and disability related payments such as pensions, if they are related to prescribed occupational injuries and diseases. Sickness cash benefits related to loss of earning because of the temporary inability to work due to illness are also recorded.

Exclude are leave related to sickness or injury of a dependent child which is recorded under family cash benefits. Expenditure regarding the public provision of health care is recorded under health.

Benefits in kind in this category encompasses services for disabled people, such as day care and rehabilitation services, home-help services etc.

Back?

socx_iput Incapacity expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 775, N: 33, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

Back?

socx_ipuc Incapacity expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 775, N: 33, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

Back?

socx_ipuk Incapacity expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 716, N: 31, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 28)

Back?

socx_impt Incapacity expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 413, N: 20, \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 20)

Back?

socx_impc Incapacity expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 400, N: 19, \bar{N} : 14, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 19)

Back?

socx_impk Incapacity expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1990-2007, n: 44, N: 3, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 3)

Back?

socx_ivpt Incapacity expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 393, N: 21, \bar{N} : 14, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

[Back?](#)

Health expenditure

Expenditure in this category encompasses, among other things, expenditure on in-patient care, ambulatory medical services and pharmaceutical goods.

Individual health expenditure, insofar as it is not reimbursed by a public institution, is not included. As already noted, cash benefits related to sickness are recorded under incapacity-related benefits.

Voluntary private social health expenditure are estimates on the benefits to recipients that derive from private health plans which contain an element of redistribution (such private health insurance plans are often employment-based and/or tax-advantaged).

socx_hput Health expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 797, N: 33, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 24)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_hpuk Health expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 699, N: 31, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_hmpt Health expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 28, N: 1, \bar{N} : 1, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 1)

[Back?](#)

socx_hmpk Health expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 28, N: 1, \bar{N} : 1, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 1)

[Back?](#)

socx_hvpt Health expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 561, N: 29, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 26)

[Back?](#)

Family expenditure

Includes expenditure which supports families (i.e. excluding one-person households). This expenditure is often related to the costs associated with raising children or with the support of other dependants. Expenditure related to maternity and parental leave is grouped under the family cash benefits sub-category.

socx_fput **Family expenditure, public, total**

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 775, N: 33, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_fpuc **Family expenditure, public, cash**

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 765, N: 33, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_fpuk **Family expenditure, public, in kind**

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 741, N: 33, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_fmpt **Family expenditure, mandatory private, total**

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 126, N: 7, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 7)

[Back?](#)

socx_fmpc **Family expenditure, mandatory private, cash**

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 111, N: 6, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 6)

[Back?](#)

socx_fm pk **Family expenditure, mandatory private, in kind**

(Time-series: 1990-2007, n: 44, N: 3, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 3)

[Back?](#)

Active labor market programs expenditure

Contains all social expenditure (other than education) which is aimed at the improvement of the beneficiaries' prospect of finding gainful employment or to otherwise increase their earnings capacity. This category includes spending on public employment services and administration, labor market training, special programs for youth when in transition from school to work, labor market programs to provide or promote employment for unemployed and other persons (excluding young and disabled persons) and special programs for the disabled.

socx_lput Labor program expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 715, N: 33, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Back?

Unemployment expenditure

Includes all cash expenditure to people compensating for unemployment. This includes redundancy payments out of public resources as well as pensions to beneficiaries before they reach the 'standard' pensionable age if these payments are made because they are out of work or otherwise for reasons of labor market policy

socx_uput Unemployment expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 754, N: 32, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 24)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Back?

socx_upuc Unemployment expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 754, N: 32, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 24)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Back?

socx_umpt Unemployment expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1990-2007, n: 18, N: 1, \bar{N} : 1, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 1)

Back?

socx_umpc Unemployment expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1990-2007, n: 18, N: 1, \bar{N} : 1, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 1)

Back?

Housing expenditure

Rent subsidies and other benefits to the individual to help with housing costs. This includes direct public subsidies to tenants (in some countries, e.g. Norway, homeowners living in their house) earmarked for support with the cost of housing. SOCX excludes mortgage relief (fiscal) and (capital-)subsidies towards the construction of housing. By convention, all housing benefits are classified as in-kind benefit as they are earmarked expenditures.

socx_hoput Housing expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 658, N: 30, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 27)

[Back?](#)

socx_hopuk Housing expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 656, N: 30, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 27)

[Back?](#)

Other Social Policy Areas

Includes social expenditure for those people who for various reasons fall outside the scope of the relevant program covering a particular contingency, or if this other benefit is insufficient to meet their needs. Social expenditure related to immigrants/refugees and indigenous people are separately recorded in this category. Finally, any social expenditure which is not attributable to other categories is included in this category.

socx_otput Other expenditure, public, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 769, N: 33, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_otpuc Other expenditure, public, cash

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 741, N: 33, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 30)

[Back?](#)

socx_otpuk Other expenditure, public, in kind

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 654, N: 31, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)

[Back?](#)

socx_otmpt Other expenditure, mandatory private, total

(Time-series: 1990-2007, n: 43, N: 3, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 14)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 3)

Back?

socx_otmpc Other expenditure, mandatory private, cash

(Time-series: 1990-2007, n: 30, N: 2, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 13)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 2)

Back?

socx_otmpk Other expenditure, mandatory private, in kind

(Time-series: 1990-2007, n: 31, N: 2, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 14)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 2)

Back?

socx_otvpt Other expenditure, voluntary private, total

(Time-series: 1980-2007, n: 446, N: 25, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 20)

Back?

Scruggs – Welfare State Entitlements

<http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/cwed/cwedall12.zip>

(Scruggs 2006; Scruggs 2007; Scruggs and Allan 2006; Esping-Andersen 1990)

The calculations in the Welfare State Entitlements Dataset are based on the wage of an average production worker (APW). The net replacement rates are calculated as the ratio of wage after taxes to benefits after taxes.

Following OECD convention, replacement rates for sickness and unemployment benefits are computed by annualizing the benefit for a 6 months spell of illness or unemployment. That amount is annualized (multiplied by 2). When the benefits due to the APW are a fixed amount per day or week, then that amount is multiplied by the appropriate units.

For pensions, the benefits are computed as if retirement commences on 1 January of the year. Thus, the last year of the wage history is the previous year's APW. Wherever possible, the wage history is simulated for calculating the standard pension benefit, since the treatment of past earnings can have a large effect on the pension benefit.

sc_bgi **Benefit generosity index**

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 574, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Scruggs & Allan's generosity index summarizes the generosity of three social insurance programs: sickness insurance, unemployment insurance and pensions. It is a revision of Esping-Andersen's (1990) decommmodification index based on Scruggs and Allan's own data but with a somewhat different methodology.

Higher scores indicate a more generous social insurance system. It varies theoretically between 0 and 64.

The index is constructed as follows:

Each program is assigned a score based on its different characteristics and on its coverage of the population. The final benefit generosity score is computed as the sum of the score of each program.

For pensions, the following six indicators are considered: minimum net replacement rate for singles, minimum net replacement rate for couples, standard net replacement rate for singles, standard net replacement rate for couples, years of contribution required to receive a standard pension (scored inversely), and the individual's share of pension financing. Each of these six characteristics is then given a score of 0-4. This score is the standardized value, based on the mean value of the indicator in 1980. The upper and lower bounds of the scores are truncated to +/- 2, and then 2 is added to make the scale 0-4. Finally, the scores of the six indicators are summed and multiplied by the take-up rate (the population above the retirement age receiving a pension).

For sickness and unemployment insurances, the following five indicators are considered: the standard net replacement rate for singles, the standard net replacement rate for a dependent family, the number of weeks of employment/insurance required prior to qualification (scored inversely), the number of waiting days before benefits are paid (scored inversely), and the number of weeks for which a benefit can be received. As for pensions, each indicator is given a score of 0-4 based on the standard deviation from the mean value of each indicator in 1980. The scores of the five indicators are summed and then multiplied with the share of the labor force covered by the insurance.

Note that if a program is based on a means test, then they get the score 0 for contribution and the weight of 0.5 for population covered.

For instance, the score for unemployment insurance is:

[Single net replacement rate (0-4) + Family replacement rate (0-4) + Duration (0-4) + Waiting Days (0-4) + Qualifying period (0-4)] * Coverage

The final benefit generosity score is computed as the sum of the score of each program.

Back?

sc_di **Decommodification index**

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Scruggs & Allan's replication of Esping-Andersen's decommodification index based on their own data. Higher scores indicate a more generous social insurance system.

The decommodification index is similar to the benefit generosity index described above (sc_bgi). However, it differs in two important aspects:

First, the score for each indicator is not on a continuous 0-4 scale, but it is either 1, 2 or 3. The score 2 is given if the indicator is within one standard deviation of the mean value of 1980. The score 1 is given if the indicator is more than one standard deviation below the mean value of 1980, and the score 3 is given if the indicator is more than one standard deviation above the mean value of 1980.

The second difference is that only the replacement rates for singles and not for couples/families is considered. Instead the replacement rate is multiplied by 2, since it is a very important characteristic of each program. For example, the score for unemployment insurance is:

$[(\text{Single net replacement rate (1-3)}) * 2 + \text{Duration (1-3)} + \text{Waiting Days (1-3)} + \text{Qualifying period (1-3)}] * \text{Coverage}$

The decommodification score is then the sum of the score of each program.

[Back?](#)

Pensions

sc_pg **Pensions generosity**

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

The generosity of pensions. It varies theoretically between 0 and 24, where higher scores indicate a more generous pensions system. See sc_bgi above for an explanation on how it is computed.

[Back?](#)

sc_pd **Pensions decommodification**

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Decommodification score for pensions. Higher values indicate a more decommodifying (generous) pensions system. See sc_di above for explanation on how it is computed.

[Back?](#)

sc_mprrs Net minimum pension replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 560, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net public pension paid to a person with no work history at retirement (beginning of year) to the net wage of a single APW.

[Back?](#)

sc_mprrc Net minimum pension replacement rate for couple

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 560, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

As for single person (see above), but this is the net rate paid to a married couple (no children) with no work history against the net wage of the family of four.

[Back?](#)

sc_sprrs Net standard pension replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 564, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 31)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net public pension paid to a person earning the APW wage during each year of their working career upon retirement.

[Back?](#)

sc_sprrc Net standard pension replacement rate for couple

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 564, N: 18, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

As for standard pension for single person, but computed for a couple with a single earner (lifetime APW wage) against a family of four net wages (as described above).

[Back?](#)

sc_pqp Pension qualifying period

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 575, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Standard number of years of pension insurance to be considered fully covered. It is assumed that people work only to the age of 65 or the retirement age. Where ambiguous, such as during transition periods, it is the number of years of coverage assumed when computing the replacement rate.

[Back?](#)

sc_pfund **Pension funding**

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 498, N: 19, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 26)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

The ratio of employees' pension contributions to employer and employees' pension contributions. This is computed as the ratio of the current pension insurance charge rates.

[Back?](#)

sc_pcov **Pension coverage/take-up**

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 461, N: 19, \bar{N} : 14, \bar{T} : 24)
(Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country, N: 17)

Portion of those above the official retirement age who are in receipt of a public pension.

[Back?](#)

sc_mret **Male retirement age**

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 560, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Official retirement age for men.

[Back?](#)

sc_fret **Female retirement age**

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 560, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Official retirement age for women.

[Back?](#)

Sick pay

sc_sg **Sickness insurance generosity**

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 574, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

The generosity of the sickness insurance. It varies theoretically between 0 and 20, where higher scores indicate a more generous sickness insurance. See sc_bgi above for an explanation on how it is computed.

[Back?](#)

sc_sd Sickness insurance decommodification

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Decommodification score for the sickness insurance. Higher values indicate a more decommodifying (generous) unemployment insurance. See sc_di above for explanation on how it is computed.

[Back?](#)

sc_srrs Net sickness insurance replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 562, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net insurance benefit for general short-term illness (not workplace or occupational illness or injury) to net income for a single person earning the APW wage.

[Back?](#)

sc_srrf Net sickness insurance replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 562, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 7 and 12) against the net income of such a household with one APW in work.

[Back?](#)

sc_sqc Sick pay qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 544, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 17)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit. (Where ambiguous, the qualifying condition consistent with the coding for replacement rate and duration of benefit is used.)

[Back?](#)

sc_sdur Sick pay benefit duration

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 543, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 17)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. Periods of means-tested assistance or long-term disability/invalidity pension, where applicable, are excluded. NB: "no limit" is coded "999".

[Back?](#)

sc_swait Sick pay waiting period

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 543, N: 18, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 17)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after falling ill.

Back?

sc_scov Sick pay coverage

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 513, N: 18, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country, N: 16)

Percentage of the labor force with sick pay insurance. N.B: This is not the percentage of currently sick who are receiving sick pay benefits.

Back?

Unemployment benefits

sc_ueg Unemployment insurance generosity

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

The generosity of the unemployment insurance. It varies theoretically between 0 and 20, where higher scores indicate a more generous unemployment insurance. See sc_bgi for an explanation on how it is computed.

Back?

sc_ued Unemployment insurance decommodification

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 576, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Decommodification score for the unemployment insurance. Higher values indicate a more decommodifying (generous) unemployment insurance. See sc_di for an explanation on how it is computed.

Back?

sc_uerrs Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 555, N: 19, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net unemployment insurance benefit to net income for an unmarried single person earning the average production worker (APW) wage.

Back?

sc_ueerrf Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 555, N: 19, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an unemployed APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 7 and 12) against the net income of such a household with one APW employed.

Back?

sc_ueqc Unemployment qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 574, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit. (Where ambiguous, the qualifying condition consistent with the coding for replacement rate and duration of benefit is used.)

Back?

sc_uedur Unemployment benefit duration

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 574, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. This excludes periods of means-tested assistance. When this varies, we have assumed the worker is aged 40 years and has paid insurance for 20 years. NB: "no limit" is coded "999".

Back?

sc_uewait Unemployment benefit waiting period

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 575, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 18)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after becoming unemployed.

Back?

sc_uecov Unemployment insurance coverage

(Time-series: 1971-2002, n: 536, N: 19, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country, N: 17)

Percentage of the labor force insured for unemployment risk. NB: This is not the percentage of currently unemployed who are currently receiving benefits.

Back?

The Social Citizenship Indicator Program

<https://dspace.it.su.se/dspace/handle/10102/7>
(Korpi & Palme 2008)

The Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) is focused on citizens' rights and duties legislated in social policy programs like old age pensions, sickness, unemployment and work accident benefits.

The calculations in SCIP are based on an Average Production Worker's (APW) wage. When calculating family benefits, the family is assumed to be a married couple with one full-time wage-earner and two children aged 2 and 7.

Following the OECD convention, the replacement rates for sickness and unemployment benefits are computed by annualizing the benefit for a 6 month long (26 weeks) period of illness or unemployment.

For pensions, the benefits are computed as if retirement commences on 1 January. Thus, the last year of the wage history is the previous year's APW. Wherever possible, the wage history is simulated for calculating the standard pension benefit, since the treatment of past earnings can have a large effect on the size of the pension benefit.

The data is given for the year 1947 and then every fifth year 1950-2000. (In the original data observations also exist for 1930, 1933 and 1939, but these years are not included in the QoG Social Policy Dataset.)

Pensions

scip_mprrs Net minimum pension replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

This is the ratio of the minimum net public pension to the net wage of a single APW. The minimum benefit is calculated as the lowest pension possible within the major scheme that includes the standard worker. This includes means-tested benefits, but not public assistance. It is assumed that the person has no property or income from other sources.

[Back?](#)

scip_mprrc Net minimum pension replacement rate for couple

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

As for single pension (scip_mprrs), but this is the net rate paid to a married couple with two dependent children.

[Back?](#)

scip_sprrs Net standard pension replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 216, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net public pension paid to a person earning the APW wage in each year of their working career until retirement.

[Back?](#)

scip_sprrc Net standard pension replacement rate for couple

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 216, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

As for standard pension for a single person, but computed for a couple with a single earner (lifetime APW wage) against a family of four (as described above).

[Back?](#)

scip_pqp Pension qualifying period

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Number of years of contribution required to qualify for benefit.

[Back?](#)

scip_pcov Pension coverage/take-up

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 216, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Coverage ratio for the population section aged 15-65 years.

[Back?](#)

scip_pfe Pension financing by employer

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 211, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from employer contributions.

[Back?](#)

scip_pfi Pension financing by insured

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 214, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from contributions by the individuals insured.

[Back?](#)

scip_pfg Pension financing by government

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 214, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from state general revenue.

Back?

scip_pfo Pension financing by other sources

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 110, N: 15, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 7)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 11)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from other financing sources (e.g. municipalities, interest income accrued from fund reserves etc.).

Back?

scip_pm Pension means test

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 214, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Dummy variable indicating whether individual and/or household means test is applied to determine male worker's qualification for benefit. A value of 1 indicates means test and a value of 0 indicates no means test.

Back?

Sick pay

scip_srrs Net sick pay replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net insurance benefit for general illness (not work accident illness) to net income for a single person earning the APW wage.

Back?

scip_srrf Net sick pay replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 2 and 7) against the net income of such a household with one APW in work.

Back?

scip_sqc Sick pay qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit.

[Back?](#)

scip_sdur Sick pay benefit duration

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. Unlimited duration is coded as 260 weeks.

[Back?](#)

scip_swait Sick pay waiting period

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after falling ill.

[Back?](#)

scip_scov Sick pay coverage

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 216, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Percentage of the labor force with sick pay insurance. N.B: This is not the percentage of currently sick who are receiving sick pay benefits

[Back?](#)

scip_sfe Sick pay financing by employer

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 213, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from employer contributions.

[Back?](#)

scip_sfi Sick pay financing by insured

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 213, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from contributions by the individuals insured.

[Back?](#)

scip_sfg Sick pay financing by government

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 213, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from state general revenue.

[Back?](#)

scip_sfo Sick pay financing by other sources

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 115, N: 15, $\bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 8$)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 8)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from other financing sources (e.g. municipalities, interest income accrued from fund reserves etc.).

[Back?](#)

scip_sm Sick pay means test

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Dummy variable indicating whether individual and/or household means test is applied to determine male worker's qualification for benefit. A value of 1 indicates means test and a value of 0 indicates no means test.

[Back?](#)

Unemployment benefits

scip_uerrs Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net unemployment insurance benefit to net income for an unmarried single person earning the average production worker (APW) wage.

[Back?](#)

scip_uerrf Net unemployment insurance replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11$)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an unemployed APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 2 and 7) against the net income of such a household with one APW employed.

[Back?](#)

scip_ueqc Unemployment benefit qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit.

[Back?](#)

scip_uedur Unemployment benefit duration

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. Unlimited duration is coded as 260 weeks.

[Back?](#)

scip_uewait Unemployment benefit waiting period

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after becoming unemployed.

[Back?](#)

scip_uecov Unemployment insurance coverage

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 216, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Percentage of the labor force insured for unemployment risk. NB: This is not the percentage of currently unemployed who are currently receiving benefits.

[Back?](#)

scip_uefe Unemployment benefit financing by employer

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 214, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from employer contributions.

[Back?](#)

scip_uefi Unemployment benefit financing by insured

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 214, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from contributions by the individuals insured.

[Back?](#)

scip_uefg Unemployment benefit financing by government

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 214, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from state general revenue.

[Back?](#)

scip_uefo Unemployment benefit financing by other sources

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 86, N: 13, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 6)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from other financing sources (e.g. municipalities, interest income accrued from fund reserves etc.).

[Back?](#)

scip_uem Unemployment benefit means test

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Dummy variable indicating whether individual and/or household means test is applied to determine male worker's qualification for benefit. A value of 1 indicates means test and a value of 0 indicates no means test.

[Back?](#)

Work accident insurance

scip_warrs Net work accident insurance replacement rate for single person

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

This is the ratio of net insurance benefit for work accident illness to net income for a single person earning the APW wage.

[Back?](#)

scip_warrf Net work accident replacement rate for dependent family

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

As for single person replacement rate, but this is the net rate paid to a household with an APW, dependent spouse, and two dependent children (aged 2 and 7) against the net income of such a household with one APW in work.

[Back?](#)

scip_waqc Work accident insurance qualifying condition

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 213, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit.

[Back?](#)

scip_wadur Work accident benefit duration

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Weeks of benefit entitlement. Unlimited duration is coded as 260 weeks.

[Back?](#)

scip_wawait Work accident insurance waiting period

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Days one must wait to start receiving benefit after becoming injured from a work accident.

[Back?](#)

scip_wacov Work accident insurance coverage

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 216, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Percentage of the labor force with work accident insurance. N.B: This is not the percentage of currently sick who are receiving work accident insurance benefits.

[Back?](#)

scip_wafe Work accident insurance financing by employer

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from employer contributions.

[Back?](#)

scip_wafi Work accident insurance financing by insured

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from contributions by the individuals insured.

[Back?](#)

scip_wafg Work accident insurance financing by government

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 215, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from state general revenue.

Back?

scip_wafo Work accident insurance financing by other sources

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 59, N: 11, \bar{N} : 1, \bar{T} : 5)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 5)

Total proportion of insurance fund receipts derived from other financing sources (e.g. municipalities, interest income accrued from fund reserves etc.).

Back?

scip_wam Work accident insurance means test

(Time-series: 1947-2000, n: 213, N: 19, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Dummy variable indicating whether individual and/or household means test is applied to determine male worker's qualification for benefit. A value of 1 indicates means test and a value of 0 indicates no means test.

Back?

UNESCO Institute for Statistics

<http://www.uis.unesco.org>

(UNESCO 2010)

Expenditure

The data on expenditure on education includes both expenditure on educational institutions and administration.

une_toe Total expenditure on education

(Time-series: 1999-2007, n: 218, N: 39, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 89)

Total expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. Includes expenditure from public, private and international sources.

Back?

une_puto Public expenditure on education, total

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 349, N: 39, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 170)

Total public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_pupre Public expenditure on pre-primary education

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 294, N: 36, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2000-2008 (varies by country), N: 95)

Public expenditure on pre-primary education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_pup Public expenditure on primary education

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 316, N: 36, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 144)

Public expenditure on primary education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_pus Public expenditure on secondary education

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 326, N: 37, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 144)

Public expenditure on secondary education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_pute Public expenditure on tertiary education

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 343, N: 38, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 144)

Public expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_putg Public expenditure on education (% of total government)

(Time-series: 1998-2008, n: 316, N: 38, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 156)

Public expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of total government expenditure.

[Back?](#)

une_prto Private expenditure on education, total

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 249, N: 38, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2000-2008 (varies by country), N: 72)

Total private expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_prpre Private expenditure on pre-primary education

(Time-series: 1998-2008, n: 128, N: 22, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 2001-2008 (varies by country), N: 41)

Private expenditure on pre-primary education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_prp Private expenditure on primary education

(Time-series: 1999-2009, n: 111, N: 19, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 2000-2007 (varies by country), N: 43)

Private expenditure on primary education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_prs Private expenditure on secondary education

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 186, N: 29, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 2000-2008 (varies by country), N: 56)

Private expenditure on secondary education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_prte Private expenditure on tertiary education

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 230, N: 33, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2000-2007 (varies by country), N: 58)

Private expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_ito International expenditure on education, total

(Time-series: 1999-2008, n: 31, N: 10, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 47)

Total expenditure on education financed by international sources, as percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

une_ppt Public expenditure per pupil, total

(Time-series: 1999-2007, n: 269, N: 36, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 7)
(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 121)

Public expenditure per pupil as a percentage of GDP per capita.

[Back?](#)

une_ppp Public expenditure per pupil, primary

(Time-series: 1971-2009, n: 848, N: 38, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 22)
(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 145)

Public expenditure per pupil in primary school, as percentage of GDP per capita.

[Back?](#)

une_pps Public expenditure per pupil, secondary

(Time-series: 1971-2009, n: 861, N: 38, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 140)

Public expenditure per pupil in secondary school, as percentage of GDP per capita.

[Back?](#)

une_ppte Public expenditure per pupil, tertiary

(Time-series: 1999-2007, n: 286, N: 36, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 130)

Public expenditure per pupil in tertiary school, as percentage of GDP per capita.

[Back?](#)

Pupil-teacher ratio

Average number of pupils (students) per teacher at a specific level of education in a given school-year.

une_ptrpre Pupil-teacher ratio, pre-primary

(Time-series: 1999-2008, n: 287, N: 33, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 9)
(Cross-section: 1999-2007 (varies by country), N: 170)

[Back?](#)

une_ptrp Pupil-teacher ratio, primary

(Time-series: 1999-2008, n: 310, N: 37, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 181)

[Back?](#)

une_ptr **Pupil-teacher ratio, secondary**

(Time-series: 1999-2008, n: 293, N: 36, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 175)

Back?

WHOSIS – WHO Statistical Information System

<http://www.who.int/whosis/en/>
(WHO 2006, 2009)

Health Expenditure

who_teh **Total expenditure on health (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

The sum of general government and private health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. It comprises the outlays earmarked for health maintenance, restoration or enhancement of the health status of the population, paid for in cash or in kind.

Back?

who_tehcu **Total expenditure on health per capita (USD)**

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Total expenditure on health per capita in US dollars (annual average exchange rate). Note: In the original data, seven of the observations had the value "<1.0". We replaced this value with 0.

Back?

who_tehci **Total expenditure on health per capita (international dollars)**

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Total expenditure on health per capita in international dollars. (International dollars are derived by dividing local currency units by an estimate of their purchasing power parity (PPP) compared with US dollars, i.e. the measure that minimizes the consequences of differences in prices between countries.) Note: In the original data, seven of the observations had the value "<1.0". We replaced this value with 0.

Back?

who_gehh Government expenditure on health (% of total health)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Government expenditure on health care services and goods as a percentage of total expenditure on health (who_teh). Expenditures on health include final consumption, subsidies to producers, and transfers to households (chiefly reimbursements for medical and pharmaceutical bills). Besides domestic funds it also includes external resources (mainly as grants passing through the government or loans channeled through the national budget).

[Back?](#)

who_gehcu Government expenditure on health per capita (USD)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001-2004 (varies by country), N: 191)

Government expenditure on health per capita in US dollars (annual average exchange rate). Note: In the original data, twenty-six of the observations had the value "<1.0". We replaced these values with 0.

[Back?](#)

who_gehci Government expenditure on health per capita (international dollars)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Government expenditure on health per capita in international dollars (see who_tehci). Note: In the original data, fourteen of the observations had the value "<1.0". We replaced these values with 0.

[Back?](#)

who_peh Private expenditure on health (% of total health)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Private expenditure on health-care services and goods as a percentage of total expenditure on health (who_teh).

[Back?](#)

who_gehg Government expenditure on health (% of total government)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 191)

Government expenditure on health-care services and goods as a percentage of total government expenditure.

[Back?](#)

who_erh External resources for health (% of total health)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001-2004 (varies by country), N: 189)

Grants and loans for health goods and services, passing through governments or private entities, in cash or in kind, as a percentage of total expenditure on health (who_teh).

Back?

who_ssh Social security expenditure on health (% of government health)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 174)

Expenditure on health by schemes that are mandatory and controlled by government, as a percentage of total government expenditure on health (who_gehh). Such social-security schemes that apply only to a selected group of the population, such as public sector employees only, are also included here.

Back?

who_oop Out-of-pocket expenditure on health (% of private health)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 190)

The direct outlays of households, including gratuities and in-kind payments made to health practitioners and to suppliers of pharmaceuticals, therapeutic appliances and other goods and services, as a percentage of total private expenditure on health (who_peh). This includes direct payments to both public and private providers.

Back?

who_ppp Private prepaid plans (% of private health)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 168)

Private insurance schemes and private social insurance schemes (with no government control over payment rates and participating providers but with broad guidelines from government), as a percentage of total private expenditure on health (who_peh).

Back?

Health Staff

who_pha Physicians (absolute value)

(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 186)

Number of physicians. Includes generalists and specialists.

Back?

who_phd **Physicians (density per 1000 population)**
(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 186)

Density of physicians per 1000 population.

Back?

who_nua **Nurses (absolute value)**
(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

Number of nurses. Includes professional nurses, auxiliary nurses, enrolled nurses and other nurses, such as dental nurses and primary care nurses.

Back?

who_nud **Nurses (density per 1000 population)**
(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

Density of nurses per 1000 population.

Back?

who_dea **Dentists (absolute value)**
(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 183)

Number of dentists. Includes dentists, dental assistants and dental technicians.

Back?

who_ded **Dentists (density per 1000 population)**
(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 183)

Density of dentists per 1000 population.

Back?

World Development Indicators

<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog>

Government Expenditure

wdi_gew **Government Expenditure on Wages and Employer Contributions (% of Expense)**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 491, N: 37, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 13)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 138)

Compensation to employees consists of all payments in cash, as well as in kind (such as food and housing), and government contributions to social insurance schemes such as social security and pensions that provide benefits to employees. Source: International Monetary Fund.

Back?

wdi_ge Government Expense (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1990-2010, n: 492, N: 37, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 13)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 140)

Expense is cash payments for operating activities of the government in providing goods and services. It includes compensation to employees (such as wages and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends. Source: International Monetary Fund. (World Bank and OECD for GDP estimates.).

[Back?](#)

wdi_gce Government Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1531, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 39)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 173)

General government final consumption expenditure includes all current government expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditure on national defence and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation. Measured as a percentage of GDP. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

Health Sector

wdi_hb Hospital Beds (per 1,000 People)

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 899, N: 39, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 1995-2007 (varies by country), N: 185)

Hospital beds per 1,000 people. Sources: WHO and OECD, supplemented by country data.

[Back?](#)

wdi_nam Nurses and Midwives (per 1,000 People)

(Time-series: 1997-2009, n: 98, N: 39, \bar{N} : 8, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 1995-2007 (varies by country), N: 188)

Number of nurses and midwives per 1,000 people. Sources: WHO and OECD, supplemented by country data.

[Back?](#)

wdi_the Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 582, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2003, N: 187)

The sum of public and private health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Source: WHO, supplemented by country data.

[Back?](#)

wdi_hec Health Expenditure per Capita, PPP (Constant USD)

(Time-series: 2003-2007, n: 195, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 5)
(Cross-section: 2003, N: 187)

The sum of public and private health expenditures as a ratio of total population. Data are in converted international dollars using 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. Source: WHO, supplemented by country data.

[Back?](#)

wdi_puhegdp Public Health Expenditure (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)
(Cross-section: 2003, N: 188)

Public health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Source: WHO, supplemented by country data.

[Back?](#)

wdi_puegov Public Health Expenditure (% of Government Expenditure)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)
(Cross-section: 2003, N: 187)

Public health expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure. Source: WHO, supplemented by country data.

[Back?](#)

wdi_prhe Private Health Expenditure (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 2003-2007, n: 195, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 5)
(Cross-section: 2003, N: 188)

Private health expenditure includes direct household (out-of-pocket) spending, private insurance, charitable donations, and direct service payments by private corporations. Measured as a percentage of GDP. Source: WHO, supplemented by country data.

[Back?](#)

Regulation of Labor

wdi_roe Rigidity of Employment

(Time-series: 2008-2009, n: 76, N: 38, \bar{N} : 38, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 2008, N: 178)

The rigidity of employment index measures the regulation of employment, specifically the hiring and firing of workers and the rigidity of working hours. The index is the average of three sub-indexes: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours index, and a difficulty of firing index. The index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulations. Source: World Bank Doing Business project.

[Back?](#)

Taxes and Government Revenue

This section includes data on tax rates and government income from different types of taxes.

Fraser Institute – Economic Freedom of the World

<http://www.freetheworld.com/>

(Gwartney and Lawson 2006)

Note: In some cases the data from Fraser Institute gives the top marginal tax rate as an interval. In these cases we have recoded the variable to the highest figure in the interval. (If, e.g., the top marginal tax rate is given as 52-59, we have recoded it to 59.)

fi_mti **Top marginal tax rate (index)**

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 349, N: 40, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 2000-2004 (varies by country), N: 114)

The index ranges from 0-10, where higher marginal tax rates that take effect at lower income thresholds give a lower rating.

[Back?](#)

fi_mitp **Top marginal income tax rate (percent)**

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 349, N: 40, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 113)

Top marginal income tax rate.

[Back?](#)

fi_miti **Top marginal income tax rate (index)**

(Time-series: 1970-2004, n: 349, N: 40, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 2000-2004 (varies by country), N: 114)

The index ranges from 0-10, where higher marginal income tax rates that take effect at lower income thresholds give a lower rating.

[Back?](#)

fi_mptp **Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (percent)**

(Time-series: 1990-2004, n: 257, N: 40, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 104)

Top marginal income and payroll tax rate.

[Back?](#)

fi_mpti Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (index)

(Time-series: 1990-2004, n: 257, N: 40, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 105)

The index ranges from 0-10, where higher marginal income and payroll tax rates that take effect at lower income thresholds give a lower rating.

[Back?](#)

OECD – Revenue Statistics

[http://caliban.sourceoecd.org/vl=1372044/cl=23/nw=1/rpsv/statistic/s19_about.htm?](http://caliban.sourceoecd.org/vl=1372044/cl=23/nw=1/rpsv/statistic/s19_about.htm?jnlissn=16081099)

[jnlissn=16081099](#)

(OECD 2006b)

rs_ttr Total tax revenue

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. This includes social security contributions.

