THE QOG STANDARD DATASET

CODEBOOK

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The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

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If you are new to statistics in general or the QoG datasets in particular we are fairly certain it is a good investment to read the *Note to first time users*, the time spent reading that note will save you lots of time down the road.

A brief note on the 2013 updated QoG Standard datasets

It has been two years since we last launched an updated version of the QoG Standard dataset but now it is here and we hope it will not disappoint you. We have made some changes to the datasets, the method used for updating it and to the actual codebook, but if you have used the datasets before they will probably feel familiar.

Regarding the method used, we have as far as possible returned to the original source. This means that there might be changes made to the data not only for the last years available for the update but to all years previous as the original sources in quite a number of cases have corrected errors in their datasets. Also, we have used a more strict approach to the units of analysis. We no longer include data for some country-years for which we previously have provided data (e.g. we no longer have data for the united Germany before the reunification). You will find more information on what country-years are included and why in the section on Country and Time Coverage.

Due to the full update we have lost some variables as they are no longer provided by the original sources. However, for the Cross-Section dataset (not to be confused with the Time-Series dataset), most of the dropped variables are a result of us using a more narrow way to compose the cross-section dataset (in order to make it more suitable for contemporary analyses, the data included refers to the year 2009 with a span of +/-3 years), you will find information about this under the segment on Cross-Section.

As for the codebook, we have included maps to show the coverage in the Cross-Section set and a bar graph to show the coverage in the time-series set. Hopefully this will make it easier to find the variables best suited for your study.

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Note to first time users

We have noticed and ourselves experienced that using a dataset for the first time has some challenges, hopefully this note will eliminate some of them.

First, if you are reading this you have already passed the first obstacle, namely finding and taking an interest in the codebook. In this codebook we dare say you will find answers to most of your questions about the datasets. If not you will find information on how to get your questions answered. The codebook has information on all the variables and which dataset that includes which variables. Now you might ask; what in the world do they mean by "which dataset", are there more than one?

The answer is yes. The QoG standard dataset is available in both time-series (TS) and cross-section (CS). In our TS dataset the unit of analysis is country-year (e.g. Sweden-1984, Sweden-1985 and so on). The CS dataset, unlike the TS dataset, does not include multiple years for a particular country and the unit of analysis is therefore countries. Many of the variables are available in both TS and CS but some are not. If you cannot find the variable you want, the reason might be you are looking in the wrong dataset. Each variable entry in this codebook includes information on which dataset you will find the variable in. If you still cannot find the variable, please let us know and will do our best to help you out.

The QoG datasets are available in three different file formats; .sav .dta and .csv, making them usable in most statistical softwares as well as in Excel. Should you need a different format, please let us know and we will do our best to help you.

It is somewhat important to understand what the QoG datasets are. Mainly they are a pool of variables gathered from other original or secondary sources.

The reason for pointing this out is that it will save you a lot of time if you do not spend too much of your time trying to write a paper from the entries in the codebook. Instead you will probably be better served by reading the original documentation (that you find in our reference list) and base your section on "Data" on that information. The codebook entries are merely a means for you to see which variables we provide, how they are constructed and coded and where we have taken them from, to enable you to make a preliminary judgment if they are suitable for your paper.

The main benefit of using the QoG Standard datasets is that you get a wide range of variables on Quality of Government and all things related neatly packed together and instantly usable. Also the basic structures of all QoG datasets are the same, which makes them easy to merge. Simply use the ccode (country-code) system to identify the individual observations (if you are using a TS set you will have to include the variable which denotes the years). If you have some other data that you want to merge with the QoG datasets it is good to know that we use the ISO 3166-1 standard system for ccodes (with minor alterations) but also include the Correlates of War (COW) ccode system and the World Banks ccode system.

We hope you will find the data useful. If you should run into any problems, please let us know.

Structure

One aim of the QoG Institute is to make publicly available cross-national comparative data on QoG and its correlates. To accomplish this objective we have compiled both a cross-sectional dataset with global coverage pertaining to the year 2009 (or the closest year available), and a cross-sectional time-series dataset with global coverage spanning the time period 1946–2012. The datasets draw on a number of freely available cross-sectional data sources, including aggregated individual-level data, and contain three types of variables:

▪ WII (What It Is) variables, that is, variables pertaining to the core features of QoG (such as corruption, bureaucratic quality and democracy)

▪ HTG (How To Get it) variables, that is, variables posited to promote the development of QoG (such as electoral rules, forms of government, federalism, legal & colonial origin, religion and social fractionalization); and

▪ WYG (What You Get) variables, that is, variables pertaining to some of the posited consequences of QoG (such as economic and human development, international and domestic peace, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and satisfied, trusting and confident citizens).

Our classification of the variables into these three categories should be seen as a heuristic, as the more exact causal ordering of one's variables obviously depends on the research question.

Time-Series

The QoG standard dataset are available in both a time-series (TS) version and a cross-section (CS) version. In the TS set we have data from 1946 to 2012 and the unit of analysis is country-year (e.g. Sweden-1946, Sweden-1947 and so on).

Countries are not a static phenomenon however, countries come and go and change shape. This has resulted in a number of what we call historical countries. Historical countries are in most cases denoted by a parenthesis following the country name and within the parenthesis we have added the to-date (e.g. Ethiopia(-1992)). Consequentially the historical countries are often associated with a present-day version of the "same" country, these are also denoted by a parenthesis but within that parenthesis we have added the from-date (e.g. Ethiopia(1993-)). You will find more information on which countries that this applies to and our line of reasoning for each country in the section on *Countries and time coverage*.

It should, however, be noted that when it comes to countries; merging and splitting variables are affected (or not) in two different ways, something that might have consequences for how you want to treat your data. Some variables, such as democracy, might not be affected at all by the fact that, for example, Eritrea splits from Ethiopia in 1993, a democracy score for Ethiopia might be the same before and after the split. Other variables such as GDP might change as a result of the split. To avoid spurious correlations and whatnot in your analysis, we have therefore decided to split Ethiopia in two. If you, however, are looking at a correlation and do not include any variables that can be expected to change as a result of the split, you might want a time-series from 1970 to 1995. If this is the case we suggest you consider replacing the missing values of Ethiopia (-1992) with the existing values in the other unit of analysis Ethiopia (1993-).

We have decided not to include data that was available for a country before we have judged that country as independent. This is debatable; it might be argue that if an original source has included values, the values are correct and could be included. However, we have reasoned that if the datasets primarily are used in cross-country comparisons, all units should be countries and not, for example, semi-independent territories.

In each entry in this codebook there is a bar graph indicating the number of countries with data available each year from 1946 to 2012. If the variable is not included in the TS dataset there is a text simply stating that this is the case. These should not be confused for visualizations of the data itself, it is only visualizations of the data availability in the datasets.

Cross-Section

The QoG standard dataset are available in both a time-series (TS) version and a cross-section (CS) version. In the CS dataset we have data from and around 2009. Simply put we have included data from 2009, if there was no data for that particular year on a variable, we have taken data from the year after and if there was no data for that year we have taken data from the year before 2009, up to +/- 3 years.

This works fine for some variables and for some it does not. For GDP growth it might be far from ideal to use figures from the following or previous year whereas it might be more or less unproblematic when it comes to say bureaucratic structures which some might argue are somewhat reluctant to change. We would therefore advice you to use your own judgment when using the CS dataset.

If you are using the CS dataset and want to know the year of measurement for each observation simply use the year-of-measurement (YoM) dataset available on our webpage. The YoM dataset is simply a duplicate of the CS dataset but it contains the years-of-measurement (YoM) for each observation and variable instead of the actual data. The YoM dataset can be used separate or merged with the CS dataset. Each variable in the YoM dataset has the same name as the variable does in the CS dataset but with "_yom" as a suffix.

In each entry in this codebook there is a map indicating which countries that have data for the variable in the CS dataset. If the variable is not included in the CS dataset there is a text simply stating that this is the case. The maps should not be confused as visualizations of the data itself, it is only visualizations of the data availability in the dataset.

Country and time coverage

There is no one standard for deciding which countries to include in a dataset and which countries not to include, fact of the matter is that it is hard to find any one definition of what a country is and that is easily applicable to reality without being unreasonably harsh. To decide which countries to include in the datasets we have relied on the following reasoning:

We have included current members of the United Nations as well as previous members of the UN provided that their *de facto* sovereignty has not changed substantially since they were members; this has meant that we, for example, have included Taiwan.

Using UN membership to decide whether or not to include a country in the dataset works quite well for cases from around 1955 after which independent states in general joined the UN following independence. This leaves us with the question of what to do with countries that might be said to have been independent some time during the period 1946 to around 1955 but was not independent after that period, case in point being Tibet. We have decided to include data for Tibet from 1946 to 1950 making it possible for users to decide for themselves if to include Tibet in their analysis or not. It is worth noting that we do not use the date on which a country gained membership to the UN to decide when a country came into being but to determine which countries to include.

All in all, this means that we have 193 countries included in the cross-sectional dataset.

Regarding the year from which we have picked the data in the cross-sectional dataset, our first choice has been 2009. If data for 2009 was not available, data for 2010 is used. If 2010 was not available, we use data for 2008, and if 2008 was lacking, 2011 is used and so forth.

In the cross-sectional *time-series* dataset we include the same 193 nations, plus an addition of 18 historical countries that that did not exist in 2009[1]: Tibet, Pakistan pre 1971 (including East Pakistan, presently Bangladesh), North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, East and West Germany, Yugoslavia pre 1992 (the People's Republic of Yugoslavia), Serbia and Montenegro, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia pre 1993 (including Eritrea), France[2] pre 1962 (including Algeria), Malaysia pre 1965 (including Singapore), Cyprus pre 1974 (including the later Turkish occupied north Cyprus); also varieties of Sudan make up another two cases as it is only the old Sudan that is included in the CS set and the TS set also contains Sudan (2012-) and South Sudan, this makes a total of 211 nations. In Appendix A we have included the full list of countries and a short note on how we have reasoned for each country.

Unfortunately there exists no established international standard for how historical cases, resulting either from country mergers or country splits, should be treated in a cross-sectional time-series setting. We have applied the following principles:

▪ After a merger of two countries the new country is considered a new case, even when the new state thus formed could be considered as a continuation of one of the merging states. This rule applies to (1) Vietnam, which merged from North and South Vietnam in 1976, (2) Yemen, which

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[1] Importantly countries included or not should not be seen as a normative statement but as a practical.

[2] We have discussed extensively on what to make of the Algerian independence or more precisely whether or not to split France before and after. We have decided to split France as Algeria was a province and not just a colony.

merged from North and South Yemen in 1990, and (3) Germany, which merged from East and West Germany in 1990.

▪ If a country has split up, the resulting new countries are considered as new cases, even when one of the new states thus formed could be considered as a continuation of the state that split up. This rule applies to (1) Pakistan, which was split into Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971, (2) the USSR, which was split into 15 Post-Soviet countries in 1991, (3) Yugoslavia, which was split into Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro (until 2001 continued to be called "Yugoslavia") in 1991, (4) Czechoslovakia, which was split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, (5) France which was split into France and Algeria in 1962, (6) Malaysia which was split into Malaysia and Singapore in 1965, (7) Cyprus which was occupied by Turkey in 1974 effectively splitting the country into Cyprus and the internationally unrecognized northern Cyprus and (8) Ethiopia, which was split into Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1993. There is one **exception** to this rule: Indonesia is considered a continuation of the country that existed before the independence of Timor-Leste in 2002 (while Timor-Leste is considered a new country).

▪ Due to the mentioned lack of international standards, most of our data sources treat these cases of country mergers and splits differently. We have thus rearranged data from those sources that do not treat cases of split ups and mergers in accordance with our criteria above. Consequently, if a merger or a split has occurred and a data source does not treat the countries as different cases, we have **moved the data** for these countries so as to be consistent with our criteria.

▪ To determine where to put the data for the year of the merger/split and when to include data for a newly independent country, we have relied on the "July 1st-principle". If the merger/split or independence occurred *after* July 1st, the data for this year will belong to the historical country or it will not be included.

Thus, for **example**: If Germany in a data source is treated as a continuation of West Germany, we place data up to and including 1990 on West Germany and leave Germany blank until and including 1990, since the merger of Germany occurred in October 1990 (*after* July 1st, 1990). If, on the other hand, Serbia and Montenegro in a data source is treated as a continuation of Yugoslavia, we place the data up to and including 1991 on Yugoslavia and from 1992 and onward on Serbia and Montenegro (which is left blank until and including 1991), since the split occurred from June 1991-March 1992 (*before* July 1st, 1992).

Finally, regarding Cyprus (1974-), we let this denote the Greek part of the island after the Turkish occupation. Most sources probably do the same with the data they refer to "Cyprus", but the documentation of the original data rarely specifies this. Users are urged to double check this with the original sources in case this is possible.

If you have used the QoG standard codebook before you will notice that we have made some changes to the general layout of the variable entries. In addition to all the figures you are used to find in the entries we have added a map and a bar graph. The purpose of these is to show which countries that have data in the CS dataset and the number of countries with data each year in the TS dataset.

# The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

Variable_name   **Variable label**

Variable description.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: Years of measurement in CS data in TS   **Years**: First and last year with

N: Number of countries with data in CS obs.   **N**: No. of countries covered   **n**: Tot. no.

$\overline{N}$: Mean no. countries/year $\overline{T}$: Mean no. of years/country

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To the left there is information pertaining to the data in the CS dataset. A country colored blue means that there is data available for that country in the CS dataset, a country left blank on the map means that there is no data available for that country on the variable in question.

The information to the right is pertaining to the data in the TS dataset, the bar graph shows the years 1946 to 2012 and the blue bars indicates the number of countries with data, each bar showing one year.

The colors on the map and the bars should not be confused for visualizations of the data, it is merely a visualization of data availability.

For a list of country names (cname) and corresponding country codes (ccode) see Appendix B.

VARIABLE OVERVIEW

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HTG (HOW TO GET IT)

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FUNCTIONAL VARIABLES OVERVIEW

WHAT IT IS WII 1/2

bnr_dem	(Democratic Breakdown)	fh_pr	(Political Rights)
bti_ds	(Democracy Status)	fh_cl	(Civil Liberties)
bti_st	(Stateness)	fh_aor	(Associational & Org. Rights)
bti_pp	(Political Participation)	fh_feb	(Free. Expression & Beliefs)
bti_rol	(Rule of Law)	fh_rol	(Rule of Law)
bti_sdi	(Stability of Democratic)	fh_pair	(Pers. Autonomy & Ind. Rights)
bti_psi	(Political & Social Integration)	fh_ep	(Electoral Process)
bti_mi	(Management Index)	fh_ppp	(Pol. Pluralism & Participation)
bti_lod	(Level of Difficulty)	fh_fog	(Functioning of Government)
bti_mp	(Management Performance)	fh_fotppr1	(Free. Print Media, Status)
bti_sc	(Steering Capability)	fh_fotpbr1	(Free. Broadcast Status)
bti_re	(Resource Efficiency)	fh_fotp2	(Free. Press, Status)
bti_cb	(Consensus-Building)	fh_fotpst3	(Free. Press, Status)
bti_ic	(International Cooperation)	fh_fotpsc3	(Free. of the Press, Score)
bdm_s	(Selectorate Size)	fh_fotpst4	(Free. Press, Status)
bdm_w	(Winning Coalition Size)	fh_fotpsc4	(Free. Press, Score)
bdm_w_s	(Winning Coalition/Selectorate)	fh_fotpst5	(Free. Press, Status)
cam_contest	(Contestation)	fh_fotpsc5	(Free. Press, Score)
cam_inclusive	(Inclusiveness)	fh_fotpapr3	(Laws & Reg. Print Media)
chga_demo	(Democracy)	fh_fotpabr3	(Laws & Reg. Broadcast)
ciri_assn	(Free. Assembly & Association)	fh_fotpapr4	(Laws & Reg. Print Media)
ciri_disap	(Disappearance)	fh_fotpabr4	(Laws & Reg. Broadcast)
ciri_dommov	(Free. of Domestic Movement)	fh_fotpa5	(Laws & Reg. Media Content)
ciri_elecsd	(Electoral Self-Determination)	fh_fotpbpr3	(Pol. Pressure & Control, Print)
ciri_empinx_new	(Empowerment Rights)	fh_fotpbbr3	(Pol. Pressure & Ctrl Broadcast)
ciri_empinx_old	(Empowerment Rights)	fh_fotpbpr4	(Pol. Pressure & Ctrl, Print)
ciri_formov	(Free. of Foreign Movement)	fh_fotpbbr4	(Pol. Pressure & Ctrl, Broadcast)
ciri_injud	(Independence of the Judiciary)	fh_fotpb5	(Pol. Pressure & Ctrl)
ciri_kill	(Extrajudicial Killing)	fh_fotpcpr3	(Econ. Influences, Print Media)
ciri_move_old	(Freedom of Movement)	fh_fotpcbr3	(Econ. Influences, Broadcast)
ciri_physint	(Physical Integrity Rights Idx.)	fh_fotpcpr4	(Econ. Influences, Print Media)
ciri_polpris	(Political Imprisonment)	fh_fotpcbr4	(Econ. Influences, Broadcast)
ciri_relfre_new	(Freedom of Religion)	fh_fotpc5	(Econ. Influences, Content)
ciri_relfre_old	(Freedom of Religion)	fh_fotpdpr3	(Repressive Actions, Print)
ciri_speech	(Freedom of Speech)	fh_fotpdbr3	(Repressive Actions, Broadcast)
ciri_tort	(Torture)	fh_fotpdpr4	(Repressive Actions, Print)
ciri_wecon	(Women's Econ. Rights)	fh_fotpdbr4	(Repressive Actions, Broadcast)
ciri_wopol	(Women's Pol. Rights)	fh_polity2	(Democracy FH/Polity)
ciri_worker	(Workers' Rights)	fh_ipolity2	(Demo. FH/Imputed Polity)
ciri_wosoc	(Women's Social Rights)	gd_ptsa	(Pol. Terror Scale Amnesty)
eiu_iod	(Index of Democracy)	gd_ptss	(Pol. Terror Scale US State Dep.)
eiu_cl	(Civil Liberties)	gir_gii	(Global Integrity Index)
eiu_dpc	(Democratic Political Culture)	gir_csmai	(Civ. Society Access to Info.)
eiu_epp	(Electoral Process & Pluralism)	gir_e	(Elections)
eiu_fog	(Functioning of Government)	gir_ga	(Government Accountability)
eiu_pp	(Political Participation)	gir_acs	(Administration & Civil Service)
er_career	(Career Opportunities)	gir_or	(Oversight & Regulation)
er_salary	(Bureaucratic Compensation)	gir_acrl	(Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law)
er_merit	(Meritocratic Recruitment)	iag_iag	(Index of African Governance)
fh_status	(Status)	iag_ss	(Safety & Security)

WHAT IT IS WII 2/2

iag_rltc   (Law & Corruption)
iag_prh   (Participation & Human Rights)
iag_seo   (Sustainable Econ. Opportunity)
iag_hd   (Human Development)
icrg_qog   (ICRG indicator of QoG)
irai_index   (IDA Resource Allocation Index)
irai_mm   (Macroecon. Management)
irai_fp   (Fiscal Policy)
irai_dp   (Debt Policy)
irai_t   (Trade)
irai_fs   (Financial Sector)
irai_bre   (Business Reg. Environment)
irai_ge   (Gender Equality)
irai_epru   (Equity of Public Resource)
irai_bhr   (Building Human Resources)
irai_spl   (Social Protection and Labor)
irai_pies   (Pol. & Inst. Environment)
irai_prrg   (Property Rights & Governance)
irai_qbfm   (Budget & Financial Manage.)
irai_erm   (Eff. Of Revenue Mobilization)
irai_qpa   (Quality of Public Admin)
irai_tac   (Transpar. Account. & Corrup.)
p_democ   (Institutionalized Democracy)
p_autoc   (Institutionalized Autocracy)
p_polity   (Combined Polity Score)
p_polity2   (Revised Polity Score)
p_parreg   (Regulation of Participation)
p_parcomp   (Competitiveness of Particip.)
p_xrreg   (Regulation Executive Recruit.)
p_xrcomp   (Competitive. Exec. Recruit.)
p_xropen   (Open. Executive Recruit.)
p_xconst   (Executive Constraints Rules)
p_durable   (Regime Durability)
p_flag   (Tentative Coding)
p_fragment   (Polity Fragmentation)
p_sf   (State Failure)
qs_impar   (Impartial Public Admin. IPA)
qs_impar_cih   (IPA – Confidence Interval)
qs_impar_cil   (IPA – Confidence Interval)
rsf_pfi   (Press Freedom Index)
t_bribe   (Have paid a bribe in any form)
t_corr   (Common: irregular payments)
t_unicri   (Bribery to Gov. Officials)
ti_cpi   (Corruption Perceptions Idx CPI)
ti_cpi_max   (CPI. Max Range)

ti_cpi_min   (CPI. Min Range)
ti_cpi_sd   (CPI Standard Deviation)
uds_mean   (Unified Demo. Score Posterior)
uds_median   (UDS Median)
uds_sd   (UDS Std. Dev.)
uds_pct025   (UDS 2.5 percentile)
uds_pct975   (UDS 97.5 percentile)
van_index   (Index of Democratization)
van_comp   (Competition)
van_part   (Participation)
wbgi_vae   (Voice and Accountability)
wbgi_vas   (Voice and Accountability)
wbgi_van   (Voice and Accountability)
wbgi_pse   (Political Stability)
wbgi_pss   (Political Stability)
wbgi_psn   (Political Stability)
wbgi_gee   (Government Effectiveness)
wbgi_ges   (Government Effectiveness)
wbgi_gen   (Government Effectiveness)
wbgi_rqe   (Regulatory Quality)
wbgi_rqs   (Regulatory Quality)
wbgi_rqn   (Regulatory Quality)
wbgi_rle   (Rule of Law)
wbgi_rls   (Rule of Law)
wbgi_rln   (Rule of Law)
wbgi_cce   (Control of Corruption)
wbgi_ccs   (Control of Corruption)
wbgi_ccn   (Control of Corruption)
wef_pr   (Property Rights)
wef_ipr   (Intellect. Property Protect.)
wef_dpf   (Diversion of Public Funds)
wef_ipb   (Irregular Payments & Bribes)
wef_ji   (Judicial Independence)
wef_fgo   (Favoritism. Gov. Decisions)
wef_bgr   (Burden of Gov. Regulation)
wef_tgp   (Transparency Gov. Policy.)
wef_bct   (Business Costs of Terrorism)
wef_bccv   (Business Costs: Crime)
wef_oc   (Organized Crime)
wef_rps   (Reliability of Police Services)
wef_ebf   (Ethical Behavior of Firms)
wef_audit   (Auditing & Reporting Standard)
wef_amp   (Effectiveness Monopoly Policy)
wef_ptsb   (Procedures to Start Business)
wef_dtsb   (Days to Start a Business)