[Back?](#)

Taxes on income, profits and capital gains

rs_ipct Income, profits and capital gains tax, total

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total (both individual and corporate) income, profits and capital gains tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_ipci Income, profits and capital gains tax, individuals

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1068, N: 30, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Income, profits and capital gains tax revenue from individuals as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_ipti Income and profits tax, individuals

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1026, N: 30, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Income and profits tax revenue from individuals, as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_cti Capital gains tax, individuals

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1018, N: 29, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 35)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Capital gains tax revenue from individuals, as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_pctc Profits and capital gains tax, corporate

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1068, N: 30, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Corporate profits and capital gains tax revenue, as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_ipcto Income, profits and capital gains tax, other

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Income, profits and capital gains tax, unallocable between individuals and corporate.

[Back?](#)

Social security contributions

rs_sst Social security contributions, total

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1116, N: 31, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total social security contributions, as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_ssee Social security contributions, employees

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1059, N: 29, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 37)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Social security contributions paid by employees, as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_sser Social security contributions, employers

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1060, N: 29, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 37)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Social security contributions paid by employers, as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_sssn Social security contributions, self- and non-employed

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1061, N: 29, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 37)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Social security contributions paid by the self- and non-employed, as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_sso Social security contributions, other

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1103, N: 30, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 37)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 29)

Social security contributions unallocable between employees, employers and the self- and non-employed.

[Back?](#)

Other taxes

rs_tpw Taxes on payroll and workforce

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1117, N: 31, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

This includes special wage tax, general wage fees, child care fees, adult education fees etc. as a percentage of GDP.

[Back?](#)

rs_tp Taxes on property

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total taxes on property, as a percentage of GDP. Includes both individual and corporate taxes.

[Back?](#)

rs_tgs Taxes on goods and services

(Time-series: 1955-2005, n: 1118, N: 31, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total taxes on goods and services, as a percentage of GDP. This includes VAT, excises, profits of fiscal monopoly, taxes on incomes and exports etc.

[Back?](#)

OECD – Taxing Wages Statistics

http://caliban.sourceoecd.org/vl=3831743/cl=13/nw=1/rpsv/statistic/s24_about.htm?nlissn=16081102
(OECD 2006a)

The calculations in the Taxing Wages Statistics are based on the wage of an average production worker (APW). Please note that from 1991, data on wages has been revised to only include production workers (excluding employees).

tw_ats **Average income tax, single (%)**

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 507, N: 31, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Average personal income tax as a percentage of gross earnings, for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

[Back?](#)

tw_atc **Average income tax, couple (%)**

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 507, N: 31, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Average personal income tax as a percentage of gross earnings, for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

[Back?](#)

tw_atcos **Average tax and contributions, single (%)**

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Employees' social security contributions and personal income tax as a percentage of gross earnings. Calculated for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

[Back?](#)

tw_atcoc **Average tax and contributions, couple (%)**

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atcos, but calculated for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

[Back?](#)

tw_atcls Average tax and contributions less transfers, single (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 507, N: 31, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Total social security contributions and personal income tax, less transfer payments, as a percentage of gross wage earnings. Calculated for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

[Back?](#)

tw_atcl Average tax and contributions less transfers, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 502, N: 31, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atcls, but calculated for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

[Back?](#)

tw_mtcls Marginal tax and contributions less transfers, single (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atcls, but marginal rate instead of average rate.

[Back?](#)

tw_mtcl Marginal tax and contributions less transfers, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atcl, but marginal rate instead of average rate. Assumes a rise in gross earnings of the principal earner in the household. The outcome may differ if the wage of the spouse goes up, especially if partners are taxed individually.

[Back?](#)

tw_atws Average tax wedge, single (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 499, N: 31, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Average tax rate, covering employees' and employers' social security contributions and personal income tax, less transfer payments, as a percentage of gross labor costs (gross wage + employers' social security contributions). Calculated for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

[Back?](#)

tw_atwc Average tax wedge, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 495, N: 31, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atws, but calculated for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

Back?

tw_mtws Marginal tax wedge, single (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atws, but marginal rate instead of average rate.

Back?

tw_mtwc Marginal tax wedge, couple (%)

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_atwc, but marginal rate instead of average rate. Assumes a rise in gross earnings of the principal earner in the household. The outcome may differ if the wage of the spouse goes up, especially if partners are taxed individually.

Back?

tw_ews Elasticity of income after tax, gross wage, single

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Measures the increase in net income after a 1 % increase in gross wage earnings. Net income is calculated as gross earnings minus employees' social security contributions and personal income tax plus family benefits.

The more progressive the tax system at these income levels, the lower is the elasticity. In a proportional tax system the elasticity would equal 1.

Calculated for a single person with no children, earning 100% of APW.

Back?

tw_ewc Elasticity of income after tax, gross wage, couple

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_ews, but calculated for a married couple with two children, where the principal earner earns 100% of APW and the spouse 0% of APW.

Back?

tw_els Elasticity of income after tax, gross labor cost, single

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_ews, but calculated for an increase in gross labor costs (gross wage + employers' social security contributions).

Back?

tw_elc Elasticity of income after tax, gross labor cost, couple

(Time-series: 1997-2004, n: 237, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Same as tw_ewc, but calculated for an increase in gross labor costs (gross wage + employers' social security contributions).

Back?

World Development Indicators

<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog>

wdi_gr Government Revenue (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1990-2010, n: 494, N: 38, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 13)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 141)

Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions and other revenues. Grants are excluded here. Measured as a percentage of GDP. Source: International Monetary Fund. (World Bank and OECD for GDP estimates.)

Back?

wdi_tr Tax Revenue (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1990-2010, n: 513, N: 39, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 13)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 141)

Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social security contributions are excluded. Measured as a percentage of GDP. Source: International Monetary Fund. (World Bank and OECD for GDP estimates.)

Back?

wdi_hmtri Highest Marginal Tax Rate, Individual (%)

(Time-series: 2003-2009, n: 273, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 1999-2006 (varies by country), N: 99)

Highest marginal tax rate (individual rate) is the highest rate shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of individuals. Sources: KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.

Back?

wdi_ifhmt **Income for Highest Marginal Tax (USD)**

(Time-series: 2008-2009, n: 62, N: 31, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 79)

The income levels for individuals for which the highest marginal tax rates levied at the national level apply, in US dollars. Sources: KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.

[Back?](#)

Social Conditions

This is a broad category where we have tried to include data that describe the structural conditions for social policy. The category encompasses things like economic inequality, GDP, unemployment, educational levels, health conditions, gender inequality, immigration, trade openness and foreign direct investments.

Armingeon et al – Comparative Political Dataset I & II

http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html

(Armingeon et al 2008; Armingeon & Careja 2006)

ar_source **Armingeon source**

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1698, N: 36, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 47)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 53)

There are three different versions of the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS), and this variable denotes from which of these each observation comes. There are observations from 23 OECD countries from CPDS I, 28 post-communist countries from CPDS II, and data for Cyprus and Malta from CPDS III.

[Back?](#)

ar_ue **Unemployment rate (%)**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1245, N: 33, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 49)

Unemployment rate in percent. Source for the OECD countries (ar_source = 1) is OECD, Employment and Labour Market Statistics. Source for the post-communist countries (ar_source = 2) is mainly Kolodko (2000).

[Back?](#)

Barro & Lee

(Time-series: 1950-2010, n: 507, N: 39, \bar{N} : 8, \bar{T} : 13)

<http://go.worldbank.org/MDJHSKYEB0>

(Barro & Lee 2000)

Note: In earlier versions of the QoG datasets, separate variables for male have been included. These data are however no longer available from the data source and we have therefore excluded them.

bl_psct25	Primary school complete (total 25+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)	Back?
bl_ssct25	Secondary school complete (total 25+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)	Back?
bl_hsct25	Higher school complete (total 25+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)	Back?
bl_pscf25	Primary school complete (female 25+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)	Back?
bl_sscf25	Secondary school complete (female 25+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)	Back?
bl_hscf25	Higher school complete (female 25+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)	Back?
bl_psct15	Primary school complete (total 15+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)	Back?
bl_ssct15	Secondary school complete (total 15+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)	Back?
bl_hsct15	Higher school complete (total 15+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)	Back?
bl_pscf15	Primary school complete (female 15+)	
	(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)	Back?

bl_sscf15 Secondary school complete (female 15+)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Back?

bl_hscf15 Higher school complete (female 15+)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Back?

bl_asyf15 Average schooling years (female 15+)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Back?

bl_asyf25 Average schooling years (female 25+)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Back?

bl_asyt15 Average schooling years (total 15+)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Back?

bl_asyt25 Average schooling years (total 25+)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Back?

Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Labor

(Cross-Section: 1997, N: 69)

http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/Regulation%20of%20Labor-All/Regulation%20of%20Labor.xls

(Botero et al 2004)

bdlls_ud Union Density

Measures the share of the total work force affiliated to labor unions in 1997. Sources: ILO Laborsta, and the World Bank.

Back?

Deiningering & Squire

<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20699070~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html>

(Deiningering & Squire 1996)

ds_gini **Gini Index**

(Time-series: 1947-1995, n: 342, N: 33, \bar{N} : 7, \bar{T} : 10)

(Cross-section: 1968-1996 (varies by country), N: 108)

The variable measures the Gini index of income inequality from observations with the highest data quality (where the quality has been rated as “accept”) in the original Deiningering & Squire (1996) dataset (higher values indicating more inequality). The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (the society’s total income accrues to only one person/household unit).

Note: Both within- and cross-country comparisons are to be handled with care since these Gini coefficients are based on varying sources of information: income or expenditure, gross or net of taxes, and using individual or household recipient units.

[Back?](#)

ds_yom **Year of measurement**

The latest year available for each country of the ds_gini measurement in the cross-sectional dataset.

[Back?](#)

Dreher – KOF Index of Globalization

(Time-series: 1970-2008, n: 1391, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 36)

<http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>

(Dreher 2006; Dreher et al 2008)

All indexes below range between 0 and 100, where higher values indicate a higher degree of globalization.

Please note that we have recoded Yemen as missing prior to 1990 in the following variables: dr_ig, dr_eg, dr_pg and dr_sg.

dr_ig **Index of Globalization**

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 155)

The overall index of globalization is the weighted average of the following variables: economic globalization, social globalization and political globalization (dr_eg, dr_sg and dr_pg). Most weight has been given to economic followed by social globalization.

[Back?](#)

dr_eg Economic Globalization

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 139)

Economic globalization is here defined as the long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. It is measured by actual flows of trade and investments, and by restrictions on trade and capital such as tariff rates.

Back?

dr_pg Political Globalization

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 189)

Political globalization is measured by the number of embassies and high commissions in a country, the number of international organizations of which the country is a member, the number of UN peace missions the country has participated in, and the number of international treaties that the country has signed since 1945.

Back?

dr_sg Social Globalization

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 157)

Social globalization is measured by three categories of indicators. The first is personal contacts, such as telephone traffic and tourism. The second is information flows, e.g. number of Internet users. The third is cultural proximity, e.g. trade in books and number of Ikea warehouses per capita.

Back?

Eurostat

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>
(Eurostat 2007)

Economic indicators

When calculating the inequality indicators, the total disposable income of a household is calculated by adding together the personal income received by all of household members plus income received at household level, once corrected by within-household non-response inflation factor to compensate for non-response in individual questionnaires.

eu_gini **Gini index**

(Time-series: 2001-2010, n: 247, N: 31, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 31)

The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (the society's total income accrues to only one household unit).

Note: In the original data Turkey 2004 has a value of 0. We have coded this as missing.
Back?

eu_8020 **80/20 income quintile share ratio**

(Time-series: 2001-2010, n: 250, N: 31, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 31)

The ratio of the share of income of the lowest and the highest quintile.

Back?

eu_grgdp **Growth of real GDP (%)**

(Time-series: 1990-2010, n: 604, N: 33, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 18)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 35)

Growth of GDP (constant prices). N.B. this is not growth of GDP per capita!

Back?

Unemployment and activity rates

The source of this data is the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS). Note that the age span when calculating the rates differs (15-74 years of age for unemployment rates, and 15-64 years for activity and employment rates).

eu_ue **Unemployment rate (%)**

(Time-series: 1990-2010, n: 483, N: 29, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 32)

The share of unemployed persons (between 15 and 74 years of age) in the total number of active persons in the labor market. Active persons are those who are either employed or actively seeking work.

Back?

eu_lue **Long term unemployment (>12 months)**

(Time-series: 1992-2010, n: 456, N: 30, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 15)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 33)

The long term unemployment rate is the share of unemployed persons (15-74 years) since 12 months or more in the total number of active persons in the labor market. Active persons are those who are either employed or actively seeking work.

Back?

eu_vlue Very long term unemployment (>24 months)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 330, N: 30, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 31)

Very long term unemployment rate is the share of the unemployed persons since 24 months or more in the total number of active persons in the labor market. Active persons are those who are either employed or actively seeking work.

[Back?](#)

eu_lf Labor force (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 358, N: 31, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 12)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 32)

The percentage of the population aged 15-64, who constitutes the supply of the labor market irrespective of current labor status (either employed or actively seeking work).

[Back?](#)

eu_flf Female labor force (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2006, n: 358, N: 31, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 12)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 32)

Same as eu_lf, but for the female population aged 15-64.

[Back?](#)

eu_er Employment rate (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2010, n: 515, N: 33, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 34)

Employment rates represent employed persons as a percentage of same age total population (15 to 64 years).

[Back?](#)

eu_fer Female employment rate (%)

(Time-series: 1992-2010, n: 515, N: 33, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 34)

Same as eu_er, but for the female population.

[Back?](#)

Education

eu_use Upper secondary education completed (%)

(Time-series: 2001-2010, n: 302, N: 31, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 10)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

Percentage of the population aged 25 to 64 having completed at least upper secondary education.

[Back?](#)

eu_usew Upper secondary education completed, women (%)

(Time-series: 2001-2010, n: 302, N: 31, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 10)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

Percentage of the female population aged 25 to 64 having completed at least upper secondary education.

[Back?](#)

eu_usem Upper secondary education completed, men (%)

(Time-series: 2001-2010, n: 302, N: 31, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 10)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

Percentage of the male population aged 25 to 64 having completed at least upper secondary education.

[Back?](#)

Population and immigration

eu_pop Population on January 1

(Time-series: 1950-2006, n: 1574, N: 32, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 49)

(Cross-section: 1996-2004 (varies by country), N: 46)

The inhabitants on 1 January of the year in question (or, in some cases, on 31 December of the previous year). Includes foreign citizens.

[Back?](#)

eu_ii Inflow of immigrants

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 278, N: 25, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2004-2006 (varies by country), N: 37)

Inflow of immigrants.

[Back?](#)

eu_nmc Net migration

(Time-series: 1950-2006, n: 1432, N: 32, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 45)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 47)

Immigration minus emigration (including corrections).

[Back?](#)

eu_crnmc Crude rate of net migration

(Time-series: 1990-2010, n: 638, N: 31, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 47)

Net migration per 1000 inhabitants. That is: net migration / (population * 1000).

[Back?](#)

eu_as Asylum seekers

(Time-series: 1996-2007, n: 339, N: 30, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 29)

Number of asylum applications.

[Back?](#)

eu_pad Positive asylum decisions

(Time-series: 1999-2006, n: 157, N: 29, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 5)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 29)

Number of positive asylum decisions. Includes: Geneva Convention status granted; humanitarian status and all other types of subsidiary protection equivalent to asylum; other positive decisions.

[Back?](#)

eu_fc Foreign citizens

(Time-series: 1999-2010, n: 318, N: 31, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 10)
(Cross-section: 1999-2003 (varies by country), N: 32)

Number of foreign citizens.

[Back?](#)

eu_lfeu Labor force, foreign EU citizens

(Time-series: 2005-2009, n: 114, N: 24, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 5)
(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 17)

Number of foreigners that are EU citizens and part of the active population. The active population is people aged 15-64, who constitute the supply of the labor market irrespective of current labor status (either employed or actively seeking work).

[Back?](#)

eu_eeu Employed foreign EU citizens

(Time-series: 1985-2001, n: 98, N: 22, \bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 4)
(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 18)

Number of employed persons that are foreigners and EU citizens.

[Back?](#)

eu_ueeu Unemployed foreign EU citizens

(Time-series: 1997-2001, n: 32, N: 17, \bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2001 (varies by country), N: 18)

Number of unemployed persons (between 15 and 74 years of age) that are foreigners and EU citizens.

[Back?](#)

eu_lfn Labor force, foreign non EU citizens

(Time-series: 2005-2009, n: 128, N: 26, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 5)
(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 17)

Same as eu_lfeu, but for foreign non EU citizens.

Back?

eu_en Employed foreign non EU citizens

(Time-series: 1985-2001, n: 97, N: 22, \bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 4)
(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 18)

Same as eu_eeu, but for foreign non EU citizens.

Back?

eu_uen Unemployed foreign non EU citizens

(Time-series: 1997-2001, n: 29, N: 17, \bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2001 (varies by country), N: 417)

Same as eu_ueeu, but for foreign non EU citizens.

Back?

Health

eu_hlyf Healthy life years at birth (female)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 274, N: 29, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 9)
(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 19)

Measures the number of remaining years that a person is expected to live in a healthy condition. A healthy condition is defined by the absence of limitations in functioning/disability. For more information see http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_information/indicators/lifeyears_en.htm.

Back?

eu_hlym Healthy life years at birth (male)

(Time-series: 1995-2009, n: 283, N: 29, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 10)
(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 20)

Same as eu_hlyf, but for men.

Back?

Heston, Summers & Aten – Penn World Table

http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php

(Heston, Summers and Aten 2009)

Note: In Penn World Table version 7.0 users are offered two different series of data for China. This is due to China's population and a degree of uncertainty about the rate of growth of China's GDP as well as its actual economic size. "China Version 1" uses the official growth rates for the whole period. "China Version 2" uses the modifications of official Chinese growth rates contained in Maddison and Wu (2008). "China Version 2" provides a more consistent recent economic history of China relative to other countries, according to the authors of the Penn World Table. We have thus included the data from "China Version 2".

pwt_rgdpch Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)

(Time-series: 1950-2009, n: 1983, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 51)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices. This is a chain index obtained by first applying the component growth rates between each pair of consecutive years, 't-1' and 't' (t=1951 to 2009), to the current price component shares in year 't-1' to obtain the domestic absorption (DA) growth rate for each year. This DA growth rate for each year 't' is then applied backwards and forwards from 2005, and summed to the constant price net foreign balance to obtain the Chain GDP series.

[Back?](#)

pwt_grgdpch Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)

(Time-series: 1951-2009, n: 1944, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 50)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 185)

Growth rate of real GDP per capita.

Note: The growth rates are provided along with a user warning. For at least half the low income countries, annual growth rates in Penn World Tables are not reliable. The anomalies in current and constant price national accounts tend to smooth out over longer periods but not for short periods. For more information on this, see the documentation of Penn World Table version 6.3.

[Back?](#)

pwt_csg Consumption Share of GDP (%)

(Time-series: 1950-2009, n: 1983, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 51)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

The consumption share of GDP, in percent.

[Back?](#)

pwt_gsg Government Share of GDP (%)

(Time-series: 1950-2009, n: 1983, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 51)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

The share of government spending as a percentage of GDP.

Back?

pwt_isg Investment Share of GDP (%)

(Time-series: 1950-2009, n: 1983, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 51)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

The share of investment as a percentage of GDP.

Back?

pwt_openk Openness to Trade, Constant Prices

(Time-series: 1950-2009, n: 1983, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 51)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

Total trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP in constant prices, with a reference year of 2005. GDP is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, government and exports, and subtracting imports in any given year.

Back?

pwt_openc Openness to Trade, Current Prices

(Time-series: 1950-2009, n: 1983, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 51)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 185)

Same as pwt_openk, but in current prices.

Back?

Franzese – Participation, Inequality and Transfers Database

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/T&T_FullDataSet.XLS
(Franzese 1998; 2002)

fr_ud Union density

(Time-series: 1947-1996, n: 1006, N: 22, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 46)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 21)

Union membership as a percentage of labor force.

Back?

Huber et al – Comparative Welfare States Data Set

<http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/cws%20lis.xls>
(Huber et al 2004)

The sum of the three variables below (with a range from 0-14), is the measure of (international) financial openness used by Quinn (1997). The higher the value, the higher the openness of the country. For more information see Quinn (1997).

hu_lcu **Liberalization of current transactions**

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 718, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 1997-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Liberalization of inward and outward current account transactions. It ranges from 0-8.

[Back?](#)

hu_lca **Liberalization of capital transactions**

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 718, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 1997-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Liberalization of inward and outward capital account transactions. It ranges from 0-4.

[Back?](#)

hu_aatr **Agreements against transaction restrictions**

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 718, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 1997-1999 (varies by country), N: 18)

Accession to international legal agreements, such as OECD, IMF, EU, and so on, that constrain a nation's ability to restrict exchange and capital flows. It ranges from 0-2.

[Back?](#)

hu_wsc **Wage setting coordination**

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 39)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Wage Setting Coordination Scores. Source: Kenworthy (2001).

- (1) Fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants.
- (2) Bargaining mainly at industry-level with little or no pattern-setting.
- (3) Industry-level bargaining with reasonably strong pattern-setting but only moderate union concentration.
- (4) Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage

schedule/freeze – without a peace obligation, high degree of union concentration and extensive, regularized pattern-setting, tacit coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive pattern-setting.

(5) Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze – with a peace obligation, extremely high degree of union concentration and coordination of industry bargaining by confederation, extensive coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive pattern-setting.

Back?

hu_um Union members (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 658, N: 19, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 12)

Total reported union members, in thousands.

Back?

hu_aum Active union membership (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 390, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 33)

(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 10)

Active union membership, in thousands. (Gross minus retired members.)

Back?

hu_num Net union membership (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 629, N: 19, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 33)

(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 4)

Net union membership, in thousands. (Gross minus retired and unemployed members.)

Back?

IMF – World Economic Outlook

<http://imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28>

(IMF 2007)

weo_gdp GDP per capita (PPP, current international dollars)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 1058, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 174)

Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita, measured in current international dollars.

Back?

weo_gbds Government budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 853, N: 30, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 32)

Government budget deficit or surplus as a percentage of GDP.

Back?

weo_infl Inflation (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 1063, N: 39, \bar{N} : 37, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 178)

Inflation as annual percentage change in consumer prices.

Back?

weo_ue Unemployment (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 854, N: 30, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 32)

Unemployment as percent of total labor force.

Back?

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation – University of Washington

<http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/>

(Gakidou et al. 2010)

Educational Levels

ihme_ayef Average Years of Education (Female)

(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1480, N: 37, \bar{N} : 37, \bar{T} : 40)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

Average number of years of education of women aged 25 and older.

Back?

ihme_ayem Average Years of Education (Male)

(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1480, N: 37, \bar{N} : 37, \bar{T} : 40)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

Average number of years of education of men aged 25 and older.

Back?

Child and Maternal Mortality

ihme_nm Neonatal Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Births)

(Time-series: 1970-2010, n: 1599, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 41)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

Probability of death from birth to age 1 month, expressed as deaths per 1,000.

Back?

ihme_pnm Postneonatal Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Births)

(Time-series: 1970-2010, n: 1599, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 41)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

Probability of death between age 1 month to 1 year, expressed as deaths per 1,000.

Back?

ihme_fmort Under-5 Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Live Births)

(Time-series: 1970-2010, n: 1599, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 41)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

Probability of death from birth to age 5, expressed as deaths per 1,000 live births.

Back?

ihme_mmr Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 Live Births)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 1131, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 180)

Number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live Births.

Back?

Jesuit & Mahler – Fiscal Redistribution Dataset

(Time-series: 1979-2004, n: 68, N: 15, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 5)

(Cross-section: 1997-2004 (varies by country), N: 12)

<http://www.lisproject.org/publications/fiscalredistdata/fiscrcd.htm>

(Jesuit & Mahler 2004, 2008; Mahler & Jesuit 2006)

The Jesuit & Mahler data is based on micro-level data from the Luxembourg Income Study (2007).

jm_gb Gini before taxes and transfers

This is what would have been the value of the Gini coefficient, had not the system of government taxes and transfers existed. It is based on the pre-government incomes of households, i.e. wages and salaries, income from property, pensions, alimony, child support and other private sources of income.

The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 1 (the society's total income accrues to only one household unit).

[Back?](#)

jm_ga Gini after taxes and transfers

Gini based on true disposable income, i.e. after government taxes and transfers.

The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 1 (the society's total income accrues to only one household unit).

[Back?](#)

jm_ar Absolute redistribution (change in Gini)

The absolute change in Gini resulting from taxes and transfers. That is $jm_gb - jm_ga$.

[Back?](#)

jm_rr Relative redistribution (change in Gini)

The percentage change in Gini resulting from taxes and transfers. That is $(jm_gb - jm_ga) / jm_gb * 100$.

[Back?](#)

jm_artr Absolute redistribution from transfers (change in Gini)

The absolute change in Gini resulting from transfers. That is jm_gb minus Gini after transfers but before taxes. The variable does not take into account the effect of taxes on transfers (since the underlying data does not permit this), which means that the redistributive effect of transfers is overstated in those countries where transfers are taxed.

[Back?](#)

jm_rrtr Relative redistribution from transfers (change in Gini)

Same as jm_artr , but reflecting the percentage change in Gini resulting from transfers rather than absolute change.

[Back?](#)

jm_arta Absolute redistribution from taxes (change in Gini)

The absolute change in Gini resulting from taxes. As noted above, taxes on transfers are not taken into account and neither are indirect taxes. This means that the redistributive effect of taxes is understated.

[Back?](#)

jm_rrta **Relative redistribution from taxes (change in Gini)**

Same as jm_arta, but reflecting the percentage change in Gini resulting from taxes rather than absolute change.

Back?

jm_srtr **Share of redistribution from transfers (%)**

Percentage share of total redistribution resulting from transfers. That is $jm_artr / jm_ar * 100$.

Back?

jm_srta **Share of redistribution from taxes (%)**

Percentage share of total redistribution resulting from taxes. That is $jm_arta / jm_ar * 100$.

Back?

jm_rprb **Relative poverty rate before taxes and transfers (%)**

Relative poverty rate based on income before government taxes and transfers. The relative poverty rate is here defined as the percentage of the population earning less than 50% of the median income. The variable is based on the pre-government incomes of households, i.e. wages and salaries, income from property, pensions, alimony, child support and other private sources of income.

Back?

jm_rpra **Relative poverty rate after taxes and transfers (%)**

Relative poverty rate based on true disposable income, i.e. after government taxes and transfers. The relative poverty rate is here defined as the percentage of the population earning less than 50% of the median income.

Back?

Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)

(Time-series: 1967-2005, n: 148, N: 29, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 5)

(Cross-section: 1996-2006 (varies by country), N: 35)

<http://www.lisproject.org/>

(Luxembourg Income Study 2007)

Note: All figures from the Luxembourg Income Study are based on disposable household income, i.e. income after taxes and transfers.

lis_gini **Gini index**

The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 1 (the society's total income accrues to only one household unit).

Back?

lis_atk5 Atkinson index (epsilon=0.5)

The Atkinson index is an alternative measure of economic inequality. Like the Gini index, the higher the value, the more unequal the income distribution.

The distinguishing feature of the Atkinson index is its ability to gauge movements in different segments of the income distribution. The Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to changes at the lower end of the income distribution as epsilon approaches 1. Conversely, as the level of inequality aversion falls (that is, as epsilon approaches 0) the Atkinson becomes more sensitive to changes in the upper end of the income distribution.

The Atkinson index is defined as:

$$A = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N y_i^{1-\varepsilon} \right)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)} & \text{for } \varepsilon \in [0, 1) \\ 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \left(\prod_{i=1}^N y_i \right)^{1/N} & \text{for } \varepsilon = 1, \end{cases}$$

where y_i is individual income ($i = 1, 2, \dots, N$) and μ is the mean income (Wikipedia 2008).

[Back?](#)

lis_atk1 Atkinson index (epsilon=1)

See lis_atk5.

[Back?](#)

lis_9010 90/10 income percentile ratio

The ratio of the income of the 90th percentile to the income of the 10th percentile.

[Back?](#)

lis_9050 90/50 income percentile ratio

The ratio of the income of the 90th percentile to the income of the 50th percentile.

[Back?](#)

lis_8020 80/20 income percentile ratio

The ratio of the income of the 80th percentile to the income of the 20th percentile.

[Back?](#)

lis_rpr40 Relative poverty rate (40%)

Percentage of the population earning less than 40 percent of the median income.

[Back?](#)

lis_rpr50 **Relative poverty rate (50%)**

Percentage of the population earning less than 50 percent of the median income.

[Back?](#)

lis_rpr60 **Relative poverty rate (60%)**

Percentage of the population earning less than 60 percent of the median income.

[Back?](#)

OECD – Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC)

(Cross-section: 1998-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)

<http://stats.oecd.org>

(OECD 2009g)

Note: Similar statistics are included in the OECD International Migration Statistics below. However, the DIOC data concerns the foreign born population, while the International Migration Statistics data primarily concerns those in the population that are foreigners.

dioc_fbe **Foreign born employed**

Number of employed persons that are foreign born.

[Back?](#)

dioc_fbue **Foreign born unemployed**

Number of unemployed persons that are foreigners.

[Back?](#)

dioc_fbi **Foreign born inactive**

Total number of foreign born persons that are neither employed nor actively seeking any work.

[Back?](#)

dioc_te **Total employment**

Total number of employed persons.

[Back?](#)

dioc_tue **Total unemployment**

Total number of unemployed persons.

[Back?](#)

dioc_ti Total inactive population

Total number of persons that are neither employed nor actively seeking any work.

[Back?](#)

OECD – Economic Outlook

http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34109_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
(OECD 2007f)

oeo_grgdp Growth of real GDP

(Time-series: 1994-2006, n: 390, N: 30, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 13)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

N.B! This is not growth of GDP per capita.

[Back?](#)

OECD – The Gender, Institutions and Development Database

<http://stats.oecd.org>
(OECD 2009d)

The OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database contains comparative data on gender equality. It has been compiled from secondary sources as well as from in-depth reviews of country case studies. The sources are the UNDP Human Development Report, World Bank Gender Stats, ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market and CIA World Factbook.

gid_far Female Activity Rate (%)

(Cross-section: 2004, N:151)

The percentage of the female population aged 15 and above who supply, or are available to supply, labor for the production of goods and services. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.).

[Back?](#)

gid_farpm Female Activity Rate as Percent of Male

(Cross-section: 2004, N:151)

Same as gid_far, but measured as percentage of male activity rate. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.).

[Back?](#)

gid_fptw Female Professional and Technical Workers (%)

(Cross-section: 1992-2004 (varies by country), N: 74)

Women's share of positions defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) which includes physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals (and associate professionals), life science and health professionals (and associate professionals), teaching professionals (and associate professionals) and other professionals and associate professionals. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.).

Back?

gid_fwe Female Wage Employment (%)

(Cross-section: 2006, N:112)

The share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector as a percentage of the total non-agricultural sector employment. (Source: UN Millennium Development Goal Indicators.).

Back?

gid_rfmi Ratio of Female to Male Income

(Cross-section: 1991-2004 (varies by country), N: 146)

The ratio of the estimated female to male earned income. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.).

Back?

gid_fgm Female Government Ministers (%)

(Cross-section: 1992-2004 (varies by country), N: 151)

The percentage of women in government at ministerial level. Includes vice prime ministers and ministers. Prime ministers are only included if they hold ministerial portfolios. Vice-presidents and heads of ministerial-level departments or agencies were also included when exercising a ministerial function within the government structure. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.).

Back?

gid_whp Women in High Positions (%)

(Cross-section: 1992-2004 (varies by country), N: 73)

The share of women's positions defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), which includes legislators, senior government officials, traditional chiefs and heads of villages, senior officials of special-interest organizations, corporate managers, directors and chief executives, production and operations department managers and other department and general managers. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.)

Back?

gid_wip Women in Parliament (%)

(Cross-section: 2006, N:154)

The percentage of women in parliament. The data refers to single house, or the weighted average of both upper and lower house, where relevant. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report.)

Back?

gid_ywv Year Women Received Right to Vote

(Cross-section, N: 153)

The year women received the right to vote. (Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.)

Back?

gid_ywse Year Women Received Right to Stand for Election

(Cross-section, N: 153)

The year women received the right to stand for election. (Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.)

Back?

gid_yfwp Year of First Woman in Parliament

(Cross-section, N: 153)

The year the first woman was appointed or elected to parliament. (Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.)

Back?

OECD – Health Data 2007

http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2825_495642_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html

(OECD 2007g)

Life expectancy at birth and age 65 is the average number of years that a person at that age can be expected to live, assuming that age-specific mortality levels remain constant.

hd_leb Life expectancy at birth

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1201, N: 31, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 39)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Back?

hd_le65f Life expectancy at 65 (female)

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1125, N: 31, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 30)

Back?

hd_le65m **Life expectancy at 65 (male)**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1130, N: 31, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 30)

Back?

hd_imort **Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)**

(Time-series: 1960-2006, n: 1332, N: 31, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

The number of deaths of children under one year of age that occurred in a given year, expressed per 1000 live births.

Back?

OECD – International Migration Statistics

<http://www.sourceoecd.org>

http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/0,3381,en_2649_37415_1_119656_1_1_37415,00.html

(OECD 2001, 2007h, 2009e)

There are two versions of the OECD International Migration Statistics that cover different time-series that overlap slightly. For some of the variables the values can, for unknown reasons, differ somewhat even for the same country and year. In these few cases we have replaced these observations with the mean of the values from the two different versions. This concerns the following variables: *ims_as*, *ims_flg*, *ims_n*, *ims_of*, *ims_sf* and *ims_sfb*.

ims_if **Inflow of foreigners (thousands)**

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 490, N: 30, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 1998-2002 (varies by country), N: 29)

Back?

ims_of **Outflow of foreigners (thousands)**

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 336, N: 21, \bar{N} : 13, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 20)

Back?

ims_sf **Stock of foreigners (thousands)**

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 427, N: 25, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 17)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 23)

Back?

ims_sfb Stock of foreign-born (thousands)

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 137, N: 23, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 6)
(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 23)

[Back?](#)

ims_as Asylum seekers (thousands)

(Time-series: 1980-2005, n: 546, N: 29, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 19)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

[Back?](#)

ims_n Naturalizations (thousands)

(Time-series: 1985-2005, n: 380, N: 26, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 15)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 25)

Number of foreigners gaining citizenship.

[Back?](#)

ims_ifw Inflow of foreign workers (thousands)

(Time-series: 1998-2007, n: 234, N: 25, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 25)

[Back?](#)

ims_flf Foreigners in labor force (thousands)

(Time-series: 1995-2005, n: 223, N: 22, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 10)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 22)

Number of foreigners that are either employed or actively seeking work.

[Back?](#)

ims_fe Foreigners employed (thousands)

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 15)

Number of employed persons that are foreigners.

[Back?](#)

ims_fue Foreigners unemployed (thousands)

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 14)

Number of unemployed persons that are foreigners.

[Back?](#)

ims_tlf Total labor force (thousands)

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 15)

Total number of persons that are either employed or actively seeking work.

Back?

ims_te Total employment (thousands)

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 15)

Total number of unemployed persons.

Back?

ims_tue Total unemployment (thousands)

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 15)

Total number of unemployed persons.

Back?

OECD – Main Economic Indicators

<http://www.oecd.org/std/mei>

(OECD 2009c)

mei_infl Inflation (%)

(Time-series: 1946-2008, n: 1492, N: 34, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 44)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 40)

Percentage change in consumer prices (all items) compared to the previous year.

Back?

OECD – National Accounts

<http://www.oecd.org/std/national-accounts>

(OECD 2009a)

na_gdp Real GDP (PPP, USD)

(Time-series: 1955-2008, n: 1174, N: 33, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 35)

N.B! This is not GDP per capita. In million US dollars. Constant prices, OECD standard base year 2000. Expenditure approach.

Back?

na_gdpc **Real GDP per capita (PPP, USD)**

(Time-series: 1959-2008, n: 1132, N: 33, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 35)

GDP per capita in US dollars. Constant prices, OECD standard base year 2000.
Expenditure approach.

[Back?](#)

OECD – Population and Labor Force Statistics

<http://www.oecd.org/std/labour>

(OECD 2006d)

plf_ue **Unemployment rate (% of civilian labor force)**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1139, N: 31, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 35)

Unemployment as a percentage of the civilian labor force.

[Back?](#)

plf_lue **Long term unemployment (% of unemployment)**

(Time-series: 1968-2005, n: 655, N: 31, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Percentage of those unemployed that have been unemployed for more than a year.

[Back?](#)

plf_flf **Female labor force (% ages 15-64)**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1055, N: 31, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 30)

Percentage of women aged 15-64 that are either employed or unemployed (actively seeking work).

[Back?](#)

plf_mlf **Male labor force (% ages 15-64)**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1055, N: 31, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 30)

Same as plf_mlf, but for men.

[Back?](#)

plf_cer **Civilian employment rate (% ages 15-64)**

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1183, N: 31, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 30)

Employment rates represent employed persons as a percentage of same age total population (15 to 64 years).

[Back?](#)

OECD Employment Database

(OECD 2009f)

http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3343,en_2649_33927_40917154_1_1_1_1,00.html

ed_num **Net union membership (thousands)**

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 1096, N: 31, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 29)

Total number of union members minus union members outside the employed labor force (retired, unemployed etc.).

[Back?](#)

ed_nud **Net union density (%)**

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 981, N: 30, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 33)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

Net union membership as a percentage of total wage earners in employment.

Treisman

<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/>

(Treisman 2007)

t_yot **Year Opened to Trade**

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 134)

The year a country opened for trade according to Sachs and Warner (1995). Coded as the two last digits of the year in question (e.g. 1950 coded as 50). If the country had not opened in 1994, it is coded as 100.

A country is defined as having an open trade policy if none of the following five conditions apply:

- “1. Nontariff barriers (NTBs) covering 40 percent or more of trade.
2. Average tariff rates of 40 percent or more.
3. A black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20 percent or

more relative to the official exchange rate, on average, during the 1970s or 1980s.

4. A socialist economic system (as defined by Kornai).

5. A state monopoly on major exports.”

(Sachs and Warner 1995, p. 22-23)

Back?

UNDP - Human Development Report

<http://hdr.undp.org/>

(UNDP 2004)

undp_gini **Gini Index (inequality measure)**

(Cross-section: 1983-2002 (varies by country), N: 126)

Measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value of 100 perfect inequality.

Back?

undp_pote **Poorest 10% share of income/consumption**

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 113)

The percentage of total income/consumption of the poorest 10 percent.

Back?

undp_potw **Poorest 20% share of income/consumption**

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 113)

The percentage of total income/consumption of the poorest 20 percent.

Back?

undp_rite **Richest 10% share of income/consumption**

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 113)

The percentage of total income/consumption of the richest 10 percent.

Back?

undp_ritw Richest 20% share of income/consumption

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 113)

The percentage of total income/consumption of the richest 20 percent.

[Back?](#)

United Nations Statistics Divisions – National Accounts

<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/>

(United Nations Statistics Divisions 2009)

Note: The UN Statistics Division treats Zanzibar and the Mainland of Tanzania as separate countries from the year 1990, while the QoG dataset treats them as one unit (Tanzania). The GDP variable (unna_gdp) was simply summed up for each pair of observations. The trade openness variables (unna_otco and unna_otcu) were also summed up, but weighted for the difference in population sizes.

unna_gdp Real GDP

(Time-series: 1970-2007, n: 1362, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

GDP at constant 1990 prices in US dollars.

[Back?](#)

unna_gdpc Real GDP per Capita

(Time-series: 1970-2007, n: 1362, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

GDP per capita at constant 1990 prices in US dollars. This variable was not published by the UN Statistics Division, but we constructed it by simply dividing unna_gdp with the population variable provided by the UN Statistics Division.

[Back?](#)

unna_grgdp Growth Rate of Real GDP (%)

(Time-series: 1971-2007, n: 1323, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

The growth rate of GDP at constant prices, in percent.

[Back?](#)

unna_grgdp **Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (%)**

(Time-series: 1971-2007, n: 1323, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

The growth rate of GDP per capita at constant prices, in percent.

This variable was not published by the UN Statistics Division, but we constructed it by dividing the difference in real GDP per capita compared to the last year with the real GDP per capita for the last year (and multiplying it by 100 to measure it in percent). That is: $(\text{unna_gdpc}_{t0} - \text{unna_gdpc}_{t-1}) / \text{unna_gdpc}_{t-1} * 100$.

Back?

unna_otco **Openness to Trade, Constant Prices (%)**

(Time-series: 1970-2007, n: 1362, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 190)

Exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Measured at constant 1990 prices.

Back?

unna_otcu **Openness to Trade, Current Prices (%)**

(Time-series: 1970-2007, n: 1362, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

Exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Measured at current prices.

Back?

UNESCO Institute for Statistics

<http://www.uis.unesco.org>

(UNESCO 2010)

Enrollment

All values given are gross enrollment rate (GER). GER is defined as the number of pupils enrolled at a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for the same level of education. For the tertiary level, the population used is the five-year age group following on from the secondary school leaving age. Gross enrollment rate can be over 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged pupils/students because of early or late entrants, and grade repetition. In this case, a rigorous interpretation of GER needs additional information to assess the extent of repetition, late entrants, etc.

une_preet **Pre-primary education enrollment, total**

(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1329, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 179)

Back?

une_preef **Pre-primary education enrollment, female**
(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1149, N: 39, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 176)

[Back?](#)

une_preem **Pre-primary education enrollment, male**
(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1149, N: 39, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 176)

[Back?](#)

une_pet **Primary education enrollment, total**
(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1385, N: 39, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 185)

[Back?](#)

une_pef **Primary education enrollment, female**
(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1313, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 34)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 185)

[Back?](#)

une_pem **Primary education enrollment, male**
(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1313, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 34)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 185)

[Back?](#)

une_set **Secondary education enrollment, total**
(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1321, N: 39, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 34)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 184)

[Back?](#)

une_sef **Secondary education enrollment, female**
(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1242, N: 39, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 32)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 184)

[Back?](#)

une_sem **Secondary education enrollment, male**
(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1242, N: 39, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 32)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 184)

[Back?](#)

une_tet Tertiary education enrollment, total

(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1342, N: 39, \bar{N} : 34, \bar{T} : 34)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 168)

[Back?](#)

une_tef Tertiary education enrollment, female

(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1280, N: 39, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 33)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 163)

[Back?](#)

une_tem Tertiary education enrollment, male

(Time-series: 1999-2008, n: 364, N: 38, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 10)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 166)

[Back?](#)

une_ppepre Percent private enrollment, pre-primary

(Time-series: 1971-2009, n: 929, N: 38, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 24)
(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 159)

Private pre-primary school enrollment, as a percentage of total enrollment.

[Back?](#)

une_ppep Percent private enrollment, primary

(Time-series: 1971-2009, n: 853, N: 36, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 24)
(Cross-section: 1999-2008 (varies by country), N: 163)

Private primary school enrollment, as a percentage of total enrollment.

[Back?](#)

une_ppes Percent private enrollment, secondary

(Time-series: 1998-2009, n: 380, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 10)
(Cross-section: 1999-2009 (varies by country), N: 163)

Private secondary school enrollment, as a percentage of total enrollment.

[Back?](#)

Duration

une_dur Duration of compulsory education

(Time-series: 1998-2010, n: 446, N: 39, \bar{N} : 34, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2002-2008 (varies by country), N: 187)

Duration of the compulsory education.

[Back?](#)

UNU-WIDER – World Income Inequality Database

(United Nations University 2008)

http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/

uw_gini **Gini (mean)**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 2309, N: 154, \bar{N} : 38, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 151)

This variable measures the Gini index of income inequality as reported by UNU-WIDER (version WIID2c). The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (the society's total income accrues to only one person/household unit). In case a country in the original data has multiple observations for a given year, we include the mean of the highest quality observations (as measured by uw_quality). Both within- and cross-country comparisons are to be handled with care since these Gini coefficients are based on varying sources of information and refer to a variety of income and population concepts, sample sizes and statistical methods.

[Back?](#)

uw_quality **Quality (mean)**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 2309, N: 154, \bar{N} : 38, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 151)

UNU-WIDER apply the following quality ratings of their Gini-measures, a lower value indicating higher quality:

- (1) for observations a) where the underlying concepts are known, and b) where the quality of the income concept and the survey can be judged as sufficient;
- (2) for observations where the quality of either the income concept or the survey is problematic or unknown or we have not been able to verify the estimates;
- (3) for observations where both income concept and the survey are problematic or unknown;
- (4) for observations classified as memorandum items.

[Back?](#)

uw_ngini **Gini (count)**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 2309, N: 154, \bar{N} : 38, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 1957-2005 (varies by country), N: 151)

The number of separate Gini measures supplied each year in the original data (of which uw_gini provides the average).

[Back?](#)

uw_sdgini **Gini (standard deviation)**

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 964, N: 126, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 1958-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

The standard deviation of those possibly separate Gini measures supplied each year in the original data (only computed for years of multiple measures).

[Back?](#)

uw_yom **Year of Measurement**

(Cross-section: 1957-2006 (varies by country), N: 150)

The latest year available for each country in the cross-sectional dataset of the uw_gini measurement.

[Back?](#)

UTIP – University of Texas Inequality Project

<http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html>
(Galbraith and Kum 2003; 2004; Galbraith 2009)

utip_ehii **Estimated household income inequality**

(Time-series: 1963-2002, n: 1217, N: 37, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 33)
(Cross-section: 1972-2002 (varies by country), N: 146)

In order to provide a more reliable and consistent measure of household income inequality, Galbraith and Kum (2004) estimate Gini coefficients through an equation whereby the Deininger and Squire (1996) high quality dataset (ds_gini) is regressed on: a measure of manufacturing pay inequality (utip_ipi); the ratio of manufacturing employment to population; and three dummies for data sources of the Deininger and Squire (1996) measures (income vs. expenditure, gross vs. net of taxes, household vs. personal unit of analysis). Apart from providing substantially enhanced coverage, Galbraith and Kum (2004) argue that this estimated income inequality measure produces better comparability both across countries and over time.

[Back?](#)

utip_ehii_yom **Year of measurement**

(Cross-section: 1972-2002 (varies by country), N: 146)

The latest year available for each country in the cross-sectional dataset of the utip_ehii measurement.

[Back?](#)

utip_ipi Industrial pay inequality

(Time-series: 1963-2002, n: 1160, N: 38, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 31)
(Cross-section: 1972-2002 (varies by country), N: 148)

Based on data on pay across industrial categories in the manufacturing sector compiled by the United Nations International Development Organization (UNIDO), Galbraith and Kum (2003) compute this measure of pay inequality. The measure consists of the between-groups component of Theil's T statistic, where groups are defined using a two or three digit code of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). Larger values indicate greater manufacturing pay inequality.

Back?

utip_ipi_yom Year of measurement

(Cross-section: 1972-2002 (varies by country), N: 148)

The latest year available for each country in the cross-sectional dataset of the utip_ipi measurement.

Back?

Visser – Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS)

<http://www.uva-aias.net/207>
(Visser 2009)

vi_wsc Wage setting coordination

(Time-series: 1960-2008, n: 1156, N: 34, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 34)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 33)

Based on Kenworthy (2001) (as is hu_wsc), but with some differences. The main difference is that except in the case of direct imposition of wage settlements or in the case of a ban on contract renewals (= score 5), Visser does not assume that the scale for government intervention in wage bargaining parallels that of wage coordination. Government intervention is taken up in a separate variable.

(5) Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze – with a peace obligation, extremely high degree of union concentration and coordination of industry bargaining by confederation, extensive coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive pattern-setting.

(4) Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze – without a peace obligation, high degree of union concentration and extensive, regularized pattern-setting, tacit coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive pattern-setting.

(3) Industry-level bargaining with reasonably strong pattern-setting but only moderate union concentration.

(2) Bargaining mainly at industry-level with little or no pattern-setting.

(1) Fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants.

Back?

vi_giwb Government intervention in wage bargaining

(Time-series: 1960-2008, n: 1156, N: 34, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 33)

Based on Hassel (2006), but with some changes.

(5) The government imposes private sector wage settlements, places a ceiling on bargaining outcomes or suspends bargaining.

(4) The government participates directly in wage bargaining (tripartite bargaining, as in social pacts).

(3) The government influences wage bargaining outcomes indirectly through price-ceilings, indexation, tax measures, minimum wages, and/or public sector wages.

(2) The government influences wage bargaining by providing an institutional framework of consultation and information exchanges, by a conditional agreement to extend private sector agreements, and/or by providing a conflict resolution mechanism that links the settlement of disputes across the economy and/or allows the intervention of state arbitrators or Parliament.

(1) None of the above.

Back?

vi_lwb Level of wage bargaining

(Time-series: 1960-2008, n: 1156, N: 34, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 33)

The dominant level (or levels) at which wage bargaining takes place.

(5) National or central level

(4) National or central level, with additional sectoral / local or company bargaining

(3) Sectoral or industry level

(2) Sectoral or industry level, with additional local or company bargaining

(1) Local or company bargaining

Back?

vi_cuwb Centralization of union wage bargaining

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 919, N: 34, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 33)

Summary measure of centralization and coordination of union wage bargaining, taking into account both union authority and union concentration at multiple levels. The variable weights the degree of authority or vertical coordination in the union movement with the degree of union concentration or horizontal coordination, taking into account the multiple levels at which bargaining can take place and assuming a non-zero division of union authority over different levels. For details on the construction of the variable, see the codebook available at <http://www.uva-aias.net/207>

Varies theoretically between 0 and 1 where higher values indicate a higher centralization.

Back?

vi_tum Total union membership (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 938, N: 34, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 1996-2004 (varies by country), N: 33)

Total number of union members (thousands).

Back?

vi_num Net union membership (thousands)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 967, N: 34, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 33)

Total number of union members minus union members outside the active, dependent and employed labor force (i.e. retired workers, independent workers, students, unemployed).

Back?

vi_nud Net union density (%)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 956, N: 34, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 33)

Net union membership as a percentage of total wage earners in employment.

Back?

vi_abc Adjusted bargaining coverage (%)

(Time-series: 1960-2007, n: 867, N: 32, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 31)

Employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a percentage of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees over the total number of dependent workers in employment).

Back?

World Development Indicators

<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog>

Economy

wdi_gdp **GDP, PPP (Constant International USD)**

(Time-series: 1980-2010, n: 1163, N: 39, \bar{N} : 38, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 178)

GDP converted to constant 2005 international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the US dollar has in the United States. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_gdpgr **GDP Growth (%)**

(Time-series: 1961-2010, n: 1517, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 39)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 187)

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 US dollars. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_gdpc **GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant International USD)**

(Time-series: 1980-2010, n: 1163, N: 39, \bar{N} : 38, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 178)

GDP per capita, PPP adjusted. (See wdi_gdp above for explanation.) Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_gdpcgr **GDP per Capita Growth (%)**

(Time-series: 1961-2010, n: 1517, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 39)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 187)

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_gdpcu GDP (current USD)

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1525, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 39)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 185)

Gross domestic product in current US dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_gni GNI, Atlas Method (Current USD)

(Time-series: 1962-2008, n: 1473, N: 39, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2001-2005 (varies by country), N: 182)

Gross national income. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted into US dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_gnipc GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (Current USD)

(Time-series: 1962-2010, n: 1421, N: 39, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 2001-2005 (varies by country), N: 182)

GNI per capita, Atlas method. (See wdi_gni above for explanation.) Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_gbds Government budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP)

(Time-series: 1990-2010, n: 480, N: 37, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 13)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 140)

Government revenue (including grants) minus expenses, minus net acquisitions of nonfinancial assets. Measured as a percentage of GDP. Source: International Monetary Fund. (World Bank and OECD for GDP estimates.)

[Back?](#)

wdi_cgd **Central Government Debt (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 412, N: 36, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 1995-2007 (varies by country), N: 99)

The gross amount of government liabilities reduced by the amount of equity and financial derivatives held by the government. Because debt is a stock rather than a flow, it is measured as of a given date, usually the last day of the fiscal year. Measured as a percentage of GDP. Source: International Monetary Fund. (World Bank and OECD for GDP estimates.)

[Back?](#)

wdi_exp **Exports (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1512, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 39)
(Cross-section: 1997-2002 (varies by country), N: 179)

Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_imp **Imports (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1512, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 39)
(Cross-section: 1997-2002 (varies by country), N: 179)

Imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_ttr **Total Trade (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1512, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 39)
(Cross-section: 1997-2002 (varies by country), N: 179)

Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a percentage of GDP. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_tot **Terms of Trade**

(Time-series: 1980-2010, n: 831, N: 37, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 22)
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 139)

The terms of trade index is calculated as the percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes, measured relative to the base year 2000. It is a measure of how much export is needed per import. Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and International Monetary Fund.

[Back?](#)

wdi_fdi **Foreign Direct Investments, Net Inflows (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1970-2010, n: 1332, N: 39, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 1996-2006 (varies by country), N: 175)

Foreign direct investments are the net inflows of investments to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of the voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. This series shows the net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP. Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, and World Bank, Global Development Finance.

[Back?](#)

wdi_ase **Agriculture's share of economy (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1363, N: 37, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 37)

(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 179)

The share of the economy that stems from agricultural production as a percentage of GDP. Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, fishing, cultivation of crops and livestock production. The variable is calculated as the net output of the sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_ise **Industry's share of economy (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1404, N: 38, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 37)

(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 179)

The share of the economy that stems from industrial production as a percentage of GDP. Industry includes mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas. The variable is calculated as the net output of the sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_sse **Services' share of economy (% of GDP)**

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1363, N: 37, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 37)

(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 179)

The share of the economy that stems from services as a percentage of GDP. Services include wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and real estate services. Also included are imputed bank service charges and import duties. The variable is calculated as the net output of the sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

[Back?](#)

wdi_infl Inflation (%)

(Time-series: 1961-2010, n: 1516, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 39)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 187)

Inflation measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator, showing the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. Sources: World Bank and OECD.

Back?

Gender Equality

wdi_gris Gender Ratio in School (%)

(Time-series: 1970-2009, n: 1225, N: 39, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 31)
(Cross-section: 1998-2009 (varies by country), N: 179)

The percentage of girls to boys enrolled at primary and secondary levels in public and private schools. Source: UNESCO.

Back?

wdi_wip Women in Parliament (%)

(Time-series: 1990-2011, n: 614, N: 39, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 16)
(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 188)

The percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held by women. Source: United Nations, Women's Indicators and Statistics database (www.ipu.org).

Back?

Economic Equality

wdi_gini Gini Index

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 120, N: 36, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 142)

Gini measure of economic inequality, where greater values represent greater inequality. Data are based on primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. Data for high-income economies are from the Luxembourg Income Study database.

Back?

wdi_isl20 **Income Share of Lowest 20%**

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 120, N: 36, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 143)

Percentage share of income that accrues to the lowest quintile of the population.
Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding. Source: see wdi_gini.

[Back?](#)

wdi_iss20 **Income Share of Second 20%**

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 120, N: 36, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 142)

Percentage share of income that accrues to the second quintile of the population.
Source: see wdi_gini.

[Back?](#)

wdi_ist20 **Income Share of Third 20%**

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 120, N: 36, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 142)

Percentage share of income that accrues to the third quintile of the population.
Source: see wdi_gini.

[Back?](#)

wdi_isf20 **Income Share of Fourth 20%**

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 120, N: 36, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 142)

Percentage share of income that accrues to the fourth quintile of the population.
Source: see wdi_gini.

[Back?](#)

wdi_ish20 **Income Share of Highest 20%**

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 120, N: 36, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 143)

Percentage share of income that accrues to the highest quintile of the population.
Source: see wdi_gini.

[Back?](#)

wdi_isl10 Income Share of Lowest 10%

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 120, N: 36, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 143)

Percentage share of income that accrues to the lowest decile of the population.
Source: see wdi_gini.

[Back?](#)

wdi_ish10 Income Share of Highest 10%

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 120, N: 36, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 143)

Percentage share of income that accrues to the highest decile of the population.
Source: see wdi_gini.

[Back?](#)

Labor Force and Unemployment

wdi_lf Labor Force (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 1170, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002-2008 (varies by country), N: 169)

The proportion of the population age 15 and older that is economically active (all persons who supply labor and are either employed or unemployed). Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_lff Labor Force, Female (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 1170, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 168)

The proportion of the female population age 15 and older that is economically active.
Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_lfm Labor Force, Male (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 1170, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 168)

The proportion of the male population age 15 and older that is economically active.
Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_ue Unemployment (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 927, N: 39, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 24)
(Cross-section: 1996-2007 (varies by country), N: 157)

The share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_uf Unemployment, Female (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2008, n: 885, N: 39, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 1996-2007 (varies by country), N: 152)

The share of the female labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_uem Unemployment, Male (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 923, N: 39, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 24)
(Cross-section: 1996-2007 (varies by country), N: 152)

The share of the male labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_uey Unemployment, Youth (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 900, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 1995-2007 (varies by country), N: 131)

The share of the labor force ages 15-24 without work but available for and seeking employment. Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_uefy Unemployment, Female Youth (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 899, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 1995-2007 (varies by country), N: 127)

The share of the female labor force ages 15-24 without work but available for and seeking employment. Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_uemy Unemployment, Male Youth (%)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 899, N: 39, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 1995-2007 (varies by country), N: 127)

The share of the male labor force ages 15-24 without work but available for and seeking employment. Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_lue Long-Term Unemployment (% of Unemployed)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 846, N: 39, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 55)

Long-term unemployment refers to the number of people with continuous periods of unemployment extending for a year or longer, expressed as a percentage of the total unemployed. Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_luef Long-Term Unemployment, Female (% of Unemployed)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 834, N: 39, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 53)

Long-term female unemployment as a percentage of women unemployed. Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

wdi_luem Long-Term Unemployment, Male (% of Unemployed)

(Time-series: 1980-2009, n: 844, N: 39, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 53)

Long-term male unemployment as a percentage of men unemployed. Source: ILO.

[Back?](#)

Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates

wdi_lifexp Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1946, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 50)

(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 188)

Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Sources: United Nations Population Division, national statistical offices, Eurostat, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, and U.S. Census Bureau.

[Back?](#)

wdi_mort Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Live Births)

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1829, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 47)
(Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country), N: 190)

Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. Source: Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UNPD, universities and research institutions).

[Back?](#)

wdi_fmort Mortality Rate, Under-5 (per 1,000)

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1829, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 47)
(Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country), N: 190)

The probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Source: Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation.

[Back?](#)

Population and Migration

wdi_pop Population

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1989, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 51)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 190)

The variable includes all population, regardless of legal status or citizenship. Values are midyear estimates.

Sources: United Nations Population Division, national statistical offices, Eurostat, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, US Census Bureau and World bank estimates.

[Back?](#)

wdi_pop14 Population Ages 0-14 (% of Total)

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1989, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 51)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 179)

Population between the ages 0-14 as a percentage of the total population. World Bank staff estimates from various sources.

[Back?](#)

wdi_pop1564 Population Ages 15-64 (% of Total)

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1989, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 51)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 179)

Population between the ages 15-64 as a percentage of the total population. World Bank staff estimates from various sources.

[Back?](#)

wdi_pop65 Population Ages 65 and Above (% of Total)

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 1989, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 51)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 179)

Population age 65 and above as a percentage of the total population. World Bank staff estimates from various sources.

Back?

wdi_nm Net Migration

(Time-series: 1960-2010, n: 429, N: 39, \bar{N} : 8, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 179)

NOTE: This variable denotes the net migration for the five-year period, not for each year!

Net migration is the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants, including citizens and noncitizens, for the five-year period. Source: United Nations Population division.

Back?

wdi_rp Refugee Population

(Time-series: 1990-2010, n: 771, N: 39, \bar{N} : 37, \bar{T} : 20)
(Cross-section: 1996-2007 (varies by country), N: 167)

Refugees are persons who are recognized as refugees under various international conventions, people granted refugee-like humanitarian status, and people provided with temporary protection. Asylum seekers who have not yet received a decision or who are registered as asylum seekers are excluded. Source: UNHCR.

Back?

World Economic Forum – Gender Gap Index

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 128)
<http://www.weforum.org/gendergap>
(World Economic Forum 2007)

There are three basic concepts underlying the Gender Gap Index. First, it focuses on measuring gaps rather than levels. Second, it captures gaps in outcome variables rather than gaps in means or input variables. Third, it ranks countries according to gender equality rather than women's empowerment.

All of the index scores below are on a 0 to 1 scale (0.00= inequality, 1.00= equality) and can be roughly interpreted as the share of the gender gap that has been closed.

wef_gend Gender gap index

The overall index is a weighted average of normalized versions of the subindexes below.

[Back?](#)

wef_ecgg Economic gender gap

The following indicators are included in the economic participation and opportunity index: the ratio of female over male labor force participation; the female over male wage ratio (for similar work); the female over male ratio of legislators senior officials and managers; the female over male ratio of professional and technical workers.

[Back?](#)

wef_edgg Educational gender gap

The following indicators are included in the educational attainment index: the female over male literacy rate; the female over male net primary education enrollment, the female over male net secondary education enrollment; the female over male gross tertiary education enrollment.

[Back?](#)

wef_hgg Health gender gap

The following indicators are included in the health and survival index: the female over male healthy life expectancy; the female over male sex ratio at birth.

[Back?](#)

wef_pegg Political empowerment gender gap

The following indicators are included in the political empowerment index: the female over male seats in parliament; the female over male number of ministers; the ratio of female over male years of head of state (last 50 years).

[Back?](#)

Public Opinion

In this section we present data on public opinion on social policy issues, like e.g. attitudes towards economic redistribution, tax financing of social services etc. Included are also data on interpersonal trust, trust in politicians and government authorities, and satisfaction with democracy and the government.

When choosing which variables to include, we have first of all prioritized those with good coverage of the countries of our primary interest (EU/OECD plus Israel). Second, we have prioritized those that were available for at least two points in time.

Since all the data in this section originally is individual level data, each observation is the mean value of the response of the individuals for that country and year.

In the wide version of the time-series dataset, the public opinion variables exist in one version for each module of the survey in question. A suffix denotes from which module the variable is taken. Example: `cses_lr_2` means that the values of the variable are from the `cses_lr` variable in the second module of the CSES survey (see below). Please note however that the Eurobarometer data is exempt from this rule, due to the very large number of modules of this survey. Instead, the Eurobarometer data is provided for each year of available data. (Example: the `eb_lr_1979` variable contains values for the `eb_lr` variable the year 1979.) For all the other, non public opinion data in the wide version of the dataset, there is one variable for every 5th year from 1970-2005.

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)

<http://www.cses.org/>

(Sapiro et al 2003; The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007)

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) is a collaborative program of research among election study teams from around the world conducting post-election studies. So far two rounds of CSES have been published.

Note: In a few cases the CSES survey was conducted the year after the election year. In these cases we have nevertheless placed the data on the year of the election that the survey is related to. For more information, see the CSES website (<http://www.cses.org>).

cses_module CSES module

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 56, N: 30, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

There are two CSES modules, and this variable denotes from which module each observation comes. Module 1 was conducted in the period 1996-2002, and module 2 in 2001-2006.

Note: For some countries there were two surveys in the same module. In these cases we have given the second survey of the module the value of 1.5 or 2.5. (In the wide version of the time-series cross-section dataset, the variables have the suffixes `_1_5` and `_2_5`.)

In the case of Portugal 2002, CSES modules 1 and 2 were part of the same election study. We have (arbitrarily) chosen to treat this observation as belonging to module 1.
Back?

cses_lr Left-right self-placement

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 54, N: 29, $\bar{N} : 5$, $\bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 39)

In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

Left Right

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Back?

cses_sd Satisfaction with democracy

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 56, N: 30, $\bar{N} : 5$, $\bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?

- (1) Very satisfied
- (2) Fairly satisfied
- (3) Not very satisfied
- (4) Not at all satisfied

Back?

cses_dbfg Democracy the best form of government

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 30, N: 29, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 1)

(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 37)

Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement:
"Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government."
Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with this statement?

- (1) Agree strongly
- (2) Agree
- (3) Disagree
- (4) Disagree strongly

Back?

cses_sgpg Satisfaction with government/president: general

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 30, N: 29, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 1)

(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 36)

Thinking about the performance of the government in [capital]/president in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government/president in [capital] has done over the past [number of years between the previous and the present election or change in government] years. Has it/he/she done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? A very bad job?

- (1) Very good job
- (2) Good job
- (3) Bad job
- (4) Very bad job

Back?

cses_sgpml Satisfaction with government/president: most important issue

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 29, N: 28, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 1)

(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 36)

Thinking about the most important issue facing [country] over the last [number of years that the last government was in office] years, how good or bad a job do you think the government/president in [capital] has done over the past [number of years between the previous and the present election OR change in government] years. Has it/he/she done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? A very bad job?

- (1) Very good job
- (2) Good job
- (3) Bad job
- (4) Very bad job

Back?

cses_lef Last election was fair

(Time-series: 1996-2002, n: 25, N: 23, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 1)
(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 29)

In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where one means that the last election was conducted fairly and five means that the last election was conducted unfairly?

- (1) Last election was conducted fairly
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5) Last election was conducted unfairly

[Back?](#)

cses_vmd Voting makes a difference

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 55, N: 30, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and five means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself?

- (1) Who people vote for won't make a difference
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5) Who people vote for can make a difference

[Back?](#)

cses_hwvvr How well are voters' views represented

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 28, N: 27, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 1)

(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 35)

Thinking about how elections in [country] work in practice, how well do elections ensure that the views of voters are represented by Majority Parties: very well, quite well, not very well, or not well at all?

- (1) Very well
- (2) Quite well
- (3) Not very well
- (4) Not well at all

Back?

cses_ppcpt Political parties care what people think

(Time-series: 1996-2002, n: 27, N: 25, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 1)

(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 32)

Some people say that political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in [country] don't care what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that political parties care about what ordinary people think, and five means that they don't care what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?

- (1) Political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5) Political parties in [country] don't care what ordinary people think

Back?

cses_ppn Political parties are necessary

(Time-series: 1996-2002, n: 27, N: 25, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 1)

(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 32)

Some people say that political parties are necessary to make our political system work in [country]. Others think that political parties are not needed in [country]. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that political parties are necessary to make our political system work, and five means that political parties are not needed in [country]), where would you place yourself?

- (1) Political parties are necessary to make our political system work
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5) Political parties are not needed in [country]

Back?

cses_pkpt Politicians know what people think

(Time-series: 1996-2002, n: 27, N: 25, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 1)

(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 23)

Some people say that members of Congress/Parliament know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of Congress/Parliament don't know much about what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that the members of Congress/Parliament know what ordinary people think, and five means that the members of Congress/Parliament don't know much about what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?