HTG (HOW TO GET IT) 1/5

ajr_settmort   (Log Settler Mort.)
al_ethnic   (Ethnic fractionalization)
al_language   (Linguistic fractionaliz.)
al_religion   (Religious fractionaliz.)
ar_li_cbi   (Central bank independence)
bl_asy15f   (Avg. Schooling Years ♀ 15)
bl_asy15mf   (Avg. Schooling Years Tot. 15)
bl_asy25f   (Avg. Schooling Years ♀ 25)
bl_asy25mf   (Avg. Schooling Years Tot 25)
bl_lu_15f   (No Schooling ♀ 15)
bl_lu_15mf   (No Schooling Tot. 15)
bl_lu_25f   (No Schooling♀ 25)
bl_lu_25mf   (No Schooling Tot. 25)
bl_lpc_15f   (Pri. School Comp. ♀ 15)
bl_lpc_15mf   (Pri. School Comp. Tot. 15)
bl_lpc_25f   (Pri. School Comp. ♀ 25)
bl_lpc_25mf   (Pri. School Comp. Tot. 25)
bl_lsc_15f   (Sec. School Comp. ♀ 15)
bl_lsc_15mf   (Sec. School Comp. Tot. 15)
bl_lsc_25f   (Sec. School Comp. ♀ 25)
bl_lsc_25mf   (Sec. School Comp. Tot. 25)
bl_lhc_15f   (Ter. School Comp. ♀ 15)
bl_lhc_15mf   (Ter. School Comp. Tot. 15)
bl_lhc_25f   (Ter. School Comp. ♀ 25)
bl_lhc_25mf   (Ter. School Comp. Tot. 25)
bti_mes   (Market Economy Status
bti_sl   (Socioeconomic Level)
bti_mo   (Market Organisation)
bti_cps   (Currency & Price Stability)
bti_prp   (Private Property)
bti_wr   (Welfare Regime)
bti_ep   (Econ. Performance)
bti_su   (Sustainability)
chga_hinst   (Regime Institutions)
cm_cbi80_89 (Central Bank Independence)
cm_cbi80_89u (Central Bank Independence)
cm_cbi03   (Central Bank Independence)
cm_cbi03u   (Central Bank Independence)
cm_cbt98   (Central Bank Transparency)
cm_cbt06   (Central Bank Transparency)
cm_cbgt80_89 (Turnover. CB Governor)
cm_cbgt95_04 (Turnover CB Governor)
dpi_system   (Regime Type)
dpi_yio   (Year in Office)
dpi_finter   (Finite Term in Office)
dpi_yct   (Years left Current Term)
dpi_mt   (Multiple Terms)
dpi_cemo   (Executive: Military Officer)
dpi_dmmo   (Defense Minister: Military Off.)
dpi_pvor   (Votes: President first round)

dpi_pvfr   (Votes: President final round)
dpi_hlio   (Party Executive: Time in Office)
dpi_erlc   (Party Exec: Right Left Center)
dpi_eage   (Party Exec: Age)
dpi_seats   (Tot. Seats: Legislature)
dpi_gf   (Gov. Fractionalization)
dpi_gs   (Number of Gov. Seats)
dpi_gvs   (Gov.Vote Share)
dpi_gps1   (Largest Gov. Party: Seats)
dpi_gpvs1   (Largest Gov. Party: Share)
dpi_gprlc1   (Largest Gov. Party: R/L/C)
dpi_gpage1   (Largest Gov. Party: Age)
dpi_gps2   (2nd Largest Gov. Party: Seats)
dpi_gpvs2   (2nd Gov. Party: Share)
dpi_gprlc2   (2nd Gov. Party: R/L/C)
dpi_gpage2   (2nd Gov. Party: Age)
dpi_gps3   (3rd Largest Gov. Party: Seats)
dpi_gpvs3   (3rd Largest Gov. Party: Share)
dpi_gprlc3   (3rd Gov. Party: R/L/C)
dpi_gpage3   (3rd Largest Gov. Party: Age)
dpi_nogp   (Number of other Gov. Parties)
dpi_nogps   (Num. other Gov. Party Seats)
dpi_ogpvs   (Other Gov. Parties Share)
dpi_opf   (Opposition Fractionalization)
dpi_nos   (Num. Oppositional Seats)
dpi_slop1   (Largest Opp. Party: Seats)
dpi_vslop1   (Largest Opp. Party: Share)
dpi_oprlc1   (Largest Opp. Right Left Center)
dpi_opage1   (Largest Opp. Party: Age)
dpi_slop2   (2nd Largest Opp. Party Seats)
dpi_vslop2   (2nd Largest Opp.Share)
dpi_slop3   (3rd Largest Opp. Party Seats)
dpi_vslop3   (3rd Largest Opp. Party Vote)
dpi_noop   (Num. other Opp. Parties)
dpi_noops   (Num. other Opp. Party Seats)
dpi_vsoop   (Vote Share: other Opp. Parties)
dpi_ulprty   (Num. Parties non-aligned/N.A.)
dpi_numul   (Num. Seats non-aligned/N.A.)
dpi_vsul   (Vote non-aligned/ unknown)
dpi_tf   (Total Fractionalization)
dpi_maj   (Majority Seats)
dpi_legelec   (Legislative Election)
dpi_exelec   (Executive Election)
dpi_lipc   (Leg. Idx Pol. Competitiveness)
dpi_eipc   (Exec. Idx Pol. Competitiveness)
dpi_mdmh   (Mean District Magnitude H.)
dpi_mdms   (Mean District Magnitude S.)
dpi_ssh   (Relative Size of Senate)
dpi_plurality   (Plurality)
dpi_pr   (Proportional Representation)

HTG (HOW TO GET IT) 2/5

dpi_housesys (House Plurality/Proportional)
dpi_sensys   (Senate Plurality/Proportional)
dpi_thresh   (Threshold for Representation)
dpi_dhondt   (D'Hondt)
dpi_cl   (Closed Lists)
dpi_fraud   (Fraud/Candidate Intimidation)
dpi_checks   (Num. of Veto Players)
dpi_polariz   (Max. Diff. of Orientation)
dpi_auton   (Autonomous Regions)
dpi_state   (Election: State/Province Gov)
dpi_muni   (Election: Municipal Gov.)
dpi_author   (Authority: Sub-nat. Gov.)
dr_ig   (Index of Globalization)
dr_eg   (Econ. Globalization)
dr_pg   (Pol. Globalization)
dr_sg   (Soc. Globalization)
ds_gini   (Gini Index)
el_gunn1   (Speaking the Official Language)
el_gunn2   (S. the Most Widely Used Lang.)
el_avelf   (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalizat.)
fe_etfra   (Ethnic Fractionalization)
fe_plural   (Plurality Group)
fe_lmin   (Largest Minority)
fe_cultdiv   (Cultural Diversity)
fi_index   (Econ. Freedom)
fi_index_cl   (Econ. Freedom)
fi_sog   (Gov. Expend. Tax & Enterprise)
fi_sog_cl   (Gov. Expend. Tax & Enterprise)
fi_legprop   (Property Rights)
fi_legprop_cl   (Property Rights)
fi_sm   (Sound Money)
fi_sm_cl   (Sound Money)
fi_ftradeint   (Trade Internationally)
fi_ftradeint_cl (Trade Internationally)
fi_reg   (Reg. Credit Labor & Business)
fi_reg_cl   (Reg. Credit Labor & Business)
fk_ppi   (Parliamentary Powers Index)
gle_imp   (Total Import)
gle_exp   (Total Export)
gle_trade   (Total Trade)
gle_pop   (Population 1000's)
gle_gdp   (GDP per Capita)
gle_rgdp   (Real GDP per Capita)
gol_adm   (Average District Magnitude)
gol_dist   (Districts)
gol_enep   (Num. Electoral Parties)
gol_enepo   (Num. Electoral Parties)
gol_enep1   (Num. Electoral Parties)
gol_enpp   (Num. Parliament/Leg. Parties)
gol_enppo   (Num. Parliament/Leg. Parties)

gol_enpp1   (Num. Parliament/Leg. Parties)
gol_enpres   (Num. Presidential Candidates)
gol_est   (Electoral System Type)
gol_inst   (Institution)
gol_legel   (Legislative Elections)
gol_est_spec   (Detailed Electoral Sys. Type)
gol_mix   (Mixed Type)
gol_mt   (Multi-Tier Type)
gol_nos   (Number of Seats)
gol_pest   (President. Electoral Sys. Type)
gol_pr   (PR Type)
gol_preel   (Presidential Election)
gol_upseat   (Upper Seats)
gol_uptier   (Upper Tier)
gtm_centrip   (Centripetalism)
gtm_centrip2   (Centripetalism)
gtm_unit   (Unitarism)
gtm_parl   (Parliamentarism)
gtm_pr   (Proportional Represent)
gr_cso   (Development Civ. Society Org.)
gr_csopop   (CSOs per Population)
h_polcon3   (Political Constraints Index)
h_polcon5   (Political Constraints Index)
h_l1   (Legislative Chamber)
h_l2   (2nd Leg. Chamber)
h_j   (Independent Judiciary)
h_f   (Independent Sub-Federal Unit)
h_alignl1   (Alignmen. Exec./Leg. Chamber)
h_alignl2   (Alignmen. Exec./Leg. Chamber)
h_alignl1l2   (Align. Low/Up. Leg. Chamber)
h_lflo   (Leg. Fractionalization low.)
h_lfup   (Leg. Fractionalization up.)
hf_efiscore   (Economic Freedom Index)
hf_business   (Business Freedom)
hf_trade   (Trade Freedom)
hf_fiscal   (Fiscal Freedom)
hf_govt   (Freedom from Gov.)
hf_monetary   (Monetary Freedom)
hf_invest   (Investment Freedom)
hf_financ   (Financial Freedom)
hf_prights   (Property Rights)
hf_corrupt   (Freedom from Corruption)
hf_labor   (Labor Freedom)
ht_regtype   (Regime Type)
ht_regtype1   (Regime Type)
ht_partsz   (Size Largest Party Leg.)
ht_partsz1   (Size of Largest Party in Leg.)
ht_region   (Region of the Country)
ht_region2   (Region of the Country)
ht_colonial   (Colonial Origin)

HTG (HOW TO GET IT) 3/5

iaep_evp	(Executive Veto Power)	idea_bdfc	(Ban Foreign Donate to Cand.)
iaep_lvp	(Leg. Veto Power)	idea_bdfp	(Ban Foreign Donations Parties)
iaep_lcre	(Leg. Can Remove Exec.)	idea_bdgcc	(Ban Gov. Corp. Don. To Cand.)
iaep_ecdl	(Exec Can Dissolve Leg.)	idea_bdgcp	(Ban Gov. Corp. Don. To Parties)
iaep_lrit	(Leg. Ratification of Treaties)	idea_bdo	(Ban Other Form Donation)
iaep_epmf	(Exec. Power over Military)	idea_bdtc	(Ban Trade Union Don. Cand.)
iaep_eccdt	(Exec. Can Change Taxes)	idea_bdtp	(Ban Trade Union Don. Parties)
iaep_lap	(Leg. Approves Budget)	idea_bsr	(Ban Against Parties/Candidate)
iaep_cc	(Constitutional Court [CC])	idea_bvb	(Ban on Vote Buying)
iaep_aecc	(Appoint / Elect. To CC)	idea_frcc	(Candidates Report Finances)
iaep_rmcc	(Removal of Members CC)	idea_frpe	(Parties Report their Finances)
iaep_wrmcc	(Who Remove Memb. Of CC)	idea_frpr	(Parties Report their Finances)
iaep_alcc	(Appointment for Life to CC)	idea_ldc	(Limit Donations to Cand.)
iaep_ccrea	(CC Rules on Exec. Actions)	idea_ldp	(Limit Donations to Parties)
iaep_ccrla	(CC Rules on Leg. Actions)	idea_ldpe	(Limit Donations to Parties)
iaep_ufs	(Unitary or Fed. States)	idea_lsc	(Limit Candidate Spending)
iaep_arr	(Appoint. Of Regional Rep.)	idea_lsp	(Limit on Parties Spending)
iaep_nee	(National Elect. For an Exec.)	idea_mc	(Subsidized Access to Media)
iaep_nel	(National Elect. For a Leg.)	idea_mp	(Subsidized Access to Media)
iaep_nr	(National Referendum)	idea_ofag	(Advantages Gender Equality)
iaep_eml	(Exec. Is Member of Leg.)	idea_pfp	(Public Funding of Parties)
iaep_ise	(Independ. Of Select. Of Exec.)	idea_pfpg	(Pub. Funding of Party Gender)
iaep_ae	(Appointment of Executive)	idea_rdid	(Identity of Donors)
iaep_d	(Dictator)	idea_rip	(Info have to be made Public)
iaep_pnlc	(Party Nominat. Of Leg. Cand.)	ihme_ayef	(Years of Education Female)
iaep_pvelc	(Party Vote Leg. Candidates)	ihme_ayem	(Years of Education Male)
iaep_snlc	(Self-Nomination of Leg. Cand.)	ipu_w_lower	(♀/ national parliament, lower)
iaep_pselc	(Petition Establish Leg. Cand.)	ipu_w_upper	(♀/ national parliament, Upper)
iaep_enlc	(Exec. Nominatio. Of Cand.)	jw_persr	(Personalistic Tier)
iaep_pnec	(Party Nominati. Of Exec. Cand.)	jw_domr	(Dominant or Populous Tier)
iaep_pveec	(Party Vote Est. Exec. Cand.)	jw_smdballot	(Party Ctrl Ballot_SMD lower)
iaep_snec	(Self-Nominatio. Of Exec. Cand.)	jw_smdballot2	(Party Ctrl Ballot_SMD upper)
iaep_pseec	(Petition Establish Exec. Cand)	jw_mmdballot	(Party Ctrl Ballot MMD lower)
iaep_es	(Electoral System)	jw_mmdballot2	(Party Ctrl Ballot MMD upper)
iaep_ee	(Election of the Executive)	jw_avgballot	(Party Ctrl Ballot lower)
iaep_ese	(Electoral System for the Exec.)	jw_avgballot2	(Party Ctrl Ballot upper)
iaep_pm5p	(Parties with More than 5 %)	jw_indy	(Ballot Access Indep. Candidate)
iaep_bp	(Banned Parties)	jw_indy2	(Ballot Access Indep. Candidate)
iaep_ebbp	(Ethnicity Based Banning)	jw_smdvote	(Cand./Party specific Vote SMD)
iaep_rbbp	(Religion Based Banning)	jw_smdvote2	(Cand./Party specific Vote SMD)
iaep_basp	(Banning "Anti-System" Parties)	jw_mmdvote	(Cand./Party spec. Vote MMD)
iaep_npa	(No Parties Allowed)	jw_mmdvote2	(Cand./Party spec. Vote MMD)
iaep_osp	(Official State Party)	jw_avgvote	(Cand./Party specific Vote low)
idea_esf	(Electoral System Design)	jw_avgvote2	(Cand./Party specific Vote up)
idea_esl	(Electoral Sys. National Leg.)	jw_smdpool	(Sharing Vote Candidates SMD)
idea_esp	(Electoral Sys. President)	jw_smdpool2	(Sharing Vote Candidates SMD)
idea_bdac	(Ban Donations to Candidates)	jw_mmdpool	(Sharing Vote Candidate MMD)
idea_bdap	(Ban Donations to Parties)	jw_mmdpool2	(Sharing Vote Candidate MMD)
idea_bdcc	(Ban Corp. Donations to Cand.)	jw_avgpool	(Sharing Vote Candidates low)
idea_bdcp	(Ban Corp. Donations to Parties)	jw_avgpool2	(Sharing Vote Candidates up)

HTG (HOW TO GET IT) 4/5

jw_mcand	(District Magnitude Leg. Low)	
jw_mcand2	(District Magnitude Leg.up)	
jw_mdist	(District Magnitude low)	
jw_mdist2	(District Magnitude up)	
jw_bicameral	(Bicameral System)	
jw_election	(Year of Election low)	
jw_election2	(Year of Election up)	
jw_legsize	(Num. Coded Legislators low)	
jw_legsize2	(Num Coded Legislators up)	
jw_multiround	(Runoff Elections)	
jw_multitier	(Multi Tier low)	
jw_multitier2	(Multi Tier up)	
jw_oneparty	(Single Party System)	
jw_parallel	(Tiers allocated Parallel)	
jw_propn	(Seats National District low)	
jw_propn2	(Seats National District up)	
jw_propsmd	(Seats Single Districts low)	
jw_propsmd2	(Seats Single Districts up)	
jw_propmmd	(Seats Multi Districts low)	
jw_propmmd2	(Seats Multi Districts up)	
jw_propcoded	(Prop. Coded Leg. Low)	
jw_propcoded2	(Prop. Coded Leg.up)	
jw_tiervote	(Tiervote low)	
jw_tiervote2	(Tiervote up)	
jw_rank	(Rank Vote low)	
jw_rank2	(Rank Vote up)	
lp_legor	(Legal origin)	
lp_lat_abst	(Latitude)	
lp_catho80	(Religion: Catholic)	
lp_muslim80	(Religion: Muslim)	
lp_protmg80	(Religion: Protestant)	
lp_no_cpm80	(Religion: Other)	
m_femlead	(Female State Leader)	
mad_pop	(Population thousand)	
mad_gdp	(GDP levels million)	
mad_gdppc1500	(GDP per Capita, year 1500)	
mad_gdppc1600	(GDP per Capita, year 1600)	
mad_gdppc1700	(GDP per Capita, year 1700)	
mad_gdppc1820	(GDP per Capita, year 1820)	
mad_gdppc1900	(GDP per Capita, year 1900)	
no_ce	(Classification of Executives)	
no_ef	(Electoral Family)	
no_ufs	(Unitary/Federal State)	
pt_federal	(Federal Political Structure)	
pt_maj	(Majoritarian Electoral Sys.)	
pt_pindo	(Ballot Structure)	
pt_pres	(Forms of Gov.)	
pwt_er	(Exchange Rate)	
pwt_rgdpch	(Real GDP per capita)	
pwt_csg	(Consumption Share of GDP)	

pwt_gsg	(Gov. Share of GDP %)
pwt_isg	(Investment Share of GDP %)
pwt_openk	(Openness to Trade)
pwt_openc	(Openness to Trade)
pwt_pop	(Population Thousands)
qs_proff	(Profess. Pub. Admin. PPA)
qs_proff_cih	(PPA Confidence Interval)
qs_proff_cil	(PPA Confidence Interval)
qs_closed	(Closed Pub. Admin.CPA)
qs_closed_cih	(CPA Confidence Interval)
qs_closed_cil	(CPA Confidence Interval)
r_roberts	(Ethnoling. Fractionalization)
r_muller	(Ethnoling. Fractionalization)
r_atlas	(Ethnoling. Fractionalization)
r_elf61	(Ethnoling. Frac. 1961)
r_elf85	(Ethnoling. Frac. 1985)
ross_oil_prod	(Oil Production)
ross_oil_value	(Oil Production)
ross_oil_price	(Constant Price of Oil)
ross_oil_exp	(Oil Exports /Day)
ross_oil_netexp	(Net Oil Export Value)
ross_oil_netexpc	(Net Oil Exp. Value /Capita)
ross_gas_prod	(Gas Production)
ross_gas_value	(Gas Production)
ross_gas_price	(Constant Price of Gas)
ross_gas_exp	(Gas Export)
ross_gas_netexp	(Net Gas Export Value)
ross_gas_netexpc	(Net Gas Exp. Value /Capita)
solt_ginet	(Gini Disposable Income)
solt_ginmar	(Gini Gross Income)
solt_redist	(Estimated % Reduction Gross)
t_demyrs	(Years of Democracy)
t_alldem	(Demo. All Years 1930-1995)
t_paper	(Newspaper /1000)
t_tvsets	(Television sets / 1000)
t_fed	(Classified as a Federation)
t_subrev	(Subnat. % of Revenues)
t_subexp	(Subnat. Share Expenditures)
t_fuel	(Mineral Fuels Manufact. Exp.)
t_yot	(Year Opened to Trade)
undp_gii	(Gender Inequality Index)
une_preef	(Pre-Primary Edu. Enrollment F)
une_preem	(Pre-Primary Edu. Enroll. M)
une_preet	(Pre-Primary Edu. Enrol. Tot)
une_pef	(Primary Edu. Enrollment F)
une_pem	(Primary Edu. Enrollment M)
une_pet	(Primary Edu. Enrollment, Tot)
une_sef	(Secondary Edu. Enrollment, F)
une_sem	(Secondary Edu. Enrollment M)
une_set	(Secondary Edu. Enroll.Tot)