- (1) Members of Congress/Parliament know what ordinary people think
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5) Members of Congress/Parliament don't know what ordinary people think

Back?

cses_cap Corruption amongst politicians

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 30, N: 29, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 1)

(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 37)

How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in [country]: very widespread, quite widespread, not very widespread, it hardly happens at all?

- (1) Very widespread
- (2) Quite widespread
- (3) Not very widespread
- (4) It hardly happens at all

Back?

cses_rif Respect for individual freedom

(Time-series: 2001-2006, n: 29, N: 28, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} :1)

(Cross-section: 2001-2006 (varies by country), N: 36)

How much respect is there for individual freedom and human rights nowadays in [country]? Do you feel there is a lot of respect for individual freedom, some respect, not much respect, or no respect at all?

- (1) A lot of respect for individual freedom
- (2) Some respect
- (3) Not much respect
- (4) No respect at all

Back?

Eurobarometer

http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/index.htm

http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/standard_eb_trend/TrendFile.htm

(Schmitt et al 2006) (Reif et al 1990-1997)

The Eurobarometer has been conducted by the European Commission since 1973, and primarily covers the European Union member states (including member candidates). The Eurobarometer data has been collected from several different sources. For available variables and countries we have aggregated data from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File (Schmitt et al 2006). In addition to this we have used single Eurobarometers, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Trend File (Reif et al 1990-1997) and single Candidate Countries Eurobarometers.

eb_module Eurobarometer module

(Time-series: 1973-2005, n: 632, N: 30, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} :21)
(Cross-section: 1996-2004 (varies by country), N: 39)

As mentioned above, the Eurobarometer data comes from different sources. This variable denotes which source each observation comes from. In some cases there are observations from two different sources for the same country and year, depending on which variable the observation concerns.

- (1) Mannheim Trend File
- (2) Standard Eurobarometer
- (3) CCEB (Candidate Countries Eurobarometer)
- (4) CEEB (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Trend File)
- (5) Mannheim Trend File and Standard Eurobarometer
- (6) Standard Eurobarometer and CCEB

[Back?](#)

eb_lr Left-right self-placement

(Time-series: 1973-2004, n: 391, N: 30, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 13)
(Cross-section: 1996-2003 (varies by country), N: 29)

In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale?

Left										Right
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

(Sources: Mannheim Trend File, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

Trust in EU organs

(Time-series: 1999-2004, n: 112, N: 28, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 4)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

(The sources of the following eight variables are the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

Have you ever heard of (...)? ...and for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not to trust it.

- (1) Tend to trust
- (2) Tend not to trust

eb_tcj	Trust in the European Court of Justice
eb_tcm	Trust in the EU Council of Ministers
eb_tec	Trust in the European Commission
eb_tecb	Trust in the European Central Bank
eb_teca	Trust in the European Court of Auditors
eb_teo	Trust in the European Ombudsman
eb_tep	Trust in the European Parliament
eb_tsec	Trust in the EU Social and Economic Committee

Back?

Trust in national organs

(The sources of the following seven variables are the standard Eurobarometer and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?

- (1) Tend to trust
- (2) Tend not to trust

eb_tls Trust in the legal system

(Time-series: 1997-2008, n: 241, N: 28, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

Back?

eb_tp Trust in the police

(Time-series: 1997-2008, n: 185, N: 28, \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 7)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

Back?

eb_ta Trust in the army

(Time-series: 1997-2008, n: 185, N: 28, \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 7)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

Back?

eb_tpp **Trust in political parties**

(Time-series: 1997-2008, n: 241, N: 28, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

[Back?](#)

eb_tcs **Trust in the civil service**

(Time-series: 1997-2003, n: 114, N: 28, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 4)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

[Back?](#)

eb_tng **Trust in the national government**

(Time-series: 1997-2009, n: 254, N: 28, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

[Back?](#)

eb_tnp **Trust in national parliament**

(Time-series: 1997-2009, n: 269, N: 28, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 10)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

[Back?](#)

Satisfaction with democracy

eb_sd **Satisfaction with democracy in country**

(Time-series: 1973-2004, n: 362, N: 30, \bar{N} : 11, \bar{T} : 12)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 29)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [our country]?

- (1) Very satisfied
- (2) Fairly satisfied
- (3) Not very satisfied
- (4) Not satisfied at all

(Sources: The Mannheim Trend File, the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer and the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_sdd **Satisfaction with democracy development in country**

(Time-series: 1990-1997, n: 74, N: 10, \bar{N} : 9, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 1996-1997 (varies by country), N: 20)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not satisfied at all with the way democracy is developing in [our country]?

- (1) Very satisfied
- (2) Fairly satisfied
- (3) Not very satisfied
- (4) Not satisfied at all

(Sources: The Central and Eastern Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_sdeu **Satisfaction with democracy in the EU**

(Time-series: 1993-2004, n: 145, N: 29, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 5)

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 29)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?

- (1) Very satisfied
- (2) Fairly satisfied
- (3) Not very satisfied
- (4) Not at all satisfied

(Sources: The Mannheim Trend File and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

Important problems

(Time-series: 1989-1994, n: 24, N: 13, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2)

I would like to hear your views on some political issues and problems. Which issue or problem do you consider the most important? And which issue or problem do you consider the second most important? And finally, which issue or problem do you consider the third most important?

(To this question there were 12 alternative problems to choose from in 1989 and 11 alternative problems in 1994. However, we only include two of them here.)

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_ipue_1 Important problem: unemployment

(0) Not mentioned as most important problem

(1) Mentioned as most important problem

Back?

eb_ipue_2 Important problem: unemployment

(0) Not mentioned as second most important problem

(1) Mentioned as second most important problem

Back?

eb_ipue_3 Important problem: unemployment

(0) Not mentioned as third most important problem

(1) Mentioned as third most important problem

Back?

eb_ipsp_1 Important problem: stable prices

(0) Not mentioned as most important problem

(1) Mentioned as most important problem

Back?

eb_ipsp_2 Important problem: stable prices

(0) Not mentioned as second most important problem

(1) Mentioned as second most important problem

Back?

eb_ipsp_3 Important problem: stable prices

(0) Not mentioned as third most important problem

(1) Mentioned as third most important problem

Back?

Things necessary to live properly

This question was posed in slightly different ways in 1989 and 1993 (the 1989 version listed first):

Not everybody has the same idea about what are the necessities of life. Among the following things which ones seem to you absolutely necessary to live properly today, and which ones don't seem to you to be absolutely necessary?

Not everybody has the same idea about what the necessities of life are. For each of the following, please tell me if you think it absolutely necessary to live properly nowadays or not?

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_swan Social welfare absolutely necessary

(Time-series: 1989-1993, n: 26, N: 15, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 2)

To be able to benefit from social welfare when needed, such as in the case of unemployment, sickness, handicap, old age.

- (0) Not mentioned
- (1) Mentioned

Back?

eb_gean Good education absolutely necessary

(Time-series: 1989-2001, n: 41, N: 17, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

Having a good education.

- (0) Not mentioned
- (1) Mentioned

Back?

Important issues

(Time-series: 2002-2007, n: 86, N: 28, \bar{N} : 14, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 29)

What do you think are the two most important issues facing [our country] at the moment? (Max 2 answers possible.)

- (0) Not mentioned
- (1) Mentioned

(To this question there were 15 alternative issues to choose from. However, we only include seven of them here.)

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

eb_iii Important issue: inflation

eb_iit Important issue: taxation

eb_iiue Important issue: unemployment

eb_iih Important issue: housing

eb_iihc Important issue: health care system

eb_iiie Important issue: educational system

eb_iip Important issue: pensions

Back?

Health care**eb_hcs Health care satisfaction**

(Time-series: 1996-2004, n: 86, N: 28, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

Please tell me whether you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with each of the following? [our country]'s health care system in general.

- (1) Very satisfied
- (2) Fairly satisfied
- (3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- (4) Not very satisfied
- (5) Not at all satisfied

Note: The answer option (3) was not available 1999 and in the 2002 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_hcsty Health care satisfaction in two years

(Time-series: 1999-2004, n: 56, N: 28, \bar{N} : 9, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 28)

And please tell me whether in two years time you think you will be more satisfied, less satisfied or will there be no change with? [our country]'s health care system in general.

- (1) More satisfied
- (2) No change
- (3) Less satisfied

Note: In the 2002 standard Eurobarometer the alternatives were instead: more satisfied, as satisfied and less satisfied.

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_hctfu Health care too frequently used

(Time-series: 1992-2004, n: 55, N: 28, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1996-2004 (varies by country), N: 28)

I am going to read out a list of statements about health and health care. For each, I would like you to tell me if you agree strongly, agree slightly, disagree slightly or disagree strongly?

People use health care facilities too frequently and therefore contribute to rising costs.

- (1) Agree strongly
- (2) Agree slightly
- (3) Uncertain/ Neither agree nor disagree (SPONTANEOUS)
- (4) Disagree slightly
- (5) Disagree strongly

Note: In 2004 the question and reply options were instead:

People use health care facilities too frequently.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Tend to agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Tend to disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_hcrw Health care runs well

(Time-series: 1996-2004, n: 43, N: 28, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 28)

Now, I will read you four statements about the way health care runs in [our country]. Which one comes closest to your own point of view?

- (1) On the whole, the health care system in [our country] runs quite well.
- (2) There are some good things in the way health care in [our country] runs, and only minor changes would make it work better.
- (3) There are some good things in the way health care in [our country] runs, but only fundamental changes would make it work better.
- (4) Health care system in [our country] runs so badly that we need to rebuild it completely.

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_oehcg Only essential health care from government

(Time-series: 1992-2004, n: 70, N: 28, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 28)

The government should only provide everyone with essential services such as care for serious diseases and encourage people to provide for themselves in other respects.

- (1) Agree strongly
- (2) Agree slightly
- (3) Uncertain/ Neither agree nor disagree (SPONTANEOUS)
- (4) Disagree slightly
- (5) Disagree strongly

Note: There is some variation in the formulation of the question and the reply options.

In 1992 the reply option (3) was not available.

In 1998 the question was: The government and/or public health insurance [national equivalent] should provide everyone with essential services such as care for serious diseases and encourage people to provide for themselves in other respects. (Note that word “only” is left out here.)

In 2002 the question was: The government or social insurance should only provide everyone with essential services, such as care for serious diseases, and encourage people to provide for themselves in other respects.

In 2004 the question and reply options were: The government or social insurance should only provide everyone with essential services, such as care for serious diseases, and encourage people to provide for themselves in other respects.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Tend to agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Tend to disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_hcie Health care inefficient

(Time-series: 1992-1996, n: 27, N: 15, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1996, N: 15)

Health services available to the average citizen are inefficient and patients are not treated as well as they should be.

- (1) Agree strongly
- (2) Agree slightly
- (3) Uncertain/ Neither agree nor disagree (SPONTANEOUS)
- (4) Disagree slightly
- (5) Disagree strongly

Note: In 1992 reply option (3) was not available.

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

Reason that people live in need

(Time-series: 1976-2002, n: 63, N: 30, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)

Why in your opinion are there people who live in need? Here are four opinions – which is closest to yours?

Note: We did not create a variable for the “none of these” option, which is why the sum of the four variables sometimes is lower than 1.

eb_pini People in need – injustice

Proportion answering: Because there is much injustice in our society

[Back?](#)

eb_pinl People in need – laziness

Proportion answering: Because of laziness and lack of willpower.

[Back?](#)

eb_pinp People in need – part modern progress

Proportion answering: It’s an inevitable part of modern progress. In 1993 this reply option was instead: It is an inevitable part of the way the modern world is going.

[Back?](#)

eb_pinu People in need – unlucky

Proportion answering: Because they have been unlucky.

(Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.)

Back?

Poverty and income differences

eb_idtl Income differences too large

(Time-series: 1999-2002, n: 43, N: 28, \bar{N} : 11, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)

The differences in income in [our country] are too wide.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Somewhat agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Somewhat disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

Back?

eb_gsrld Government should reduce income differences

(Time-series: 1999-2002, n: 43, N: 28, \bar{N} : 11, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 28)

It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Somewhat agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Somewhat disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

Back?

eb_rnrp Reduce number of rich and poor

(Time-series: 1976-1991, n: 53, N: 14, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 4)

Here is a list of problems the people of [country] are more or less interested in. Could you please tell me, for each problem, whether you personally consider it a very important problem, important, of little importance or not at all important?

Try and reduce the number both of very rich people and of very poor people.

- (1) Very important
- (2) Important
- (3) Of little importance
- (4) Not at all important

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_cep Chance of escaping poverty

(Time-series: 1976-1993, n: 35, N: 15, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 2)

In your opinion, do the people who are in deprived circumstances have a chance of escaping from them or have they virtually no chance of escaping?

- (1) They have a chance
- (2) Almost no chance

In 1993 the question was instead: We are now going to talk again about people living in poverty or extreme poverty / social exclusion or total social exclusion.

In your opinion, do the people who are in such deprived circumstances have a chance of escaping from them or have they virtually no chance of getting out?

- (1) A chance
- (2) Virtually no chance

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_cep **Chance of escaping poverty, children**

(Time-series: 1976-1993, n: 35, N: 15, $\bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 2$)

(Follow-up question to eb_cep)

And do their young children have any chance of escaping?

(1) They have a chance

(2) Almost no chance

In 1989 the reply options were instead:

(1) Have an opportunity

(2) Have scarcely any opportunity

In 1993 the question was instead: And have the children of these people a chance of getting out of these circumstances?

(1) A chance

(2) Virtually no chance

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_pafp **Public authorities fighting poverty**

(Time-series: 1976-1993, n: 34, N: 14, $\bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 2$)

Do you think that what the authorities are doing for people in poverty is about what they should do, too much, or too little?

(1) Do too much

(2) Do what they should

(3) Do not do enough

In 1976 the reply options were instead:

(1) Too much

(2) About what they should do

(3) Too little

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_fpws Fighting poverty worth sacrifices

(Time-series: 1988-1990, n: 25, N: 13, \bar{N} : 8, \bar{T} : 2)

In your opinion, in this list which are the great causes which nowadays are worth the trouble of taking risks and making sacrifices for? (Several answers possible.)

Fight against poverty

(0) Not mentioned

(1) Mentioned

Note: The documentation states that the coding “Not mentioned” is unclear for Norway in 1990. Nevertheless, we have chosen to include that data since the Norwegian data does not differ in any obvious way compared to the data of the other countries.

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

Other

eb_suf Society unfair

(Time-series: 1976-1993, n: 35, N: 15, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 2)

Taking everything into account do you yourself have the feeling that society is unfair to you?

(1) Yes

(2) That depends (volunteered)

(3) No

For the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1976 the question was instead:

Taking everything into account, do you, yourself have the feeling that society as a whole is being fair or unfair to you?

This means that the question as documented in the English language questionnaires asks for the alternative if “... society ... is being fair or unfair ...”, while all other language versions explicitly ask if “... society is being unfair ...”. The British questionnaire, in the version provided by the data producer, keeps the ambiguous English language question wording ambiguous with the response options “yes” or “no”. Since data apparently do not show dubious patterns across countries, subsequent textual adaptations and/or data recoding probably have occurred.

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer)

[Back?](#)

eb_fue Fight unemployment

(Time-series: 1976-1991, n: 53, N: 14, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 4)

Here is a list of problems the people of [country] are more or less interested in. Could you please tell me for each problem, whether you personally consider it a very important problem, important, of little importance or not at all important?

Fighting unemployment

- (1) Very important
- (2) Important
- (3) Of little importance
- (4) Not at all important

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_re Responsibility for the elderly

(Time-series: 1992-2001, n: 27, N: 15, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 15)

For each of these statements about elderly people and pensions, I would like you to tell me if you agree strongly, agree slightly, disagree slightly, disagree strongly?

Those who are now working have a duty to ensure, through the contributions or taxes they pay, that elderly people have a decent standard of living.

- (1) Agree strongly
- (2) Agree slightly
- (3) Disagree slightly
- (4) Disagree strongly

Note: In 2001 the alternatives were formulated somewhat differently: strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, strongly disagree.

(Source: Standard Eurobarometer.)

[Back?](#)

eb_ls **Life satisfaction**

(Time-series: 1973-2009, n: 477, N: 32, \bar{N} : 13, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 1995 & 2002 (varies by country), N: 16)

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead? Would you say you are ...

- (1) Very satisfied
- (2) Fairly satisfied
- (3) Not very satisfied
- (4) Not satisfied at all

Note: In two cases the question was put somewhat differently. To make the data over time as comparable as possible, we excluded these two cases. (This concerns Eurobarometer 52.1 and 56.1 in 1999 and 2001. There were additional Eurobarometers these years, where the question was put in the ordinary way, so for these years we aggregated data from these other Eurobarometers instead.)

[Back?](#)

European Social Survey

<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>

(Jowell et al 2003, 2005, 2007)

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically-driven survey designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of its populations. So far four rounds of the ESS have been published.

Note: In aggregating the ESS data we have used design weights. However, for Latvia and Romania in round three and for Slovakia in round four, there does not yet exist any weights to use. We have nevertheless chosen to publish this data aggregated without weights.

ess_module **ESS module**

(Time-series: 2002-2010, n: 104, N: 30, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

There exist four ESS rounds and this variable denotes from which round each observation comes. The first round of ESS was fielded in 2002-2003, the second in 2004-2006, the third in 2006-2007 and the fourth in 2008-2009.

[Back?](#)

ess_it Interpersonal trust

(Time-series: 2002-2010, n: 104, N: 30, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.

You can't be
too careful

Most people can
be trusted

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Back?

ess_pf Most people try to be fair

(Time-series: 2002-2010, n: 104, N: 30, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

Most people try to
take advantage of me

Most people
try to be fair

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Back?

ess_ph Most people try to be helpful

(Time-series: 2002-2010, n: 104, N: 30, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?

People mostly look
out for themselves

People mostly try
to be helpful

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Back?

ess_gsrld Government should reduce income differences

(Time-series: 2002-2010, n: 104, N: 30, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.

- (1) Agree strongly
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Disagree strongly

Back?

ess_mdg Member of discriminated group

(Time-series: 2002-2010, n: 103, N: 30, \bar{N} : 11, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 32)

Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

Back?

ess_ieo Importance of equal opportunities

(Time-series: 2002-2010, n: 102, N: 29, \bar{N} : 11, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 31)

Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.

- (1) Very much like me
- (2) Like me
- (3) Somewhat like me
- (4) A little like me
- (5) Not like me
- (6) Not like me at all

Back?

International Social Survey Program (ISSP)

<http://zcat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp>

<http://www.issp.org/>

The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is a continuing annual program of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics relevant to social science research.

issp_module ISSP module

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 214, N: 32, \bar{N} : 9, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 1998-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

There exist many different ISSP modules and this variable denotes from which module each observation comes. Note that the same module often was conducted in different years in different countries.

- (1) Role of Government I (1985-1986)
- (2) Social Inequality I (1987-1988)
- (3) Work Orientations I (1989)
- (4) Role of Government II (1990-1991)
- (5) Religion I (1990-1991)
- (6) Social Inequality II (1991-1993)
- (7) Environment I (1992-1994)
- (8) Role of Government III (1995-1998)
- (9) Religion II (1998-1999)
- (10) Social Inequality III (1998-2001)
- (11) Environment II (2000-2001)
- (12) Citizenship (2003-2006)
- (13) Role of Government IV (2005-2008)

Please note these special cases:

The modules Role of Government II and Religion I use the same sample for Israel 1991
195

according to the ISSP documentation. We have chosen to treat this observation as belonging to the Role of Government II module (issp_module = 4).

In the cases of Australia and Austria 1993, the variables issp_gsrdrp and issp_grjfa come from the Religion I module (5). Since the rest of the variables come from the Role of Government II module, we have treated these observations as belonging to this module (issp_module = 6).

In the cases of Chile, Germany and the United States 2000, there are two surveys made in the same year: Social Inequality III and Environment II. We have chosen to keep the observations from the former, since the Social Inequality III module contains more variables (issp_module = 10).

In the case of Israel in 2005, the variables issp_elf and issp_lelh come from Citizenship I and the rest of the variables from Role of Government IV. We have treated these observations as belonging to the latter module (issp_module = 13).

[Back?](#)

Income differences and inequality

issp_gsrid Government should reduce income differences

(Time-series: 1985-2001, n: 120, N: 30, \bar{N} : 7, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 1996-2001 (varies by country), N: 32)

What is your opinion of the following statement:

It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

- (1) Agree strongly
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Disagree strongly

[Back?](#)

issp_gsrdrp Government should reduce differences between rich and poor

(Time-series: 1985-1999, n: 74, N: 28, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 1998-1999 (varies by country), N: 30)

On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to:

Reduce income differences between the rich and poor.

- (1) Definitely should be
- (2) Probably should be
- (3) Probably should not be
- (4) Definitely should not be

Back?

issp_idtl Income differences too large

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Differences in income in [respondent's country] are too large.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

Back?

issp_nosmp No one studies for years unless more pay

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

Back?

issp_idnp Income differences necessary for prosperity

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Large differences in income are necessary for [respondent's country] prosperity.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

Back?

issp_cilja Continued inequality due to lack of joined up action

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Inequality continues to exist because ordinary people don't join together to get rid of it.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

Back?

issp_iebr Inequality exists because it benefits the rich

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Inequality continues to exist because it benefits the rich and the powerful.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

Back?

Government measures for the economy

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 60, N: 29, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Circle one number for each action to show whether you are in favor of it or against it.

Cuts in government spending.

Government financing of projects to create new jobs.

Reducing the working week to create more jobs.

- (1) Strongly in favor of
- (2) In favor of
- (3) Neither in favor of nor against
- (4) Against
- (5) Strongly against

issp_cgs Cut government spending

issp_gfj Government should finance new jobs

issp_rww Reduce work week

Increase government spending

Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it.

Health.

Education.

Old age pensions.

Unemployment benefits.

- (1) Spend much more
- (2) Spend more
- (3) Spend the same as now
- (4) Spend less
- (5) Spend much less

Back?

issp_igsh Increase government spending: health

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 60, N: 29, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

Back?

issp_igse Increase government spending: education

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 60, N: 29, $\bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2$)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

Back?

issp_igsp Increase government spending: pensions

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 60, N: 29, $\bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2$)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

Back?

issp_igsub Increase government spending: unemployment benefits

(Time-series: 1985-1998, n: 36, N: 24, $\bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2$)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 34)

Back?

Government responsibility

On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to:

Provide a job for everyone who wants one.

Provide health care for the sick.

Provide a decent standard of living for the old.

Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed.

- (1) Definitely should be
- (2) Probably should be
- (3) Probably should not be
- (4) Definitely should not be

Back?

issp_grjfa Government responsibility: jobs for all

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 108, N: 30, $\bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 3$)

(Cross-section: 1998-2008 (varies by country), N: 38)

Back?

issp_grhc Government responsibility: health care

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 61, N: 29, $\bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2$)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

Back?

issp_gro Government responsibility: the old

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 61, N: 29, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

[Back?](#)

issp_grue Government responsibility: the unemployed

(Time-series: 1985-2008, n: 71, N: 29, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

[Back?](#)

Getting ahead in life

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 46, N: 26, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

We have some questions about opportunities for getting ahead. Please tick one box for each of these to show how important you think it is for getting ahead in life.

First, how important is coming from a wealthy family?
Knowing the right people – how important is it?

- (1) Essential
- (2) Very important
- (3) Fairly important
- (4) Not very important
- (5) Not important at all

[Back?](#)

issp_gawf Getting ahead: wealthy family

issp_gakrp Getting ahead: know right people

Taxes

(Time-series: 1987-2008, n: 69, N: 29, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 36)

Generally, how would you describe taxes in [respondent's country] today? (We mean all taxes together, including national insurance, income tax, VAT and all the rest.)

First, for those with high incomes, are taxes ...
Next, for those with middle incomes, are taxes ...

Lastly, for those with low incomes, are taxes ...

- (1) Much too high
- (2) Too high
- (3) About right
- (4) Too low
- (5) Much too low

Back?

issp_tfhi **Taxes for high incomes**

issp_tfmi **Taxes for middle incomes**

issp_tfli **Taxes for low incomes**

issp_hlthi **Higher or lower taxes for high incomes**

(Time-series: 1987-2001, n: 44, N: 26, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1998-2001 (varies by country), N: 25)

Do you think that people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share?

- (1) Much larger share
- (2) Larger
- (3) The same share
- (4) Smaller
- (5) Much smaller share

Back?

Other

issp_rpbo **Rich parents better opportunity**

(Time-series: 1985-1986, n: 6, N: 6, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 1)

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

A person whose parents are rich has a better chance of earning a lot of money than a person whose parents are poor.

- (1) Agree strongly
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Disagree strongly

Back?

issp_iou Inflation or unemployment

(Time-series: 1985-1998, n: 32, N: 21, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 18)

If the government had to choose between keeping down inflation or keeping down unemployment to which do you think it should give highest priority?

- (1) Keeping down inflation
- (2) Keeping down unemployment

Back?

issp_gtmp Government too much power

(Time-series: 1985-1998, n: 37, N: 24, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 24)

And what about the government, does it have too much power or too little power?

(In the US the question was instead: And what about the federal government, does it have too much power or too little power?)

- (1) Far too much power
- (2) Too much power
- (3) About the right amount of power
- (4) Too little power
- (5) Far too little power

Back?

issp_lelh Last election: level of honesty

(Cross-section: 2003-2006 (varies by country), N: 38)

Thinking of the last national election in [respondent's country], how honest was it regarding the counting and reporting of the votes?

- (1) Very honest
- (2) Somewhat honest
- (3) Neither honest nor dishonest
- (4) Somewhat dishonest
- (5) Very dishonest

Note: In Brazil, there were only two possible answers:

- (2) Honest
- (4) Dishonest

Back?

issp_1elf Last election: level of fairness

(Cross-section: 2003-2006 (varies by country), N: 38)

Thinking of the last national election in [respondent's country], how fair was it regarding the opportunities of the candidates and parties to campaign?

- (1) Very fair
- (2) Somewhat fair
- (3) Neither fair nor unfair
- (4) Somewhat unfair
- (5) Very unfair

Note: In Brazil, there were only two possible answers:

- (2) Fair
- (4) Unfair

Back?

World Values Survey

<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>
(European and World Values Surveys 2006)

The World Values Survey (WVS) is an ongoing project by social scientists to assess the state of sociocultural, moral, religious and political values of different cultures around the world.

wvs_module WVS module

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 135, N: 40, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 80)

The variable denotes from which of the five WVS waves the observation comes.

- (1) 1981-1984
- (2) 1989-1993
- (3) 1994-1999
- (4) 1999-2004
- (5) 2004-2008

In the cross-sectional dataset different variables may come from different waves for the same country. In these cases we have let wvs_module take the value of the wave from which the most variables were picked for that country.

Back?

wvs_a008 Feeling of happiness

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 133, N: 40, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 94)

Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?

- (1) Very happy
- (2) Quite happy
- (3) Not very happy
- (4) Not at all happy

[Back?](#)

wvs_a009 State of health (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 105, N: 37, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 83)

All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is...

- (1) Very good
- (2) Good
- (3) Fair
- (4) Poor
- (5) Very poor

[Back?](#)

wvs_a168 Do you think most people try to take advantage of you (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 40)

Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

- (1) Would take advantage
- (2) Try to be fair

[Back?](#)

wvs_a170 How satisfied are you with your life

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 134, N: 40, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 94)

All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

Dissatisfied

Satisfied

- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

[Back?](#)

wvs_e035 Incomes more equal (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2008, n: 104, N: 39, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 76)

Incomes should be
made more equal

We need larger income
differences as incentives

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Back?

wvs_e036 Private ownership of business (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2008, n: 98, N: 37, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 88)

Private ownership of
business and industry
should be increased

Government ownership of
business and industry
should be increased

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Back?

wvs_e037 Government more responsibility (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2008, n: 112, N: 40, $\bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 94)

People should take more responsibility
to provide for themselves

The government should take more
responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Back?

wvs_e039 Competition is good (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2008, n: 111, N: 39, $\bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 90)

Competition is good. It
stimulates people to work hard
and develop new ideas

Competition is harmful.
It brings out the worst
in people

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Back?

wvs_e040 Hard work doesn't bring success (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2008, n: 78, N: 37, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 70)

In the long run,
hard work usually
brings a better life

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Hard work doesn't
generally bring success –
it's more a matter of luck
and connections

8 9 10

Back?

wvs_e043 The state should be responsible for everyone's pension (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 17)

Individual responsibility
for pension

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

State responsibility
for pension

8 9 10

Back?

wvs_e044 The state should be responsible for everyone's housing (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 12)

Individual responsibility
for housing

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

State responsibility
for housing

8 9 10

Back?

wvs_e066 Society should be competitive rather than egalitarian (mean)

(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 15)

Could you please tell me which type of society you think this country should aim to be in the future. For each pair of statements, would you prefer being closer to the first or to the second alternative?

First statement: An egalitarian society where the gap between rich and poor is small, regardless of achievement.

Second statement: A competitive society, where wealth is distributed according to ones' achievement.

- (1) First
- (2) Somewhat closer to first
- (3) Can't say
- (4) Somewhat closer to second
- (5) Second

Back?

wvs_e067 Low taxes rather than extensive welfare (mean)

(Cross-section: 2000-2005 (varies by country), N: 15)

Could you please tell me which type of society you think this country should aim to be in the future. For each pair of statements, would you prefer being closer to the first or to the second alternative?

First statement: A society with extensive social welfare, but high taxes.

Second statement: A society where taxes are low and individuals take responsibility for themselves.

- (1) First
- (2) Somewhat closer to first
- (3) Can't say
- (4) Somewhat closer to second
- (5) Second

Back?

wvs_e111 How good is the system for governing this country (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-2004, n: 50, N: 35, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 1$)

(Cross-section: 1995-2005 (varies by country), N: 69)

People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?

Bad										Very good
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Back?

wvs_e117 Having a democratic political system (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-2008, n: 77, N: 38, $\bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 2$)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 91)

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

Having a democratic political system.

- (1) Very good
- (2) Fairly good
- (3) Bad
- (4) Very bad

Back?

wvs_e125 Satisfaction with the people in national office (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-2004, n: 32, N: 24, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 1)

(Cross-section: 1995-2005 (varies by country), N: 64)

How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

- (1) Very satisfied
- (2) Fairly satisfied
- (3) Fairly dissatisfied
- (4) Very dissatisfied

[Back?](#)

wvs_e131 People are poor because of an unfair society (mean)

(Cross-section: 1995-1999 (varies by country), N: 50)

Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: Which comes closest to your view?

- (1) Poor because of laziness and lack of will power
- (2) Poor because of an unfair society

[Back?](#)

wvs_e132 There is very little chance for people to escape poverty (mean)

(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 48)

In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or is there very little of chance escaping?

- (1) They have a chance
- (2) There is very little chance

[Back?](#)

wvs_e133 The government is doing too little for people in poverty (mean)

(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 47)

Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little?

- (1) Too much
- (2) About the right amount
- (3) Too little

[Back?](#)

wvs_e196 How widespread is corruption (mean)

(Cross-section: 1995-2004 (varies by country), N: 49)

- (1) Almost no public officials engaged in it
- (2) A few are
- (3) Most are
- (4) Almost all public officials are engaged in it

Back?

wvs_it Interpersonal trust (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 135, N: 40, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 94)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

- (1) Most people can be trusted
- (2) Can't be too careful

Back?

wvs_lr Left-right self-placement (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 130, N: 40, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 90)

In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

Left

Right

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Back?

wvs_sdd Satisfaction with democracy development in country (mean)

(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 68)

On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?

- (1) Very satisfied
- (2) Rather satisfied
- (3) Not very satisfied
- (4) Not at all satisfied

Back?

Confidence

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

- (1) A great deal
- (2) Quite a lot
- (3) Not very much
- (4) None at all

wvs_e069_02 Confidence: armed forces (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 130, N: 39, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 89)

Back?

wvs_e069_05 Confidence: labor unions (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 132, N: 39, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 90)

Back?

wvs_e069_06 Confidence: the police (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 131, N: 39, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 90)

Back?

wvs_e069_07 Confidence: parliament (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 129, N: 39, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 89)

Back?

wvs_e069_08 Confidence: the civil services (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 129, N: 39, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 90)

Back?

wvs_e069_09 Confidence: social security system (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 58, N: 35, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 31)

Back?

wvs_e069_11 Confidence: the government (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2008, n: 58, N: 29, $\bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 81)

[Back?](#)

wvs_e069_12 Confidence: the political parties (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2008, n: 57, N: 29, $\bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 81)

[Back?](#)

wvs_e069_16 Confidence: health care system (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 31)

[Back?](#)

wvs_e069_17 Confidence: justice system (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 126, N: 39, $\bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 83)

[Back?](#)

wvs_e069_18 Confidence: the European Union (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2008, n: 85, N: 33, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 3$)
(Cross-section: 1997-2008 (varies by country), N: 58)

[Back?](#)

wvs_e069_19 Confidence: NATO (mean)

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n:51, N: 34, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 47)

[Back?](#)

wvs_e069_20 Confidence: the United Nations (mean)

(Time-series: 1995-2008, n: 79, N: 38, $\bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 92)

[Back?](#)

Justifiable

Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

Never justifiable Always justifiable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

[Back?](#)

wvs_f114 Justifiable: claiming government benefits (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 105, N: 38, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 92)

Back?

wvs_f115 Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 93, N: 38, \bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 87)

Back?

wvs_f116 Justifiable: cheating on taxes (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 106, N: 38, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 2)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 91)

Back?

wvs_f117 Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (mean)

(Time-series: 1981-2001, n: 108, N: 39, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 3)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 92)4

Back?

wvs_f131 Justifiable: paying cash to avoid taxes (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 31)

Back?

Just society

In order to be considered “just”, what should a society provide? Please tell me for each statement if it is important or unimportant to you. 1 means very important; 5 means not important at all.

Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens.

Guaranteeing that basic needs are met for all, in terms of food, housing, clothes, education, health.

Giving young people equal opportunity to pursue their education irrespective of family income.

- (1) Very important
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5) Not at all important

wvs_e146 Just society: eliminate big income inequalities (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 30)

Back?

wvs_e147 Just society: guarantee that basic needs are met for all (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 30)

Back?

wvs_e149 Just society give: young people equal education opportunities (mean)

(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 15)

Back?

Reason that people live in need

Why are there people in this country who live in need? Here are four possible reasons. Which one reason do you consider to be most important?

wvs_pini1 People in need - injustice

(Time-series: 1990-2004, n: 59, N: 36, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2$)

(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 32)

Proportion answering "injustice in society" as their first choice.

Back?

wvs_pinl1 People in need – laziness

(Time-series: 1990-2004, n: 59, N: 36, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2$)

(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 32)

Proportion answering "laziness or lack of willpower" as their first choice.

Back?

wvs_pinp1 People in need - part modern progress

(Time-series: 1990-2004, n: 59, N: 36, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2$)

(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 32)

Proportion answering "part modern progress" as their first choice.

Back?

wvs_pinu1 People in need – unlucky

(Time-series: 1990-2004, n: 59, N: 36, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 32)

Proportion answering “unlucky” as their first choice.

Back?

wvs_pini2 People in need – injustice

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 58, N: 35, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 31)

Proportion answering “injustice in society” as their second choice.

Back?

wvs_pinp2 People in need - part modern progress

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 58, N: 35, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 31)

Proportion answering “part modern progress” as their second choice.

Back?

wvs_pinl2 People in need – laziness

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 58, N: 35, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 31)

Proportion answering “laziness or lack of willpower” as their second choice.

Back?

wvs_pinu2 People in need – unlucky

(Time-series: 1990-2001, n: 58, N: 35, $\bar{N} : 4, \bar{T} : 2$)
(Cross-section: 1999-2001 (varies by country), N: 31)

Proportion answering “unlucky” as their second choice.

Back?

Political Indicators

This section includes data on policy positions of governments and parliaments based on election results, expert judgments of party positions and the study of party manifestos. Included is also data on political institutions such as forms of government and electoral systems.

Armingeon et al– Comparative Political Dataset I, II & III

(Armingeon et al 2007; Armingeon & Careja 2006; Armingeon et al 2008)

http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html

ar_source **Armingeon source**

(Time-series: 1946-2007, n: 1698, N: 36, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 47)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 53)

There are three different versions of the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS), and this variable denotes from which of these each observation comes. There are observations from 23 OECD countries from CPDS I, 28 post-communist countries from CPDS II, and data for Cyprus and Malta from CPDS III.

The definition of some variables varies slightly depending on the source. Such cases are noted in the codebook under each variable.

[Back?](#)

ar_vt **Voter turnout**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1311, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 37)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 53)

Voter turnout in election.

[Back?](#)

ar_ed **Election date**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 344, N: 25, \bar{N} : 7, \bar{T} : 14)

Date of election of national parliament. (If there were two elections in a year, the date of the second is given.)

[Back?](#)

ar_ed2 Election date

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 99, N: 27, \bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 4)

Same as ar_ed, except that the source is CPDS II (i.e., ar_source = 2). The reason we have entered this as a separate variable is that ar_ed2 is in string format, while ar_ed is in numerical format.

[Back?](#)

Election results

Percentage of votes gained for each group of parties in the last election.

Armingeon et al. follow Lane, McKay & Newton (1997) to a large extent and group parties into 11 different families. A few more groups have been added, including party coalition alliances. Only parties reaching at least 2 percent of the votes in an election are counted as a part of each respective group. Parties which got less than 2 percent of the votes are instead counted in the “others” category.

The grouping of parties differs somewhat between CPDS I, II and III (ar_source = 1, 2 or 3). When categories don't apply to all three sources this is noted below.

ar_vs Votes: socialist

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_vls Votes: left-socialist

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_vcom Votes: communist

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_va Votes: agrarian

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_vcon **Votes: conservative**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_vr **Votes: religious**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_vl **Votes: liberal**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_vur **Votes: ultra-right**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_vp **Votes: protest**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_vg **Votes: green**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_ve **Votes: ethnic**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_vo **Votes: others**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

Residual category for those parties which got less than 2 percent of the votes.

The following three variables only apply to observations from CPDS I (ar_source = 1).

[Back?](#)

ar_vla **Votes: left alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1111, N: 23, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

[Back?](#)

ar_vca **Votes: center alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1111, N: 23, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

[Back?](#)

ar_vra **Votes: right alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1111, N: 23, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

The following eleven variables only apply to observations from CPDS III (ar_source = 3).

[Back?](#)

ar_vpc **Votes: post-communist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_vna **Votes: nationalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Parties focusing their discourse or program on the notion of recovering the past greatness of the nation or of fighting for or maintaining independence from the former Soviet Union.

[Back?](#)

ar_vreg **Votes: regionalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_vfe **Votes: feminist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_vmo **Votes: monarchic**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_vper **Votes: personalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

The personalist label designates parties created to support one candidate and cannot be assigned an ideological label.

[Back?](#)

ar_vind **Votes: independent**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 187, N: 11, \bar{N} : 9, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 19)

Unaffiliated candidates.

[Back?](#)

ar_vpen **Votes: pensioners**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Parties of pensioners and persons with special needs.

[Back?](#)

ar_vnl **Votes: no-label**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_vini **Votes: initiative groups**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_val **Votes: alliance**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Coalition between several parties or groupings. Most commonly such an alliance is formed to strengthen members' chances of passing the threshold for a seat and obtaining a larger number of seats in parliament.

[Back?](#)

Legislative seats

Percentage of total parliamentary seats for each group of parties.

Armingeon et al. follow Lane, McKay & Newton (1997) to a large extent and group parties into 11 different families. A few more groups have been added, including party coalition alliances. Only parties reaching at least 2 percent of the votes in an election are counted as a part of each respective group. Parties which got less than 2 percent of the votes are instead counted in the “others” category.

The grouping of parties differs somewhat between CPDS I & III (ar_source = 1 or 3) on the one hand, and CPDS II (ar_source = 2) on the other hand. When categories don't apply to all three sources this is noted below.

ar_ls **Legislative seats: socialist**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_lls **Legislative seats: left-socialist**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_lcom **Legislative seats: communist**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_la **Legislative seats: agrarian**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_lcon **Legislative seats: conservative**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_lr **Legislative seats: religious**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_ll **Legislative seats: liberal**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_lur **Legislative seats: ultra-right**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_lp **Legislative seats: protest**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_lg **Legislative seats: green**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_le **Legislative seats: ethnic**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 52)

[Back?](#)

ar_lo **Legislative seats: others**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1313, N: 35, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 52)

Residual category for those parties which got less than 2 percent of the votes. Note: 38 observations in the time-series data had a negative value. We replaced those observations with a missing value.

The following three variables only apply to observations from CPDS I (ar_source = 1).

[Back?](#)

ar_lla **Legislative seats: left alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1111, N: 23, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

[Back?](#)

ar_lca **Legislative seats: center alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1111, N: 23, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

[Back?](#)

ar_lra **Legislative seats: right alliance**

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1111, N: 23, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

The following eleven variables only apply to observations from CPDS II (ar_source = 2).

[Back?](#)

ar_lpc **Legislative seats: post-communist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_lna **Legislative seats: nationalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Parties focusing their discourse or program on the notion of recovering the past greatness of the nation or of fighting for or maintaining independence from the former Soviet Union.

[Back?](#)

ar_lreg **Legislative seats: regionalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_lfe **Legislative seats: feminist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_lmo **Legislative seats: monarchic**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_lper **Legislative seats: personalist**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

The personalist label designates parties created to support one candidate and cannot be assigned an ideological label.

[Back?](#)

ar_lal **Legislative seats: alliance**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Coalition between several parties or groupings. Most commonly such an alliance is formed to strengthen members' chances of passing the threshold for a seat and obtaining a larger number of seats in parliament.

[Back?](#)

ar_lind **Legislative seats: independent**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 19)

Unaffiliated candidates.

[Back?](#)

ar_lpen **Legislative seats: pensioners**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

Parties of pensioners and persons with special needs.

[Back?](#)

ar_lnl **Legislative seats: no-label**

(Time-series: 1990-2009, n: 202, N: 12, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 17)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

ar_lini **Legislative seats: initiative groups**

(Time-series: 1990-2006, n: 162, N: 10, \bar{N} : 10, \bar{T} : 16)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

[Back?](#)

Cabinets: OECD, Malta and Cyprus

The following six variables only have data from CPDS I and III (ar_source = 1 or 3).

ar_crw Cabinet portfolios: right-wing

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1149, N: 25, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Right party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by the days the government was in office in a given year.

[Back?](#)

ar_cce Cabinet portfolios: center

(Time-series: 1960-2005, n: 1149, N: 25, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Center party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by the days the government was in office in a given year.

[Back?](#)

ar_cle Cabinet portfolios: left

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1149, N: 25, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Left party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by the days the government was in office in a given year.

[Back?](#)

ar_ci Cabinet ideology

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1148, N: 25, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 27)

This variable is based on the proportion of left party cabinet portfolios (ar_cle):

- (1) Hegemony of right-wing parties (ar_cle = 0)
- (2) Dominance of right-wing and center parties (ar_cle < 33.3)
- (3) Standoff between left and right (33.33 < ar_cle < 66.6)
- (4) Dominance of social-democratic and other left parties (ar_cle > 66.6)
- (5) Hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties (ar_cle = 100)

Note however these two exceptions, both due to many non-partisans in government: Italy 1996 is coded as a stand-off between left and right (3), even though the percentage of left parties in government is less than 33 %. Portugal 2001 is coded as dominance of social-democratic and other left parties (4), even though the percentage of left parties in government is less than 66 %.

[Back?](#)

ar_tg Type of government

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1098, N: 25, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 44)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

- (1) Single party majority government
- (2) Minimum winning coalition
- (3) Surplus coalition
- (4) Single party minority government
- (5) Multi party minority government
- (6) Caretaker government

The indicator refers to the type of government that was in office for the longest period each year.

[Back?](#)

ar_chg Changes in government

(Time-series: 1960-2009, n: 1149, N: 25, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Number of changes in government per year, due to elections, resignation of the prime minister, dissension within government, lack of parliamentary support, or intervention by the head of state.

[Back?](#)

Cabinets: Post-communist countries

(Time-series: 1990-2005, n: 144, N: 10, \bar{N} : 9, \bar{T} : 14)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 14)

The following 17 variables only have data from 28 post-communist countries in CPDS II (ar_source = 2).

The variables give the proportion of legislative seats for each group of parties in government, relative to the total parliamentary seats of all parties in government. The variables are also weighted for the number of days each government was in office.

The formula is thus:

(share of parliamentary seats of group * 100 * number of days in office) / (total share of seats for all parties in government * number of days in given year)

Only parties which were part of the government are taken into consideration, and not parties that offered parliamentary support without governmental portfolios.

For the first governments after independence or fall of communist rule the total weight does not amount to 100, since the governments did not commence their time in office at the beginning of the calendar year.

Note: In the original data there were two different observations for Bulgaria 2005. We have therefore replaced Bulgaria 2005 as missing.

ar_cs	Cabinet party composition: socialist
ar_cls	Cabinet party composition: left-socialist
ar_ccom	Cabinet party composition: communist
ar_ca	Cabinet party composition: agrarian
ar_ccon	Cabinet party composition: conservative
ar_cr	Cabinet party composition: religious
ar_cli	Cabinet party composition: liberal
ar_cur	Cabinet party composition: ultra-right
ar_cp	Cabinet party composition: protest
ar_cg	Cabinet party composition: green
ar_ce	Cabinet party composition: ethnic
ar_cpc	Cabinet party composition: post-communist
ar_cna	Cabinet party composition: nationalist

Parties focusing their discourse or program on the notion of recovering the past greatness of the nation or of fighting for or maintaining independence from the former Soviet Union.

[Back?](#)

ar_creg	Cabinet party composition: regionalist
ar_cper	Cabinet party composition: personalist

The personalist label designates parties created to support one candidate and cannot be assigned an ideological label.

[Back?](#)

ar_cal	Cabinet party composition: alliance
---------------	--

Coalition between several parties or groupings. Most commonly such an alliance is formed to strengthen members' chances of passing the threshold for a seat and obtaining a larger number of seats in parliament.

[Back?](#)

ar_cpem **Cabinet party composition: pensioners**
Parties of pensioners and persons with special needs.

[Back?](#)

Lijphart data on institutions

(Time-series: 1946-1996, n: 1124, N: 24, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 47)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 23)

The following variables originally come from Lijphart (1999). The variables have two values for each country: one representing the period 1945-1970, and the other value representing the period 1971-1996. For some observations, two variables are exempt from this rule: ar_li_cr and ar_li_eld are calculated for each year for the 28 post-communist countries in CPDS II (i.e., when ar_source = 2).

ar_li_epd **Executives-parties dimension**

Higher values indicate a democracy more towards the “consensus” model and lower values indicates a democracy more towards the “majoritarian” model in the executives-parties dimension (Lijphart 1999:5). The index is based on the following five variables.

[Back?](#)

ar_li_enp **Effective number of parties**

Effective number of parliamentary parties.

[Back?](#)

ar_li_mc **Minimal winning, one-party majority cabinets (%)**

The mean of the percentage of cabinets that are one-party majority and the percentage of cabinets that are minimal winning coalitions.

[Back?](#)

ar_li_exd **Executive dominance**

Index that measures the balance of power between the executive and the parliament. The higher the value the more executive dominance.

[Back?](#)

ar_li_eld **Electoral disproportionality (%)**

Gallagher’s index of disproportionality. The higher the value the more disproportionate the electoral system. The formula is:

$$G = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (v_i - s_i)^2}$$

where v is vote percentages and s is seat percentages. See also Lijphart (1999:158).

[Back?](#)

ar_li_igp Interest group pluralism

Index of interest group pluralism. Lower values indicate corporatist systems and higher values pluralist systems. Based on Siaroff (1999).

[Back?](#)

ar_li_fud Federal-unitary dimension

Higher values indicate a democracy more towards the “consensus” model and lower values indicates a democracy more towards the “majoritarian” model in the federal-unitary dimension (Lijphart 1999:5). The index is based on the following five variables.

[Back?](#)

ar_li_f Federalism

Index of federalism and decentralization. Lower values indicate unitary and centralized states, and higher values federal and decentralized states.

[Back?](#)

ar_li_b Bicameralism

Index of concentration/division of legislative power. Higher values indicate more division of legislative power.

[Back?](#)

ar_li_cr Constitutional rigidity

Index of constitutional rigidity. Higher values indicate that the constitution is harder to amend.

[Back?](#)

ar_li_jr Judicial review

Index of judicial review. Higher values indicate stronger judicial review.

[Back?](#)

ar_li_cbi Central bank independence

Index of central bank independence. Higher values indicate a more independent central bank.

[Back?](#)

Political institutions, other

ar_ie Integrated economy

(Time-series: 1970-1995, n: 86, N: 24, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 1995, N: 23)

Siaroff (1999) index of integrated economy, where 5 indicates greatest integration and 1 the least integration. The Siaroff index can be considered as a proxy for corporatism.

[Back?](#)

ar_cbi **Central bank independence**

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 770, N: 22, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 1998, N: 21)

Index of central bank independence constructed by Freitag (1999). The index ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 indicates maximum central bank independence, and 3 maximum central bank dependence.

Back?

Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Labor

(Cross-Section: covers the 1997-2002 period, N: 84, except where noted)

http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/Regulation%20of%20Labor-All/Regulation%20of%20Labor.xls

(Botero et al 2004)

bdlls_lcpo1 **Left/Center Political Orientation 1928-1995**

Measures the percentage of years between 1928 and 1995, during which both the party of the chief executive and the largest party in congress had left or center orientation. If the country was not independent in the initial year of the period, Botero et al. use the independence year as the first period. For countries that were part of a larger country in the initial year of the period and subsequently broke-up, Botero et al. include in calculations the political orientation of the political parties in the mother country in the pre-breakup period. In the case of military regimes, where political affiliations are unclear, the regime is classified based on its policies.

Sources: Authors' calculations based on: Political Handbook of the World, Europa Yearbook, World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties, Political Parties of the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies, Encyclopedia of Latin American Politics, Political Parties of Europe, Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific, Statesmen database: <http://www.worldstatesmen.org>, Country Reports History: <http://www.countryreports.org>, Rulers database: <http://rulers.org/>, various regional and country sources.

Back?

bdlls_lcpo2 **Left/Center Political Orientation 1975-1995**

Same as bdlls_lcpo1, but for the period 1975-1995.

bdlls_pr **Proportional Representation**

Equals one if legislators were elected based on the percentage of votes received by their party; equals zero otherwise. This variable is measured as the average from 1975 through 1995. Source: Beck et al. (2001).

Back?

bdlls_dg **Divided Government**

(N: 83)

This variable measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies will belong to a different party in a given year. It is missing if there is no parliament or if there are no parties in the legislature; and zero if there are no opposition party seats. This variable is measured as the average from 1975 through 1995. Source: Beck et al. (2001).

[Back?](#)

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)

<http://www.cses.org/>

(Sapiro et al 2003; The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007)

The variables below on voter turnout and compulsory voting have been provided by the CSES research teams (unlike the CSES “Public Opinion” data above, which is aggregated individual level survey data).

Note: In a few cases the CSES survey was conducted the year after the election year. In these cases we have nevertheless placed the data on the year of the election that the survey is related to. For more information, see the CSES documentation.

cses_vt **Voter turnout**

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 56, N: 30, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 41)

Percentage of voting age population who cast ballots.

[Back?](#)

cses_cv **Compulsory voting**

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 56, N: 30, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 2)

(Cross-section: 1997-2006 (varies by country), N: 39)

- (1) Compulsory voting with strictly enforced sanctions.
- (2) Compulsory voting with weakly enforced sanctions.
- (3) Compulsory voting with limited enforcement.
- (4) Compulsory voting without sanction for violation.
- (5) No compulsory voting.

[Back?](#)

Crowe and Meade – Central Bank Governance

<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/data/wp08119.zip>
(Crowe and Meade 2007, 2008; Cukierman et al 1992)

cm_cbi80_89 Central Bank Independence 1980-1989

(Cross-section (1980-1989), N: 72)

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank independence.

The variable is based on central bank laws from the years 1980-1989. Sixteen legal characteristics are considered and they relate to the following areas: the central bank management's insulation from political pressure by secure tenure and independent appointment for the head of the bank; the government's ability to participate or overturn the bank's policy decisions; the clarity of the defined objective for monetary policy specified in the central bank's legal mandate; restrictions that limit lending to the government.

Each legal characteristic was scored according to the authors' numerical coding on a range from zero (least independent) to one (most independent). The characteristics were then weighted to obtain an overall independence measure.

For more information, see Cukierman et al (1992).

[Back?](#)

cm_cbi80_89u Central Bank Independence 1980-1989, unweighted

(Cross-section (1980-1989), N: 72)

Same as cm_cbi80_89, but the unweighted instead of the weighted average.

[Back?](#)

cm_cbi03 Central Bank Independence 2003

(Cross-section (2003), N: 96)

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank independence.

The variable is based on IMF data pertaining to the year 2003. It is a replication done by Crowe and Meade using the methodology from Cukierman et al (1992). See the description of cmi_cbi80_89.

[Back?](#)

cm_cbi03u Central Bank Independence 2003, unweighted

(Cross-section (2003), N: 96)

Same as cm_cbi03, but the unweighted instead of the weighted average.

[Back?](#)

cm_cbt98 Central Bank Transparency 1998

(Cross-section (1998), N: 87)

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank transparency.

The variable is based on information from 1998. It is constructed as the unweighted average of ten indicators from five categories: the clarity of the central bank's legal mandate; the publication of the data used by the central bank as basis for its decisions; the communication of the explicit policy strategy and information on the decision-making process; timely announcements on policy actions and indications of likely future actions; discussion of economic disturbances and policy errors.

Back?

cm_cbt06 Central Bank Transparency 2006

(Cross-section (2006), N: 39)

Same as cm_cbt98, but based on data from 2006.

Back?

cm_cbgt80_89 Central Bank Governor Turnover 1980-1989

(Cross-section (1980-1989), N: 71)

This is the average number of changes of the central bank's governor per year from 1980 to 1989. Higher values indicate lower independence of the central bank.

The turnover rate is sometimes considered to be a better measure of the de facto bank independence than the legal measures above. "The reasoning is that with higher turnover, the central bank governor's term in office would shorten relative to that of the executive making the governor more susceptible to political interference from the government and reducing the independence of the central bank." (Crowe and Meade 2008: 75).

Back?

cm_cbgt95_04 Central Bank Governor Turnover 1995-2004

(Cross-section (1995-2004), N: 114)

Same as cm_cbgt80_89, but for the period 1995-2004.

Back?

Cusack – Center of Political Gravity

http://www.wzb.eu/alt/ism/people/misc/cusack/d_sets.en.htm

(Cusack 1997)

Cusack's center of political gravity measures are based on Gross & Sigelman's (1984) index, using data on electoral results, legislative seat distribution, and cabinet seat distribution data (drawn from a variety of sources), as well as data on ideological

position of parties based on Castles & Mair's (1984) expert survey data. Each of the indexes range from 1 (far left) to 5 (far right). For an explanation of how the center of political gravity is computed, see under Cusack & Engelhardt below.

cu_lcpg **Legislative center of political gravity**

(Time-series: 1950-1996, n: 873, N: 21, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 42)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 17)

Center of political gravity of the lower house.

Back?

cu_ccpg **Cabinet center of political gravity**

(Time-series: 1950-1996, n: 861, N: 21, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 41)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 16)

Center of political gravity of the cabinet.

cu_ecpg **Electoral center of political gravity**

(Time-series: 1950-1996, n: 868, N: 21, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 41)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 16)

Center of political gravity of the electorate at most recent election.

Back?

cu_ey **Election year**

(Time-series: 1950-1996, n: 940, N: 21, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 45)
(Cross-section: 1996, N: 20)

Equals 1 if election year and 0 otherwise. (Refers to lower house elections, except for the United States where years of presidential elections are given.)

Back?

Cusack & Engelhardt

http://www.wzb.eu/alt/ism/people/misc/cusack/d_sets.en.htm
(Cusack & Engelhardt 2003)

The basis for Cusack & Engelhardt's (2003) data is the analysis of political manifestos from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and to some extent expert judgments of parties' ideologies (see Klingemann et al 2006). By combining the CMP data and expert judgments with data on election results and government composition, Cusack & Engelhardt (2003) have produced data on, among other things, the ideological composition of cabinets and parliaments.

Many of the indices in the Cusack & Engelhardt data are based on a concept called the center of political gravity. This index is a summation across all parties of each party's ideological position weighted by its relative strength (see Gross & Sigelman 1984):

$$CPG = \sum_{i=1}^n T_i C_i$$

where:

T_i = party i 's decimal share of seats/votes

C_i = party i 's position on the ideological dimension

The ideological variables all come in four versions, distinguished by the suffixes cmp, ce1, ce2 and ci. Three of these are different ways of aggregating the CMP data to overall ideological measurements on the left-right scale. The fourth is a composite index based on different expert judgments. The four versions are:

cmp: CMPs own left-right index. It is constructed by counting 13 categories of pro-right and 13 categories of pro-left sentences in political manifestos, and then subtracting the percentage of pro-left sentences from the percentage of pro-right sentences. Thus, higher values indicate ideological positions more to the right. It varies theoretically between -100 and 100. For more information, see Cusack & Engelhardt (2003) or Budge et al (2001).

ce1: Index constructed by Cusack & Engelhardt (2003). Higher values indicate ideological positions more to the right. It is constructed by counting sentences in political manifestos. Cusack & Engelhardt sum the percentage of sentences positive to free enterprise, economic orthodoxy and governmental and administrative efficiency, and from these subtract the percentage of sentences positive to market regulation, economic planning, controlled economy, social justice and welfare state expansion.

The variable varies theoretically between -100 and 100.

ce2: Index constructed by Cusack & Engelhardt (2003). Higher values indicate ideological positions more to the right. It is constructed by counting sentences in political manifestos. Cusack & Engelhardt first sum the percentage of sentences positive to free enterprise, economic orthodoxy and governmental and administrative efficiency, and from these subtract the percentage of sentences positive to market regulation, economic planning, Keynesian demand management, controlled economy, nationalization, social justice and welfare state expansion. They then divide this difference with the total sum of percentage of sentences counted, and finally multiply it with 100.

The variable varies theoretically between -100 and +100.

ci: Composite ideology index based on the expert surveys in Castles & Mair (1984), Huber & Inglehart (1995) and Laver & Hunt (1992). Where needed Cusack &

Engelhardt (2003) have fitted values from the equation estimating ce1 (see below).

The variable varies theoretically between -100 (far left) to 100 (far right).

ce_ccpg_cmp Cabinet: center of political gravity (cmp)

ce_ccpg_ce1 Cabinet: center of political gravity (ce1)

ce_ccpg_ce2 Cabinet: center of political gravity (ce2)

ce_ccpg_ci Cabinet: center of political gravity (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1110, N: 24, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 45)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 22)

The center of political gravity of the cabinet.

Back?

ce_cml Cabinet majority, lower house

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Describes whether the cabinet coalition has a minority (1), equal (2) or majority position (3) in the lower house.

Back?

ce_cmu Cabinet majority, upper house

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 686, N: 17, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 40)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 14)

Describes whether the cabinet coalition has a minority (1), equal (2) or majority position (3) in the upper house.

Back?

ce_cpsl Cabinet: percentage of seats, lower house

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Percentage of seats in lower house held by the government.

Back?

ce_cnp Cabinet: number of parties

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 47)

(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Number of parties in cabinet.

[Back?](#)

ce_lcpg_cmp Lower house: center of political gravity (cmp)

ce_lcpg_ce1 Lower house: center of political gravity (ce1)

ce_lcpg_ce2 Lower house: center of political gravity (ce2)

ce_lcpg_ci Lower house: center of political gravity (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1118, N: 24, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 47)

(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

The overall center of political gravity in the lower house.

[Back?](#)

ce_ccpgl_cmp Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (cmp)

ce_ccpgl_ce1 Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (ce1)

ce_ccpgl_ce2 Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (ce2)

ce_ccpgl_ci Cabinet: center of political gravity, lower house (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1111, N: 24, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 22)

The center of political gravity of the government parties in the lower house.

[Back?](#)

ce_cpsu Cabinet: percentage of seats, upper house

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 686, N: 17, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 40)

(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Percentage of seats in upper house held by the government.

[Back?](#)

ce_ucpg_cmp Upper house: center of political gravity (cmp)

ce_ucpg_ce1 Upper house: center of political gravity (ce1)

ce_ucpg_ce2 Upper house: center of political gravity (ce2)

ce_ucpg_ci Upper house: center of political gravity (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 684, N: 17, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 40)

(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 14)

The overall center of political gravity in the upper house.

[Back?](#)

ce_ccpgu_cmp Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (cmp)

ce_ccpgu_ce1 Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (ce1)

ce_ccpgu_ce2 Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (ce2)

ce_ccpgu_ci Cabinet: center of political gravity, upper house (ci)

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 681 N: 17, \bar{N} : 12, \bar{T} : 40)

(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 13)

The center of political gravity of the government parties in the upper house.

[Back?](#)

ce_lf Lower house: fractionalization

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 47)

(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Fractionalization of lower house as a whole.

The convention for splitting parties into two categories, left and right, used by Cusack & Engelhard (2003) is to treat a party as being on the left if its ideological score is less than 0, and to treat all other parties as being on the right, including those few ambiguous cases where the ideological score was exactly 0.

[Back?](#)

ce_uf Upper house: fractionalization

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 636, N: 15, \bar{N} : 11, \bar{T} : 42)

(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 13)

Fractionalization of upper house as a whole. See ce_lf for more information.

[Back?](#)

ce_cf Cabinet: fractionalization

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Fractionalization of the cabinet. See ce_lf for more information.

Back?

ce_cpv Cabinet: percentage of votes in election

(Time-series: 1946-2001, n: 1120, N: 24, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 23)

Government parties' share of votes in election.

Back?

Database of Political Institutions

<http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40>
(Beck et al 2000; 2001; Keefer 2009)

The data is from DPI2010 (updated December 2010).

Note: The data from the DPI refers to January 1 of each year.

In the original data "not applicable" is coded as -999. We have replaced these observations with missing.

dpi_system Regime type

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1302, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 33)
(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 175)

The variable captures whether countries are presidential, assembly-elected presidential, or parliamentary:

- (0) Direct presidential
- (1) Strong president elected by assembly
- (2) Parliamentary

Back?

dpi_seats Total Seats in the Legislature

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1388, N: 40, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 35)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 175)

Total seats in the legislature, or in the case of bicameral legislatures, the total seats in the lower house. This variable includes appointed and elected seats.

Back?

dpi_gf Government fractionalization

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1272, N: 40, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 32)
(Cross-section: 1996-2009 (varies by country), N: 171)

Government fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies from among the government parties will be of different parties.

[Back?](#)

dpi_gs Number of Government Seats

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1388, N: 40, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 35)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 175)

Number of seats in the legislature of the parties in government.

[Back?](#)

dpi_opf Opposition fractionalization

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1190, N: 40, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 1997-2007 (varies by country), N: 154)

Opposition fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies belonging to the parties in the opposition will be of different parties.

[Back?](#)

dpi_nos Number of Oppositional Seats

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1388, N: 40, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 35)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 175)

Number of seats in the legislature of the parties in opposition.

[Back?](#)

dpi_numul Number of Seats non-aligned/allegiance unknown

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1388, N: 40, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 35)
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 175)

Number of seats in the legislature of parties that are non-aligned/allegiance unknown.

[Back?](#)

dpi_tf Total fractionalization

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1262, N: 40, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 32)
(Cross-section: 1996-2009 (varies by country), N: 171)

Total fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies in the legislature belong to different parties.

[Back?](#)

dpi_legelec **Legislative election**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1301, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 33)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 174)

Dummy variable, 1 if there is a legislative election held this year.

[Back?](#)

dpi_exelec **Executive election**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1302, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 33)
(Cross-section: 2001-2002 (varies by country), N: 174)

Dummy variable, 1 if there is an executive election held this year.

[Back?](#)

dpi_mdmh **Mean district magnitude (house)**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1179, N: 40, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 2001-2008 (varies by country), N: 171)

[Back?](#)

dpi_mdms **Mean district magnitude (senate)**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 561, N: 19, \bar{N} : 16, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 1997-2009 (varies by country), N: 62)

The average number of representatives elected by each electoral district in a country. If information is available, the average is weighted by constituency size.

[Back?](#)

dpi_ssh **Relative size of senate**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 647, N: 23, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 28)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 72)

Number of senate seats / (number of house seats + number of senate seats).

[Back?](#)

dpi_plurality **Plurality**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1266, N: 40, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 32)
(Cross-section: 1997-2008 (varies by country), N: 164)

Dummy variable, 1 if plurality is used as electoral rule to select any candidate in any house, or if there is competition for the seats in a one-party state (dpi_lipc=4).

[Back?](#)

dpi_pr Proportional representation

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1220, N: 40, \bar{N} : 34, \bar{T} : 31)

(Cross-section: 1997-2008 (varies by country), N: 164)

Dummy variable, 1 if Proportional Representation (PR) is used as electoral rule to select any candidate in any house.

[Back?](#)

dpi_housesys House: plurality or proportional?

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1266, N: 40, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 32)

(Cross-section: 1997-2008 (varies by country), N: 162)

If both Plurality and Proportional Representation are used as electoral rules, which governs the majority/all of the House seats? Dummy variable, 1 if Plurality, 0.5 if 50% Plurality and 50% Proportional, and 0 if Proportional.

[Back?](#)

dpi_sensys Senate: plurality or proportional?

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 328, N: 13, \bar{N} : 9, \bar{T} : 25)

(Cross-section: 2000-2008 (varies by country), N: 33)

If both Plurality and Proportional Representation are used as electoral rules, which governs the majority/all of the Senate seats? Dummy variable, 1 if Plurality, 0.5 if 50% Plurality and 50% Proportional, and 0 if Proportional.

[Back?](#)

dpi_thresh Vote threshold for representation

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 976, N: 34, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 2001-2009 (varies by country), N: 101)

Records the minimum vote share that a party must obtain in order to take at least one seat in PR systems, in percent.

[Back?](#)

dpi_dhondt D'Hondt

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1014, N: 36, \bar{N} : 28, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 2000-2008 (varies by country), N: 100)

Dummy variable, 1 if the D'Hondt rule is used to allocate seats in a PR system.