HTG (HOW TO GET IT) 5/5

une_tef   (Tertiary Edu. Enrollment F)
une_tem   (Tertiary Edu. Enrollment M)
une_tet   (Tertiary Edu. Enrollment Tot)
une_ppepre   (% Private Pre-Primary Enroll.)
une_ppep   (% Private Primary Enrollment)
une_ppes   (% Private Secondary Enroll.)
unna_er   (Exchange rate)
unna_gdp   (Real GDP)
unna_pop   (Population)
utip_ehii   (Household Income Inequality)
utip_ipi   (Industrial Pay Inequality)
van_urban   (Urban Population %)
van_nagric   (Non-Agricultural Population %)
van_occup   (Occupational Diversification)
van_students (Students)
van_studentsp (Students %)
van_literates (Literates %)
van_knowdist (Knowledge Distribution)
van_familyf   (Family Farms %)
van_decent   (Decentralization of Resources)
van_distec   (Distribution: Econ. Power)
van_powres   (Power Resources)
van_mean   (Power Resources)
wdi_aid   (Development Aid)
wdi_aidcu   (Development Aid)
wdi_gdpc   (GDP per capita, PPP)

wdi_gni   (GNI, Atlas method)
wdi_gnipc   (GNI per Capita, Atlas method)
wdi_gdpcu   (GDP)
wdi_gdp   (GDP, PPP)
wdi_area   (Land Area)
wdi_dn   (Daily newspapers)
wdi_pl   (Phone lines)
wdi_inet   (Internet users)
wdi_fe   (Fuel exports)
wdi_oame   (Ores and metals exports)
wdi_me   (Merchandise exports)
wdi_gini   (Gini Index)
wdi_isl20   (Income share held low. 20%)
wdi_megdp   (Military expenditure)
wdi_mege   (Military expenditure)
wdi_pop   (Population)
wdi_tds   (Total Debt Service)
wdi_urban   (Urban population)
wdi_wip   (Women in Parliament)
wdi_tot   (Terms of Trade)
wdi_ttr   (Total Trade)
wdi_exp   (Exports)
wdi_imp   (Imports)
wr_regtype   (Regime Type)
wr_nonautocracy (Non-Autocracy)

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WYG (WHAT YOU GET) 1/3

bdm_hobbes (Hobbes Index)
bdm_short   (Short)
bdm_nasty   (Nasty)
bdm_solitary (Solitary)
bdm_poor   (Poor)
bdm_brute   (Brutish)
epi_epi   (Environmental Performance)
epi_acsat   (Access to Sanitation)
epi_agsub   (Agricultural Subsidies)
epi_aze   (Critical Habitat Protection)
epi_chmort   (Child Mortality)
epi_co2cap   (CO2 Emissions per Capita)
epi_co2gdp   (CO2 Emissions per GDP)
epi_co2kwh   (CO2 Emissions/Electricity)
epi_forcov   (Forest Cover Change)
epi_forgrow   (Forest Growing Stock)
epi_forloss   (Forest Loss)
epi_fsoc   (Fish Stocks Overexploited)
epi_indoor   (Indoor Air Pollution)
epi_mpaeez   (Marine Protection)
epi_pacov   (Biome Protection)
epi_pm25   (Particulate Matter)
epi_pops   (Pesticide Regulation)
epi_renew   (Renewable Electricity)
epi_so2cap   (SO2 Emissions per Capita)
epi_so2gdp   (SO2 Emissions per GDP)
epi_tceez   (Coastal Shelf Fishing)
epi_watsup   (Access to Drinking Water)
fao_fcc05_10 (Forest Cover Change 2005-10)
fao_fcc00_05 (Forest Cover Change 2000-05)
fao_fcc90_00 (Forest Cover Change 1990-00)
fao_fpic   (Fish Prod. Inland Capture)
fao_fpmc   (Fish Prod. Marine Capture)
fao_fe   (Fish Export)
fao_fi   (Fish Import)
ffp_fsi   (Failed States Index)
gid_fptw   (♀ Professional & Tech. Work.)
gid_rfmi   (Female/Male Income)
gid_whp   (Women in High Positions)
gid_wip   (Women in Parliament)
hg_gsi   (Good Society Index)
ihme_nm   (Neonatal Mortality Rate)
ihme_pnm   (Postneonatal Mortality Rate)
ihme_fmort   (Under-5 Mortality Rate)
ihme_mmr   (Maternal Mortality Ratio)
ucdp_type1   (Extrasystemic armed conflict)
ucdp_type2   (Interstate armed conflict)
ucdp_type3   (Internal armed conflict)
ucdp_type4   (Internationalized conflict)
ucdp_count   (Number of Conflicts)

ucdp_loc   (Conflict Location)
undp_hdi   (Human Development Index)
wdh_ygm80_83 (Years in Good Mood)
wdh_ygm90_91 (Years in Good Mood)
wdh_ylh80_83 (Years Lived Happy)
wdh_ylh90_91 (Years Lived Happy)
wdh_ylh90_95 (Years Lived Happy)
wdh_ylh90_98 (Years Lived Happy)
wdh_yls80_83 (Years Lived Satisfied)
wdh_yls90_91 (Years Lived Satisfied)
wdh_yls90_95 (Years Lived Satisfied)
wdh_yls90_98 (Years Lived Satisfied)
wdi_gdpgr   (GDP Growth)
wdi_gdpcgr   (GDP per Capita Growth)
wdi_pb2   (Pop. Below $2 a Day)
wdi_pb125   (Pop. Below $1.25 a Day)
wdi_pbpl   (Pop. Below Poverty Line)
wdi_lifexp   (Life Expectancy at Birth)
wdi_mort   (Infant Mortality Rate)
wdi_fmort   (Mortality rate, under-5)
wdi_hiv   (Prevalence of HIV)
wdi_hec   (Health expenditure per capita)
wdi_prhe   (Private Health Expenditure)
wdi_puhe   (Public Health Expenditure)
wdi_the   (Total Health Expenditure)
wdi_gbds   (Gov. budget deficit/surplus)
wdi_cgd   (Central government debt)
wdi_gr   (Government revenue)
wdi_tr   (Tax revenue)
wdi_gew   (Compensation of employees)
wdi_ge   (Government Expense)
wdi_gce   (Gov. Consumption Expend.)
wdi_co2   (CO2 emissions)
wdi_epc   (Electric power consumption)
wdi_eu   (Energy use)
wdi_fw   (Annual freshwater withdraw)
wdi_aas   (Access to Adequate Sanitation)
wdi_iws   (Access to Water)
wdi_ase   (Agriculture % of Econ.)
wdi_ise   (Industry % Econ.)
wdi_sse   (Services % of Econ.)
wdi_brd   (Battle-Related Deaths)
wdi_idp   (Internally Displaced Persons)
wdi_eodb   (Ease of Doing Business)
wdi_trsb   (Time to Start a Business)
wdi_fdi   (Foreign Direct Investments)
wdi_fr   (Fertility Rate)
wdi_gris   (Gender Ration in School)
wdi_infl   (Inflation)
wdi_rir   (Real interest rate)

WYG (WHAT YOU GET) 2/3

wdi_ue	(Unemployment)	
wdi_lue	(Long-term unemployment)	
wef_gend	(Gender Gap Index)	
wef_gci	(Global Competitiveness Index)	
wef_gdp	(GDP)	
wef_pop	(Population)	
wef_gdpc	(GDP per Capita)	
wef_gdpp1	(GDP/World GDP)	
wef_gdpp2	(GDP)	
wef_ptp	(Public Trust in Politicians)	
wef_wgs	(Wastefulness Gov. Spending)	
wef_gsibp	(Gov. Service Business Perfom.)	
wef_qoi	(Quality of Infrastructure)	
wef_qroad	(Quality of Roads)	
wef_qrail	(Quality of Railroad)	
wef_qport	(Quality of Port)	
wef_qair	(Quality of Air Transport)	
wef_aas	(Available Airline Seat)	
wef_elec	(Quality Electricity Supply)	
wef_mobile	(Mobile Tele. Subscriptions)	
wef_tele	(Telephone Lines)	
wef_gbb	(Gov. Budget Balance)	
wef_gns	(Gross National Savings)	
wef_infl	(Inflation)	
wef_gd	(General Government Debt)	
wef_ccr	(Country Credit Rating)	
wef_bim	(Business Impact of Malaria)	
wef_cm	(Malaria Cases)	
wef_bit	(Business Impact: Tuberculosis)	
wef_ct	(Tuberculosis Cases)	
wef_bihiv	(Business Impact of HIV/AIDS)	
wef_chiv	(HIV Prevalence)	
wef_imort	(Infant Mortality)	
wef_lifexp	(Life Expectancy)	
wef_qpe	(Quality of Primary Edu.)	
wef_qes	(Quality of the Edu. Sys.)	
wef_ias	(Internet Access in Schools)	
wef_ilc	(Intensity: Local Competition)	
wef_md	(Extent of Market Dominance)	
wef_eet	(Extent and Effect of Taxation)	
wef_tax	(Total Tax Rate)	
wef_bd	(Brain Drain)	
wef_wlf	(Women in Labor Force)	
wef_ci	(Capacity for Innovation)	
wef_qsri	(Qual: Scientific Research Inst.)	
wef_uic	(Uni.-Ind. Collaboration in R&D)	
wri_pa	(Protected Land Area)	
wvs_module	(WVS Module)	
wvs_a008	(Feeling of Happiness)	
wvs_a009	(State of Health)	

wvs_a062	(How often discusses politics)
wvs_a165	(Most people can be trusted)
wvs_a168	(Most people take advantage?)
wvs_a170	(How satisfied with life?)
wvs_a173	(How much freedom you feel)
wvs_c006	(Satisfaction with financial situ.)
wvs_e023	(Interested in politics)
wvs_e150	(Follows politics in the news)
wvs_b001	(Give income for environment)
wvs_b002	(Taxes to prevent pollution)
wvs_b003	(Gov. should reduce pollution)
wvs_b008	(Environment vs. Econ. Growth)
wvs_b009	(Human & nature)
wvs_e033	(Self-positioning: political scale)
wvs_e035	(Incomes more equal)
wvs_e036	(Private ownership of business)
wvs_e037	(Gov. more responsibility)
wvs_e039	(Competition is good)
wvs_e196	(Widespread is corruption)
wvs_e069_01	(Confidence: Churches)
wvs_e069_02	(Confidence: Armed Forces)
wvs_e069_04	(Confidence: Press)
wvs_e069_05	(Confidence: Labor Unions)
wvs_e069_06	(Confidence: Police)
wvs_e069_07	(Confidence: Parliament)
wvs_e069_08	(Confidence: Civil Services)
wvs_e069_09	(Confidence: Soc. Security Sys.)
wvs_e069_10	(Confidence: Television)
wvs_e069_11	(Confidence: Government)
wvs_e069_12	(Confidence: Pol. Parties)
wvs_e069_13	(Confidence: Major Comp.)
wvs_e069_14	(Confidence: Environment Org.)
wvs_e069_15	(Confidence: ♀ Movement)
wvs_e069_17	(Confidence: Justice System)
wvs_e069_18	(Confidence: EU)
wvs_e069_19	(Confidence: NATO)
wvs_e069_20	(Confidence: UN)
wvs_e114	(Having a strong leader)
wvs_e115	(Having experts make decisions)
wvs_e116	(Having the army rule)
wvs_e117	(Having a Demo. Pol. Sys.)
wvs_e120	(Dem: Econ. Sys. Runs badly)
wvs_e121	(Demo. Are indecisive)
wvs_e122	(Demo. Aren't good at order)
wvs_e123	(Demo. Problems but is better)
wvs_e124	(Respect for ind. Human rights)
wvs_e110	(Demo. Is developing)
wvs_e125	(Satisfaction: people in office)
wvs_e128	(Country is run by big interest)
wvs_f114	(Justifiable: Claiming Benefits)

WYG (WHAT YOU GET) 3/3

wvs_f115   (Justifiable: Fare on Public Transport)
wvs_f116   (Justifiable: Cheating on Taxes)
wvs_f117   (Justifiable: Accepting a Bribe)
wvs_sup   (Support for democracy)
wvs_org   (Belong to organizations)
wvs_vol   (Voluntary work for org.)
wvs_theo   (Support for theocracy)
wvs_act   (Political Action)
wvs_pm4   (Post-Materialism)
wvs_pm12   (Post-Materialism)
wvs_gen   (Gender Equality Scale)
wvs_rs   (Religiosity Scale)
wvs_selfexp1 (Self-expression values)
wvs_selfexp2 (Self-expression values)
wvs_selfexp3 (Self-expression values)
wvs_secrat   (Secular-rational values)
wvs_abort   (Justifiable: Abortion)
wvs_homo   (Justifiable: Homo.)
wvs_auth   (Respect for authority)
wvs_auton   (Autonomy index)
wvs_happy   (Happiness)
wvs_lib   (Liberty and participation)
wvs_lifsat   (Life satisfaction)
wvs_pet   (Public self-expression)
wvs_proud   (National pride)
wvs_rel   (Religiousness)
wvs_tol   (Tolerance of diversity)
wvs_trust   (Interpersonal trust)

IDENTIFICATION VARIABLES

Country and Case Identifier Codes

ccode   **Country Code**
Numeric country code based on the ISO-3166-1 standard. All the numeric country codes are unique and this is thus the variable best suitable to use when merging files (in combination with year for time-series data). (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1_numeric) Back?

ccodealp   **3-letter Country Code**
3-letter country code based on the ISO-3166-1 alpha3 standard. Please note, the ccodealp variable does not uniquely identify all countries. Back?

cname   **Country Name**
The name of the countries. Back?

ccodewb   **Country Code World Bank**
Numeric country code from the World Bank. Back?

ccodecow   **Country Code Correlates of War**
Numeric country code from the Correlates of War. Back?

year   **Year**

cname_year   **Country Name and Year**

ccodealp_year   **3-letter Country Code and Year**

version   **Version of the Dataset**

WII (WHAT IT IS)

Bernhard, Nordstrom & Reenock

http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/bernhard/content/data/data.htm   (2013- 03-07)

(Bernhard, Nordstrom & Reenock 2001)

Event History Coding of Democratic Breakdowns

bnr_dem   Democratic Breakdown

The variable is a binary coding of all democracies from 1913 until 2005 (included in the QoG dataset are only the years 1946-2005) prepared for use in event history analysis. Countries that meet the minimum conditions for democracy (see below) enter the dataset and are coded "0." When countries cease to meet those minimum criteria they are coded "1" and exit from the dataset. If, after a democratic breakdown, a country again meets our minimum criteria it re-enters the data as a new democratic episode. The time frame onset in 1913 is a function of when the first country (Norway) meets the minimum conditions. All series terminate in either in a breakdown in various years or right censorship in 2005.

The minimal conditions are based on Dahl's notion of polyarchy (competitiveness, inclusiveness) combined with Linz and Stepan's stateness criteria.

Competitiveness: Like Przeworski et al. we include countries that hold elections for both the executive and legislature, and in which more than one party contests the elections. However, we exclude cases in which we detected outcome changing vote fraud, in which there was either extensive or extreme violence that inhibited voters' preference expression, or in which political parties representing a substantial portion of the population were banned.

Inclusiveness: We only include competitive polities in which at least fifty percent of all adult citizens are enfranchised to vote in our set of democracies.

Stateness: We also considered questions of sovereignty, not including colonial states, where founding elections were held prior to the granting of independence, and countries experiencing internal wars in which twenty percent or greater of the population or territory was out of control of the state.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1946-2005

N: N/A   **N**: 196   **n**: 8060 $\bar{N}$: 134 $\bar{T}$: 41

52

Bertelsmann Transformation Index
http://www.bti-project.org/index/   (2013-04-11)
(Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012)

Democracy and Management

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bti_ds   Democracy Status
The score for Democracy Status is obtained by calculating the mean value of the ratings for the following variables: stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions and political and social integration.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

---

bti_st   Stateness
The variable measure to what extent the state's monopoly on the use of force covers the entire territory; to what extent all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation state as legitimate; to what extent the state's legitimacy and its legal order is defined without inference by religious dogmas; and to what extent basic administrative structures exist.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

---

bti_pp   Political Participation

The variable examine if rulers are determined by general, free and fair elections; if democratically elected leaders have the effective power to govern or if there are veto powers and political enclaves; if independent political and civic groups can associate freely; and to what extent citizens, organizations and the mass media can express opinions freely.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

bti_rol   Rule of Law

The variable measures to what extent a working separation of powers exists; to what extent an independent judiciary exists, to what extent there are legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions; and to what extent civil liberties are guaranteed and protected.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

bti_sdi   Stability of Democratic Institutions

The variable measures to what extent the democratic institutions, including the administrative and judicial systems, are capable of performing, and the extent to which the democratic institutions are accepted or supported by the relevant actors.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

bti_psi   Political and Social Integration

The variable examines to what extent there is a stable, moderate and socially rooted party system to articulate and aggregate societal interests; to what extent there is a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system; how strong citizen consent is to democratic norms and procedures; and to what extent social self-organization and the construction of social capital have advanced.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2010
N: 127

Years: 2003-2012
N: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

bti_mi   Management Index

The Management Index is based on Level of Difficulty (bti_lod) and Management Performance (bti_mp), as defined below. The Level of Difficulty criterion accounts for the fact that the quality transformation management is shaped by each state's unique structural conditions. The more adverse a state's structural conditions and the more limited its available resources, the higher the good governance is scored in the Management Index.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2010
N: 127

Years: 2003-2012
N: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

bti_lod — Level of Difficulty

The variable measures to what extent structural difficulties constrain the political leadership's governance capacity; to what extent there are traditions of civil society; how serious ethnic, religious and social conflicts are; per capita GNI PPP (2005); UN Education Index as a measure of the educational level; and Stateness and Rule of Law (average of BTI variables above).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010
N: 127

Years: 2003-2012
N: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

bti_mp — Management Performance

The score for Management Performance is obtained by calculating the mean value of the ratings for the following criteria: Steering Capability, Resource Efficiency, Consensus-Building and International Cooperation.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2010
N: 127

Years: 2003-2012
N: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

bti_sc — Steering Capability

The variable evaluates to what extent the political leadership sets and maintains strategic priori-ties; how effective the government is in implementing reform policy; how flexible and innovative the political leadership is; and if the political leadership learns from past errors.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010
N: 127

Years: 2003-2012
N: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

56

bti_re   **Resource Efficiency**

The variable measures to what extent the government makes efficient use of available economic and human resources; to what extent the government can coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent policy; and to what extent government successfully contains corruption.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

bti_cb   **Consensus-Building**

The variable measures to what extent the major political actors agree on a market economy and democracy as strategic long-term aims; to what extent the reformers can exclude or co-opt anti-democratic veto actors; to what extent the political leadership can manage political cleavages so that they do not escalate into irreconcilable conflicts; to what extent the political leadership enables the participation of civil society in the political process; and to what extent the political leadership can bring about reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators of past injustices.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

bti_ic   **International Cooperation**

The variable evaluates to what extent the political leadership uses the support of international partners to improve its domestic reform policies; to what extent the government acts as a credible and reliable partner in its relations with the international community; and to what extent the political leadership is willing to cooperate with neighboring countries in regional and international organizations.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012

N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm   (2013-01-21)

(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003)

The Logic of Political Survival Data Source

The variables are made from data from several data sources; see each variable for the original sources.

Note: We have decided to drop cases that could not be clearly identified.

bdm_s   **Selectorate Size**

Selectorate is defined as the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteris-tics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government's leadership. This variable is measured through the breadth of the selectiveness of the members of each country's legislature.

(0)   No legislature
(0.5)   The legislature is chosen by heredity or ascription or is simply chosen by the effective executive
(1)   The members of the legislature are directly or indirectly selected by popular election.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1946-1999

N: N/A   **N**: 194   **n**: 6998 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 36

bdm_w   **Winning Coalition Size**

The winning coalition is defined as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society. This variable is measured as a composite index based on whether the regime is civil or military, the openness and competition of executive recruitment, and the competitiveness of participation. The index varies from 0 (smallest) to 1 (largest winning coalition) Original sources are Banks (1996) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   _Back?_

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1946-1999
N: N/A   **N**: 199   **n**: 7268 $\overline{N}$: 135 $\overline{T}$: 37

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bdm_w_s   **Winning Coalition Size Relative to Selectorate Size**

The Winning Coalition size relative to Selectorate size. W/S is transformed to avoid division by zero: bdm_w/(log((bdm_s+1)*10)/3).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   _Back?_

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1946-1999
N: N/A   **N**: 194   **n**: 6998 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 36

Coppedge, Alvarez & Maldonado

http://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm   (2013-01-23)

(Coppedge et al. 2008)

Comparative Political Data Set I 1960-2010

Robert Dahl (1971) defined two dimensions of polyarchy – contestation and inclusiveness. There is contestation when citizens have unimpaired opportunities to:

- formulate their preferences
- signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action
- have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government

Inclusiveness is variation in the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government. These data reflect an effort to measures these two dimensions of polyarchy independently on a cross-section of countries over time.

Both dimensions are measured as a principal component factor index using three overlapping samples of country years: 1950-1971, 1972-1988, and 1981-2000. Each principal component analysis is repeated in each of the three pooled samples. Then the means and standard deviations for contestation and inclusiveness are calculated by year. The standardized score on each dimen-sion is then the original score multiplied by the annual standard deviation, plus the annual mean score. For the years with overlapping samples (1981-1988), the means and standard deviations were chained forward from the 1981 scores based on the average changes in both samples, and from the 1988 scores based on the changes in the most recent sample.

---

cam_contest   Contestation (standardized version)

A principal component factor index of a number of indicators of contestation. The exact nature and data sources for these indicators vary by country year sample; see Coppedge et al. (2008) for more detailed information.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1950-2000
N: 205   **n**: 7376 $\overline{N}$: 145 $\overline{T}$: 36

---

cam_inclusive   Inclusiveness (standardized version)

A principal component factor index of a number of indicators of contestation. The exact nature and data sources for these indicators vary by country year sample; see Coppedge et al. (2008) for more detailed information.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1950-2000
N: 205   **n**: 7376 $\overline{N}$: 145 $\overline{T}$: 36

Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland

https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited

(Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010)   (2013-01-22)

Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited

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chga_demo   Democracy

A regime is considered a democracy if the executive and the legislature is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is de facto existence of multiple parties outside of regime front, there are multiple parties within the legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage (e.g. unconstitutional closing of the lower house or extension of incumbent's term by postponing of subsequent elections). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

(0)   No Democracy
(1)   Democracy

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008   **Years**: 1946-2008
N: 192   **N**: 205   **n**: 8991 $\overline{N}$: 143 $\overline{T}$: 44

Cingranelli & Richards

http://www.humanrightsdata.org/   (2013-01-22)

(Cingranelli & Richards 2010)

Human Rights Dataset

The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset contains standards-based quantitative information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 195 countries, annually from 1981-2010. It is designed for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and consequences of human rights violations, as well as policy makers and analysts who seek to estimate the human rights effects of a wide variety of institutional changes and public policies including democratization, economic aid, military aid, structural adjustment, and humanitarian intervention.

Note: We have decided to recode the following codes as missing: -66 (country is occupied by foreign powers), -77 (complete collapse of central authority) and -999 (missing).

ciri_assn   **Freedom of Assembly and Association**

It is an internationally recognized right of citizens to assemble freely and to associate with other persons in political parties, trade unions, cultural organizations, or other special-interest groups. This variable indicates the extent to which the freedoms of assembly and association are subject to actual governmental limitations or restrictions (as opposed to strictly legal protections).

(0)   Citizens' rights to freedom of assembly or association were severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens.

(1)   These rights were limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for select groups.

(2)   These rights were virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 4724 $\bar{N}$: 157 $\bar{T}$: 24

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ciri_disap   **Disappearance**

Disappearances are cases in which people have disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been found. Knowledge of the whereabouts of the disappeared is, by definition, not public knowledge. However, while there is typically no way of knowing where victims are, it is typically known by whom they were taken and under what circumstances.

(0)   Disappearances have occurred frequently.
(1)   Disappearances occasionally occurred.
(2)   Disappearances did not occur.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 4715 $\bar{N}$: 157 $\bar{T}$: 24

ciri_dommov   Freedom of Domestic Movement

This variable indicates citizens' freedom to travel within their own country.

(0)   Severely restricted freedom
(1)   Somewhat restricted freedom
(2)   Unrestricted freedom

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years:** 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 5306 $\overline{N}$: 177 $\overline{T}$: 27

ciri_elecsd   Electoral Self-Determination

This variable indicates to what extent citizens enjoy freedom of political choice and the legal right and ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them through free and fair elections. This right is sometimes known as the right to selfdetermination.

(0)   The right to self-determination through free and fair elections did not exist in law or practice.

(1)   While citizens had the legal right to self-determination, there were some limitations to the fulfillment of this right in practice. Therefore, in states receiving a 1, political participation was only moderately free and open.

(2)   Political participation was very free and open and citizens had the right to self-determination through free and fair elections in both law and practice.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 4729 $\overline{N}$: 158 $\overline{T}$: 24

ciri_empinx_new   Empowerment Rights Index (new)

This is an additive index constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 4689 $\overline{N}$: 156 $\overline{T}$: 24

ciri_empinx_old   Empowerment Rights Index (old)

This is an additive index constructed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers' Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 10 (full government respect for these five rights).

Note: Starting with the 2007 coding, this variable was retired in favor of the newer index ciri_empinx_new

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006   **Years**: 1981-2006
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 3953 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 20

ciri_formov   Freedom of Foreign Movement

This variable indicates citizens' freedom to leave and return to their country.

(0)   The freedom of foreign movement was severely restricted
(1)   The freedom of foreign movement was somewhat restricted
(2)   Unrestricted freedom of foreign movement.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 204   **n**: 5304 $\overline{N}$: 177 $\overline{T}$: 27

ciri_injud   Independence of the Judiciary

This variable indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military.

(0)   Not independent judiciary.
(1)   Partially independent judiciary.
(2)   Generally independent judiciary.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 5289 $\overline{N}$: 176 $\overline{T}$: 27

ciri_kill   Extrajudicial Killing

Extrajudicial killings are killings by government officials without due process of law. They include murders by private groups *if* instigated by government. These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others.

(0)   Extrajudicial killings were practiced frequently.
(1)   Extrajudicial killings were practiced occasionally.
(2)   Extrajudicial killings did not occur.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 4713 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 24

ciri_move_old   Freedom of Movement (old)

This variable indicates citizens' freedom to travel within their own country and to leave and return to that country.

(0)   Domestic and foreign travel was restricted.
(1)   Domestic and foreign travel was generally unrestricted.

Note: Starting with the 2007 coding, this variable was retired and became two separate variables, Freedom of Domestic Movement (ciri_dommov) and Freedom of International Movement (ciri_formov).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 3970 $\overline{N}$: 132 $\overline{T}$: 20

ciri_physint   Physical Integrity Rights Index

This is an additive index constructed from the Torture (ciri_tort), Extrajudicial Killing (ciri_kill), Political Imprisonment (ciri_polpris), and Disappearance (ciri_disap) indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009-2010
N: 192

Years: 1981-2010
N: 199   **n**: 4697 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 24

ciri_polpris   Political Imprisonment

Political imprisonment refers to the incarceration of people by government officials because of: their speech; their non-violent opposition to government policies or leaders; their religious beliefs; their non-violent religious practices including proselytizing; or their membership in a group, including an ethnic or racial group.

(0)   There were many people imprisoned because of their religious, political or other beliefs.
(1)   A few people were imprisoned.
(2)   No persons were imprisoned for any of the above reasons.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009-2010
N: 192

Years: 1981-2010
N: 199   **n**: 4720 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 24

67

ciri_relfre_new   **Freedom of Religion (New)**

This variable indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. Citizens should be able to freely practice their religion and proselytize (attempt to convert) other citizens to their religion as long as such attempts are done in a non-coercive, peaceful manner.

(0)   Government restrictions on religious practices are severe and widespread
(1)   Government restrictions on religious practices are moderate
(2)   Government restrictions on religious practices are practically absent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 5267 $\overline{N}$: 176 $\overline{T}$: 26

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ciri_relfre_old   **Freedom of Religion (Old)**

This variable indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. Citizens should be able to freely practice their religion and proselytize (attempt to convert) other citizens to their religion as long as such attempts are done in a non-coercive, peaceful manner.

(0)   The government restricted some religious practices.
(1)   The government placed no restrictions on religious practices.

Note: Starting with the 2007 coding, this variable was retired.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006   **Years**: 1981-2006
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 3960 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 20

ciri_speech   Freedom of Speech

This variable indicates the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government censorship, including ownership of media outlets. Censorship is any form of restriction that is placed on freedom of the press, speech or expression. Expression may be in the form of art or music.

(0)   Government censorship of the media was complete.
(1)   Some government censorship of the media.
(2)   No government censorship of the media.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 4729 $\overline{N}$: 158 $\overline{T}$: 24

ciri_tort   Torture

Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading. This also includes deaths in custody due to negligence by government officials.

(0)   Torture was practiced frequently.
(1)   Torture was practiced occasionally.
(2)   Torture did not occur.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199   **n**: 4719 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 24

ciri_wecon   **Women's Economic Rights**

Women's economic rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights include:

- Equal pay for equal work
- Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent
- The right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent
- Equality in hiring and promotion practices
- Job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs, etc...)
- Non-discrimination by employers
- The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace
- The right to work at night
- The right to work in occupations classified as dangerous
- The right to work in the military and the police force

(0)   There were no economic rights for women in law and that systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law.

(1)   Women had some economic rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced.

(2)   Women had some economic rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in economic matters.

(3)   All or nearly all of women's economic rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in practice.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Years: 2009

N: 192

Years: 1981-2010

N: 199   **n**: 4661 $\overline{N}$: 155 $\overline{T}$: 23

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

ciri_wopol   Women's Political Rights

Women's political rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights include:

- The right to vote
- The right to run for political office
- The right to hold elected and appointed government positions
- The right to join political parties
- The right to petition government officials

(0)   Women's political rights were not guaranteed by law.

(1)   Women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but severely prohibited in practice.

(2)   Women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but were still moderately prohibited in practice.

(3)   Women's political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199 **n**: 4712 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 24

ciri_worker   Workers' Rights

Workers should have freedom of association at their workplaces and the right to bargain collectively with their employers. This variable indicates the extent to which workers enjoy these and other internationally recognized rights at work, including a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; a minimum age for the employment of children; and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.

(0)   Workers' rights were severely restricted.
(1)   Workers' rights were somewhat restricted.
(2)   Workers' rights were fully protected.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1981-2010
N: 192   **N**: 199 **n**: 4728 $\overline{N}$: 158 $\overline{T}$: 24

ciri_wosoc   **Women's Social Rights**

Women's social rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights include:

- The right to equal inheritance
- The right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men
- The right to travel abroad
- The right to obtain a passport
- The right to confer citizenship to children or a husband
- The right to initiate a divorce
- The right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage
- The right to participate in social, cultural, and community activities
- The right to an education
- The freedom to choose a residence/domicile
- Freedom from female genital mutilation of children and of adults without their consent
- Freedom from forced sterilization

(0)   There were no social rights for women in law and that systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law.

(1)   Women had some social rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced.

(2)   Women had some social rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in social matters.

(3)   All or nearly all of women's social rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforced these laws in practice.

Note: This Variable was retired as of 2005.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007   **Years**: 1981-2007
N: 184   **N**: 199   **n**: 3633 $\overline{N}$: 135 $\overline{T}$: 18

Economist Intelligence Unit

http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf   (2013-01-28)

(Kekic 2007)

Index of Democracy

eiu_iod   Index of Democracy

The index of democracy is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped into the five following categories. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five variables below.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 165   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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eiu_cl   Civil Liberties

Civil liberties include freedom of speech, expression and the press; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to due judicial process.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 165   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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eiu_dpc   Democratic Political Culture

The Democratic Political Culture index measures the extent to which there is a societal consensus supporting democratic principles.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 165   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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eiu_epp   **Electoral Process and Pluralism**
This category is based on indicators relating to the condition of having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 165   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

eiu_fog   **Functioning of Government**
The Functioning of Government category is based on indicators relating to e.g. the extent to which control over government is exercised by elected representatives, the capability of the civil service, and the pervasiveness of corruption.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 165   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

eiu_pp   **Political Participation**
The Political Participation index measures among other things the adult literacy rate, the amount of women in parliament, and the extent to which citizens freely choose to elect representatives and join political parties.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 165   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

Evans & Rauch

http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jrauch/research_bureaucracy.html   (2013-01-28)

(Evans & Rauch 2000)

Bureaucratic Structure and Economic Performance

Used in the article Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of 'Weberian' State Structures on Economic Growth," by Peter B. Evans and James E. Rauch

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er_career   Career Opportunities

The respondents were asked to choose 'the four most important agencies in the central state bureaucracy in order of their power to shape overall economic policy'. "Career Opportunities" is an equal-weight index, ranging from 0 to 1, of the following five questions:

- Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. appointed by the President or Chief Executive)? ("none", "just agency chiefs", "agency chiefs and vice-chiefs", "all of top 2 or 3 levels").

- Of political appointees to these positions, what proportion is likely to already be members of the higher civil service? ("less than 30%", "30–70%", "more than 70%")

- Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are political appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself or its associated ministry(ies) if the agency is not itself a ministry? ("less than 50%", "50–70%", "70–90%", "over 90%").

- What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in one of these agencies during his career? ("1–5 years", "5–10 years", "10–20 years", "entire career")

- What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies through a higher civil service examination early in his / her career reasonably expect? Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between an entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency? (if respondent circled 'if performance is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below political appointees is not an unreasonable expectation' or 'in at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within the civil service and then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political appointments' and not 'in most cases, will move up one or two levels but no more' or 'in most cases, will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level just below political appointees').

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 34   **N**: 34   Country Constant Variable

er_salary Bureaucratic Compensation

Bureaucratic Compensation concerns the change of bureaucratic compensation relative to the private sector. It is an equal-weight index of the following two questions:

- How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or other extralegal sources of income) of higher officials in these agencies relative to those of private sector manag-ers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities? ("less than 50%", "50–80%", "80–90%", "Comparable", "Higher")

- Over the period in question (roughly 1970–1990) what was the movement of legal income in these agencies relative to salaries in the private sector? ("declined dramatically", "declined slightly", "maintained the same position", "improved their position").

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 34

Years: 1946-2012
N: 34   Country Constant Variable

er_merit Meritocratic Recruitment

Meritocratic Recruitment addresses the extent to which recruitment is meritocratic at the entry level. It is an equal-weight index of two questions, where each question and the index itself has been normalized to lie in the range 0–1.

- Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these agencies enters the civil service via a formal examination system? ("less than 30%", "30–60%", "60–90%," "more than 90%")

- Of those that do *not* enter via examinations, what proportion has university or postgraduate degrees? ("less than 30%", "30–60%", "60–90%", "more than 90%").

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 34

Years: 1946-2012
N: 34   Country Constant Variable

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

Freedom House

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores

(Freedom House 2013)   (2013-02-01)

Note: The 1982 edition of *Freedom in the World* covers the period Jan 1981- Aug 1982 (=1981 in our dataset). The 1983-84 edition covers the period Aug 1982 – Nov 1983 (=1983 in our dataset). This leaves 1982 empty.

For 1972, South Africa was in the original data rated as "White" (fh_cl: 3, fh_pr: 2, fh_status: Free) and "Black" (fh_cl: 6, fh_pr: 5, fh_status: Not Free). We treat South Africa 1972 as missing.

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fh_status   **Status**

(1)   Free
(2)   Partly Free
(3)   Not Free

Note: Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "Partly Free", and between 5.5 and 7.0 "Not Free". Since then, countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered "Free", 3.0 to 5.0 "Partly Free", and 5.5 to 7.0 "Not Free".

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1972-2012
N: 193   **N**: 207   **n**: 7040 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 34

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fh_pr   **Political Rights**

Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1972-2012
N: 193   **N**: 207   **n**: 7040 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 34

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
fh_cl   **Civil Liberties**

Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1972-2012
N: 193   **N**: 207   **n**: 7040 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 34

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fh_aor   **Associational and Organizational Rights**

The variable evaluates the freedom of assembly, demonstrations and open public discussion; the freedom for nongovernmental organization; and the freedom for trade unions, peasant organizations and other professional and private organizations. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2005-2012
N: 193   **N**: 196   **n**: 1542 $\overline{N}$: 193 $\overline{T}$: 8

fh_feb   **Associational and Organizational Rights**

The variable measures the freedom and independence of the media and other cultural expressions; the freedom of religious groups to practice their faith and express themselves; the academic freedom and freedom from extensive political indoctrination in the educational system; and the ability of the people to engage in private (political) discussions without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2005-2012
N: 193   **N**: 196   **n**: 1542 $\overline{N}$: 193 $\overline{T}$: 8

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fh_rol   **Rule of Law**

The variable measures the independence of the judiciary; the extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters; the existence of direct civil control over the police; the protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile and torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and the extent to which laws, policies and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2005-2012
N: 193   **N**: 196   **n**: 1542 $\overline{N}$: 193 $\overline{T}$: 8

fh_pair   Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

The variable evaluates the extent of state control over travel, choice of residence, employment or institution of higher education; the right of citizens to own property and establish private businesses; the private business' freedom from unduly influence by government officials, security forces, political parties or organized crime; gender equality, freedom of choice of marriage partners and size of family; equality of opportunity and absence of economic exploitation. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2005-2012

N: 193   **N**: 196   **n**: 1542 $\overline{N}$: 193 $\overline{T}$: 8

fh_ep   Electoral Process

The variable measures to what extent the national legislative representatives and the national chief authority are elected through free and fair elections. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2005-2012

N: 193   **N**: 196   **n**: 1542 $\overline{N}$: 193 $\overline{T}$: 8

fh_ppp   Political Pluralism and Participation

This variable encompasses an examination of the right of the people to freely organize in political parties; the existence of an opposition with a realistic possibility to increase its support; the ability of the people to make political choices free from domination by the military, totalitarian parties or other powerful groups; and the existence of full political rights for all minorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2005-2012
N: 193   **N**: 196   **n**: 1542 $\overline{N}$: 193 $\overline{T}$: 8

fh_fog   Functioning of Government

The variable examines in what extent the freely elected head of government and a national legislative representative determine the policies of the government; if the government is free from pervasive corruption; and if the government is accountable to the electorate between elections and operates with openness and transparency. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2005-2012
N: 193   **N**: 196   **n**: 1542 $\overline{N}$: 193 $\overline{T}$: 8

fh_fotppr1   **Freedom of Print Media, Status (1979-1987)**

(1)   Free
(2)   Partly Free
(3)   Not Free

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1979-1987
N: 193   **N**: 158   **n**: 1245 $\overline{N}$: 138 $\overline{T}$: 8

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fh_fotpbr1   **Freedom of Broadcast Media, Status (1979-1987)**

(1)   Free
(2)   Partly Free
(3)   Not Free

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1979-1987
N: 193   **N**: 158   **n**: 1239 $\overline{N}$: 138 $\overline{T}$: 8

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fh_fotp2   **Freedom of the Press, Status (1988-1992)**

(1)   Free
(2)   Partly Free
(3)   Not Free

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1988-1992
N: N/A   **N**: 180   **n**: 803 $\overline{N}$: 161 $\overline{T}$: 4

fh_fotpst3   **Freedom of the Press, Status (1993-1995)**

(1)   Free
(2)   Partly Free
(3)   Not Free

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1993-1995
N: 185   **n**: 554 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 3

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fh_fotpsc3   **Freedom of the Press, Score (1993-1995)**

The press freedom index is computed by adding four component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls, Economic Influences and Repressive actions. The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1993-1995
N: 185   **n**: 550 $\overline{N}$: 183 $\overline{T}$: 3

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fh_fotpst4   **Freedom of the Press, Status (1996-2000)**

(1)   Free
(2)   Partly Free
(3)   Not Free

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1957-2012
N: 204   **n**: 6518 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 32

fh_fotpsc4 **Freedom of the Press, Score (1996-2000)**

The press freedom index is computed by adding four component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls, Economic Influences and Repressive actions. The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A **Years**: 1996-2000
N: N/A **N**: 185 **n**: 925 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 5

fh_fotpst5 **Freedom of the Press, Status (2001-2011)**

(1) Free
(2) Partly Free
(3) Not Free

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009 **Years**: 2001-2011
N: 193 **N**: 194 **n**: 2110 $\overline{N}$: 192 $\overline{T}$: 11

fh_fotpsc5 **Freedom of the Press, Score (2001-2011)**

The press freedom index is computed by adding three component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls and Economic Influences. The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009 **Years**: 2001-2011
N: 193 **N**: 194 **n**: 2110 $\overline{N}$: 192 $\overline{T}$: 11