[Back?](#)

dpi_cl **Closed lists**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1052, N: 36, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 1996-2009 (varies by country), N: 109)

Dummy variable, 1 when PR is used (dpi_pr) and voters cannot express preferences for candidates within a party list.

[Back?](#)

dpi_auton **Autonomous regions**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1300, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 33)
(Cross-section: 2001-2007 (varies by country), N: 174)

Dummy variable, 1 if there are autonomous regions.

[Back?](#)

dpi_state **Election of state/province government**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 1172, N: 36, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 33)
(Cross-section: 1995-2008 (varies by country), N: 143)

One dimension of information on sub-national governments is whether state/provincial governments are locally elected. Coded 0 if neither the local executive nor the local legislature are directly elected by the local population that they govern; 1 if either is directly elected and the other is indirectly elected (e.g., by councils at subsidiary levels of government) or appointed; and 2 if they are both directly and locally elected. If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, we consider the highest level as the “state/province” level.

[Back?](#)

dpi_muni **Election of municipal government**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 962, N: 33, \bar{N} : 27, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 2001-2007 (varies by country), N: 123)

Are the municipal governments locally elected? Coded the same as the state/provincial government, dpi_state above (0-2). If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, the lowest level is considered as the “municipal” level.

[Back?](#)

dpi_author **Authority of sub-national governments**

(Time-series: 1975-2010, n: 557, N: 19, \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 67)

Dummy variable, 1 if sub-national governments have extensive taxing, spending or regulatory authority.

[Back?](#)

Fish and Kroenig – The Parliamentary Powers Index

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 158)

<http://polisci.berkeley.edu/faculty/bio/permanent/Fish,M>

(Fish and Kroenig 2009)

fk_ppi Parliamentary Powers Index

The Parliamentary Powers Index assesses the strength of the national legislature. The index, based on 32 underlying dummy variables, gauges the legislature's sway of the executive, its institutional autonomy, its authority in specific areas, and its institutional capacity. (For a complete list of the variables, see Fish and Kroenig 2009 or <http://polisci.berkeley.edu/faculty/bio/permanent/Fish,M>.)

The data was generated by means of an international survey of experts, a study of secondary sources, and analyses of constitutions and other relevant documents.

The variable ranges from 0 (least powerful) to 1 (most powerful). The score is calculated by summing up the number of powers that the national legislature possesses and dividing it by 32. For example, a country with a national legislature that possesses 16 of the 32 parliamentary powers has a PPI of .50

[Back?](#)

Golder

<http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html>

(Golder 2005)

Golder's data cover electoral institutions used in democratic legislative (lower chamber) and presidential elections, where democracy is defined according to `gol_polreg` below. Note that data (with the exception of `gol_lleg` and `gol_preel`) for 'non-democratic regimes' is coded as 'missing'. There are some countries that had two elections (legislative or presidential) in the same year: Argentina 1973, Bangladesh 1996, Denmark 1953, Greece 1989, Iceland 1959, Ireland 1982, Saint Lucia 1987, Sri Lanka 1960, Thailand 1992, and United Kingdom 1974. As a result, it is not possible to provide data for both elections that occurred in the same year in the country-year data format. In those cases where there were two elections, data is from the second election. Those interested in data for the first elections should consult Golder's original data.

gol_adm Average district magnitude

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1431, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Average district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is calculated as the total number of seats allocated in the lowest tier divided by the total number of districts in that tier. For example, `gol_adm`=7.94 in Denmark after 1971 since there are 135 seats allocated in the lowest tier between 17 districts.

[Back?](#)

gol_dist **Districts**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1431, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Number of electoral districts or constituencies in the lowest electoral tier for the lower house of the legislature.

[Back?](#)

gol_enep **Effective number of electoral parties**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1421, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 103)

Effective number of electoral parties based on formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

[Back?](#)

gol_enepo **Effective number of electoral parties (others)**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1420, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 103)

This is the percentage of the vote going to parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official electoral results.

[Back?](#)

gol_enep1 **Effective number of electoral parties1**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1420, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 103)

Effective number of electoral parties once the 'other' category has been corrected for by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997). The method of bounds essentially requires, first, calculating the effective number of parties treating the 'other' category as a single party; this estimate corresponds to the minimum effective number of parties. Second, the effective number of parties is recalculated as if every vote in the 'other' category belonged to different parties; this estimate corresponds to the maximum effective number of parties. Finally, one takes the mean of these minimum and maximum estimates.

[Back?](#)

gol_enpp **Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1431, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 107)

Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties constructed using the formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

[Back?](#)

gol_enppo **Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties (others)**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 106)

This is the percentage of the seats going to parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official electoral results.

[Back?](#)

gol_enpp1 **Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties1**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 106)

Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties once the 'other' category has been corrected for by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997).

[Back?](#)

gol_enpres **Effective number of presidential candidates**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1432, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Effective number of presidential candidates based on the formula from Amorim Neto and Cox (1997).

[Back?](#)

gol_est **Electoral system type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Variable indicating the type of electoral system used:

(1) Majoritarian (employs plurality, absolute majority, qualified majority, limited vote, alternative vote, single non-transferable vote or modified Borda count in a single electoral tier)

(2) Proportional (employs party list or single transferable vote in a single electoral tier)

(3) Multi-tier (employs a single electoral formula, majoritarian or proportional, across multiple tiers)

(4) Mixed (employs a mixture of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules in one or more electoral tiers)

[Back?](#)

gol_est2 Electoral system type 2

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Variable constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset indicating the type of electoral system used, where multi-tier systems are recoded as being majoritarian (only concerns Papua New Guinea and Mauritius) or proportional (concerns all others):

- (1) Majoritarian
- (2) Proportional
- (3) Mixed

[Back?](#)

gol_inst Institution

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1831, N: 40, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 189)

Classification of political regimes in which democracies are distinguished by the type of executive as given below:

- (0) Dictatorship
- (1) Parliamentary Democracy
- (2) Mixed Democracy
- (3) Presidential Democracy

Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges. On the criteria for determining whether a regime is a dictatorship, see Political Regimes (gol_polreg). A presidential regime is one in which the government serves under the elected president. The president may be directly elected or indirectly elected; the important feature is that the president selects and determines the survival of the government. A parliamentary system is one in which the government serves so long as it maintains the confidence of the legislature. A system in which the government must respond to both the legislative assembly and to an elected president is classified as mixed. Typically, these mixed systems are characterized by a president who is elected for a fixed term with some executive powers and a government that serves under the direction of the legislature. This classification scheme follows the recommendations of Przeworski et al. (2000).

[Back?](#)

gol_legal Legislative elections

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1831, N: 40, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 189)

Indicates the number of elections for the national lower chamber of the legislature held in that year. Partial elections such as those taking place in Costa Rica 1946, Poland 1989, Laos 1958, or Luxembourg 1948, 1951 are coded 0. This variable does not include elections to constituent assemblies such as those in Pakistan 1955,

Nicaragua 1984, Sudan 1965, 1968, Italy 1946, or France 1946. It also excludes the 1960 election in Somalia, as this was only a legislative election for Somaliland (later to become the northern region of Somalia). 18 democratic legislative elections occur in years where `gol_polreg` is coded as a dictatorship (Argentina 1962, Bolivia 1980, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Congo 1963, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Pakistan 1977, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines 1965, Sierra Leone 1967, Somalia 1969, Sri Lanka 1977, Sudan 1958, Thailand 1976). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of `gol_polreg` is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic.

Back?

gol_legro **Runoff**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1430, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no legislative runoff; 1 if there is.

Back?

gol_maj **Majoritarian type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 420, N: 10, \bar{N} : 8, \bar{T} : 42)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 45)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of majoritarian electoral system used in legislative elections as given below:

- (1) Plurality
- (2) Absolute majority
- (3) Qualified majority
- (4) Limited vote
- (5) Alternative vote
- (6) Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)
- (7) Modified Borda

Back?

gol_mdm **Median district magnitude**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1205, N: 39, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 31)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 108)

Median district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is the district magnitude associated with the median legislator in the lowest tier. The median legislator is determined by finding the number of legislators elected in the lower tier and dividing this figure by two. For further details on this variable, see Amorim Neto and Cox (1997).

Back?

gol_mix **Mixed type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 285, N: 14, \bar{N} : 5, \bar{T} : 20)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 29)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of mixed electoral system used in legislative elections as given below:

- (1) Coexistence, independent
- (2) Superposition, independent
- (3) Fusion, independent
- (4) Correction, dependent
- (5) Conditional, dependent

A dependent mixed system is one in which the application of one formula is dependent on the outcome produced by the other formula. There are three types of independent mixed systems: coexistence (where some districts use a majoritarian, while others employ a proportional formula), superposition (where two different electoral formulas are applied nationwide), and fusion (where majoritarian and proportional formulas are used within a single district) systems. An independent mixed system is one in which the two electoral formulas are implemented independently of each other. There are two types of dependent mixed systems: correction (where seats distributed by proportional representation in one set of districts are used to correct for the distortions created by the majoritarian formula in another) and conditional (where the actual use or not of one formula depends on the outcome produced by the other) systems.

[Back?](#)

gol_mt **Multi-tier type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 466, N: 17, \bar{N} : 8, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 25)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of multi-tier electoral system used in legislative elections as given below:

- (1) Linked
- (2) Unlinked

A multi-tier system is linked whenever unused votes from one electoral tier are used at another level, or if the allocation of seats in one tier is conditional on the seats received in another tier.

[Back?](#)

gol_nos **Number of seats**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1432, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 111)

Total number of seats in the lower house of the legislature during the election year.

[Back?](#)

gol_pest **Presidential electoral system type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 91, N: 16, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 6)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 56)

Variable that indicates the type of electoral system used in presidential elections:

- (1) Plurality
- (2) Absolute majority
- (3) Qualified majority
- (4) Electoral College
- (5) Single Transferable Vote (STV)

[Back?](#)

gol_polreg **Political regimes**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1831, N: 40, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 46)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 189)

Transition years are coded as the regime that exists (0 Democracy, 1 Dictatorship) as of December 31st in that year. A regime is considered a dictatorship if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, or there has been no alternation in power (Przeworski et al. 2000). A regime is democratic if those who govern are selected through contested elections.

[Back?](#)

gol_pr **PR type**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1009, N: 28, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 36)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 56)

Classification, constructed by the authors of the QoG dataset (but based on Golder's underlying data), indicating the type of proportional formula used in legislative elections:

- (1) Hare
- (2) Droop
- (3) Imperiali
- (4) Reinforced Imperiali
- (5) Modified Hare
- (6) D'Hondt
- (7) Saint-Laguë
- (8) Modified Saint-Laguë
- (9) Single Transferable Vote (STV)

Back?

gol_preel Presidential election

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1831, N: 40, \bar{N} : 33, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 2000 (varies by country), N: 188)

Indicates the number of direct presidential elections held in that year. Note: This variable does not signify that the election chose either the nominal or effective head of government. For example, gol_preel=1 if there is an election for president in mixed systems, even though the nominal and effective head of government is the prime minister. This variable does not include plebiscites or referenda as have occurred in countries like Taiwan and the Maldives.

18 democratic presidential elections occur in years where gol_polreg is coded as a dictatorship (Argentina 1962, Bolivia 1980, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Congo 1963, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Pakistan 1977, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines 1965, Sierra Leone 1967, Somalia 1969, Sri Lanka 1977, Sudan 1958, Thailand 1976). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of gol_polreg is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic.

Back?

gol_prero Presidential runoff

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1433, N: 40, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 112)

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no presidential runoff; 1 if there is a presidential runoff. Presidential elections are coded as having runoff provisions if a successful candidate must win an absolute or qualified majority of the vote to become president.

Back?

gol_upseat Upper seats

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1308, N: 37, \bar{N} : 24 \bar{T} : 35)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 109)

The number of seats allocated in electoral districts or constituencies above the lowest tier. This variable may include seats allocated in several different upper tiers.

[Back?](#)

gol_uptier Upper tier

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1308, N: 37, \bar{N} : 24 \bar{T} : 35)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 109)

Percentage of seats allocated in electoral districts above the lowest tier.

[Back?](#)

Gerring, Thacker & Moreno

<http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/data.htm>
(Gerring et al 2005)

Gerring, Thacker and Moreno only include country-years that obtain a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p_polity2). (For details, see Gerring et al. 2005: p.572)

gtm_centrip Centripetalism

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 1193, N: 40, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 132)

Sum of Unitarism (gtm_unit), Parliamentarism (gtm_parl), and Proportional Representation (gtm_pr).

[Back?](#)

gtm_centrip2 Centripetalism (weighted)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 1193, N: 40, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 1996-2000 (varies by country), N: 132)

The variable is a moving weighted sum of Unitarism (gtm_unit), Parliamentarism (gtm_parl), and Proportional Representation (gtm_pr), beginning in 1901 and ending in 2000. For details, see Gerring et al (2005).

[Back?](#)

gtm_unit Unitarism

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 1267, N: 40, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 32)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 150)

Average of Nonfederalism and Nonbicameralism:

- Nonfederalism is coded as 0 = federal (elective regional legislatures plus conditional recognition of subnational authority), 1 = semifederal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government), or 2 = nonfederal.

- Nonbicameralism is coded as 0 = strong bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power; the two houses are incongruent), 1 = weak bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power, though not necessarily a formal veto; the two houses are congruent), or 2 = unicameral (no upper house or weak upper house).

[Back?](#)

gtm_parl Parliamentarism

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 1267, N: 40, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 32)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 150)

The parliamentary/presidential distinction is conceptualized as a continuum with two dimensions: (a) the degree of separation (independence) between president and parliament (unity = parliamentary, separation = presidential) and, if there is any separation at all, (b) the relative power of the two players (the more power the president possesses, the more presidential is the resulting system). This complex reality is captured with a three-part coding scheme:

- (0) Presidential
- (1) Semi-presidential
- (2) Parliamentary

[Back?](#)

gtm_pr Proportional Representation

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 1267, N: 40, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 32)
(Cross-section: 1995-2001 (varies by country), N: 151)

The centripetal theory of democratic governance emphasizes the following three features of an electoral system: (a) district magnitude (M), (b) seat allocation rules (majoritarian or proportional), and (c) candidate selection rules. The centripetal ideal type is defined by $M > 1$, proportional seat allocation rules, and party-controlled candidate selection. This is the closed-list-PR electoral system. Other systems are ranked lower in this coding according to their deviation from this ideal type. Thus, the coding for the list-PR variable is as follows:

- (0) Majoritarian or Preferential-vote
- (1) Mixed-member majority or Block vote
- (2) Closed-list-PR

Back?

Huber et al – Comparative Welfare States Data Set

<http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/cws%20lis.xls>
(Huber et al 2004)

Note: Huber et al (2004) code Christian parties which combine Catholic and Protestant forces (such as the Dutch Christian Democrats after the merger, or the German Christian Democrats) as either center or right “Christian”.

hu_vt Voter turnout

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 733, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 39)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

Voter turnout in election (percentage of total electorate who cast a ballot).

Back?

Election results

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 39)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

hu_vl Votes: left

Percentage of total votes for left parties.

Back?

hu_vcs Votes: center secular

Percentage of total votes for center secular parties.

Back?

hu_vcch Votes: center Christian

Percentage of total votes for center Christian parties.

Back?

hu_vcca Votes: center Catholic

Percentage of total votes for center Catholic parties.

Back?

hu_vrs **Votes: right secular**
Percentage of total votes for right secular parties. Back?

hu_vrch **Votes: right Christian parties**
Percentage of total votes for right Christian parties. Back?

hu_vrca **Votes: right Catholic**
Percentage of total votes for right Catholic parties. Back?

Legislative seats
(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 39)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

hu_ll **Legislative seats: left**
Percentage of total seats in parliament for left parties. Back?

hu_lcs **Legislative seats: center secular**
Percentage of total seats in parliament for center secular parties. Back?

hu_lcch **Legislative seats: center Christian**
Percentage of total seats in parliament for center Christian parties. Back?

hu_lcca **Legislative seats: center Catholic**
Percentage of total seats in parliament for center Catholic parties. Back?

hu_lrs **Legislative seats: right secular**
Percentage of total seats in parliament for right secular parties. Back?

hu_lrch **Legislative seats: right Christian parties**
Percentage of total seats in parliament for right Christian parties. Back?

hu_lrca **Legislative seats: right Catholic**
Percentage of total seats in parliament for right Catholic parties. Back?

Governments

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 39)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

For each group of parties there is one variable that shows the legislative seats of that group as a share of all seats held by all government parties, given that parties from this group are included in the government. There is also another variable (ending with _cum) which is the cumulative score from 1946 to the year of the observation. For example, the score of _cum the year 1960 is the score of hu_gl of 1946 + hu_gl 1947 + hu_gl 1948 and so on until 1960.

hu_gl Government parties legislative seats: left

hu_gl_cum Left governments cumulative

Left seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

[Back?](#)

hu_gcs Government parties legislative seats: center secular

hu_gcs_cum Center secular governments cumulative

Center secular seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

[Back?](#)

hu_gcch Government parties legislative seats: center Christian

hu_gcch_cum Center Christian governments cumulative

Center Christian seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

[Back?](#)

hu_gcca Government parties legislative seats: center Catholic

hu_gcca_cum Center Catholic governments cumulative

Center Catholic seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

[Back?](#)

hu_grs Government parties legislative seats: right secular

hu_grs_cum Right secular governments cumulative

Right secular seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

[Back?](#)

hu_grch **Government parties legislative seats: right Christian parties**

hu_grch_cum **Right Christian governments cumulative**

Right Christian seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

Back?

hu_grca **Government parties legislative seats: right Catholic**

hu_grca_cum **Right Catholic governments cumulative**

Right Catholic seats as share of seats held by all government parties.

Back?

Political institutions

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 738, N: 19, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 39)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 18)

The following variables use Lijphart (1984) and Lijphart (1999) as a base for their coding.

hu_federal **Federalism**

(0) Not federal

(1) Weak federalism

(2) Strong federalism

Back?

hu_pres **Presidentialism**

(0) Parliamentary system

(1) President or collegial executive

Back?

hu_est **Electoral system type**

(0) Proportional representation

(1) Modified proportional representation

(2) Single member, simple plurality systems

Back?

hu_bicameral **Bicameral system**

(0) No second chamber or, second chamber with very weak powers

(1) Weak bicameralism

(2) Strong bicameralism

Back?

- hu_ff** **Frequent referenda**
(0) None or infrequent referenda
(1) Frequent referenda

Back?

- hu_jr** **Judicial review**
(0) No judicial review
(1) Judicial review

Back?

IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)

<http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm>

The total number of registered voters (Registered Voters, RV) and voting age population (Voting Age Population, VAP) can both be used as indicators for electoral turnout. Data is only given for election years.

Please note that we for the cross-sectional dataset for each country pick the observation of 2002, and if 2002 is not available then 2003 is used, and if 2003 is not available then 2001 is used and so forth. We do not include observations from elections held earlier than 1995 in the cross-sectional dataset.

idea_parvap Turnout in Parliamentary Elections (VAP)

(Time-series: 1946-2008, n: 563, N: 40, \bar{N} : 9, \bar{T} : 14)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 179)

Turnout in parliamentary elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the voting age population (VAP).

Note: We have observed a dubious value of over 1000 percent. This concern the Democratic Republic of Congo in the cross-sectional version of our data. We have nevertheless chosen to leave the data as it is.

Back?

idea_parrv Turnout in Parliamentary Elections (RV)

(Time-series: 1946-2009 n: 552, N: 40, \bar{N} : 9, \bar{T} : 14)
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 180)

Turnout in parliamentary elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the number of registered voters (RV).

Back?

idea_presvap Turnout in Presidential Elections (VAP)

(Time-series: 1946-2008, n: 104, N: 16, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 102)

Turnout in presidential elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the voting age population (VAP).

Note: We have observed a dubious value of nearly 1000 percent. This concerns the Democratic Republic of Congo in the cross-sectional version of our data. We have nevertheless chosen to leave the data as it is.

[Back?](#)

idea_presrv Turnout in Presidential Elections (RV)

(Time-series: 1950-2009, n: 97, N: 16, \bar{N} : 2, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 1996-2008 (varies by country), N: 102)

Turnout in presidential elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the number of registered voters (RV).

[Back?](#)

Institutions and Elections Project

<http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html>

(Regan and Clark 2010)

The objective of the data from the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) is to describe the formal institutions that are in place, even if practice does not comport with those formal rules. The data refers to the situation January 1st each year.

Please also note that according to the documentation of the data many of the cases “have more than one executive; [...] the executive referred to may be any one of the executives established in a country.” We urge users to refer to the documentation at the IAEP web site for information about which executive each particular case refers to.

Executive-Legislature Relationship

iaep_evp Executive Veto Power

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1083, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 2001-2005 (varies by country), N: 155)

Equals 1 if there is an executive with constitutional veto power over laws passed by the legislature, and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

iaep_lvp Legislature Veto Power

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1056, N: 37, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 153)

Equals 1 if the legislature has constitutional veto power to stop executive action, and 0 otherwise.

Back?

iaep_lcre Legislature Can Remove Executive

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1095, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2001-2005 (varies by country), N: 156)

Equals 1 if the legislature according to the constitution can remove an executive from office, and 0 otherwise.

Back?

iaep_ecdl Executive Can Dissolve Legislature

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1079, N: 137, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 2001-2005 (varies by country), N: 156)

Equals 1 if an executive according to the constitution can dissolve the legislature, and 0 otherwise.

Back?

iaep_lrit Legislature's Ratification of International Treaties

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1037, N: 36, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 151)

Does the legislature have the constitutional authority to ratify international treaties negotiated by an executive?

- (1) No authority
- (2) One chamber's approval necessary
- (3) Both chambers' approval necessary

Back?

iaep_epmf Executive Power over Military Force

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1079, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 29)
(Cross-section: 1995-2005 (varies by country), N: 154)

Equals 1 if an executive has the power to use military force abroad without legislative approval, and 0 otherwise

Back?

iaep_eccdt Executive Can Change Domestic Taxes

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1051, N: 37, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 28)
(Cross-section: 1995-2005 (varies by country), N: 154)

Equals 1 if an executive can change domestic taxes (excluding import/export tariffs) without legislative approval, and 0 otherwise.

Back?

iaep_lap Legislature Approves Budget

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1063, N: 36, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 157)

Equals 1 if an executive has to secure legislative approval for the budget, and 0 otherwise.

Back?

Judiciary

iaep_cc Constitutional Court

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1095, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 1999-2004 (varies by country), N: 160)

Equals 1 if the country according to the constitution has a national constitutional court, and 0 otherwise. In some cases, a council with powers of a constitutional court may exist, though it may not be part of the formal judiciary. In such cases, this non-judicial council with powers of a constitutional court is coded as the constitutional court.

Back?

iaep_aecc Appointments/Elections to Constitutional Court

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 745, N: 30, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 25)
(Cross-section: 1997-2005 (varies by country), N: 133)

Are members of the constitutional court appointed or elected? "Elected" here refers to popular elections. Elections by legislative bodies are considered appointments

(1) Appointed

(2) Elected

Back?

iaep_rmcc Removal of Members of Constitutional Court

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 662, N: 28, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 24)
(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 119)

Equals 1 if members of the constitutional court can be removed, and 0 otherwise.

Back?

iaep_wrmcc Who Removes Members of Constitutional Court

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 498, N: 22, \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 94)

If members of the constitutional court can be removed, by whom? Here, the term “court itself” may refer to another court in the judiciary, not necessarily the constitutional court itself.

- (1) Legislature
- (2) Executive
- (3) Requires both legislature and executive action
- (4) Vote of general public
- (5) Court itself

Back?

iaep_alcc Appointment for Life to Constitutional Court

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 634, N: 27, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2001-2005 (varies by country), N: 124)

Equals 1 if the members of the constitutional court are appointed for life, and 0 otherwise.

Back?

iaep_ccrea Constitutional Court Rules on Executive Actions

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 719, N: 28, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 26)

(Cross-section: 2001-2005 (varies by country), N: 124)

Equals 1 if the constitutional court can rule on executive actions, and 0 otherwise.

Back?

iaep_ccrla Constitutional Court Rules on Legislative Actions

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 745, N: 30, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 25)

(Cross-section: 2001-2005 (varies by country), N: 130)

Equals 1 if the constitutional court can rule on legislative actions, and 0 otherwise.

Back?

Government Centralization

The data in this section is on the relationship between the central and those regional governments which are immediately below the central government. The data is exclusively on states or provincial levels of government, municipalities are not coded.

iaep_ufs Unitary or Federal State

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1093, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 161)

- (1) Unitary system
- (2) Confederation
- (3) Federal system

Back?

iaep_arr Appointment of Regional Representatives

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1078, N: 37, \bar{N} : 142, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 158)

In practice, do regions or provinces:

- (1) Appoint, elect or otherwise choose their own representatives autonomous from decisions by the central government.
- (2) Have their administrators appointed by the central government.
- (3) No regional/provincial governments.

[Back?](#)

Elections and Electoral Outcomes

iaep_nee National Elections for an Executive

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1101, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 161)

Equals 1 if the country holds national elections for an executive, and 0 otherwise. These elections must involve subjecting the executive to some form of popular plebiscite. This electoral process may or may not bear any relationship to the ultimate appointment of the executive. Executive council elections that select an executive are not considered national elections.

[Back?](#)

iaep_nel National Elections for the Legislature

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1101, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 161)

Equals 1 if the country holds national elections for the legislature, and 0 otherwise. These elections must involve subjecting the legislature to some form of popular plebiscite. While seats may be divided into districts, national elections are considered to occur when district-wide elections are organized at the national level.

[Back?](#)

iaep_nr National Referendums

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 985, N: 37, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 154)

Equals 1 if the country holds national elections on referendum items, and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

Selection of the Executive

iaep_emi **Executive is Member of Legislature**

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 931, N: 36, $\bar{N} : 27$, $\bar{T} : 26$)

(Cross-section: 1995-2005 (varies by country), N: 148)

Equals 1 if there is an executive who is also a member of the legislature, and 0 otherwise. The value 1 is given if there is either an explicit rule which requires an executive to maintain a seat in the legislature, or if practice or convention determines membership.

Back?

iaep_ise **Independence of Selection of Executive**

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1101, N: 37, $\bar{N} : 32$, $\bar{T} : 30$)

(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 161)

Equals 1 if an executive is chosen independently of the legislature (e.g. like a president), and 0 otherwise. If the process that selects the executive is distinct from that which selects the legislature, then the two are considered independent.

Back?

iaep_ae **Appointment of Executive**

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1100, N: 37, $\bar{N} : 32$, $\bar{T} : 30$)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 161)

Equals 1 if there is an executive that is appointed either by a PM (that is, an executive who is also a member of the legislature) or a president (an independently selected executive), and 0 otherwise.

Back?

iaep_d **Dictator**

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1101, N: 37, $\bar{N} : 32$, $\bar{T} : 30$)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 161)

Equals 1 if there is a dictator, and 0 otherwise. A dictator is here defined as someone who rules without the normal set of political constraints and whose support and continued rule is guaranteed by coercion, either the actual resort to force or the threat to do so. A dictator rules without voluntary support of a wide selectorate, his or her ability to remain in power is a function of the coercive capability to do so, and he or she may have come to power through coercion.

Back?

Rules Governing Elections – the Outcome

iaep_es Electoral System

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1090, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 2001-2005 (varies by country), N: 151)

The type of electoral system for legislative elections.

- (1) Plurality (first past the post)
- (2) Majority
- (3) Proportional representation
- (4) Mixed systems

Mixed systems includes situations in which a single chamber contains seats selected by different methods, and situations in which all of the seats in a chamber are chosen with the same method, but each chamber is selected through different methods.

Back?

iaep_ee Election of the Executive

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1094, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 30)

(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country), N: 146)

The executive is elected by:

- (1) Directly elected by public vote
- (2) Elected through legislative action by members of the legislature
- (3) Chosen through party process strictly by a party
- (4) Indirect public vote
- (5) Appointed

Back?

iaep_ese Electoral System for the Executive

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 757, N: 29, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 127)

Election rules governing the determination of electoral outcomes for the executive. The variable records the data on the electoral requirements for winning executive elections, specifically, the sorts of vote required for winners. If the executive is appointed or otherwise comes to power via non-electoral processes, this is coded as missing.

- (1) Majority rule (50% + 1). Where run-offs are held, "majority rule" is selected, as the intention of a run-off election is to have one candidate receive a majority of the votes.
- (2) Plurality
- (3) No official, explicit rule governing the outcome
- (4) Party leader of majority party/coalition legislature automatically selected without additional process.

Back?

iaep_pm5p Parties with More than 5 Percent

(Time-series: 1972-2005, n: 1081, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 1996-2005 (varies by country), N: 149)

How many parties hold at least 5% of seats in the legislature?

- (1) One
- (2) Two
- (3) More than two

Back?

Kim & Fording

<http://heeminkimfsu.googlepages.com/datasetsandsolutionconceptscreated>

(Kim & Fording 1998; 2002; 2003; 2008)

The basis for Kim & Fording's data is the analysis of political manifestos from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, see e.g. Klingemann et al 2006). By combining the CMP data with data on election results and government composition, Kim & Fording have produced ideology scores on the left-right scale for parliaments and governments (as captured by parties' vote shares).

The first step is to compute the ideology score for each party in each election. Kim & Fording use 26 categories from the CMP data; 13 of the categories demonstrate pro-left tendencies in the manifestos analyzed and 13 demonstrate pro-right tendencies. (See Kim & Fording 2008, p. 3 for a list of these categories.) The score is computed by subtracting the number of rightist statements from the number of leftist statements, and then dividing by the total number of rightist and leftist statements. Thus:

$$\text{Party ideology} = \frac{\sum \text{left statements} - \sum \text{right statements}}{\sum \text{left statements} + \sum \text{right statements}}$$

This results in a measure of party ideology ranging from -1 to 1, which is then transformed to take on a possible range of 0 to 100, where lower scores indicate right ideology, and higher scores left ideology.

kf_mvi Median voter ideology

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 1341, N: 26, \bar{N} : 23, \bar{T} : 52)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Median voter ideology on a 0 to 100 scale, where lower scores indicate right ideology and higher scores left ideology.

To estimate the median ideological position within the electorate of each country at each election, Kim & Fording proceed in a series of three steps. First they obtain the ideology scores for each party in each election (see above) and place the parties on an

ideological dimension by their scores. Second, they find an interval for each party where its supporters are located. This interval is found by calculating a midpoint between this party and the one immediately to the left of it and another midpoint between this party and the one immediately to the right of it. It is then assumed that those voting for this party fall into the interval between these two midpoints. Third, the percentage of the vote received by each party is used to transform the data into a grouped frequency distribution, estimating the median position by using the following formula:

$$M = L + [(50 - C) / F] * W$$

Where:

M = Median voter position (ideological score).

L = The lower end (ideological score) of the interval containing the median.

C = The cumulative frequency (vote share) up to but not including the interval containing the median.

F = The frequency (vote share) in the interval containing the median.

W = The width of the interval containing the median.

By using data on election dates, a monthly series of voter ideology scores was computed using linear interpolation. Finally, the yearly series of voter ideology scores is the average of the monthly scores each year.

[Back?](#)

kf_pi Parliament ideology

(Time-series: 1946-1998, n: 1159, N: 26, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 45)

(Cross-section: 1995-1998 (varies by country), N: 24)

Parliament ideology on a 0 to 100 scale, where lower scores indicate right ideology and higher scores left ideology.

For each election, parliament ideology is computed as a weighted average of the ideology of the parties in the parliament:

$$\text{Parliament ideology} = \sum [\text{Ideology}_i * (\# \text{Seats}_i / \text{TotalSeats})]$$

Where:

Ideology_i = the ideology of party i

#Seats_i = the total number of parliamentary seats controlled by party i

Total Seats = the total number of parliamentary seats.

Based on the month of the election, Kim & Fording then interpolated the data across months within each country, and finally computed the average score for each year in each country.

For the computation of party ideology, see above.

[Back?](#)

kf_gi1 Government ideology 1

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 1166, N: 26, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 45)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 23)

Back?

kf_gi2 Government ideology 2

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 1230, N: 26, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 25)

Back?

kf_gi3 Government ideology 3

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 1230, N: 26, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 47)
(Cross-section: 1995-2002 (varies by country), N: 25)

Government ideology on a 0 to 100 scale, where lower scores indicate right ideology and higher scores left ideology.

The variable comes in three versions that differ in how they handle those cases in which there is no CMP data for one or more of the parties that were part of the government. One type of missing data is treated in the same way in all three versions: In those cases where a party never appears in the manifesto data, Kim & Fording estimated the missing scores by assuming that the ideology of these ministers were equal to the average ideology of all ministers for which they were able to observe ideology scores within that government. (Most of these missing values originate from non-partisan ministers.)

Another type of missing data is when a party's ideology was not coded for the most recent election, but they were coded for other elections in the CMP data. In these cases Kim & Fording used two different strategies. The first, resulting in the kf_gi2 variable, was to use the most recent (past) party score to estimate the missing scores. In case there was no data from earlier elections, Kim & Fording instead used the most proximate future score. The other strategy, resulting in the kf_gi3 variable, was to use the average party ideology score across all elections for which the party's ideology was observed across the entire CMP dataset.

Note: in a few cases Kim & Fording report data for several governments for the same year in the same country. In these cases we have only kept the data of the last government of that year.