84

fh_fotpapr3　　　　　　**Laws and Regulations, Print Media (1993-1995)**

The variable "Laws and Regulations that Influence Media Content" encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1993-1995
N: 185　　**n**: 550　　$\overline{N}$: 183　　$\overline{T}$: 3

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fh_fotpabr3　　　　　　**Laws and Regulations, Broadcast Media (1993-1995)**

The variable "Laws and Regulations that Influence Media Content" encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1993-1995
N: 185　　**n**: 550　　$\overline{N}$: 183　　$\overline{T}$: 3

fh_fotpapr4   **Laws and Regulations, Print Media (1996-2000)**

The variable "Laws and Regulations that Influence Media Content" encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1996-2000
N: N/A   **N**: 185   **n**: 925 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 5

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fh_fotpabr4   **Laws and Regulations, Broadcast Media (1996-2000)**

The variable "Laws and Regulations that Influence Media Content" encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1996-2000
N: N/A   **N**: 185   **n**: 925 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 5

fh_fotpa5   Laws and Regulations (2001-2011)

The variable "Laws and Regulations that Influence Media Content" encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2001-2011
N: 193   **N**: 194   **n**: 2110 $\overline{N}$: 192 $\overline{T}$: 11

fh_fotpbpr3   Political Pressure and Control, Print Media (1993-1995)

The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996-2000 from 0-30, and from 2001 and onwards from 0-40. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1993-1995
N: N/A   **N**: 185   **n**: 550 $\overline{N}$: 183 $\overline{T}$: 3

fh_fotpbbr3   Political Pressure and Control, Broadcast Media (1993-1995)

The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996-2000 from 0-30, and from 2001 and onwards from 0-40. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1993-1995
N: 185   **n**: 550 $\overline{N}$: 183 $\overline{T}$: 3

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fh_fotpbpr4   Political Pressure and Control, Print Media (1996-2000)

The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996-2000 from 0-30, and from 2001 and onwards from 0-40. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1996-2000
N: 185   **n**: 925 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 5

fh_fotpbbr4   Political Pressure and Control, Broadcast Media (1996-2000)

The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996-2000 from 0-30, and from 2001 and onwards from 0-40. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1996-2000
N: N/A   **N**: 185   **n**: 925 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 5

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fh_fotpb5   Political Pressure and Control (2001-2011)

The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, in 1996-2000 from 0-30, and from 2001 and onwards from 0-40. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2001-2011
N: 193   **N**: 194   **n**: 2110 $\overline{N}$: 192 $\overline{T}$: 11

fh_fotpcpr3 **Economic Influences, Print Media (1993-1995)**

This variable examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, from 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A

N: N/A

Years: 1993-1995

N: 185   **n**: 550 $\overline{N}$: 183 $\overline{T}$: 3

fh_fotpcbr3 **Economic Influences, Broadcast Media (1993-1995)**

This variable examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, from 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A

N: N/A

Years: 1993-1995

N: 185   **n**: 550 $\overline{N}$: 183 $\overline{T}$: 3

fh_fotpcpr4   **Economic Influences, Print Media (1996-2000)**

This variable examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, from 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1996-2000
N: 185   **n**: 925 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 5

fh_fotpcbr4   **Economic Influences, Broadcast Media (1996-2000)**

This variable examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, from 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1996-2000
N: 185   **n**: 925 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 5

fh_fotpc5   **Economic Influences (2001-2011)**

This variable examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-20, from 1996 and onwards from 0-30. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2001-2011
N: 193   **N**: 194   **n**: 2110 $\overline{N}$: 192 $\overline{T}$: 11

fh_fotpdr3   **Repressive Actions, Print Media (1993-1995)**

This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-40, in 1996-2000 from 0-10. Since 2001 the Freedom House includes such violations within the respective fh_pol and fh_econ categories as cases of actual political or economic pressure on the content of information. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1993-1995
N: N/A   **N**: 185   **n**: 550 $\overline{N}$: 183 $\overline{T}$: 3

fh_fotpdbr3   **Repressive Actions, Broadcast Media (1993-1995)**

This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-40, in 1996-2000 from 0-10. Since 2001 the Freedom House includes such violations within the respective fh_pol and fh_econ categories as cases of actual political or economic pressure on the content of information. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1993-1995
N: N/A   **N**: 185   **n**: 550 $\overline{N}$: 183 $\overline{T}$: 3

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fh_fotpdpr4   **Repressive Actions, Print Media (1996-2000)**

This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-40, in 1996-2000 from 0-10. Since 2001 the Freedom House includes such violations within the respective fh_pol and fh_econ categories as cases of actual political or economic pressure on the content of information. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1996-2000
N: N/A   **N**: 185   **n**: 925 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 5

fh_fotpdbr4 **Repressive Actions, Broadcast Media (1996-2000)**

This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). In 1993-1995 the scale varied from 0-40, in 1996-2000 from 0-10. Since 2001 the Freedom House includes such violations within the respective fh_pol and fh_econ categories as cases of actual political or economic pressure on the content of information. 0 indicates *more* freedom.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　[Back?]

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A　　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 1996-2000
N: N/A　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 185　　**n**: 925　　$\overline{N}$: 185　　$\overline{T}$: 5

Freedom House / Polity

(Hadenius & Teorell 2005)

fh_polity2 **Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)**

Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　[Back?]

Years: 2009-2010　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 1972-2011
N: 162　　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 176　　**n**: 5858　　$\overline{N}$: 146　　$\overline{T}$: 33

fh_ipolity2   **Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity)**

Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2.

The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. Hadenius & Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1972-2012
N: 193   **N**: 207   **n**: 7040 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 34

Gibney, Cornett & Wood

Political Terror Scale

The PTS is computed annually by Mark Gibney, Reed Wood and a group of volunteers well versed in human rights practices. The "data" for the PTS is provided by the annual reports on human rights practices that are published by Amnesty International (A) and the U.S. State Department (S).

gd_ptsa   Political Terror Scale – Amnesty International

Human rights score (1 to 5 scale):

(1)   Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

(2)   There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

(3)   There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

(4)   Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

(5)   Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1976-2011
N: 162   **N**: 186   **n**: 4774 $\overline{N}$: 133 $\overline{T}$: 26

gd_ptss   Political Terror Scale – US State Department

Human rights score (1 to 5 scale):

(1)   Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

(2)   There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

(3)   There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

(4)   Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

(5)   Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1976-2011

N: 178   **N**: 187   **n**: 5760 $\overline{N}$: 160 $\overline{T}$: 31

Global Integrity Report

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gir_gii   Global Integrity Index

The Global Integrity Index assesses the existence, effectiveness, and citizen access to key anti-corruption mechanisms at the national level in a country. It does not measure corruption per se or perceptions of corruption. Nor does it measure governance "outputs". Instead, the index quantitatively assesses the opposite of corruption, that is, the access that citizens and businesses have to a country's government, their ability to monitor its behavior, and their ability to seek redress and advocate for improved governance. In-country teams of social scientists and journalists report on the *de jure* as well as *de facto* reality of corruption and anticorruption mechanisms.

The index grades countries on a 0 to 100 scale, with 0 being the worst score and 100 the best. The overall index is the average of the following six variables (which in turn are built on more than 300 indicators):

- Civil Society, Media, Access to Information
- Elections
- Government Accountability
- Administration and Civil Service
- Oversight and Regulation
- Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

Note: The original source use a different scale for the year 2004. We have rescaled the data for this year to the same scale as the following years (0-100).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2004-2011
N: 91   **N**: 94   **n**: 251 $\overline{N}$: 31 $\overline{T}$: 3

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gir_csmai   Civil Society, Media, Access to Information

This category examines civil society organizations working on anti-corruption issues, the media's effectiveness in reporting on corruption (including licensing requirements), and public access to information.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 91

Years: 2004-2011
N: 94   **n**: 251 $\overline{N}$: 31 $\overline{T}$: 3

gir_e   Elections

This category assesses voting and elections integrity as well as regulations governing the financing of political parties and candidates.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 91

Years: 2004-2011
N: 94   **n**: 251 $\overline{N}$: 31 $\overline{T}$: 3

gir_ga   Government Accountability

This category explores the existence and effectiveness of conflicts of interest regulations, "cooling off" periods for former government officials, and asset disclosure requirements in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Budget transparency is also assessed.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 91

Years: 2004-2011
N: 94   **n**: 251 $\overline{N}$: 31 $\overline{T}$: 3

gir_acs   Administration and Civil Service

This category examines administration and civil service regulations, whistleblower protections, and transparency around government procurement and privatization.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 91

Years: 2004-2011
N: 94   **n**: 251 $\bar{N}$: 31 $\bar{T}$: 3

gir_or   Oversight and Regulation

This category assesses the effectiveness of the national ombudsman (or equivalent mechanism), supreme audit institution, taxes and customs agencies, transparency surrounding state-owned enterprises, and business licensing requirements.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 91

Years: 2004-2011
N: 94   **n**: 251 $\bar{N}$: 31 $\bar{T}$: 3

gir_acrl   Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

This category examines a country's anti-corruption laws, the country's anti-corruption agency (or equivalent mechanism), citizen access to justice, and law enforcement accountability.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 91

Years: 2004-2011
N: 94   **n**: 251 $\bar{N}$: 31 $\bar{T}$: 3

Rotberg & Gisselquist
http://www.nber.org/data/iag.html   (2013-04-09)

(Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009)

2009 Index of African Governance Data Set
The Index of African Governance measures to which degree five categories of political goods are provided within Africa's fifty-three countries. Please refer to the original documentation for de-tailed information on how the indexes are constructed.

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iag_iag   Index of African Governance
The index is based on five sub-indicators: safety and security; rule of law, transparency and cor-ruption; participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity; human development. In the calculation of the overall index each category is weighted equally. For more information on how the sub-categories are constructed, see below. The index varies between 0 and 100 where higher values indicate better governance.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007   **Years**: 2000-2007
N: 53   **N**: 53   **n**: 265 $\overline{N}$: 33 $\overline{T}$: 5

---

iag_ss   Safety and Security
This category is based on e.g. indicators on homicide rate, government involvement in armed conflict and refugees and asylum seekers originating from the country. The index varies between 0 and 100 where higher values indicate better governance.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007   **Years**: 2000-2007
N: 53   **N**: 53   **n**: 265 $\overline{N}$: 33 $\overline{T}$: 5

iag_rltc   Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption

Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an effective legislative chamber (based on information from Polity's Executive Constraints, p_xconst).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2007
N: 53

Years: 2000-2007
N: 53   **n**: 265 $\bar{N}$: 33 $\bar{T}$: 5

iag_prh   Participation and Human Rights

This category is based on e.g. indicators on free and fair elections, respect for civil rights, press freedom and women's rights. The index varies between 0 and 100 where higher values indicate better governance.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2007
N: 53

Years: 2000-2007
N: 53   **n**: 265 $\bar{N}$: 33 $\bar{T}$: 5

iag_seo   Sustainable Economic Opportunity

This category is based on e.g. indicators on GDP per capita, inflation, government defi-cit/surplus and phone subscribers per capita. The index varies between 0 and 100 where higher values indicate better governance.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2007
N: 53

Years: 2000-2007
N: 53   **n**: 265 $\bar{N}$: 33 $\bar{T}$: 5

iag_hd   **Human Development**

This category is based on e.g. indicators on economic inequality, life expectancy, access to drink-ing water and literacy rate. The index varies between 0 and 100 where higher values indicate bet-ter governance.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2007   **Years**: 2000-2007

N: 53   **N**: 53   **n**: 265 $\overline{N}$: 33 $\overline{T}$: 5

International Country Risk Guide – The PRS Group

ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government

ICRG collects political information and financial and economic data, converting these into risk points.

icrg_qog   **ICRG indicator of Quality of Government**

The mean value of the ICRG variables "Corruption", "Law and Order" and "Bureaucracy Quality", scaled 0-1. Higher values indicate higher quality of government.

Corruption (originally 6 points)

This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, it introduces an inherent instability into the political process.

The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Such corruption can make it dif-ficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases my force the withdrawal or withholding of an investment.

Although the measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. According to ICRG, these insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market.

The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, so as to provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering the country ungovernable.

Law and order (originally 6 points)
Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating if it suffers from a very high crime rate or if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes).

Bureaucracy Quality (originally 4 points)
The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.

The component variables can be purchased at http://www.countrydata.com

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1984-2012
N: 139   **N**: 146   **n**: 3826 $\overline{N}$: 132 $\overline{T}$: 26

World Bank
http://www.worldbank.org/ida/IRAI-2011.html   (2013-01-28)
(World Bank, IDA 2013)

IDA Resource Allocation Index
The World Bank's IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) is based on the results of the annual Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) exercise that covers the IDA eligible countries. The criteria are focused on balancing the capture of the key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction, with the need to avoid undue burden on the assessment process. The IDA Resource Allocation Index measures the quality of a country's present policy and institutional framework. "Quality" refers to how conducive that framework is to fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of development assistance. The 16 criteria to be assessed are grouped into four clusters:

- Economic Management
    - Macroeconomic Management (irai_mm)
    - Fiscal Policy (irai_fp)
    - Debt Policy (irai_dp)
- Structural Policies
    - Trade (irai_t)
    - Financial Sector (irai_fs)
    - Business Regulatory Environment (irai_bre)

- Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity
    - Gender Equality (irai_ge)
    - Equity of Public Resource Use (irai_epru)
    - Building Human Resources (irai_bhr)
    - Social Protection and Labor (irai_spl)
    - Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability (irai_pies)
- Public Sector Management and Institutions
    - Property Rights and Rule-based Governance (irai_prrg)
    - Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management (irai_qbfm)
    - Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization (irai_erm)
    - Quality of Public Administration (irai_qpa)
    - Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector (irai_tac)

For each criterion, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). A 1 rating corresponds to a very weak performance, and a 6 rating to a very strong performance. Intermediate scores of 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5 may also be given.

Note: Not all IRAI variables fit well under the "What It Is" section, but since they all form an index they are kept together.

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irai_index   IDA Resource Allocation Index

The IDA Resource Allocation Index measures the quality of a country's present policy and institutional framework. "Quality" refers to how conducive that framework is to fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of development assistance. It is calculated as the mean of the score of the four clusters Economic Management, Structural Policies, Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity and Public Sector Management and Institutions. The index ranges between 1 (lowest) and 6 (highest).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_mm **Macroeconomic Management**

This criterion assesses the quality of the monetary/exchange rate and aggregate demand policy framework. A high quality policy framework is one that is favorable to sustained medium-term economic growth. Critical components are: a monetary/exchange rate policy with clearly defined price stability objectives; aggregate demand policies that focus on maintaining short and medium-term external balance (under the current and foreseeable external environment); and avoid crowding out private investment. Fiscal issues, including sustainability, are covered in *cpia_fp*, and debt issues are covered in *cpia_dp*.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 80

Years: 2005-2011
N: 81 **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_fp **Fiscal Policy**

This criterion assesses the short- and medium-term sustainability of fiscal policy (taking into account monetary and exchange rate policy and the sustainability of the public debt) and its impact on growth. Fiscal policy is not sustainable if it results in a continuous increase in the debt to GDP ratio and/or creates financing needs that cannot be adequately met by the supply of funds available to the public sector. This criterion covers the extent to which: (a) the primary balance is managed to ensure sustainability of the public finances; (b) public expenditure/revenue can be adjusted to absorb shocks if necessary; and (c) the provision of public goods, including infrastructure, is consistent with medium-term growth. Sustainability is defined inclusive of off-budget government spending items and contingent liabilities. The impact of fiscal policy on economic growth depends on the marginal productivity of government spending and on the distortions introduced by taxes collected to finance this spending.

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
Years: 2006-2011
N: 80

Years: 2005-2011
N: 81 **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_dp   **Debt Policy**

This criterion assesses whether the debt management strategy is conducive to minimize budgetary risks and ensure long-term debt sustainability. The criterion evaluates the extent to which external and domestic debts are contracted with a view to achieving/maintaining debt sustainability, and the degree of co-ordination between debt management and other macroeconomic policies. This criterion covers the adequacy of the debt recording systems, the timelines of the public debt data, and the effectiveness of the debt management unit.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_t   **Trade**

This criterion assesses how the policy framework fosters trade in goods. Two areas are covered: (a) trade regime restrictiveness focusing on the height of tariffs barriers, the extent to which non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are used, and the transparency and predictability of the trade regime; and (b) customs and trade facilitation, including the extent to which the customs service is free of corruption, relies on risk management, processes duty collections and refunds promptly, and operates transparently. The overall score is a weighted average of the scores for the two components: (a) trade restrictiveness (0.75) and (b) customs/trade facilitation (0.25).

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
Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

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irai_fs   Financial Sector

This criterion assesses the structure of the financial sector and the policies and regulations that affect it. Three dimensions are covered; (a) financial stability; (b) the sector's efficiency, depth, and resource mobilization strength; and (c) access to financial services. These are areas that are fundamental to support successful and sustainable reforms and development. The first dimension assesses the sector's vulnerability to shocks, the banking system's soundness, and the adequacy of relevant institutional elements, such as the degree of adherence to the Basel Core Principles and the quality of risk management and supervision. The second dimension assesses efficiency, the degree of competition, and the ownership structure of the financial system, as well as its depth and resource mobilization strength. The third dimension covers institutional factors, (such as the adequacy of payment and credit reporting systems) the regulatory framework affecting financial transactions (including collateral and bankruptcy laws and their enforcement) and the extent to which consumers and firms have access to financial services.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_bre   Business Regulatory Environment

This criterion assesses the extent to which the legal, regulatory, and policy environment helps or hinders private business in investing, creating jobs, and becoming more productive. The emphasis is on direct regulations of business activity and regulation of goods and factor markets. Three subcomponents are measured: (a) regulations affecting entry, exit, and competition; (b) regulations of ongoing business operations; and (c) regulations of factor markets (labor and land). These three components should be considered separately and equally weighted.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_ge   Gender Equality

This criterion assesses the extent to which the country has enacted and put in place institutions and programs to enforce laws and policies that (a) promote equal access for men and women to human capital development; (b) promote equal access for men and women to productive and economic resources; and (c) give men and women equal status and protection under the law.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81 **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_epru   Equity of Public Resource Use

This criterion assesses the extent to which the pattern of public expenditures and revenue collection affects the poor and is consistent with national poverty reduction priorities. The assessment of the consistency of government spending with the poverty reduction priorities takes into account the extent to which: (a) individuals, groups, or localities that are poor, vulnerable, or have unequal access to services and opportunities are identified; (b) a national development strategy with explicit interventions to assist the groups identified in (a) has been adopted; and (c) the composition and incidence of public expenditures are tracked systematically and their results feedback into subsequent resource allocation decisions. The assessment of the revenue collection dimension takes into account the incidence of major taxes, e.g. whether they are progressive or regressive, and their alignment with the poverty reduction priorities.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81 **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_bhr   Building Human Resources

This criterion assesses the national policies and public and private sector service delivery that affect access to and quality of: (a) health and nutrition services, including population and reproductive health, (b) education, ECD, training and literacy programs, and (c) prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. ECD refers to Early Child Development programs, including both formal and non-formal programs (which may combine education, health and nutrition interventions) aimed at children aged 0-6.

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
Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_spl   Social Protection and Labor

This criterion assesses government policies in the area of social protection and labor market regulation, which reduce the risk of becoming poor, assist those who are poor to better manage further risks, and ensure a minimal level of welfare to all people. Interventions include: social safety net programs, pension and old age savings programs; protection of basic labor standards; regulations to reduce segmentation and inequity in labor markets; active labor market programs, such as public works or job training; and community driven initiatives. In interpreting the guidelines it is important to take into account the size of the economy and its level of development. This criterion is a composite indicator of five different areas of social protection and labor policy: (a) social safety net programs; (b) protection of basic labor standards; (c) labor market regulations; (d) community driven initiatives; and (e) pension and old age savings programs.

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
Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_pies   **Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability**

This criterion assesses the extent to which environmental policies foster the protection and sustainable use of natural resources and the management of pollution. Assessment of environmental sustainability requires multi-dimension criteria (i.e. for air, water, waste, conservation management, coastal zones management, natural resources management).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011

N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

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irai_prrg   **Property Rights and Rule-based Governance**

This criterion assesses the extent to which private economic activity is facilitated by an effective legal system and rule-based governance structure in which property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced. Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) legal basis for secure property and contract rights; (b) predictability, transparency, and impartiality of laws and regulations affecting economic activity, and their enforcement by the legal and judicial system; and (c) crime and violence as an impediment to economic activity.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011

N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

irai_qbfm   **Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management**

This criterion assesses the extent to which there is: (a) a comprehensive and credible budget, linked to policy priorities; (b) effective financial management systems to ensure that the budget is implemented as intended in a controlled and predictable way; and (c) timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting, including timely and audited public accounts and effective arrangements for follow up.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

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irai_erm   **Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization**

This criterion assesses the overall pattern of revenue mobilization, not only the tax structure as it exists on paper, but revenue from all sources as they are actually collected.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80   **N**: 81   **n**: 532 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 7

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irai_qpa   **Quality of Public Administration**

This criterion assesses the extent to which civilian central government staffs (including teachers, health workers, and police) are structured to design and implement government policy and deliver services effectively. Civilian central government staffs include the central executive together with all other ministries and administrative departments, including autonomous agencies. It excludes the armed forces, state-owned enterprises, and sub-national government.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 2005-2011

irai_tac　　Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector

This criterion assesses the extent to which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees within the executive are required to account for the use of resources, administrative decisions, and results obtained. Both levels of accountability are enhanced by transparency in decision-making, public audit institutions, access to relevant and timely information, and public and media scrutiny. A high degree of accountability and transparency discourages corruption, or the abuse of public office for private gain. National and sub-national governments should be appropriately weighted. Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance; (b) access of civil society to information on public affairs; and (c) state capture by narrow vested interests.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　　Back?

Years: 2006-2011　　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 2005-2011
N: 80　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 81　　**n**: 532　　$\overline{N}$: 76　　$\overline{T}$: 7

Polity IV

http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   (2013-02-29)

(Marshall & Jaggers 2011)

Polity IV Project Data Set

The Polity project is one of the most widely used data resource for studying regime change and the effects of regime authority.

Missing codes:

(-66)   Interruption periods.
(-77)   Interregnum periods.
(-88)   Transition periods.

---

p_democ   Institutionalized Democracy

Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil liberties.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation (variable p_parcomp), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables p_xropen and p_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (variable p_xconst).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8594 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 48

p_autoc   Institutionalized Autocracy

"Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity, but we regard this as a function of political ideology and choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the question of how autocracy, democracy, and directiveness (performance) have covaried over time.

An eleven-point autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operational indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable p_parcomp), the regulation of participation (variable p_parreg), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables p_xropen and p_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (variable p_xconst).

Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high)

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8594 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 48

p_polity   Combined Polity Score

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8594 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 48

p_polity2   Revised Combined Polity Score

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The revised version of the polity variable is designed to facilitate the use of the polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual polity score by applying a simple treatment, or ""fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e. -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e. within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set:

(-66)   Cases of foreign "interruption" are treated as "system missing".
(-77)   Cases of "interregnum," or anarchy, are converted to a "neutral" Polity score of "0".
(-88)   Cases of "transition" are prorated across the span of the transition.

For example, country X has a p_polity score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follow: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

Note: Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year are converted to "system missing" values. Transitions (-88) following a year of independence, interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value "0".

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 162   **N**: 179   **n**: 8501 $\overline{N}$: 129 $\overline{T}$: 47

p_parreg   Regulation of Participation

Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways; the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion, and the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion among shifting coalitions of partisan groups. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:

(1)   **Unregulated**: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time.

(2)   **Multiple Identities**: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level – parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected – but there are few recognized, overlapping (common) interests.

(3)   **Sectarian**: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e. active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries).

(4)   **Restricted**: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism, but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.

(5)   **Regulated**: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8594 $\bar{N}$: 130 $\bar{T}$: 48

p_parcomp   The Competitiveness of Participation

The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities which are coded Unregulated ("1") on Regulation of Participation are coded "0" (Not Applicable) for competitiveness. Competitiveness is coded on a five category scale:

(0)   **Not Applicable**: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political Participation (variable p_parreg).

(1)   **Repressed**: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a Repressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition.

(2)   **Suppressed**: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished from Factional competition (below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political

party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are:

i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g. no national political parties or no ethnic political organizations).

ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g. Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).

iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups.

(3)   **Factional**: Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularistic agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.

(4)   **Transitional**: Any transitional arrangement from Restricted or Factional patterns to fully competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.

(5)   **Competitive**: There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be restricted in the Competitive pattern.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8594 $\bar{N}$: 130 $\bar{T}$: 48

p_xrreg   Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment

In considering recruitment, we must first determine whether there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power. Three categories are used to differentiate the extent of institutionalization:

(1)   **Unregulated**: Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power. Such caesaristic transfers of power are sometimes legitimized after the fact in noncompetitive elections or by legislative enactment. Despite these "legitimization" techniques, a polity remains unregulated until the de facto leader of the coup has been

replaced as head of government either by designative or competitive modes of executive selection. However, unregulated recruitment does not include the occasional forceful ouster of a chief executive if elections are called within a reasonable time and the previous pattern continues.

(2)   **Designational/Transitional**: Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (i.e., one-party systems or "rigged" multiparty elections). Also coded here are transitional arrangements intended to regularize future power transitions after an initial unregulated seizure of power (i.e., after constitutional legitimization of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political realm as head of the military). This category also includes polities in transition from designative to elective modes of executive selection (i.e., the period of "guided democracy" often exhibited during the transition from military to civilian rule) or vice versa (i.e. regimes ensuring electoral victory through the intimidation of oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a "state of emergency" before executive elections).

(3)   **Regulated**: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections. Ascriptive/designative and ascriptive/elective selections (i.e., an effective king and premier) are also coded as regulated. The fundamental difference between regulated selection and unregulated recruitment is that regulated structures require the existence of institutionalized modes of executive recruitment, either through constitutional decree or lineage. Moreover, in regulated competitive systems, unlike the designational/transitional mode, the method of future executive selection is not dependent on the particular party or regime currently holding power.

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
Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8594 $\bar{N}$: 130 $\bar{T}$: 48

p_xrcomp   Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment

Competitiveness refers to "the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr 1974, p.1483)." For example, selection of chief executives through popular elections involving two or more viable parties or candidates is regarded as competitive. If power transfers are coded Unregulated ("1") in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, Competitiveness is coded "0" (Not Applicable). Four categories are used to measure this concept:

(0)   **Not Applicable**: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg).

(1)   **Selection**: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are: rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection

of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.

(2)   **Dual/Transitional**: Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.

(3)   **Election**: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections involving two or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly).

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
Years: 2009
N: 164

Years: 1946-2011
N: 179   **n**: 8594 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 48

p_xropen   Openness of Executive Recruitment

Recruitment of the chief executive is "open" to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (1) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (p_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, Openness is coded "0" (Not Applicable). Five categories are used:

(0)   **Not Applicable**: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg).

(1)   **Closed**: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc., who assume executive powers by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded "closed" unless a relative actually succeeds him as ruler.

(2)   **Dual Executive–Designation**: Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.

(3)   **Dual Executive–Election**: Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.

(4)   **Open**: Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transition-al arrangements between designation and election.

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011

N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8594 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 48

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p_xconst   Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)

According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner: "Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially "properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p.121) Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups". In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A category scale is used.

(1)   **Unlimited Authority**: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:

         i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.

         ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.

         iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the ex-ecutive's pleasure.

         iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can re-move them at will.

         v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.

         vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.

Note: If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a legislature to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is not a change to unlimited authority.

(2)   **Intermediate Category**

(3)   **Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority**: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:

         i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.

ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees.

iii. Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted.

iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.

v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.

vi. There is an independent judiciary.

vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.

(4)   **Intermediate Category**

(5)   **Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority**: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them.

Examples:
i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.

ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.

iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.

iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.

(6)   **Intermediate Category**

(7)   **Executive Parity or Subordination**: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence:

i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.

ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).

iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability".

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
Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8594 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 48

p_durable   Regime Durability

The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the p_polity score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the p_durable value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline "year zero" (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the p_durable variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011

N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8565 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 48

p_flag   Tentative Coding

Trichotomous "flag" variable indicating confidence of codings (recent year codings only).

(0)   **Confident**: Reasonably confident coding of established authority patterns that have been "artificially smoothed" to present consistency over time between substantive polity changes.

(1)   **Tentative**: Reasonably confident coding of emerging authority patterns that have not been smoothed over time; these codes are "free floating," that is, they are based on information available in the case-year and are not tied to prior year coding(s). Codes are considered tentative for up to five years following a substantive polity change.

(2)   **Tenuous**: Best judgment coding based on limited information and/or insufficient time span since a substantive polity change and the emergence of new authority patterns.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011

N: 164   **N**: 179   **n**: 8594 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 48

p_fragment   Polity Fragmentation

This variable codes the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive). Local autonomy arrangements voluntarily established and accepted by both central and local authorities are not considered fragmentation. A polity that cannot exercise effective authority over at least 50 percent of its established territory is necessarily considered to be in a condition of "state failure" (i.e., interruption or interregnum, see below, or civil war). Polity fragmentation may result from open warfare (active or latent) or foreign occupation and may continue in the absence of open warfare if a situation of de facto separation remains unresolved and unchallenged by the state.

(0)   **No overt fragmentation**

(1)   **Slight fragmentation**: Less than ten percent of the country's territory is effectively under local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

(2)   **Moderate fragmentation**: Ten to twenty-five percent of the country's territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

(3)   **Serious fragmentation**: Over twenty-five percent (and up to fifty percent) of the country's territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

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
Years: 2009   **Years**: 1976-2011
N: 164   **N**: 165   **n**: 2029 $\overline{N}$: 56 $\overline{T}$: 12

p_sf   **State Failure**

Variable p_sf is a flag variable that designates (by code "1") every year during which a Polity is considered to be in a condition of "complete collapse of central authority" or "state failure" (i.e., -77). The variable p_sf is also coded "1" for years when a state disintegrates and when a pro- found revolutionary change in political authority occurs (during which the authority of the previous Polity is assumed to have collapsed completely prior to the revolutionary seizure of power and subsequent restructuring of authority). Using the p_sf variable to select regime information will facilitate identification of periods of state failure.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2011   **Years**: 1949-2011
N: 3   **N**: 32   **n**: 149 $\overline{N}$: 2 $\overline{T}$: 5

Teorell, Dahlström & Dahlberg

http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html   (2013-01-29)

(Teorell et al 2011)

The QoG Expert-Survey

The QoG Survey is a data set on the structure and behavior of public administration, based on a web survey. The dataset covers key dimensions of quality of government, such as politicization, professionalization, openness, and impartiality.

Included in the QoG dataset are three indexes, each based on a group of questions from the survey. When constructing the indexes we excluded countries with less than three responding experts. (Two indexes are listed below. The third index is listed in the "What It Is" section.)

The confidence interval variables give the higher and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval.

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qs_impar   **Impartial Public Administration (IPA)**

qs_impar_cih   **IPA – Confidence Interval (High)**

qs_impar_cil   **IPA – Confidence Interval (Low)**

The index measures to what extent government institutions exercise their power impartially. The impartiality norm is defined as: "When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law." (Rothstein and Teorell 2008, p. 170)

The index is built on five items from the survey:

- By a common definition, impartiality implies that when implementing policies, public sector employees should not take anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not

stipulated in the policy. Generally speaking, how often would you say that public sector employees today, in your chosen country, act impartially when deciding how to implement a policy in an individual case? (Response categories from 1-7, "hardly ever" to "almost always")

- Hypothetically, let's say that a typical public employee was given the task to distribute an amount equivalent to 1000 USD per capita to the needy poor in your country. According to your judgment, please state the percentage that would reach: (Six response categories for which the respondents could fill in a number from 0 to 100 percent. The percentage reaching "the needy poor" was here used as the indicator of how impartial the policy would be implemented).

Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today?

- Firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid?
- When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, public sector employees treat some groups in society unfairly?
- When granting licenses to start up private firms, public sector employees favor applicants with which they have strong personal contacts? (Response categories from 1-7, from "hardly ever" to "almost always".)

The index is constructed by adding each measure weighted by the factor loading obtained from a principle components factor analysis. Missing values on one or more of the questions have been imputed on the individual expert level. After that, aggregation to the country level has been made (mean value of all experts per country).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 105   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

Reporters Sans Frontières

Press Freedom

rsf_pfi   **Press Freedom Index**

The Press Freedom index measures the amount of freedom journalists and the media have in each country and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. It does not take account of all human rights violations, only those that affect press freedom. Neither is it an indicator of the quality of a country's media.

Note: With the exception of the year 2012 the index ranges between 0 (total press freedom) and 100 (no press freedom). However for the 2012 data release RSF changed the scale so that negative values can be and indeed are assigned to countries with more press freedom. We have decided leave the data as is in the source data.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 2002-2012
N: 171   **N**: 175   **n**: 1624 $\overline{N}$: 148 $\overline{T}$: 9

Treisman

http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Pages/publishedpapers.html   (2013-01-31)
(Treisman 2007)

Corruption

Data used in the article "What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical research?".

t_bribe   **Have paid a bribe in any form**

Percentage of the population who answered "Yes" to the question: "In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form?"

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 65   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

t_corr   **Common to pay irregular additional payments**

Country averages of business representatives' answers to the question: "It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular 'additional payments' to get things done." (ranges from 1 = always to 6 = never).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 78   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\bar{N}$: N/A $\bar{T}$: N/A

t_unicri   **Bribery to Government Officials**

Percentage of the population that had been asked or expected to pay bribe by government officials in last year, late 1990s (if more than one year available for late 1990s, averaged).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 48   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\bar{N}$: N/A $\bar{T}$: N/A

Transparency International

http://www.transparency.org/   (2013-01-29)

(Transparency International 2012)

Corruption Perceptions

ti_cpi   **Corruption Perceptions Index**

The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

Note: The time-series information in the CPI scores can only be used if interpreted with caution. Year-to-year shifts in a country's score can result not only from a changing perception of a country's performance but also from a changing sample and methodology. That is, with differing respondents and slightly differing methodologies, a change in a country's score may also relate to the fact that

different viewpoints have been collected and different questions have been asked. Moreover, each country's CPI score is composed as a 3-year moving average, implying that if changes occur they only gradually affect a country's score. For a more detailed discussion of comparability over time in the CPI, see Lambsdorff 2005.

Note: In 2012 TI changed to a scale ranging from 0-100 only assigning whole numbers. We have decided to divide the values for 2012 by 10. Note also that there seems to have been some adjustment in the relative grading.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2011
N: 181

Years: 1995-2012
N: 184   **n**: 2256 $\overline{N}$: 125 $\overline{T}$: 12

ti_cpi_max   **Corruption Perceptions Index – Max Range**

ti_cpi_min   **Corruption Perceptions Index – Min Range**

The CPI score is accompanied by a 90 confidence range determined by a bootstrap (non-parametric) methodology, which allows inferences to be drawn on the underlying precision of the results. A 90% confidence range is established, where there is 5% probability that the value is below the minimum range (ti_cpi_min) and 5% probability that the value is above the maximum range (ti_cpi_max). However, particularly when only few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2011
N: 181

Years: 2004-2012
N: 184   **n**: 1520 $\overline{N}$: 169 $\overline{T}$: 8

129

ti_cpi_sd   **Corruption Perceptions Index – Standard Deviation**

This is the standard deviation in the values of the sources underlying the CPI: the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2011   **Years**: 1998-2011
N: 2   **N**: 181   **n**: 946 $\overline{N}$: 68 $\overline{T}$: 5

Pemstein, Meserve & Melton

http://www.unified-democracy-scores.org/uds.html   (2013-03-21)

(Pemstein et al 2010)

Unified Democracy Scores

Using a Bayesian latent variable approach, the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) synthesize a new measure of democracy.

uds_mean   **Unified Democracy Score Posterior (Mean)**

Unified democracy score posterior mean. Higher values indicating more democratic.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008   **Years**: 1946-2008
N: 188   **N**: 204   **n**: 8938 $\overline{N}$: 142 $\overline{T}$: 44

uds_median   Unified Democracy Score Posterior (Median)
Unified democracy score posterior median.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008
N: 188

Years: 1946-2008
N: 204   **n**: 8938 $\overline{N}$: 142 $\overline{T}$: 44

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uds_sd   Unified Democracy Score Posterior (Std. Dev.)
Unified democracy score posterior standard deviation.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008
N: 188

Years: 1946-2008
N: 204   **n**: 8938 $\overline{N}$: 142 $\overline{T}$: 44

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uds_ pct025   Unified Democracy Score Posterior (2.5 percentile)
Unified democracy score posterior 2.5 percentile.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008
N: 188

Years: 1946-2008
N: 204   **n**: 8938 $\overline{N}$: 142 $\overline{T}$: 44

131

uds_ pct975　　　　　**Unified Democracy Score Posterior (97.5 percentile)**

Unified democracy score posterior 97.5 percentile.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Years: 2008　　　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 1946-2008

N: 188　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 204　　　**n**: 8938　　　$\overline{N}$: 142　　　$\overline{T}$: 44

Vanhanen

http://www.fsd.uta.fi/en/data/catalogue/FSD1289/index.html　　　　　　　(2013-01-30)

(Vanhanen 2011)

Index of Democratization

Three different variables, created by Tatu Vanhanen in his long-term research, for each year from 1946 to 2010. The variables in question are political competition, political participation and the index of democratization.

Note: The original source provide values from 1810.

van_index　　　　　　**Index of Democratization**

This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy – competition and participation – measured as the percentage of votes not cast for the largest party (Competition) times the percentage of the population who actually voted in the election (Participation). This product is di-vided by 100 to form an index that in principle could vary from 0 (no democracy) to 100 (full democracy). (Empirically, however, the largest value is 49).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Years: 2009-2010　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 1946-2010

N: 187　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 200　　　**n**: 9128　　　$\overline{N}$: 140　　　$\overline{T}$: 46

van_comp   **Competition**

The competition variable portrays the electoral success of smaller parties, that is, the percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections. The variable is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes won by the largest party (the party which wins most votes) in parliamentary elections or by the party of the successful candidate in presidential elections. The variable thus theoretically ranges from 0 (only one party received 100 % of votes) to 100 (each voter cast a vote for a distinct party).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2010
N: 187   **N**: 200   **n**: 9129 $\overline{N}$: 140 $\overline{T}$: 46

van_part   **Participation**

The percentage of the total population who actually voted in the election.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2010
N: 187   **N**: 200   **n**: 9129 $\overline{N}$: 140 $\overline{T}$: 46

World Bank

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp   (2013-04-12)
(Kauffman et al 2009)

The Worldwide Governance Indicators

These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. These individual measures of governance are assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance. An unobserved component model is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators. Point estimates of the dimensions of governance, the margins of error as well as the number of sources are presented for each country.

The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.

Note: Since the estimates are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) at each year of measurement, they are not directly suitable for over-time comparisons within countries.

Kaufmann et al. (2006) however find no systematic time-trends in a selection of indicators that do allow for comparisons over time, which suggests that time-series information in the WBGI scores can be used if interpreted with caution.

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wbgi_vae　　　　　　**Voice and Accountability (Estimate)**

wbgi_vas　　　　　　**Voice and Accountability (Standard Errors)**

wbgi_van　　　　　　**Voice and Accountability (Number of Sources)**

"Voice and Accountability" includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　Back?

Years: 2009　　　　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 1996-2011
N: 193　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 193　　　**n**: 2492　　　$\overline{N}$: 156　　　$\overline{T}$: 13

---

wbgi_pse　　　　　　**Political Stability (Estimate)**

wbgi_pss　　　　　　**Political Stability (Standard Errors)**

wbgi_psn　　　　　　**Political Stability (Number of Sources)**

"Political Stability" combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　Back?

Years: 2009　　　　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 1996-2011
N: 193　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 193　　　**n**: 2452　　　$\overline{N}$: 153　　　$\overline{T}$: 13

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wbgi_gee   **Government Effectiveness (Estimate)**

wbgi_ges   **Government Effectiveness (Standard Errors)**

wbgi_gen   **Government Effectiveness (Number of Sources)**

"Government Effectiveness" combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on "inputs" required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1996-2011
N: 191   **N**: 191   **n**: 2437 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 13

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wbgi_rqe   **Regulatory Quality (Estimate)**

wbgi_rqs   **Regulatory Quality (Standard Errors)**

wbgi_rqn   **Regulatory Quality (Number of Sources)**

"Regulatory Quality" includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1996-2011
N: 191   **N**: 191   **n**: 2438 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 13

135

wbgi_rle   **Rule of Law (Estimate)**

wbgi_rls   **Rule of Law (Standard Errors)**

wbgi_rln   **Rule of Law (Number of Sources)**

"Rule of Law" includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1996-2011
N: 193   **N**: 193   **n**: 2492 $\overline{N}$: 156 $\overline{T}$: 13

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wbgi_cce   **Control of Corruption (Estimate)**

wbgi_ccs   **Control of Corruption (Standard Errors)**

wbgi_ccn   **Control of Corruption (Number of Sources)**

"Control of Corruption" measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of "additional payments to get things done", to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring "grand corruption" in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in "state capture".