The variable is a weighted average of the ideology of the parties in government:

$$\text{Government ideology} = \sum [\text{Ideology}_i * (\# \text{Posts}_i / \text{Total Posts})]$$

Where:

Ideology_i = the ideology of party i

#Posts_i = the total number of cabinet posts controlled by party i
Total Posts = the total number of cabinet posts

For the computation of party ideology, see above.

[Back?](#)

Norris – Democracy Time-Series Dataset

<http://www.pippanorris.com>
(Norris 2009)

Note: The Democracy Time-Series Dataset has data for Germany even before the unification in 1990. The same applies to Yemen. We have decided to leave the data as is.

Executives

(Time-series: 1972-2003, n: 1165, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

no_ce Classification of Executives

- (1) Parliamentary Monarchy
- (2) Presidential Republic
- (3) Mixed Executive
- (4) Monarchy
- (5) Military State

Note: Some of the observations have a value of 0, which is not explained in the documentation. In communication with the author it was stated that this might indicate that the observations actually should be coded as missing. We have nevertheless chosen to leave the data as is.

[Back?](#)

no_pm Parliamentary Monarchy

Equals 1 if the country is a parliamentary monarchy, and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

no_pr Parliamentary Republic

Equals 1 if the country is a parliamentary republic, and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

no_rm Ruling Monarchy

Equals 1 if the country is a ruling monarchy, and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

Electoral Systems

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 1204, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 31)
(Cross-section: 2002-2003 (varies by country), N: 191)

The following variables have IDEA as original source of data.

no_ef **Electoral Family**

Classification of the electoral system.

- (1) Majoritarian
- (2) Combined (mixed)
- (3) Proportional
- (4) No competitive elections

[Back?](#)

no_ndel **No Directly Elected Legislature**

Equals 1 if the country lacks a directly elected legislature, and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

no_pes **Proportional Electoral System**

Equals 1 if the country has a proportional electoral system, and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

no_ces **Combined (Mixed) Electoral System**

Equals 1 if the country has a combined (mixed) electoral system, and 0 otherwise

[Back?](#)

no_mes **Majoritarian Electoral System**

Equals 1 if the country has a majoritarian electoral system, and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

Decentralization

no_ufs **Unitary or Federal State**

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 1151, N: 39, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 30)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

- (0) Non-unitary
- (1) Unitary

[Back?](#)

Persson & Tabellini

http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=1169&tbn=albero&id_folder=177
(Persson & Tabellini 2003)

Persson and Tabellini only include countries of democratic rule in their sample. To be included in the cross-section, an average of the Freedom House indexes for civil liberties and political rights (fh_cl and fh_pr) lower than an average of 5 for the 1990-1998 period is required. For the 1960-1998 panel data, Persson and Tabellini include country-years that obtain a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p_polity2) (For details, see Persson and Tabellini 2003, 74-77.)

pt_federal **Federal Political Structure**

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 1060, N: 29, \bar{N} : 60, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 60)

Dummy variable, 1 if the country has a federal political structure and 0 otherwise.

[Back?](#)

pt_magn **Inverse of District Magnitude**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 84)

Inverse of district magnitude, defined as districts (the number of electoral districts in a country, including the number of primary as well as secondary and tertiary districts if applicable) over the number of seats (pt_seats).

[Back?](#)

pt_maj **Majoritarian Electoral Systems**

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 2179, N: 61, \bar{N} : 56, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 60)

Dummy variable, 1 if the lower house is selected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered.

[Back?](#)

pt_pind **Ballot Structure 1**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Continuous measure of the ballot structure defined as the proportion of legislators elected by plurality rule via a vote on individuals (as opposed to party lists). Computed as $1 - \text{list}/\text{pt_seats}$, where list is the number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems.

[Back?](#)

pt_pindo Ballot Structure 2

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Continuous measure of the ballot structure defined as the proportion of legislators in the lower house elected individually or on open lists. Computed as $1 - \text{list}/\text{pt_seats} * \text{clist}$, where list is the number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems and clist is a dummy variable for closed party lists.

[Back?](#)

pt_pres Forms of Government

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 1092, N: 29, \bar{N} : 38, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 60)

Dummy variable, 1 for presidential regimes and 0 otherwise. Only regimes in which the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in power (even if an elected president is not the chief executive, or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes. Most semi-presidential and premier-presidential systems are classified as parliamentary.

[Back?](#)

pt_sdm Weighted Inverse District Magnitude

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 77)

Inverse of district magnitude, where the weight on each district is the share of legislators running in districts of that size.

[Back?](#)

pt_seats Number of Seats

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

The number of seats in lower or single chambers for the last legislature of each country. It is also related to the number of districts in which primary elections are held.

[Back?](#)

QoG Survey

(Cross-section: 2008-2009 (varies by country), N: 52)

<http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>

(Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2010)

The QoG Survey is a unique dataset on the structure and behavior of public administration, based on a web survey of 528 country experts from 58 countries around the world (although advanced industrialized and post-communist countries carry the weight of countries covered). The dataset covers key dimensions of quality of government, such as politicization, professionalization, openness, and impartiality.

Included in the QoG Social Policy Dataset are three indexes, each based on a group of questions from the survey. When constructing the indexes we excluded countries with less than three responding experts (which left us with 52 countries in the sample). (Two indexes are listed below. The third index is listed under the “Quality of Government” section.)

The confidence interval variables give the higher and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval.

qs_proff **Professional Public Administration**
qs_proff_cih **Professional Public Administration – Confidence Interval (High)**
qs_proff_cil **Professional Public Administration – Confidence Interval (Low)**

The index measures to what extent the public administration is professional rather than politicized. Higher values indicate a more professionalized public administration. It is based on four questions from the survey:

Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today:

- When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job?
- When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants decide who gets the job?
- The top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials?
- Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector?

The scale for each question is 1-7 (from “hardly ever” to “almost always”).

The index is constructed by first taking the mean for each responding expert of the four questions above. The value for each country is then calculated as the mean of all the experts’ means. (If one or more answers are missing, these questions are ignored when calculating the mean value for each expert. The scale of the second and third questions are reversed so that higher values indicate more professionalism).

Back?

qs_closed **Closed Public Administration**
qs_closed_cih **Closed Public Administration – Confidence Interval (High)**
qs_closed_cil **Closed Public Administration – Confidence Interval (Low)**

The index measures to what extent the public administration is more closed or public-like, rather than open or private-like. Higher values indicate a more closed public administration. It is based on three questions from the survey:

Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today:

- Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system?
- Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one stays a public sector employee for the rest of one's career?

To what extent would you say the following applies today to the country you have chosen to submit your answers for?

- The terms of employment for public sector employees are regulated by special laws that do not apply to private sector employees?

The scale for the first two questions is 1-7 (from "hardly ever" to "almost always"). The scale for the third question is 1-7 (from "not at all" to "to a very large extent").

The index is constructed by first taking the mean for each responding expert of the three questions above. The value for each country is then calculated as the mean of all the experts' means. (If one or more answers are missing, these questions are ignored when calculating the mean value for each expert.)

Back?

Swank – Comparative Parties Data Set

(Time-series: 1950-2006, n: 1121, N: 22, \bar{N} : 20, \bar{T} : 51)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 21)

<http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/Swank.htm>

(Swank, Coman and Charette 2008a, b)

Swank's classification of parties for the most part corresponds with those of Castles & Mair (1984). See Swank (2008b) for exceptions.

sw_ey **Election year**

Dummy variable coded 1 for years in which lower house elections occurred, and 0 otherwise. For the United States, both congressional and presidential election years are coded as 1, and for the French Fifth Republic both presidential and national assembly elections are coded as 1.

Back?

Election results

sw_vl **Votes: left**

Left party votes as a percentage of total votes.

[Back?](#)

sw_vr **Votes: right**

Right party votes as a percentage of total votes.

[Back?](#)

sw_vcd **Votes: Christian democratic**

Total Christian democratic party votes as a percentage of total votes.

[Back?](#)

sw_vccd **Votes: centrist Christian democratic**

Centrist Christian democratic party votes as a percentage of total votes.

[Back?](#)

sw_vce **Votes: Center**

Center party votes as a percentage of total votes.

[Back?](#)

sw_vrwp **Votes: Right-wing populist**

Percentage of national vote for right-wing populist parties in elections to lower chamber.

[Back?](#)

sw_vll **Votes: Left-libertarian votes**

Percentage of national vote for left-libertarian parties in elections to lower chamber.

[Back?](#)

Legislative seats

sw_ll **Legislative seats: left**

Left party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats. (For the United States, non-southern Democratic seats are reported as left seats.)

[Back?](#)

sw_lr **Legislative seats: right**

Right party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats.

[Back?](#)

sw_lcd **Legislative seats: Christian democratic**
Total Christian democratic party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats.
Back?

sw_lccd **Legislative seats: centrist Christian democratic**
Centrist Christian democratic party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats.
Back?

sw_ice **Legislative seats: center**
Center party legislative seats as a percentage of all legislative seats.
Back?

sw_lrwp **Legislative seats: Right-wing populist**
Percentage of seats in lower chamber of national parliament held by right-wing populist parties.
Back?

sw_lll **Legislative seats: Left-libertarian**
Percentage of seats in lower chamber of national parliament held by left-libertarian parties.
Back?

Cabinets

sw_cl **Cabinet portfolios: left**
Left party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.
Back?

sw_cr **Cabinet portfolios: right**
Right party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.
Back?

sw_ccd **Cabinet portfolios: Christian democratic**
Total Christian democratic party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.
Back?

sw_cccd **Cabinet portfolios: centrist Christian democratic**
Centrist Christian democratic party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.
Back?

sw_cce **Cabinet portfolios: center**
Center party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios.
Back?

Tsebelis

http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/veto_players_data
(Tsebelis 1999; 2008)

ts_mg **Minority government**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 999, N: 21, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 20)

Varies between 0 and 1. If there are two (or more) different governments the same year, the value is a weighted average of the two (hence the variable will sometimes be a decimal value).

[Back?](#)

ts_mwc **Minimum winning coalition**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 999, N: 21, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 20)

Single party or multiple party minimum winning coalition. Varies between 0 and 1. If there are two (or more) different governments the same year, the value is a weighted average of the two (hence the variable will sometimes be a decimal value).

[Back?](#)

ts_og **Oversized government**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 999, N: 21, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 20)

Government larger than minimum winning coalition. Varies between 0 and 1. If there are two (or more) different governments the same year, the value is a weighted average of the two (hence the variable will sometimes be a decimal value).

[Back?](#)

ts_vp **Veto players**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 1018, N: 22, \bar{N} : 19, \bar{T} : 46)
(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 21)

A veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo. In a parliamentary system, veto players are the parties in government as well as other actors endowed with veto powers.

The only possible veto players other than government parties are the upper house and the head of state. However, these will only count as veto players under special circumstances. In the case of the upper house, it must have the power to veto legislation and be controlled by other parties than the government. In the case of the head of state, it must have veto power and not share the same political preferences as the parties in government.

Tsebelis does not count parties outside government as veto players, even if the government is a minority government. He argues that they “are equipped with significant positional and institutional weapons that enable them (most of the time) to impose their will on parliament, just as majority governments do.” (Tsebelis 1999: 594)

Back?

Cabinet ideology

The following variables were constructed by Tsebelis through combining data from expert rankings of the ideology of parties with data on government participation. For the years when there is no new government, Tsebelis uses interpolation based on the value of the last new government and the next new government.

ts_cicm Cabinet ideology, Castles and Mair

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 775, N: 17, \bar{N} : 14, \bar{T} : 46)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 15)

A left-right scale from 0-10, where higher values indicate governments more to the right. The variable is based on Castles & Mair’s (1995) expert survey.

Back?

ts_cihi Cabinet ideology, Huber and Inglehart

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 839, N: 20 \bar{N} : 15, \bar{T} : 42)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 17)

A left-right scale from 1-10, where higher values indicate governments more to the right. The variable is based on Huber & Inglehart’s (1995) expert survey.

Note: There are some dubious figures in the data. This concerns Belgium 1978 and the Netherlands 1960-1964, 1968-1972, 1978-1981 and 1983-1989. In these cases the value is over 10, which shouldn’t be possible.

Back?

ts_cilh1 Cabinet ideology, Laver and Hunt

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 947, N: 21, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 45)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 19)

The scale is from 1-20, where 1 means “promote raising taxes to increase public service” and 20 means “promote cutting public services to cut taxes”. The variable is based on Laver & Hunt’s (1993) expert survey.

Note: There is a dubious value in the data. Denmark 1993 has the value of 0, which shouldn’t be possible.

Back?

ts_cilh2 **Cabinet ideology, Laver and Hunt**

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 947, N: 21, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 45)

(Cross-section: 1995-2000 (varies by country), N: 19)

The scale is from 1-20, where 1 means “promote development of friendly relations with Soviet Union” and 20 means “oppose development of friendly relations with Soviet Union”. The variable is based on Laver & Hunt’s (1993) expert survey.

[Back?](#)

Quality of Government

In this section we include data on the core areas of the quality of government compound, such as corruption, bureaucratic quality, political and civil rights and democracy.

Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Labor

http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/Regulation%20of%20Labor-All/Regulation%20of%20Labor.xls

(Botero et al 2004)

Unless otherwise specified, higher values indicate higher worker protection. All dummy variables are equal to one or zero. All normalized variables lie between 0 and 1, where 0 (1) is the minimum (maximum) actual value in the sample of countries.

bdlls_au Autocracy

(Cross-section: 1950-1990, N: 70)

This variable classifies regimes based on their degree of autocracy. This variable ranges from zero to two, where higher values equal a higher degree of autocracy. Democracies are coded as 0, dictatorships with a legislature are coded as 1, and dictatorships without a legislature are coded as 2. Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges afterwards. This variable is measured as the average from 1950 through 1990. Source: Alvarez et al. 2000.

[Back?](#)

bdlls_de Democracy

(Cross-section: 1950-1995, N: 84)

A measure of the degree of democracy in a given country based on: (1) the competitiveness of political participation; (2) the openness and competitiveness of the chief executive recruitment; and (3) the constraints on the chief executive. The variable ranges from zero to ten, where higher values represent a higher degree of institutionalized democracy. The starting period is either 1950 or the country's independence date, whichever is later. The variable is measured as the average from the initial period through 1995. For countries that are break-up nations, Boetero et al. include in the calculations the democracy score of the mother country in the pre-breakup period. Source: Boter et al.'s calculations using the data in Jagers and Marshall (2000).

[Back?](#)

Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow

<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm>
(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003)

bdm_s Selectorate Size

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 7247, N: 196, \bar{N} : 134, \bar{T} : 37)
(Cross-section: 1999, N: 182)

Selectorate is defined as the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government's leadership. This variable is measured through the breadth of the selectiveness of the members of each country's legislature. A code of 0 means that there is no legislature, 0.5 that the legislature is chosen by heredity or ascription or is simply chosen by the effective executive, and 1 that the members of the legislature are directly or indirectly selected by popular election.

Original source is Banks (1996).

[Back?](#)

bdm_w Winning Coalition Size

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 9643, N: 199, \bar{N} : 179, \bar{T} : 48)
(Cross-section: 1999, N: 187)

The winning coalition is defined as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society. This variable is measured as a composite index based on whether the regime is civil or military, the openness and competition of executive recruitment, and the competitiveness of participation. The index varies from 0 (smallest) to 1 (largest winning coalition)

Original sources are Banks (1996) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

[Back?](#)

bdm_w_s Winning Coalition Size Relative to Selectorate Size

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 7247, N: 196, \bar{N} : 134, \bar{T} : 37)
(Cross-section: 1999, N: 182)

The Winning Coalition size relative to Selectorate size. W/S is transformed to avoid division by zero: $bdm_w / (\log((bdm_s + 1) * 10) / 3)$.

[Back?](#)

Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland

(Time-series: 1946-2008, n: 2144, N: 40, \bar{N} : 34, \bar{T} : 54)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DD_page.html

(Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2009)

chga_demo Democracy

Coded 1 if democracy, 0 otherwise. A regime is considered a democracy if the executive and the legislature is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is de facto existence of multiple parties outside of regime front, there are multiple parties within the legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage (e.g. unconstitutional closing of the lower house or extension of incumbent's term by postponing of subsequent elections). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

Back?

Cingranelli & Richards - Human Rights Dataset

(Cingranelli and Richards 2010)

<http://www.humanrightsdata.org> (Dataset version: 2010.05.17)

ciri_assn Freedom of Assembly and Association

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

Citizens' rights to freedom of assembly and association are:

- (0) Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens
- (1) Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for selected groups
- (2) Virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens

Back?

ciri_disap Disappearance

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

Disappearances:

- (0) Have occurred frequently
- (1) Have occurred occasionally
- (2) Have not occurred

Back?

ciri_empinx_old Empowerment Rights Index (Old)

(Time-series: 1981-2006, n: 925, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

This is an additive index constructed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Worker's Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 10 (full government respect for these five rights). (Details on its construction and use can be found in Richards et al 2001).

Note: Starting with the 2007 coding, this variable was retired in favor of the newer index *ciri_empinx_new* (see below).

Back?

ciri_empinx_new Empowerment Rights Index (New)

(Time-series: 2007-2010, n: 156, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 4)
(Cross-section: 2007, N: 192)

This is an additive index constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights).

Back?

ciri_kill Extrajudicial Killing

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

Political or Extrajudicial Killings are:

- (0) Practiced frequently
- (1) Practiced occasionally
- (2) Have not occurred

Back?

ciri_move_old Freedom of Movement (Old)

(Time-series: 1981-2006, n: 925, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

Domestic and foreign travel is:

- (0) Restricted
- (1) Generally unrestricted

Note: Starting with the 2007 coding, this variable was retired and became two separate variables, Freedom of Foreign Movement and Freedom of Domestic Movement, *ciri_formov* and *ciri_dormov* (see below).

Back?

ciri_formov Freedom of Foreign Movement

(Time-series: 2007-2010, n: 156, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 4)
(Cross-section: 2007, N: 192)

Citizens' freedom to leave and return to their country is:

- (0) Severely restricted
- (1) Somewhat restricted
- (2) Unrestricted

Back?

ciri_dommov Freedom of Domestic Movement

(Time-series: 2007-2010, n: 156, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 4)
(Cross-section: 2006-2007 (varies by country), N: 192)

Citizens' freedom to travel within their own country is:

- (0) Severely restricted
- (1) Somewhat restricted
- (2) Unrestricted

Back?

ciri_physint Physical Integrity Rights Index

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

This is an additive index constructed from the Torture (ciri_tort), Extrajudicial Killing (ciri_kill), Political Imprisonment (ciri_polpris), and Disappearance indicators (ciri_disap). It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). (Details on its construction and use can be found in Cingranelli and Richards 1999).

Back?

ciri_elecsd Electoral Self-Determination

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

This variable indicates to what extent citizens enjoy freedom of political choice and the legal right and ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them through free and fair elections. This right is sometimes known as the right to self-determination.

A score of 0 indicates that the right to self-determination through free and fair elections did not exist in law or practice during the year in question. A score of 1 indicates that while citizens had the legal right to self-determination, there were some limitations to the fulfillment of this right in practice. Therefore, in states receiving a 1, political participation was only moderately free and open. A score of 2 indicates that political participation was very free and open during the year in question and citizens had the right to self-determination through free and fair elections in both law and practice.

Back?

ciri_polpris Political Imprisonment

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

Are there any people imprisoned because of their political, religious, or other beliefs?

- (0) Yes, many
- (1) Yes, but few
- (2) None

[Back?](#)

ciri_relfre_old Freedom of Religion (Old)

(Time-series: 1981-2006, n: 925, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

There are restrictions on some religious practices by the government:

- (0) Yes
- (1) No

Note: Starting with the 2007 coding, this variable was retired and replaced with `ciri_relfre_new` (see below).

[Back?](#)

ciri_relfre_new Freedom of Religion (New)

(Time-series: 2007-2010, n: 156, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 4)
(Cross-section: 2007, N: 192)

Government restrictions on religious practices are:

- (0) Severe and widespread
- (1) Moderate
- (2) Practically absent

[Back?](#)

ciri_speech Freedom of Speech

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

Government censorship and/or ownership of the media (including radio, TV, Internet, and domestic news agencies) is:

- (0) Complete
- (1) Some
- (2) None

[Back?](#)

ciri_tort Torture

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

Torture is:

- (0) Practiced frequently
- (1) Practiced occasionally
- (2) Have not occurred

[Back?](#)

ciri_wecon Women's Economic Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1077, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

In measuring women's economic rights we are primarily interested in two things: one, the extensiveness of flaws pertaining to women's economic rights; and two, government practices towards women or how effectively the government enforces the laws.

Regarding the economic equality of women:

- (0) There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women.
- (1) There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against women.
- (2) There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a low level of discrimination against women.
- (3) All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.

[Back?](#)

ciri_wopol Women's Political Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

Regarding the political equality of women:

- (0) None of women's political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process.
- (1) Political equality is guaranteed by law. However, there are significant limitations in practice. Women hold less than five percent of seats in the national legislature and in other high-ranking government positions.
- (2) Political equality is guaranteed by law. Women hold more than five percent but less than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.
- (3) Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold more than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.

[Back?](#)

ciri_worker Workers Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2010, n: 1081, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 193)

Worker's rights are:

- (0) Severely restricted
- (1) Somewhat restricted
- (2) Fully protected

[Back?](#)

ciri_wosoc Women's Social Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2007, n: 850, N: 40, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 193)

In measuring women's social rights we are primarily interested in two things: one, the extensiveness of laws pertaining to women's social rights; and two, government practices towards women or how effectively the government enforces the law.

Regarding the social equality of women:

- (0) There are no social rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women.
- (1) There are some social rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against women.
- (2) There are some social rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a low level of discrimination against women.
- (3) All or nearly all of women's social rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.

[Back?](#)

ciri_injud Independence of the Judiciary

(Time-series: 2007-2010, n: 156, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 2007, N: 192)

This variable indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military.

- (0) Not independent
- (1) Partially independent
- (2) Generally independent

Back?

Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Entry

(Cross-Section: 1999, N: 84)

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/registration_new.dta

(Djankov et al 2002)

dlls_proc Number of Procedures

The number of different procedures that a start-up firm has to comply with in order to obtain a legal status, i.e. to start operating as a legal entity.

Back?

dlls_time Time

The time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm, in business days. A week has five business days and a month has twenty-two.

Back?

dlls_cost Cost

(Cross-Section: 1999, N: 83)

The cost to obtain legal status to operate a firm as a share of per capita GDP in 1999. Includes all identifiable official expenses (fees, costs of procedures and forms, photocopies, fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc). The company is assumed to have a start-up capital of ten times per capita GDP in 1999.

Back?

Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Courts

(Cross-Section: the year varies, N: 101)

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/courts_dataset_july06.xls
(Djankov et al 2003)

dlls1_fie Formalism Index (Eviction)

dlls1_fic Formalism Index (Check)

The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in two forms of judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts: the **eviction** of a residential tenant for nonpayment of rent, and the collection of a **check** returned for nonpayment. The index is formed by adding up separate indexes measuring: (1) whether the resolution of the case relies on the work of professional judges and attorneys, as opposed to other types of adjudicators and lay people; (2) the number of stages carried out mostly in written (as opposed to oral) form over the total number of applicable stages; (3) the level of legal justification (use of legal language) required in the process, (4) the level of statutory control or intervention of the administration, admissibility, evaluation, and recording of evidence; (5) the level of control or intervention of the appellate (superior) court's review of the first-instance judgment; (6) the formalities required to engage someone in the procedure or to hold him/her accountable of the judgment; and (7) the normalized number of independent procedural actions, i.e. steps of the procedure, mandated by law or court regulation, that demand interaction between the parties or between them and the judge or court officer. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control or intervention in the judicial process.

[Back?](#)

dlls1_tde Total Duration (Eviction)

dlls1_tdc Total Duration (Check)

The total estimated duration in calendar days of the procedure under the factual and procedural assumptions provided. The index equals the estimated duration, in calendar days, between the moment the plaintiff files the complaint until the moment the landlord repossesses the property (for the **eviction** case) or the creditor obtains payment (for the **check** collection case).

[Back?](#)

Economist Intelligence Unit – Index of Democracy

(Cross-section: 2006, N: 164)

http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf

(Kekic 2007)

eiu_iod Index of Democracy

The index of democracy is based on the ratings of 60 indicators grouped into the following five categories. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of these variables:

[Back?](#)

eiu_cl Civil Liberties

Civil liberties include freedom of speech, expression and the press; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to due judicial process.

[Back?](#)

eiu_dpc Democratic Political Culture

The Democratic Political Culture index measures the extent to which there is a societal consensus supporting democratic principles.

[Back?](#)

eiu_epp Electoral Process and Pluralism

This category is based on indicators relating to the condition of having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom.

[Back?](#)

eiu_fog Functioning of Government

The Functioning of Government category is based on indicators relating to e.g. the extent to which control over government is exercised by elected representatives, the capabilities of the civil service to implement government policies, and the pervasiveness of corruption.

[Back?](#)

eiu_pp Political Participation

The Political Participation index measures among other things the adult literacy rate, the amount of women in parliament, and the extent to which citizens freely choose to elect representatives and join political parties.

[Back?](#)

Freedom House

<http://www.freedomhouse.org>

Freedom in the World

(Time-series: 1972-2010, n: 1370, N: 40, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 34)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

Note: The 1982 edition of Freedom in the World covers the period Jan 1981- Aug 1982 (=1981 in our dataset). The 1983-84 edition covers the period Aug 1982 – Nov 1983 (=1983 in our dataset). This leaves 1982 empty.

For 1972, South Africa was in the original data rated as “White” (fh_cl: 3, fh_pr: 2, fh_status: Free) and “Black” (fh_cl: 6, fh_pr: 5, fh_status: Not Free). We treat South Africa 1972 as missing.

fh_cl **Civil Liberties**

Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years. For the year 2006 Freedom House has published the scores for the sub-categories (see below). Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

[Back?](#)

fh_pr **Political Rights**

Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years. For the year 2006 Freedom House has published the scores for the sub-categories (see below). Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

[Back?](#)

fh_status **Status**

- (1) Free
- (2) Partly Free
- (3) Not Free

Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated “Free”; between 3.0 and 5.5 “Partly Free”, and between 5.5 and 7.0 “Not Free”. Since then, countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered “Free”, 3.0 to 5.0 “Partly Free”, and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not Free”.

[Back?](#)

Freedom in the World Sub-Categories: Civil Liberties

(Time-series: 2005-2010, n: 234, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 2005-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

fh_feb Freedom of Expression and Belief

The variable measures the freedom and independence of the media and other cultural expressions; the freedom of religious groups to practice their faith and express themselves; the academic freedom and freedom from extensive political indoctrination in the educational system; and the ability of the people to engage in private (political) discussions without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

[Back?](#)

fh_aor Associational and Organizational Rights

The variable evaluates the freedom of assembly, demonstrations and open public discussion; the freedom for nongovernmental organizations; and the freedom for trade unions, peasant organizations and other professional and private organizations. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

[Back?](#)

fh_rol Rule of Law

The variable measures the independence of the judiciary; the extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters; the existence of direct civil control over the police; the protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile and torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and the extent to which laws, policies and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

[Back?](#)

fh_pair Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

The variable evaluates the extent of state control over travel, choice of residence, employment or institutions of higher education; the right of citizens to own property and establish private businesses; private businesses' freedom from undue influence by government officials, security forces, political parties or organized crime; gender equality, freedom of choice of marriage partners and size of family; equality of opportunity and absence of economic exploitation. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

[Back?](#)

Freedom in the World Sub-Categories: Political Rights

(Time-series: 2005-2010, n: 234, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 2005-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

fh_ep Electoral Process

The variable measures the extent to which the national legislative representatives and the national chief authority are elected through free and fair elections. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

[Back?](#)

fh_ppp Political Pluralism and Participation

This variable encompasses an examination of the right of the people to freely organize in political parties; the existence of an opposition with a realistic possibility to increase its support; the ability of the people to make political choices free from domination by the military, totalitarian parties or other powerful groups; and the existence of full political rights for all minorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

[Back?](#)

fh_fog Functioning of Government

The variable examines the extent to which the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government; if the government is free from pervasive corruption; and if the government is accountable to the electorate between elections and operates with openness and transparency. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

[Back?](#)

Freedom of the Press

fh_press Freedom of the press

(Time-series: 1993-2008, n: 624, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

All states, from the most democratic to the most authoritarian, are through the UN system (Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) committed to universality of information freedom – a basic human right. Freedom House recognizes that cultural distinctions or economic underdevelopment may limit the volume of news flows within a country, but these and other arguments are not acceptable explanations for outright centralized control of the content of news and information. Some poor countries allow for the exchange of diverse views, while some developed countries restrict content diversity. Freedom House seeks to recognize press freedom wherever it exists, in poor and rich countries as well as in countries of various ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The press freedom index is computed by adding four (three) component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls, Economic Influences, and Repressive actions (the latter is since 2004 not assessed as a separate component, see below). The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

[Back?](#)

fh_law Laws and regulations that influence media content

(Time-series: 1993-2007, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

The variable encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1997-2006 from 0-30. 0 indicates most freedom.

[Back?](#)

fh_pol Political pressures and controls on media content

(Time-series: 1993-2007, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1997-2001 from 0-30, and in 2002-2006 from 0-40. 0 indicates most freedom.

[Back?](#)

fh_econ Economic influences over media content

(Time-series: 1993-2007, n: 585, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1997-2006 from 0-30. 0 indicates most freedom.

[Back?](#)

fh_repres **Repressive actions**

(Time-series: 1993-2000, n: 312, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). In 1994-1996 the scale varied from 0-40, in 1997-2001 from 0-10. Since 2002 Freedom House includes such violations within the respective fh_pol and fh_econ categories as cases of actual political or economic pressures on the content of information. 0 indicates most freedom.

Back?

Freedom House/Polity

fh_polity2 **Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)**

(Time-series: 1972-2010, n: 1256, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 34)
(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 162)

Back?

fh_ipolity2 **Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity)**

(Time-series: 1972-2010, n: 1370, N: 40, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 34)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. The average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2. The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. Hadenius & Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.

Back?

Gibney & Dalton

<http://www.politicalterroryscale.org>
(Gibney, Cornett and Wood 2010; Gibney and Dalton 1996)

gd_ptsa **Political Terror Scale – Amnesty International**

(Time-series: 1976-2008, n: 859, N: 39, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 22)
(Cross-section: 1995-2007 (varies by country), N: 171)

Back?

gd_ptss Political Terror Scale – US State Department

(Time-series: 1976-2008, n: 1141, N: 40, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 29)

(Cross-section: 2002-2007 (varies by country), N: 178)

Human rights score (1 to 5 scale):

- Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
- Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
- Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
- Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
- Level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Back?

International Country Risk Guide – The PRS Group

(Time-series: 1984-2008, n: 893, N: 40, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 140)

<http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx>

<http://www.prsgroup.com/CountryData.aspx>

icrg_qog ICRG indicator of Quality of Government

The mean value of the ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy Quality”, scaled 0-1. Higher values indicate higher quality of government.

Corruption (originally 6 points)

This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, it introduces an inherent instability into the political process.

The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Such corruption can make it difficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases may force the withdrawal or withholding of an investment.

Although our measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. In our view these insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market.

The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, so as to provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering the country ungovernable.

(Note: In the original data, the value for Iceland 1985 is "6.1667". We have replaced this presumably incorrect value with the value "6").

Law and order (originally 6 points)

Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating – 1 – if it suffers from a very high crime rate / if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes).

Bureaucracy Quality (originally 4 points)

The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.

The component variables can be purchased at <http://www.countrydata.com>

Back?

Inter-Parliamentary Union

<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world-arc.htm>

ipu_w_lower Women in national parliament (lower house)

(Time-series: 1997-2005 (December or latest available), n: 342, N: 39, \bar{N} : 38, \bar{T} : 9)
(Cross-section: 2002-2005 (varies by country), N: 188)

Percentage of women in single house or lower house. (Also see m_wominpar below.)
[Back?](#)

ipu_w_upper Women in national parliament (upper house)

(Time-series: 1997-2005 (December or latest available), n: 163, N: 20, \bar{N} : 18, \bar{T} : 8)
(Cross-section: 1999-2005 (varies by country), N: 83)

Percentage of women in upper house or senate. (Also see m_wominpar below.)
[Back?](#)

Knack & Kugler

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 180)

<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/FlagshipCourse2003/SecondGenerationIndicators.pdf>

(Knack and Kugler 2002)

kk_gg Index of Objective Indicators of Good Governance

The Index is built on nine indicators: the regulation of entry, contract enforcement, contract intensive money, international trade tax revenue, budgetary volatility, revenue source volatility, telephone wait times, phone faults, and the percentage of revenues paid to public officials in bribes, as reported in surveys of business firms. The index is computed by first normalizing each indicator using the standard normal distribution, and then aggregating these scores through a percentile matching procedure. Larger numbers indicate better governance.

(Note: In the original data Samoa is given two different values. We do not include any of the values in our dataset.)

[Back?](#)

La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches & Shleifer— Judicial Independence

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/jcb_data.xls
(La Porta et al 2004)

llps_tensc Tenure of Supreme Court Judges

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 70)

This variable measures the tenure of Supreme Court judges (highest court in any country). The variable takes three possible values:

- (0) if tenure is less than six years
- (1) if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong
- (2) if tenure is lifelong

[Back?](#)

llps_tenac Tenure of Administrative Court Judges

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 70)

This variable measures the tenure of the highest ranked judges ruling on administrative cases. The variable takes three possible values:

- (0) if tenure is less than six years
- (1) if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong
- (2) if tenure is lifelong.