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1996-2011
N: 191   **N**: 191   **n**: 2437 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 13

World Economic Forum
http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform/   (2013-03-05)
(Schwab 2012)

Global Competitiveness Report

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wef_pr   Property Rights
How would you rate the protection of property rights, including financial assets, in your country? [1 = very weak; 7 = very strong]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_ipr   Intellectual Property Protection
How would you rate intellectual property protection, including anti-counterfeiting measures, in your country? [1 = very weak; 7 = very strong]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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
wef_dpf **Diversion of Public Funds**

In your country, how common is diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption? [1 = very common; 7 = never occurs]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_ipb **Irregular Payments and Bribes**

Average score across the five components of the following Executive Opinion Survey question: In your country, how common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with (a) imports and exports; (b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding of public contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining favorable judicial decisions. In each case, the answer ranges from 1 (very common) to 7 (never occurs). Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_ji **Judicial Independence**

To what extent is the judiciary in your country independent from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms? [1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_fgo   **Favoritism in Decisions of Government Officials**

To what extent do government officials in your country show favoritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts? [1 = always show favoritism; 7 = never show favoritism]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_bgr   **Burden of Government Regulation**

How burdensome is it for businesses in your country to comply with governmental administrative requirements (e.g., permits, regulations, reporting)? [1 = extremely burdensome; 7 = not burdensome at all]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_tgp   **Transparency of Government Policymaking**

How easy is it for businesses in your country to obtain information about changes in government policies and regulations affecting their activities? [1 = impossible; 7 = extremely easy]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_bct   **Business Costs of Terrorism**

To what extent does the threat of terrorism impose costs on businesses in your country? [1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at all]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_bccv   **Business Costs of Crime and Violence**

To what extent does the incidence of crime and violence impose costs on businesses in your country? [1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at all]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_oc   **Organized Crime**

To what extent does organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses in your country? [1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at all]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_rps   **Reliability of Police Services**

To what extent can police services be relied upon to enforce law and order in your country? [1 = cannot be relied upon at all; 7 = can be completely relied upon]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_ebf   Ethical Behavior of Firms

How would you compare the corporate ethics (ethical behavior in interactions with public officials, politicians, and other enterprises) of firms in your country with those of other countries in the world? [1 = among the worst in the world; 7 = among the best in the world]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_audit   Strength of Auditing and Reporting Standards

In your country, how would you assess financial auditing and reporting standards regarding company financial performance? [1 = extremely weak; 7 = extremely strong]. Years 2011–12 weighted average

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_amp   **Effectiveness of Anti-Monopoly Policy**

To what extent does anti-monopoly policy promote competition in your country? [1 = does not promote competition; 7 = effectively promotes competition]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_ptsb   **Number of Procedures to Start a Business**

Number of procedures required to start a business. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 139   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_dtsb   **Number of Days to Start a Business**

Number of days required to start a business. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 139   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

HTG (HOW TO GET IT)

Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson

Settler Mortality

Data used in the article The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.

ajr_settmort   Log Settler Mortality

Log of the mortality rate faced by European settlers at the time of colonization.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 62   **N**: 62   Country Constant Variable

Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg

Fractionalisation

The variables reflect the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not share a certain characteristic, the higher the number the less probability of the two sharing that characteristic.

al_ethnic   Ethnic fractionalization

The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. The result is a higher degree of fractionalization than the commonly used ELF-index (see el_elf60) in for example Latin America, where people of many races speak the same language.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 187   **N**: 189   Country Constant Variable

al_language   Linguistic fractionalization

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same linguistic group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized society.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 181   **N**: 182   Country Constant Variable

al_religion   Religious fractionalization

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same religious group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized society.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 190   **N**: 191   Country Constant Variable

144

Armingeon, Weisstanner, Engler, Potolidis & Gerber

http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html

(Armingeon et al 2012)

Comparative Political Data Set I 1960-2010

The Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2010 is a collection of political and institutional data which have been assembled in the context of the research projects "Die Handlungs-spielräume des Nationalstaates" and "Critical junctures".

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ar_li_cbi   **Central bank independence**

Higher values indicate a more independent central bank. The variable originally comes from Lijphart (1999). The variable has two values for each country: one representing the period 1945-1970, and the other value representing the period 1971-1996.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A

N: N/A

Years: 1960-1998

N: 24   **n**: 773 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 32

Barro & Lee

http://www.barrolee.com/

(Barro & Lee 2010)

The Barro-Lee Data set (2011) provide data disaggregated by sex and by 5-year age intervals. It provides educational attainment data for 146 countries in 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010. It also provides information about the distribution of educational attainment of the adult population over age 15 and over age 25 by sex at seven levels of schooling - no formal education, incomplete primary, complete primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary. Average years of schooling at all levels - primary, secondary, and tertiary - are also measured for each country in the world.

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bl_asy15f Average Schooling Years, Female (15+)

Average schooling years in the female population aged 15 and over.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2010
N: 143

Years: 1950-2010
N: 147 **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_asy15mf Average Schooling Years, Female and Male (15+)

Average schooling years in the total population aged 15 and over.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2010
N: 143

Years: 1950-2010
N: 147 **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_asy25f Average Schooling Years, Female (25+)

Average schooling years in the female population aged 25 and over.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2010
N: 143

Years: 1950-2010
N: 147 **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_asy25mf   Average Schooling Years, Female and Male (25+)

Average schooling years in the total population aged 25 and over.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2010

N: 143

Years: 1950-2010

N: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lu_15f   No Schooling, Female (15+)

Percentage of the female population aged 15 and over with no schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2010

N: 143

Years: 1950-2010

N: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lu_15mf   No Schooling, Female and Male (15+)

Percentage of the total population aged 15 and over with no schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2010

N: 143

Years: 1950-2010

N: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lu_25f   **No Schooling, Female (25+)**

Percentage of the female population aged 25 and over with no schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 143   **N**: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lu_25mf   **No Schooling, Female and Male (25+)**

Percentage of the total population aged 25 and over with no schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 143   **N**: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lpc_15f   **Primary Schooling Complete, Female (15+)**

Percentage of the female population aged 15 and over with complete primary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 143   **N**: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lpc_15mf   Primary Schooling Complete, Female and Male (15+)

Percentage of the total population aged 15 and over with complete primary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 143   **N**: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lpc_25f   Primary Schooling Complete, Female (25+)

Percentage of the female population aged 25 and over with complete primary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 143   **N**: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lpc_25mf   Primary Schooling Complete, Female and Male (25+)

Percentage of the total population aged 25 and over with complete primary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 143   **N**: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

149

bl_lsc_15f   Secondary Schooling Complete, Female (15+)

Percentage of the female population aged 15 and over with complete secondary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010
N: 143

Years: 1950-2010
N: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lsc_15mf   Secondary Schooling Complete, Female and Male (15+)

Percentage of the total population aged 15 and over with complete secondary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010
N: 143

Years: 1950-2010
N: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lsc_25f   Secondary Schooling Complete, Female (25+)

Percentage of the female population aged 25 and over with complete secondary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010
N: 143

Years: 1950-2010
N: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lsc_25mf   Secondary Schooling Complete, Female and Male (25+)

Percentage of the total population aged 25 and over with complete secondary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 143   **N**: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lhc_15f   Tertiary Schooling Complete, Female (15+)

Percentage of the female population aged 15 and over with complete tertiary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 143   **N**: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lhc_15mf   Tertiary Schooling Complete, Female and Male (15+)

Percentage of the total population aged 15 and over with complete tertiary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 143   **N**: 147   **n**: 1504 $\overline{N}$: 25 $\overline{T}$: 10

bl_lhc_25f   Tertiary Schooling Complete, Female (25+)

Percentage of the female population aged 25 and over with complete tertiary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2010

N: 143

Years: 1950-2010

N: 147   **n**: 1504 $\bar{N}$: 25 $\bar{T}$: 10

bl_lhc_25mf   Tertiary Schooling Complete, Female and Male (25+)

Percentage of the total population aged 25 and over with complete tertiary schooling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2010

N: 143

Years: 1950-2010

N: 147   **n**: 1504 $\bar{N}$: 25 $\bar{T}$: 10

Bertelsmann Transformation Index

http://www.bti-project.org/index/   (2013-04-11)

(Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012)

Market Economy

bti_mes　　　　　　　**Market Economy Status**

The score for Market Economy Status is obtained by calculating the mean value of the ratings for the following criteria: socioeconomic level, market organization, currency and price stability, private property, welfare regime, economic performance and sustainability.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Years: 2010　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 129　　**n**: 613　　$\overline{N}$: 61　　$\overline{T}$: 5

---

bti_sl　　　　　　　　**Socioeconomic Level**

The variable measures to what extent significant parts of the population are fundamentally ex-cluded from society due to poverty and inequality combined (income gaps, gender, education, religion, ethnicity).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Years: 2010　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 129　　**n**: 613　　$\overline{N}$: 61　　$\overline{T}$: 5

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bti_mo　　　　　　　　**Market Organisation**

The variable measures to what level the fundamentals of market-based competition have developed; to what extent safeguards exist to prevent the development of economic monopolies and cartels; to what extent foreign trade has been liberalized; and to what extent a solid banking system and a capital market have been established.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Years: 2010　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 129　　**n**: 613　　$\overline{N}$: 61　　$\overline{T}$: 5

bti_cps   **Currency and Price Stability**

The variable measures to what extent the country pursues a consistent inflation policy and an appropriate foreign exchange policy; if there is an independent central bank; and to what extent the government's fiscal and debt policies support macroeconomic stability.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\bar{N}$: 61 $\bar{T}$: 5

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bti_prp   **Private Property**

Measures to what extent government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property and regulate the acquisition of property, and to what extent private companies are permitted; and if state companies are undergoing a process of privatization consistent with market principles.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\bar{N}$: 61 $\bar{T}$: 5

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bti_wr   **Welfare Regime**

The variable measures to what extent social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment or disability, and to what extent equality of opportunity exists.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2003-2012
N: 127   **N**: 129   **n**: 613 $\bar{N}$: 61 $\bar{T}$: 5

bti_ep   Economic Performance

Measures how the economy performs according to a set of quantitative indicators.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2010

N: 127

Years: 2003-2012

N: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

bti_su   Sustainability

The variable measures to what extent environmental concerns are taken into account in both macro- and microeconomic terms, and to what extent there are solid institutions for basic, sec-ondary and tertiary education, as well as for research and development.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2010

N: 127

Years: 2003-2012

N: 129   **n**: 613 $\overline{N}$: 61 $\overline{T}$: 5

155

Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland

https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited

(Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010)   (2013-01-22)

Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited

---

chga_hinst   Regime Institutions

Six-fold classification of political regimes, coded:

(0)   Parliamentary democracy
(1)   Mixed (semi-presidential) democracy
(2)   Presidential democracy
(3)   Civilian dictatorship
(4)   Military dictatorship
(5)   Royal dictatorship

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008   **Years**: 1946-2008
N: 192   **N**: 205   **n**: 8991 $\overline{N}$: 143 $\overline{T}$: 44

Crowe & Meade

http://www.voxeu.org/article/central-bank-independence-and-transparency-not-just-cheap-talk-part-1   (2013-01-27)

(Crowe & Meade 2007, 2008; Eijffinger & Geraats 2006; Cukierman et al 1992)

Central Bank Governance

---

cm_cbi80_89   Central Bank Independence, Weighted (1980-1989)

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank independence.

The variable is based on central bank laws from the years 1980-1989. Sixteen legal characteristics are considered and they relate to the following areas: the central bank management's insulation from political pressure by secure tenure and independent appointment for the head of the bank; the government's ability to participate or overturn the bank's policy decisions; the clarity of the defined objective for monetary policy specified in the central bank's legal mandate; restrictions that limit lending to the government.

Each legal characteristic was scored according to the authors' numerical coding on a range from zero (least independent) to one (most independent). The characteristics were then weighted to obtain an overall independence measure.

For more information, see Cukierman et al (1992).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: See variable description
N: 70

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

cm_cbi80_89u   Central Bank Independence, Unweighted (1980-1989)

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank independence.

The variable is based on central bank laws from the years 1980-1989. Sixteen legal characteristics are considered and they relate to the following areas: the central bank management's insulation from political pressure by secure tenure and independent appointment for the head of the bank; the government's ability to participate or overturn the bank's policy decisions; the clarity of the defined objective for monetary policy specified in the central bank's legal mandate; restrictions that limit lending to the government.

Each legal characteristic was scored according to the authors' numerical coding on a range from zero (least independent) to one (most independent). The characteristics were then averaged (unweighted) to obtain an overall independence measure.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 70   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

cm_cbi03   Central Bank Independence, Weighted 2003

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank independence.

The variable is based on IMF data pertaining to the year 2003. It is a replication done by Crowe and Meade, using the methodology from Cukierman et al (1992). See the description of cmi_cbi80_89.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2003   **Years**: N/A
N: 95   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

cm_cbi03u   **Central Bank Independence, Unweighted 2003**

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank independence.

The variable is based on IMF data pertaining to the year 2003. It is a replication done by Crowe and Meade, using the methodology from Cukierman et al (1992). See the description of cmi_cbi80_89u.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2003   **Years**: N/A
N: 95   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

cm_cbt98   **Central Bank Transparency (1998)**

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank transparency.

The variable is based on information from 1998. It is constructed as the unweighted average of ten indicators from five categories: the clarity of the central bank's legal mandate; the publication of the data used by the central bank as basis for its decisions; the communication of the explicit policy strategy and information on the decision-making process; timely announcements on policy actions and indications of likely future actions; discussion of economic disturbances and policy errors.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 1998   **Years**: N/A
N: 87   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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cm_cbt06   Central Bank Transparency (2006)

The index varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater central bank transparency.

The variable is based on information from 2006. It is constructed as the unweighted average of ten indicators from five categories: the clarity of the central bank's legal mandate; the publication of the data used by the central bank as basis for its decisions; the communication of the explicit policy strategy and information on the decision-making process; timely announcements on policy actions and indications of likely future actions; discussion of economic disturbances and policy errors.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2006   **Years**: N/A
N: 39   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

cm_cbgt80_89   Turnover of Central Bank Governor (1980-1989)

This is the average number of changes of the central bank's governor per year from 1980 to 1989. Higher values indicate *lower* independence of the central bank.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 69   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

cm_cbgt95_04   Turnover of Central Bank Governor (1995-2004)

This is the average number of changes of the central bank's governor per year from 1995 to 2004. Higher values indicate *lower* independence of the central bank.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 114   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

Database of Political Institutions

http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html   (2013-01-23)

(Beck et al 2001)

DPI2012

DPI2012 extends DPI2010 through 2012, adding data for the years 2011 and 2012. Note: The data from the DPI refers to January 1 of each year. In the original data "not applicable" is coded as -999. We have replaced these observations with missing.

---

dpi_system   Regime Type

Systems with unelected executives (those scoring a 2 or 3 on the Executive Index of Political Competitiveness – to be defined below) get a 0. Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by an electoral college (whose *only* function is to elect the president), in cases where there is no prime minister, also receive a 0. In systems with both a prime minister and a president, we consider the following factors to categorize the system: a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the parliament needs a supermajority to override the veto; b) Appoint prime minister: president can appoint *and* dismiss prime minister and / or other ministers; c) Dissolve parliament: president can dissolve parliament and call for new elections; d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention the president more often than the PM then this serves as an additional indicator to call the system presidential *(Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, Yugoslavia).*

The system is presidential if (a) is true, or if (b) **and** (c) are true. If no information or ambiguous information on (a), (b), (c), then (d). Consult Appendix for specific country examples.

Countries in which the legislature elects the chief executive are parliamentary (2), with the following exception: if that assembly or group cannot easily recall him (if they need a 2/3 vote to impeach, or must dissolve themselves while forcing him out) then the system gets a 1.

(0)   Presidential
(1)   Strong president elected by assembly
(2)   Parliamentary

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6207 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_yio   **Year in Office**

The number of years in office of the chief executive.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6203 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 34

---

dpi_finter   **Finite Term in Office**

Is there a constitutional limit on the number of years the executive can serve before new elections must be called? Deviating from the convention, a 0 is recorded if a limit is not explicitly stated. This gets a 0 in the cases where the constitution with year limits is suspended or unenforced.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 174   **N**: 184   **n**: 6121 $\overline{N}$: 161 $\overline{T}$: 33

---

dpi_yct   **Years left in Current Term**

Only full years are counted. Thus, a "0" is scored in an election year, and n-1 in the year after an election, where n is the length of the term. In countries where early elections can be called, dpi_yct is set to the de jure term limit or schedule of elections, but resets in the case of early elections.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2010   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 158   **N**: 168   **n**: 4938 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 29

dpi_mt   Multiple Terms

Dummy variable, 1 if the chief executive's term is constitutionally limited (dpi_finter=1) and (s)he may serve additional terms following the current one, also in cases where this is not explicit-ly stated; and 0 if (s)he may not serve additional terms. Prime ministers always get "1".

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 158   **N**: 172   **n**: 4817 $\overline{N}$: 127 $\overline{T}$: 28

dpi_cemo   Chief Executive a Military Officer

Dummy variable, 1 if the chief executive is a military officer. If chief executives were described as officers with no indication of formal retirement when they assumed office, they are always listed as officers for the duration of their term. If chief executives were formally retired military officers upon taking office, then this variable gets a 0.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6203 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_dmmo   Defense Minister a Military Officer

Dummy variable.1 if the defense minister is a military officer, definition same as dpi_cemo. If no one in the cabinet with such responsibility, or if there are no armed forces, then "missing". If there is no defense minister but the chief executive controls military directly, then same answer as in dpi_cemo.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 165   **N**: 177   **n**: 5489 $\overline{N}$: 144 $\overline{T}$: 31

dpi_pvor   **Votes for the President in the first/only round**

Percentage of votes for the president in the first/only round.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2008-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 93   **N**: 102   **n**: 2168 $\overline{N}$: 57 $\overline{T}$: 21

---

dpi_pvfr   **Votes for the President in the final round**

Percentage of votes for the President in the final round.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 36   **N**: 48   **n**: 468 $\overline{N}$: 12 $\overline{T}$: 10

---

dpi_hlio   **Party of Chief Executive: How Long in Office**

The number of years the party of the chief executive has been in office.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2007-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 148   **N**: 171   **n**: 4940 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 29

---

dpi_erlc   **Party of Chief Executive: Right, Left or Center**

Party orientation with respect to economic policy, coded based on the description of the party in the sources, using the following criteria: Right: for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. Left: for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. Center: for parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). *Not* described as centrist if competing factions "average out" to a centrist position (e.g. a party of "right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists").

The variable captures whether the party is right, left or center oriented:

(1)   Right
(2)   Left
(3)   Center

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 104   **N**: 145   **n**: 3723 $\overline{N}$: 98 $\overline{T}$: 26

---

dpi_eage   **Party of Chief Executive: Age**

Time since formation under current name of the party of the Chief Executive.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 150   **N**: 171   **n**: 4763 $\overline{N}$: 125 $\overline{T}$: 28

dpi_seats   Total Seats in the Legislature

Total seats in the legislature, or in the case of bicameral legislatures, the total seats in the lower house. This variable includes appointed and elected seats.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009
N: 174

Years: 1975-2012
N: 185   **n**: 6252 $\overline{N}$: 165 $\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_gf   Government Fractionalization

Government fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies from among the government parties will be of different parties.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011
N: 173

Years: 1975-2012
N: 185   **n**: 5344 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 29

dpi_gs   Number of Government Seats

Number of seats in the legislature of the parties in government.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009
N: 174

Years: 1975-2012
N: 185   **n**: 6252 $\overline{N}$: 165 $\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_gvs   **Government Vote Share (%)**

The total vote share of all government parties in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6252 $\overline{N}$: 165 $\overline{T}$: 34

---

dpi_gps1   **Largest Government Party: Seats**

Number of seats in the legislature of the largest government party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6174 $\overline{N}$: 162 $\overline{T}$: 33

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dpi_gpvs1   **Largest Government Party: Vote Share (%)**

The total vote share of all government parties in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 146   **N**: 181   **n**: 4832 $\overline{N}$: 127 $\overline{T}$: 27

167

dpi_gprlc1   **Largest Government Party: Right, Left or Center**

Codes whether the largest government party is right, left or center oriented (see variable dpi_erlc for more information).

Note: Some observations had the value 0, which means "No information" according to the codebook. We replaced these values with missing.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 169   **N**: 181   **n**: 5355 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 30

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dpi_gpage1   **Largest Government Party: Age**

Time since formation under this name of largest government party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 161   **N**: 175   **n**: 4931 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 28

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dpi_gps2   **2nd Largest Government Party: Seats**

Number of seats in the legislature of the 2nd largest government party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6187 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 33

dpi_gpvs2   **2nd Largest Government Party: Vote Share (%)**
Vote share of 2nd largest government party, in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 163   **N**: 184   **n**: 5497 $\overline{N}$: 145 $\overline{T}$: 30

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dpi_gprlc2   **2nd Largest Government Party: Right, Left or Center**
Codes whether the 2nd largest government party is right, left or center oriented (see variable dpi_erlc for more information).