[Back?](#)

llps_cl Case Law

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 69)

This variable is a dummy taking value:

- (1) if judicial decisions in a given country are a source of law
- (0) otherwise.

[Back?](#)

llps_ji Judicial Independence

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 69)

Judicial independence is computed as the normalized sum of Tenure of Supreme Court Judges (llps_tensc), Tenure of the Administrative Court Judges (llps_tenac), and Case Law (llps_cl).

[Back?](#)

llps_roc Rigidity of Constitution

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 71)

This variable measures (on a scale from 1 to 4) how hard it is to change the constitution in a given country. One point each is given if the approval of the majority of the legislature, the chief of state and a referendum is necessary in order to change the constitution. An additional point is given for each of the following: if a supermajority in the legislature (more than 66% of votes) is needed, if the approval of both houses of the legislature is required, if the legislature has to approve the amendment in two consecutive legislative terms, or if the approval of a majority of state legislatures is required.

Back?

llps_jr Judicial Review

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 71)

This variable measures the extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or Constitutional Court) have the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country. The variable takes three values: (0) if there is no review of constitutionality of laws, (1) if there is limited review of constitutionality of laws, and (2) if there is full review of constitutionality of laws.

Back?

llps_cr Constitutional Review

(Cross-section: the year varies, N: 71)

Constitutional review is computed as the normalized sum of Constitutional Review (llps_jr) and Rigidity of Constitution (llps_roc).

Back?

Melander

<http://www.pcr.uu.se/personal/anstallda/melander.htm>
(Melander 2005)

m_femlead Female State Leader

(Time-series: 1965-2002, n: 1316, N: 40, \bar{N} : 35, \bar{T} : 33)
(Cross-section: 2002, N: 169)

Dummy variable taking value: (1) Female leader (0) Male leader. Female leaders during the 20th century defined as “the president, prime minister, or any other decision maker who is essentially the ‘decision maker of last resort’”. Original source: Caprioli & Boyer (2001), Melander has extended the data using the information available in Schemmel (2004).

Back?

m_wominpar Women in Parliament (percent)

(Time-series: 1965-2002, n: 1304, N: 40, \bar{N} : 34, \bar{T} : 33)

(Cross-section: 1996-2002 (varies by country), N: 162)

Percentage of women holding seats in the legislature. Original source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995; 2005). Note: if the parliament is not unicameral the upper house is used.

Back?

Polity IV

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

(Marshall and Jaggers 2002)

Missing codes:

(-66) Interruption periods.

(-77) Interregnum periods.

(-88) Transition periods.

p_democ Institutionalized Democracy

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2017, N: 37, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 55)

(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 161)

Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high)

Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil liberties.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation (variable p_parcomp), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables p_xropen and p_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (variable p_xconst).

Back?

p_autoc Institutionalized Autocracy

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2017, N: 37, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 55)
(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country, N: 161)

Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high)

"Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity, but we regard this as a function of political ideology and choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness (performance) have covaried over time.

An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operational indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable p_parcomp), the regulation of participation (variable p_parreg), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables p_xropen and p_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (variable p_xconst).

[Back?](#)

p_polity Combined Polity Score

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2049, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 55)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

[Back?](#)

p_polity2 Revised Combined Polity Score

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2039, N: 37, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 55)
(Cross-section: 2000-2006 (varies by country), N: 162)

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The revised version of the polity variable is designed to facilitate the use of the polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual polity score by applying a simple treatment, or "fix," to convert instances of

302

“standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set:

(-66) Cases of foreign “interruption” are treated as “system missing.”

(-77) Cases of “interregnum,” or anarchy, are converted to a “neutral” Polity score of “0.”

(-88) Cases of “transition” are prorated across the span of the transition.

For example, country X has a p_polity score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follow: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

Note: Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year are converted to “system missing” values. Transitions (-88) following a year of independence, interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value “0”.

[Back?](#)

p_parreg Regulation of Participation

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2049, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 55)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways; the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion, and the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion among shifting coalitions of partisan groups. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:

(1) **Unregulated:** Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time.

(2) **Multiple Identities:** There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level – parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected – but there are few recognized, overlapping (common) interests.

(3) **Sectarian:** Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing

groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries).

(4) **Restricted:** Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism, but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.

(5) **Regulated:** Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

Back?

p_parcomp The Competitiveness of Participation

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2049, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 55)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities which are coded Unregulated ("1") on Regulation of Participation are coded "0" (Not Applicable) for competitiveness. Competitiveness is coded on a five category scale:

(0) **Not Applicable:** This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political Participation (variable p_parreg).

(1) **Repressed:** No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a Repressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition.

(2) **Suppressed:** Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished from Factional competition (below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are:

- i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties or no ethnic political organizations).
- ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).
- iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile;

candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups.

(3) **Factional:** Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularistic agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.

(4) **Transitional:** Any transitional arrangement from Restricted or Factional patterns to fully competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.

(5) **Competitive:** There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be restricted in the Competitive pattern.

Back?

p_xrreg Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2049, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 55)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

In considering recruitment, we must first determine whether there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power. Three categories are used to differentiate the extent of institutionalization:

(1) **Unregulated:** Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power. Such caesaristic transfers of power are sometimes legitimized after the fact in noncompetitive elections or by legislative enactment. Despite these "legitimization" techniques, a polity remains unregulated until the de facto leader of the coup has been replaced as head of government either by designative or competitive modes of executive selection. However, unregulated recruitment does not include the occasional forceful ouster of a chief executive if elections are called within a reasonable time and the previous pattern continues.

(2) **Designational/Transitional:** Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (i.e., one-party systems or "rigged" multiparty elections). Also coded here are transitional arrangements intended to regularize future power transitions after an initial unregulated seizure of power (i.e., after constitutional legitimization of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political realm as head of the military). This category also includes polities in transition from designative to elective modes of executive selection (i.e., the period of "guided democracy" often exhibited during the transition from military to civilian rule) or vice versa (i.e., regimes ensuring electoral victory through the intimidation of oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a "state of emergency" before executive elections).

(3) **Regulated:** Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections. Ascriptive/designative and ascriptive/elective selections (i.e., an effective king and premier) are also coded as regulated. The fundamental difference between regulated selection and unregulated recruitment is that regulated structures require the existence of institutionalized modes of executive recruitment, either through constitutional decree or lineage. Moreover, in regulated competitive systems, unlike the designational/transitional mode, the method of future executive selection is not dependent on the particular party or regime currently holding power.

Back?

p_xrcomp Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2049, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 55)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

Competitiveness refers to “the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr 1974, p.1483).” For example, selection of chief executives through popular elections involving two or more viable parties or candidates is regarded as competitive. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (“1”) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, Competitiveness is coded “0” (Not Applicable). Four categories are used to measure this concept:

(0) **Not Applicable:** This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg).

(1) **Selection:** Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are: rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.

(2) **Dual/Transitional:** Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascriptive and/or designation) and competitive election.

(3) **Election:** Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections involving two or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly.)

Back?

p_xropen Openness of Executive Recruitment

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2049, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 55)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

Recruitment of the chief executive is “open” to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a

regularized process. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (1) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (p_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, Openness is coded "0" (Not Applicable). Five categories are used:

(0) **Not Applicable:** This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg).

(1) **Closed:** Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc., who assume executive powers by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded "closed" unless a relative actually succeeds him as ruler.

(2) **Dual Executive–Designation:** Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.

(3) **Dual Executive–Election:** Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.

(4) **Open:** Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

Back?

p_xconst Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2049, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 55)

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner: "Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially "properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p.121) Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups". In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used.

(1) **Unlimited Authority:** There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:

- i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
- ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.

- iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure.
 - iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
 - v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
 - vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.
- Note: If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a legislature to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is not a change to unlimited authority.

(2) Intermediate Category

(3) **Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority:** There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:

- i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
- ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees.
- iii. Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted.
- iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
- v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.
- vi. There is an independent judiciary.
- vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.

(4) Intermediate Category

(5) **Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority:** The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them. Examples:

- i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
- ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
- iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
- iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.

(6) Intermediate Category

(7) **Executive Parity or Subordination:** Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence:

- i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
- ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).
- iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability".

Back?

p_durable Regime Durability

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2049, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 55)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the p_polity score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the p_durable value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline “year zero” (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the p_durable variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs.

Back?

p_flag Tentative Coding

(Time-series: 1946-2010, n: 2049, N: 37, \bar{N} : 32, \bar{T} : 55)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

Trichotomous “flag” variable indicating confidence of codings (recent year codings only).

(0) **Confident:** Reasonably confident coding of established authority patterns that have been “artificially smoothed” to present consistency over time between substantive polity changes.

(1) **Tentative:** Reasonably confident coding of emerging authority patterns that have not been smoothed over time; these codes are “free floating,” that is, they are based on information available in the case-year and are not tied to prior year coding(s). Codes are considered tentative for up to five years following a substantive polity change.

(2) **Tenuous:** Best judgment coding based on limited information and/or insufficient time span since a substantive polity change and the emergence of new authority patterns.

Back?

p_fragment Polity Fragmentation

(Time-series: 2000-2010, n: 396, N: 36, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 11)
(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 163)

This variable codes the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive). Local autonomy arrangements voluntarily established and accepted by both central and local authorities are not considered fragmentation. A polity that cannot exercise effective authority over at least 50 percent of its established territory is necessarily considered to be in a condition of “state failure” (i.e., interruption or interregnum, see below, or civil war). Polity fragmentation may result from open warfare (active or latent) or foreign occupation

and may continue in the absence of open warfare if a situation of de facto separation remains unresolved and unchallenged by the state.

(0) No overt fragmentation

(1) **Slight fragmentation:** Less than ten percent of the country's territory is effectively under local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

(2) **Moderate fragmentation:** Ten to twenty-five percent of the country's territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

(3) **Serious fragmentation:** Over twenty-five percent (and up to fifty percent) of the country's territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

Back?

p_sf State Failure

(Time-series: 1956-1968, n: 7, N: 2, \bar{N} : 1, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 1995-2003 (varies by country), N: 13)

Variable p_sf is a flag variable that designates (by code "1") every year during which a Polity is considered to be in a condition of "complete collapse of central authority" or "state failure" (i.e., -77). The variable p_sf is also coded "1" for years when a state disintegrates and when a profound revolutionary change in political authority occurs (during which the authority of the previous Polity is assumed to have collapsed completely prior to the revolutionary seizure of power and subsequent restructuring of authority). Using the p_sf variable to select regime information will facilitate identification of periods of state failure.

Back?

QoG Survey

(Cross-section: 2008-2009 (varies by country), N: 52)

<http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>

(Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2010)

The QoG Survey is a unique data set on the structure and behavior of public administration, based on a web survey of 528 country experts from 58 countries around the world (although advanced industrialized and post-communist countries carry the weight of countries covered). The dataset covers key dimensions of quality of government, such as politicization, professionalization, openness, and impartiality.

Included in the QoG Social Policy Dataset are three indexes, each based on a group of questions from the survey. When constructing the indexes we excluded countries with less than three responding experts (which left us with 52 countries in the sample).

(One index is listed below. The two other indexes are listed under "Political Indicators".)

The confidence interval variables give the higher and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval.

qs_impar **Impartial Public Administration**
qs_impar_cih **Impartial Public Administration – Confidence Interval (High)**
qs_impar_cil **Impartial Public Administration – Confidence Interval (Low)**

The index measures to what extent government institutions exercise their power impartially. The impartiality norm is defined as: “When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law.” (Rothstein and Teorell 2008, p. 170)

The index is built on five items from the survey:

- By a common definition, impartiality implies that when implementing policies, public sector employees should not take anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not stipulated in the policy. Generally speaking, how often would you say that public sector employees today, in your chosen country, act impartially when deciding how to implement a policy in an individual case?

(Response categories from 1-7, “hardly ever” to “almost always”)

- Hypothetically, let’s say that a typical public employee was given the task to distribute an amount equivalent to 1000 USD per capita to the needy poor in your country. According to your judgment, please state the percentage that would reach:

(Six response categories for which the respondents could fill in a number from 0 to 100 percent. The percentage reaching “the needy poor” was here used as the indicator of how impartial the policy would be implemented.)

Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today?

- Firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid?
- When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, public sector employees treat some groups in society unfairly?
- When granting licenses to start up private firms, public sector employees favor applicants with which they have strong personal contacts?

(Response categories from 1-7, from “hardly ever” to “almost always”.)

The index is constructed by adding each measure weighted by the factor loading obtained from a principle components factor analysis. Missing values on one or more of the questions have been imputed on the individual expert level. After that, aggregation to the country level has been made (mean value of all experts per country).

Back?

Reporters Sans Frontières

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 134)

http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=4116

rsf_pfi **Press Freedom Index**

The Press Freedom index measures the amount of freedom journalists and the media have in each country and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. It does not take account of all human rights violations, only those that affect press freedom. Neither is it an indicator of the quality of a country's media. The index ranges between 0 (total press freedom) and 100 (no press freedom).

[Back?](#)

Transparency International

<http://www.transparency.org/>

ti_cpi **Corruption Perceptions Index**

(Time-series: 1995-2010, n: 578, N: 39, \bar{N} : 36, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2000-2009 (varies by country), N: 181)

The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

WARNING: The time-series information in the CPI scores can only be used if interpreted with caution. Year-to-year shifts in a country's score can result not only from a changing perception of a country's performance but also from a changing sample and methodology. That is, with differing respondents and slightly differing methodologies, a change in a country's score may also relate to the fact that different viewpoints have been collected and different questions have been asked. Moreover, each country's CPI score is composed as a 3-year moving average, implying that if changes occur they only gradually affect a country's score. For a more detailed discussion of comparability over time in the CPI, see Lambsdorff 2005.

[Back?](#)

ti_cpi_max **Corruption Perceptions Index – Max Range**

ti_cpi_min **Corruption Perceptions Index – Min Range**

(Time-series: 2004-2010, n: 273, N: 39, \bar{N} : 39, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2004-2009 (varies by country), N: 49)

The CPI score is accompanied by a 90 confidence range determined by a bootstrap (non-parametric) methodology, which allows inferences to be drawn on the underlying precision of the results. A 90% confidence range is established, where there is 5% probability that the value is below the minimum range (ti_cpi_min) and 5% probability that the value is above the maximum range (ti_cpi_max). However, particularly when only few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%.

Back?

ti_cpi_sd **Corruption Perceptions Index – Standard Deviation**

(Time-series: 1998-2010, n: 377, N: 39, \bar{N} : 29, \bar{T} : 10)

(Cross-section: 2000-2009 (varies by country), N: 142)

This is the standard deviation in the values of the sources underlying the CPI: the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources.

Back?

Treisman

<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/>

(Treisman 2007)

t_bribe **Have paid a bribe in any form**

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2005

(Cross-section: 2005, N: 66)

Percentage of the population who answered "Yes" to the question: "In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form?"

Original source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2005).

Back?

t_corr **Common to pay irregular additional payments**

<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-wbes>

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 79)

Country averages of business representatives' answers to the question: "It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular 'additional payments' to get things done." (ranges from 1 = always to 6 = never). Original source: World Business Environment Survey (2000).

Back?

t_unicri Bribery to Government Officials

<http://www.bus.lsu.edu/mocan/publication.htm>

(Cross-section: 1991-1999, N: 49)

Percentage of the population that had been asked by - or expected to pay a bribe to - government officials in the past year for the period of late 1990s (if more than one year available for late 1990s, averaged). Original source: Mocan (2007).

Back?

Vanhanen – Index of Democratization

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 1988, N: 40, \bar{N} : 34, \bar{T} : 50)

<http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/index.html>

(Vanhanen 2000; 2005)

van_index Index of Democratization

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy – competition and participation – measured as the percentage of votes not cast for the largest party (Competition) times the percentage of the population who actually voted in the election (Participation). This product is divided by 100 to form an index that in principle could vary from 0 (no democracy) to 100 (full democracy). (Empirically, however, the largest value is 49.)

Back?

van_comp Competition

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

The competition variable portrays the electoral success of smaller parties, that is, the percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections. The variable is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes won by the largest party (the party which wins most votes) in parliamentary elections or by the party of the successful candidate in presidential elections. The variable thus theoretically ranges from 0 (only one party received 100 % of votes) to 100 (each voter cast a vote for a distinct party).

Back?

van_part Participation

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

The percentage of the total population who actually voted in the election.

Back?

World Bank – Governance Indicators (a.k.a KKZ)

(Time-series: 1996-2009, n: 429, N: 39, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 11)

<http://www.govindicators.org>
(Kaufmann et al 2009)

These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. These individual measures of governance are assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance. An unobserved component model is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators. Point estimates of the dimensions of governance, the margins of error as well as the number of sources are presented for each country.

The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5 , with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.

WARNING: Since the estimates are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) each year of measurement, they are not directly suitable for over-time comparisons within countries. Kaufmann et al. (2006) however find no systematic time-trends in a selection of indicators that do allow for comparisons over time, which suggests that time-series information in the WBGI scores can be used if interpreted with caution.

wbgi_vae **Voice and Accountability – Estimate**

wbgi_vas **Voice and Accountability – Standard Errors**

wbgi_van **Voice and Accountability – Number of Sources**

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

“Voice and Accountability” includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

[Back?](#)

- wbgi_pse** **Political Stability – Estimate**
- wbgi_pss** **Political Stability – Standard Errors**
- wbgi_psn** **Political Stability – Number of sources**

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

“Political Stability” combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.

[Back?](#)

- wbgi_gee** **Government Effectiveness – Estimate**
- wbgi_ges** **Government Effectiveness – Standard Errors**
- wbgi_gen** **Government Effectiveness – Number of Sources**

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

“Government Effectiveness” combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

[Back?](#)

- wbgi_rqe** **Regulatory Quality – Estimate**
- wbgi_rqs** **Regulatory Quality – Standard Errors**
- wbgi_rqn** **Regulatory Quality – Number of Sources**

(Cross-section: 2002-2008 (varies by country), N: 192)

“Regulatory Quality” includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.

[Back?](#)

wbgi_rle	Rule of Law – Estimate
wbgi_rls	Rule of Law – Standard Errors
wbgi_rln	Rule of Law – Number of Sources

(Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country), N: 194)

“Rule of Law” includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

[Back?](#)

wbgi_cce	Control of Corruption – Estimate
wbgi_ccs	Control of Corruption – Standard Errors
wbgi_ccn	Control of Corruption – Number of Sources

(Cross-section: 2002-2008 (varies by country), N: 192)

“Control of Corruption” measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done”, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in “state capture”.

[Back?](#)

References

- Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J., Limongo, F & Przewoski, A. 2000. "ACLP Political and Economic Database Codebook", in *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press.
- Armingeon, K. & Careja, R. 2006. Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2006. Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html
- Armingeon, K. et al. 2007. Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2004. Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html
- Armingeon, K. et al. 2008. Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2005. Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html
- Banks, A. S. 1996. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Binghamton, NY: Center for Social Analysis, State University of New York at Binghamton.
- Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P. 2000. "New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2283.
- Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P. 2001. "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions", World Bank Economic Review, 15(1): 165-176.
- Botero, J.C., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 2004. "The Regulation of Labor." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 119(4): 1339-1382.
- Budge, I. et al. 2001. Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford: University Press.
- Bueno De Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M. and Morrow, J. D. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.
- Castles, F.G. & Mair, P. 1984. "Left-Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments". *European Journal of Political Research*, 12 (March): 73-88.

- Cheibub, J. A. and Gandhi, J. 2004. "Classifying Political Regimes: A Sixfold Classification of Democracies and Dictatorships." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Cingranelli, D. L. and Richards, D. L. 2010. The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. Version 2010.05.17. <http://www.humanrightsdata.org>.
- Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 2007. (<http://www.cses.org>). CSES MODULE 2 FULL RELEASE [dataset]. June 27, 2007 version.
- Cusack, T.R. 1997. "Partisan Politics and Public Spending". *Public Choice*, 91(3-4): 375-395.
- Cusack, T.R. & Engelhardt, L. 2003. Parties, Governments and Legislatures Data Set. http://www.wzb.eu/alt/ism/people/misc/cusack/d_sets.en.htm
- Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V. and Teorell, J. 2010. "Dimensions of Bureaucracy. A Cross-National Dataset on the Structure and Behavior of Public Administration." QoG Working Paper Series 2010:13, The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg. <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>
- Deiningner, K. and Squire, L. 1996. "A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality." *The World Bank Economic Review*, 3: 565-591.
- Djankov, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 2002. "The Regulation of Entry." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117: 1-37.
- Djankov, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 2003. "Courts: The Lex Mundi Project." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118: 453-517.
- Dreher, A. 2006. "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a New Index of Globalization." *Applied Economics*, 38(10): 1091-1110.
- Dreher, A., Gaston, N. and Martens, P. 2008. *Measuring Globalization – Gauging its Consequences*. New York: Springer.
- Esping-Andersen, G. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006. The European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association. Aggregate File Producers: ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain/Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. Aggregate File Distributors: ASEP/JDS and ZA, Cologne, Germany.
- Eurostat, 2007. Statistical Office of the European Communities. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>

Fish, M.S. and Kroenig, M. 2009. *The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Franzese, R.J. 1998: Participation, Inequality and Transfers Database.
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/T&T_FullDataSet.XLS

Franzese, R.J. 2002: *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*. (Chapter 2). Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: University Press.

Freitag, M. 1999. *Politik und Wahrung. Ein internationaler Vergleich*". PhD dissertation, University of Bern.

Gakidou, E., Cowling, K., Lozano, R. and Murray, C.J.L. 2010. "Increased educational attainment and its effect on child mortality in 175 countries between 1970 and 2009: a systematic analysis". *Lancet*, 376: 959-974.

Galbraith, James. 2009. "Inequality, unemployment and growth: New measures for old controversies". *Journal of Economic Inequality*, 7: 189-206.

Galbraith, James and Hyunsub Kum. 2003. *Inequality and Economic Growth: A Global View Based on Measures of Pay*, *CESifo Economic Studies* 49(4): 527–556.

Galbraith, James and Hyunsub Kum. 2004. *Estimating the Inequality of Household Incomes: A Statistical Approach to the Creation of a Dense and Consistent Global Data Set*. UTIP Working Paper No. 22. http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/papers/utip_22rv5.pdf

Gerring, J., Thacker, S. C. and Moreno, C. 2005. "Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry." *American Political Science Review*, 99(4): 567-581.

Gross, D.A. & Sigelman, L. 1984. "Comparing Party Systems: A Multidimensional Approach". *Comparative Politics*, 16: 463-479.

Gibney, M., and Dalton, M. 1996. "The Political Terror Scale." *Policy Studies and Developing Nation*,. 4: 73-84.

Gibney, M., Cornett, L., And Wood, R. 2010. *Political Terror Scale 1976-2008*. Retrieved April 21, 2010 from the Political Terror Scale web site:
<http://www.politicalterror scale.org>

Golder, M. 2005. "Democratic Electoral Systems around the World." *Electoral Studies*, 24: 103-121.

Gwartney, J. and Lawson, R. 2006. *Economic Freedom of the World: 2006 Annual Report*. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.

Hadenius, A. and Teorell, J. 2005. "Assessing Alternative Indices of Democracy", C&M Working

Papers 6, IPSA, August 2005 (http://www.concepts-methods.org/working_papers/20050812_16_PC%206%20Hadenius%20&%20Teorell.pdf).

Hassel, A. 2006. Wage Setting, Social Pacts and the Euro. A new role for the state? Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. August 2009. Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.

Huber, E., Ragin, C., Stephens, J.D., Brady, D. and Beckfield, J. 2004. Comparative Welfare States Data Set. Northwestern University, University of North Carolina, Duke University and Indiana University.

<http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/welfareaccess.htm>

Huber, J. & Inglehart, R. (1995): "Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies". *Party Politics* 1 (1): 73-111.

IMF, 1986. A Manual on Government Finance Statistics. (GFSM 1986). Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/gfs.htm>

IMF, 2001. A Manual on Government Finance Statistics 2001. (GFSM 2001). Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/gfs.htm>

Iversen, T. & Cusack, T. 2000. "The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?" *World Politics*, 50(April): 313-349.

Iversen, T. & Soskice, D. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others". *American Political Science Review*, 100(2): 165-181.

Jagers, K. & Marshall, M. 2000. Polity IV Project Dataset. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.

Jesuit, M. & Mahler, V.A. 2004. "State Redistribution in Comparative Perspective : A Cross-National Analysis of the Developed Countries". Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series, No. 392. <http://www.lisproject.org/publications/liswps/392.pdf>

Jesuit, M. & Mahler, V.A. 2008. Fiscal Redistribution Dataset, version 2, February 2008. <http://www.lisproject.org/publications/fiscalredistdata/fiscres.htm>

Jowell, R. & the Central Co-ordinating Team. 2003. European Social Survey 2002/2003: Technical Report, London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University. <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>

Jowell, R. & the Central Co-ordinating Team. 2005. European Social Survey 2004/2005: 321

Technical Report, London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University.
<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>

Jowell, R. & the Central Co-ordinating Team. 2007. European Social Survey 2006/2007: Technical Report, London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University.
<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. 2006. "Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996–2005", The World Bank.

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. 2009. "Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996–2008". World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 4978. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424591>

Keefer, P. 2009. DPI2009. "Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions." Development Research Group, World Bank.

Kekic, L. 2006. "The Economist Intelligence Unit's index of democracy." The Economist. The World in 2007. London.

Kenworthy, L. 1999. "Do Social-Welfare Policies Reduce Poverty? A Cross-National Assessment." *Social Forces*, 77(3): 1119-1139.

Kenworthy, L. 2001. "Wage-Setting Measures: A Survey and Assessment." *World Politics* 54(1): 57-98.

Kim, H & Fording R.C. 1998. "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989". *European Journal of Political Research*, 33: 73-97.

Kim, H & Fording R.C. 2002. "Government Partisanship in Western Democracies, 1945-1998". *European Journal of Political Research*, 41: 165-184.

Kim, H & Fording R.C. 2003. "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies: An Update". *European Journal of Political Research*, 42: 95-105.

Kim, H & Fording R.C. 2008. Party Manifesto Data and Measures of Ideology in Western Democracies. Florida State University and University of Kentucky. Unpublished paper. Available at <http://heeminkimfsu.googlepages.com/datasetsandsolutionconceptscreated>. June 19, 2008.

Klingemann, H.-D. et al. 2006. Mapping Policy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003. Oxford: University Press.

Knack, S. and Kugler, M. 2002. "Constructing an Index of Objective Indicators of Good

Governance". PREM Public Sector Group, World Bank.

Kolodko G. W. 2000. From Shock to Therapy. The Political Economy of Postsocialist Transformation. Oxford: University Press.

Korpi, W. & Palme, J. (2008): The Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP), Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University.

Lane, J.-E., McKay, D. & Newton, K. (eds.) 1997. Political Data Handbook. OECD Countries. 2nd ed. Oxford: University Press.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C. and Shleifer, A. 2004. Judicial Checks and Balances. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(2): 445-470.

Laver, M. & Hunt, W.B. 1992. Policy and Party Competition. New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall.

Lijphart, A. 1984. Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures.
<http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm> 2007-10-08.

Maddison, A. & Wu, H. 2008. "Measuring China's Economic Performance", *World Economics*, June.

Mahler, V.A. & Jesuit, M. 2006. "Fiscal Redistribution in the Developed Countries: New Insights from the Luxembourg Income Study". *Socio-Economic Review*, 1 (3): 483-511.

Marshall, M. G. and Jaggers, K. 2002. 'Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002: Dataset Users' Manual. Maryland: University of Maryland.

Melander, Erik. 2005. "Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(4): 695-714.

Mocan, N. 2007. "What Determines Corruption? International Evidence from Micro Data." Revised version of NBER Working Paper 10460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

OECD. 2001. International Migration Statistics. "Summary tables vol 2001 release 01" and "Population and Labour Force by Country of Origin Vol 2001 release 01". Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.

OECD. 2006a. Taxing Wages Statistics. Tables "Comparative tax rates and benefits (old

definition) Vol 2006 release 01” and “Historical Tax Rates (old definition) Vol 2006 release 01”. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://caliban.sourceoecd.org/vl=3831743/cl=13/nw=1/rpsv/statistic/s24_about.htm?jnlissn=16081102

OECD. 2006b. Revenue Statistics. Table “Tax as percentage GDP – Total sectors Vol 2006 release 01”. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://caliban.sourceoecd.org/vl=1372044/cl=23/nw=1/rpsv/statistic/s19_about.htm?jnlissn=16081099

OECD. 2006c. Benefits and Wages. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2825_497118_34053248_1_1_1_1,00.html

OECD. 2006d. Population and Labour Force Statistics. Vol 2006 release 02. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
<http://www.oecd.org/std/labour>.

OECD. 2007a. Public Sector Pay and Employment Database. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en_2649_37457_2408769_1_1_1_37457,00.html

OECD. 2007b. The Social Expenditure Database. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG

OECD. 2007c. The Social Expenditure database: An Interpretative Guide. Version February 2007. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34635_38141385_1_1_1_1,00.html

OECD. 2007f. Economic Outlook No. 82 (December 2007). Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34109_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

OECD. 2007g. OECD Health Data 2007. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2649_34631_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html

OECD. 2007h. International Migration Data 2007. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_33931_39336771_1_1_1_1,00.html

OECD. 2009a. National Accounts. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
<http://www.oecd.org/std/national-accounts>

OECD. 2009b. Family Database. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
<http://www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database>

OECD. 2009c. Main Economic Indicators. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development. <http://www.oecd.org/std/mei>

OECD. 2009d. The Gender, Institutions and Development Database. Data downloaded from <http://stats.oecd.org> May 12 2009. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.

OECD. 2009e. International Migration Data 2009. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://www.oecd.org/document/52/0,3343,en_2649_33931_42274676_1_1_1_37415,00.html

OECD. 2009f. Employment Database. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.
http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3343,en_2649_33927_40917154_1_1_1_1,00.html

OECD. 2009g. Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC). Data downloaded from <http://stats.oecd.org>. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development.

Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC)

Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. 2003. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Quinn, D. 1997 "The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation." *The American Political Science Review*, 91(3): 531-551.

Rae, D. 1968. "A Note on Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems". *Comparative Political Studies* 1: 413-418.

Reif et al. 1990-1997. *Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 1990-1997: Trends CEEB1-8*. European Commission, Brussels. Distributed by Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln (ZA), <http://www.gesis.org/za/>. Dataset identification number: ZA3648.

Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration." *Brooking Paper on Economic Activity*, 1: 1-118.

Sapiro, V., Philips Shively, W. & the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 2003. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, 1996-2001: Module 1 Micro-District-Macro Data [dataset]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor].

Schmitt, H., Scholz, E., Leim, I. & Moschner, M. 2006. The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002. Data Set Edition 2.00. January 20, 2005 (revised September 25, 2006).

Scruggs, L. 2006. Welfare State Entitlements Data Set: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Eighteen Welfare States, version 1.2.
<http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm>

Scruggs, L. 2007. "Welfare State Generosity Across Space and Time." In Clasen, J. and Siegel, N. (eds.) Investigating Welfare State Change. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Scruggs, L. & Allan, J. 2006. "Welfare-State Decommodification in 18 OECD Countries: A Replication and Revision". Journal of European Social Policy 16(1): 55-72.

Siaroff, A. 1999. "Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement". European Journal of Political Research. 36(2): 175-205.

Swank, D., Coman, E. and Charette, J. 2010a. Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of Political Parties by Ideological Group in Capitalist Democracies, 1950-2006: A Database.
<http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/Swank.htm>

Swank, D., Coman, E. and Charette, J. 2010b. Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of Political Parties by Ideological Group in Capitalist Democracies, 1950-2006: A Database – Codebook.
<http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/Swank.htm>

Teorell, J. and Hadenius, A. 2005 "Determinants of Democratization: Taking Stock of the Large-N Evidence", mimeo., Department of Government, Uppsala University.

Treisman, Daniel. 2007. "What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" Annual Review of Political Science, 10: 211-244.

Tsebelis, G. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis". American Political Science Review, 93(3): 591-608.

Tsebelis, G. 2008. Veto Players Data.
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/veto_players_data

UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2010. Montreal. <http://www.uis.unesco.org>

United Nations Statistics Division, Economic Statistics Branch. 2009. National Accounts Statistics Database. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama>

United Nations University. 2008. UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c, May 2008.

Vanhanen, T. 2000. "A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998." *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(2): 252-65.

Vanhanen, T. 2005. Measures of Democracy 1810-2004 [computer file]. FSD1289, version 2.0 (2005-08-17). Tampere: Finnish Social Science Data Archive [distributor].

Visser, J. 2009. The ICTWSS Database: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and 2007. Version 2, January 2009. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, University of Amsterdam. <http://www.uva-aias.net/207>

WHO, 2006. World Health Statistics 2006. Geneva: World Health Organization. <http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat2006/en/index.html>

WHO, 2009. WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS). Geneva: World Health Organization. <http://www.who.int/whosis/en/>

Wikipedia contributors. 2008. "Atkinson index". *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Atkinson_index&oldid=228292385 (accessed August 15, 2008).

World Economic Forum, 2007. Global Gender Gap Report.