Note: Some observations had the value 0, which means "No information" according to the codebook. We replaced these values with missing.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 99   **N**: 139   **n**: 2051 $\overline{N}$: 54 $\overline{T}$: 15

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dpi_gpage2   **2nd Largest Government Party: Age**
Time since formation under this name of 2nd largest government party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 94   **N**: 128   **n**: 1748 $\overline{N}$: 46 $\overline{T}$: 14

169

dpi_gps3   **3rd Largest Government Party: Seats**
Number of seats in the legislature of the 3rd largest government party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6206 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_gpvs3   **3rd Largest Government Party: Vote Share (%)**
Vote share of 3rd largest government party, in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 169   **N**: 184   **n**: 5698 $\overline{N}$: 150 $\overline{T}$: 31

dpi_gprlc3   **3rd Largest Government Party: Right, Left or Center**
Codes whether the 3rd largest government party is right, left or center oriented (see variable dpi_erlc for more information).

Note: Some observations had the value 0, which means "No information" according to the codebook. We replaced these values with missing.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 72   **N**: 115   **n**: 1254 $\overline{N}$: 33 $\overline{T}$: 11

170

dpi_gpage3   3rd Largest Government Party: Age

Time since formation under this name of 3rd largest government party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2011
N: 66

Years: 1975-2012
N: 94   **n**: 979 $\overline{N}$: 26 $\overline{T}$: 10

dpi_nogp   Number of other Government Parties

Number of government parties other than the three largest.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012
N: 173

Years: 1975-2012
N: 185   **n**: 5430 $\overline{N}$: 143 $\overline{T}$: 29

dpi_nogps   Number of other Government Party Seats

Number of seats in the legislature of government parties other than the three largest.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2012
N: 174

Years: 1975-2012
N: 185   **n**: 6186 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 33

171

dpi_ogpvs   **Other Government Parties' Vote Share (%)**

Vote share for the parties other than the three largest, in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 169   **N**: 185   **n**: 5760 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 31

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dpi_opf   **Opposition Fractionalization**

Opposition fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies belonging to the parties in the opposition will be of different parties.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 153   **N**: 160   **n**: 3950 $\overline{N}$: 104 $\overline{T}$: 25

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dpi_nos   **Number of Oppositional Seats**

Number of seats in the legislature of all the parties in opposition.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6252 $\overline{N}$: 165 $\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_slop1   Largest Opposition Party: Seats

Number of seats in the legislature of the largest opposition party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6152 $\overline{N}$: 162 $\overline{T}$: 33

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dpi_vslop1   Largest Opposition Party: Vote Share (%)

Share of votes of the largest opposition party, in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 151   **N**: 184   **n**: 4992 $\overline{N}$: 131 $\overline{T}$: 27

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dpi_oprlc1   Largest Opposition Party: Right, Left or Center

Codes whether the largest opposition party is right, left or center oriented (see variable dpi_erlc for more information).

Note: Some observations had the value 0, which means "No information" according to the codebook. We replaced these values with missing.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 153   **N**: 161   **n**: 4023 $\overline{N}$: 106 $\overline{T}$: 25

dpi_opage1   Largest Opposition Party: Age
Time since formation under this name of largest opposition party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 146   **N**: 158   **n**: 3550 $\overline{N}$: 93 $\overline{T}$: 22

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dpi_slop2   2nd Largest Opposition Party: Seats
Number of seats in the legislature of the 2nd largest opposition party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6192 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 33

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dpi_vslop2   2nd Largest Opposition Party: Vote Share (%)
Share of votes of the 2nd largest opposition party, in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 155   **N**: 184   **n**: 5139 $\overline{N}$: 135 $\overline{T}$: 28

dpi_slop3   3rd Largest Opposition Party: Seats
Number of seats in the legislature of the 3rd largest opposition party.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6208 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_vslop3   3rd Largest Opposition Party: Vote Share (%)
Share of votes of the 3rd largest opposition party, in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 161   **N**: 184   **n**: 5282 $\overline{N}$: 139 $\overline{T}$: 29

dpi_noop   Number of other Opposition Parties
Number of opposition parties other than the three largest.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 173   **N**: 185   **n**: 5368 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 29

dpi_noops   **Number of other Opposition Party Seats**

Number of seats in the legislature of opposition parties other than the three largest.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6204 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 34

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dpi_vsoop   **Vote Share of other Opposition Parties (%)**

Vote share of opposition parties other than the three largest, in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 163   **N**: 184   **n**: 5350 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 29

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dpi_ulprty   **Number of Parties non-aligned/allegiance unknown**

Number of Parties non-aligned/allegiance unknown.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 173   **N**: 185   **n**: 5377 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 29

dpi_numul   Number of Seats non-aligned/allegiance unknown

Number of Seats non-aligned/allegiance unknown.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6205 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_vsul   Vote Share non-aligned/allegiance unknown (%)

Vote share non-aligned/allegiance unknown, in percent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 152   **N**: 184   **n**: 5699 $\overline{N}$: 150 $\overline{T}$: 31

dpi_tf   Total Fractionalization

Total fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies in the legislature belong to different parties.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 172   **N**: 185   **n**: 5278 $\overline{N}$: 139 $\overline{T}$: 29

dpi_maj   Majority Seats
Number of government seats divided by total seats in the legislature.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 173

Years: 1975-2012
N: 185   **n**: 5341 $\bar{N}$: 141 $\bar{T}$: 29

dpi_legelec   Legislative Election
Dummy variable. 1 if there is a legislative election held this year.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2011
N: 174

Years: 1975-2012
N: 185   **n**: 6216 $\bar{N}$: 164 $\bar{T}$: 34

dpi_exelec   Executive Election
Dummy variable. 1 if there is an executive election held this year.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 174

Years: 1975-2012
N: 185   **n**: 6217 $\bar{N}$: 164 $\bar{T}$: 34

dpi_lipc   Legislative Index of Political Competitiveness

This variable captures the degree of political competitiveness in the legislature as follows:

(1)	No legislature
(2)	Unelected legislature
(3)	Elected legislature with single candidates (like in many Communist countries)
(3,5)	Unclear whether there is competition among elected legislators in a single-party system
(4)	Single party with multiple candidates
(5)	Multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats
(5,5)	Not clear whether multiple parties ran and only one party won or multiple parties ran and won more than 75% of the seats
(6)	Multiple parties won seats but the largest party received more than 75% of the seats
(6,5)	Multiple parties won seats but it is unclear how many the largest party got
(7)	Largest party got less than 75%

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009

N: 174

Years: 1975-2012

N: 185   **n**: 6205 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 34

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dpi_eipc   Executive Index of Political Competitiveness

Uses the same scale as the Legislative Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi_lipc) but applies for executive elections instead.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010

N: 174

Years: 1975-2012

N: 185   **n**: 6200 $\overline{N}$: 163 $\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_mdmh   **Mean District Magnitude (House)**

The *weighted average* of the number of representatives elected by each constituency size, if available. If not, we use the number of seats divided by the number of constituencies (if both are known). If the constituencies are the provincial or state divisions, the number of states or provinces are used to make this calculation for as long as we the number and the number of seats are known. If the only information available is the number of constituencies from the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU), and the constituencies are not the states/provinces, the IPU's number are used to calculate the Mean District Magnitude for 1995, and leave all unknowns blank.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 169   **N**: 176   **n**: 4433 $\overline{N}$: 117 $\overline{T}$: 25

dpi_mdms   **Mean District Magnitude (Senate)**

Uses the same method as the Mean District Magnitude (House) but applies for the senate instead.

Note: For both variables dpi_mdmh and dpi_mdms, a value of -888 means that that the legislature is appointed or that members are indirectly elected.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 57   **N**: 66   **n**: 1472 $\overline{N}$: 39 $\overline{T}$: 22

dpi_ssh   **Relative Size of Senate**

Number of senate seats/ (number of house seats + number of senate seats).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 61   **N**: 81   **n**: 1870 $\overline{N}$: 49 $\overline{T}$: 23

dpi_plurality   Plurality

Dummy variable. 1 if plurality is used as electoral rule to select any candidate in any house, or if there is competition for the seats in a one-party state (dpi_lipc=4).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 163   **N**: 171   **n**: 4710 $\overline{N}$: 124 $\overline{T}$: 28

dpi_pr   Proportional Representation

Dummy variable. 1 if Proportional Representation (PR) is used as electoral rule to select any candidate in any house.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 163   **N**: 170   **n**: 4248 $\overline{N}$: 112 $\overline{T}$: 25

dpi_housesys   House: Plurality or Proportional?

If Plurality and Proportional Representation - which governs the majority/all of the House seats? (1 if Plurality, 0.5 if 50% Plurality and 50% Proportional, and 0 if Proportional).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 162   **N**: 171   **n**: 4657 $\overline{N}$: 123 $\overline{T}$: 27

dpi_sensys   Senate: Plurality or Proportional?

If Plurality and Proportional Representation - which governs the majority/all of the Senate seats? (1 if Plurality, 0.5 if 50% Plurality and 50% Proportional, and 0 if Proportional).

Note: A value of -888 means that that the legislature is appointed or that members are indirectly elected.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 29   **N**: 36   **n**: 729 $\overline{N}$: 19 $\overline{T}$: 20

dpi_thresh   Vote Threshold for Representation

Records the minimum vote share that a party must obtain in order to take at least one seat in PR systems, in percent. If there is more than one threshold, the variable denotes the one that governs the most seats.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 100   **N**: 108   **n**: 2521 $\overline{N}$: 66 $\overline{T}$: 23

dpi_dhondt   D'Hondt

Dummy variable, 1 if the D'Hondt rule is used to allocate seats in a PR system.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 99   **N**: 104   **n**: 2442 $\overline{N}$: 64 $\overline{T}$: 23

dpi_cl   **Closed Lists**

Dummy variable. 1 when PR is used (dpi_pr) and voters cannot express preferences for candidates within a party list.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 107   **N**: 116   **n**: 2818 $\overline{N}$: 74 $\overline{T}$: 24

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dpi_fraud   **Fraud or Candidate Intimidation Affection**

Dummy variable. 1 when opposition is officially legal but reported vote fraud or candidate intimidation were serious enough to affect the outcome of elections. If not an election year, or if elected government has been deposed, records to the most recent election.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 163   **N**: 175   **n**: 5187 $\overline{N}$: 137 $\overline{T}$: 30

dpi_checks **Number of Veto Players**

Equals 1 if the Legislative Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi_lipc) or the Executive Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi_eipc) is less than six. In countries where dpi_lipc and dpi_eipc are greater than or equal to six, dpi_checks is incremented by one if there is a chief executive, by a further one if the chief executive is competitively elected (dpi_eipc greater than six), and by a further one if the opposition controls the legislature.

In presidential systems, dpi_checks is incremented by one for each chamber of the legislature (unless the president's party has a majority in the lower house and a closed-list system is in effect), and by one for each party coded as allied with the president's party and which has an ideological (left-right) orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the president's party.

In parliamentary systems dpi_checks is incremented by one for every party in the government coalition as long as the parties are needed to maintain a majority, and by one for every party in the government coalition that has a position on economic issues closer to the largest opposition party than to the party of the executive. (The prime minister's party is *not* counted as a check if there is a closed rule in place.)

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset [Back?]

Years: 2009-2011 **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 174 **N**: 185 **n**: 6047 $\overline{N}$: 159 $\overline{T}$: 33

dpi_polariz **Maximum Difference of Orientation**

The maximum difference between the left-right-center orientation of the chief executive's party and the placement of the three largest government parties and the largest opposition party. Is coded (0) if the Legislative Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi_lipc) or the Executive Index of Political Competitiveness (dpi_eipc) are less than six (elections are not competitive), and if the chief executive's party has an absolute majority in the legislature. Ranges between 0 and 2.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset [Back?]

Years: 2006-2012 **Years**: 1975-2012
N: 157 **N**: 183 **n**: 5615 $\overline{N}$: 148 $\overline{T}$: 31

dpi_auton**Autonomous Regions**

Autonomous regions are *not* the same as states, provinces, etc. An autonomous region is recorded if a source explicitly mentions a region, area, or district that is autonomous or self-governing. Furthermore, they must be constitutionally designated as "autonomous" or "independent" or "special". Federal Districts or Capital Districts do not count as autonomous regions. Disputed autonomy is not recorded. Indian reservations are not counted as autonomous.

Note: Deviating from convention, no information recorded as 0.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset☑ Time-Series DatasetBack?

Years: 2008-2009
N: 173

Years: 1975-2012
N: 184**n**: 6184$\overline{N}$: 163$\overline{T}$: 34

dpi_state**Election of State/Province Government**

One dimension of information on sub-national governments is whether state/provincial governments are locally elected.

(0)Neither the local executive nor the local legislature are directly elected by the local population that they govern

(1)Either is directly elected and the other is indirectly elected (e.g., by councils at subsidiary levels of government) or appointed.

(2)Both are directly and locally elected. If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, the highest level is considered as the "state/province" level.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset☑ Time-Series DatasetBack?

Years: 2008-2009
N: 139

Years: 1975-2012
N: 158**n**: 4667$\overline{N}$: 123$\overline{T}$: 30

dpi_muni   **Election of Municipal Government**

Are the municipal governments locally elected? Coded the same as the state/provincial government, dpi_state above (0-2). If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, the lowest level is considered as the "municipal" level.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 121   **N**: 130   **n**: 3629 $\overline{N}$: 96 $\overline{T}$: 28

---

dpi_author   **Authority of Sub-national Governments**

Dummy variable. 1 if sub-national governments have extensive taxing, spending or regulatory authority.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1975-2012

N: 65   **N**: 76   **n**: 2150 $\overline{N}$: 57 $\overline{T}$: 28

Dreher

http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/   (2013-03-07)

(Dreher 2006; Dreher et al 2008)

KOF Index of Globalization

All indexes below range between 0 and 100, where higher values indicate a higher degree of globalization.

---

dr_ig   Index of Globalization

The overall index of globalization is the weighted average of the following variables: economic globalization, social globalization and political globalization (dr_eg, dr_sg and dr_pg). Most weight has been given to economic followed by social globalization.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2010

N: 181   **N**: 184   **n**: 6504 $\overline{N}$: 159 $\overline{T}$: 35

dr_eg   Economic Globalization

Economic globalization is here defined as the long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. It is measured by actual flows of trade and investments, and by restrictions on trade and capital such as tariff rates.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2010

N: 150   **N**: 153   **n**: 5501 $\overline{N}$: 134 $\overline{T}$: 36

dr_pg   Political Globalization

Political globalization is measured by the number of embassies and high commissions in a country, the number of international organizations of which the country is a member, the number of UN peace missions the country has participated in, and the number of international treaties that the country has signed since 1945.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2010

N: 190   **N**: 193   **n**: 6839 $\overline{N}$: 167 $\overline{T}$: 35

dr_sg   **Social Globalization**

Social globalization is measured by three categories of indicators. The first is personal contacts, such as telephone traffic and tourism. The second is information flows, e.g. number of Internet users. The third is cultural proximity, e.g. trade in books and number of Ikea warehouses per capita.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2010
N: 183   **N**: 186   **n**: 6586 $\overline{N}$: 161 $\overline{T}$: 35

Deininger & Squire

http://go.worldbank.org/UVPO9KSJJ0   (2013-01-27)

(Deininger & Squire 1996)

ds_gini   **Gini Index**

The variable measures the Gini index of income inequality from observations with highest quality (quality="accept") in the original Deininger & Squire (1996) dataset (higher values indicate more inequality). The Gini coefficient varies theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (the society's total income accrues to only one person/household unit). Note: Both within- and cross-country comparisons should be handled with care, as these Gini coefficients are based on varying sources of information: income or expenditure, gross or net of taxes, individual or household recipient units.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1947-1996
N: N/A   **N**: 113   **n**: 665 $\overline{N}$: 13 $\overline{T}$: 6

Easterly & Levine

http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20700002~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html (2013-02-01)

(Easterly and Levine 1997)

Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions

Variables from the dataset compiled by Easterly and Levine and used in the article *Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions*. The original source used by Easterly and Levine is listed under each variable.

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el_gunn1   % of Pop. not Speaking the Official Language

The share of the population of each country for whom the language spoken at home is not the official language of the country.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 145

Years: 1946-2012
N: 147   Country Constant Variable

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el_gunn2   % of Pop. not Speaking the Most Widely Used Language

The share of the population not speaking the most widely used language.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 146

Years: 1946-2012
N: 148   Country Constant Variable

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el_avelf   Average Value of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization

Average value of el_gunn1, el_gunn2 and three other ethnolinguistic fractionalization variables taken from Muller (1964), Roberts (1962) and Atlas Narodov Mira (1964).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 108   **N**: 108   Country Constant Variable

Fearon

Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country

Used in the article "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country" published in *Journal of Economic Growth*, containing data on 822 ethnic groups in 160 countries that made up at least 1 percent of the country population in the early 1990s.

fe_etfra   Ethnic Fractionalization

Restricting attention to groups that had at least 1 percent of country population in the 1990s, Fearon identifies 822 ethnic and "ethnoreligious" groups in 160 countries. This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to different such groups. The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 153   **N**: 159   Country Constant Variable

190

fe_plural **Plurality Group**

Based on the same set of groups, this variable reflects the population share of the largest group (plurality group) in the country.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009 **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 152 **N**: 158 Country Constant Variable

fe_lmin **Largest Minority**

Based on the same set of groups, this variable reflects the population share of the second largest group (largest minority).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009 **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 144 **N**: 149 Country Constant Variable

fe_cultdiv **Cultural Diversity**

This measure modifies fractionalization (fe_etfra) so as to take some account of cultural distances between groups, measured as the structural distance between languages spoken by different groups in a country. If the groups in a country speak structurally unrelated languages, their cultural diversity index will be the same as their level of ethnic fractionalization (fe_etfra). The more similar are the languages spoken by different ethnic groups, however, the more will this measure be reduced below the level of ethnic fractionalization for that country.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009 **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 152 **N**: 158 Country Constant Variable

Fraser Institute

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fi_index   **Economic Freedom of the World Index (Current)**

The index is founded upon objective components that reflect the presence (or absence) of economic freedom. The index comprises 21 components designed to identify the consistency of institutional arrangements and policies with economic freedom in five major areas:

- size of government (fi_sog)
- legal structure and security of property rights (fi_legprop)
- access to sound money (fi_sm)
- freedom to trade internationally (fi_ftradeint)
- regulation of credit, labor and business (fi_reg)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'less economic freedom' and 10 to 'more economic freedom'. This is the version of the index published at the current year of measurement, without taking methodological changes over time into account.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1970-2010

N: 143   **N**: 144   **n**: 2026 $\overline{N}$: 49 $\overline{T}$: 14

---

fi_index_cl — Economic Freedom of the World Index (Chain-Linked)

One problem with the version of the index of economic freedom (fi_index) is that the underlying data is more complete in recent years than in earlier years. As a result, changes in the index ratings over time may reflect the fact that some components are missing in some years but not in others. The problem of missing components threatens the comparability of the index ratings over time. In order to correct for this problem, the Fraser Institute has constructed a chain-linked summary index of economic freedom that is based on the 2000 rating as a base year. Changes to the index going backward (and forward) in time are then based only on changes in components that were present in adjacent years. The chain-linked methodology means that a country's rating will change across time periods only when there is a change in ratings for components present during both of the over-lapping years. This is precisely what one would want when making comparisons across time periods.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009
N: 122

Years: 1970-2010
N: 123 **n**: 1900 $\overline{N}$: 46 $\overline{T}$: 15

fi_sog — Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises (Current)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'large general government consumption', 'large transfer sector', 'many government enterprises', and 'high marginal tax rates and low income thresholds', and 10 to 'small general government consumption', 'small transfer sector', 'few government enterprises', and 'low marginal tax rates and high income thresholds'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption
- Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
- Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of total investment
- Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies)

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009-2010
N: 143

Years: 1970-2010
N: 145 **n**: 2095 $\overline{N}$: 51 $\overline{T}$: 14

fi_sog_cl   **Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises (Chain-Linked)**

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'large general government consumption', 'large transfer sector', 'many government enterprises', and 'high marginal tax rates and low income thresholds', and 10 to 'small general government consumption', 'small transfer sector', 'few government enterprises', and 'low marginal tax rates and high income thresholds'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption
- Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
- Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of total investment
- Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies)

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2010
N: 122   **N**: 124   **n**: 1968 $\overline{N}$: 48 $\overline{T}$: 16

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fi_legprop   **Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (Current)**

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'no judicial independence', 'no trusted legal framework exists', 'no protection of intellectual property', 'military interference in rule of law', and 'no integrity of the legal system' and 10 corresponds to 'high judicial independence', 'trusted legal framework exists', 'protection of intellectual property', 'no military interference in rule of law', and 'integrity of the legal system'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- Judicial independence: The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in dispute
- Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations
- Protection of intellectual property
- Military interference in rule of law and the political process
- Integrity of the legal system

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1970-2010
N: 143   **N**: 144   **n**: 1986 $\overline{N}$: 48 $\overline{T}$: 14

fi_legprop_cl — Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (Chain-Linked)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'no judicial independence', 'no trusted legal framework exists', 'no protection of intellectual property', 'military interference in rule of law', and 'no integrity of the legal system' and 10 corresponds to 'high judicial independence', 'trusted legal framework exists', 'protection of intellectual property', 'no military interference in rule of law', and 'integrity of the legal system'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- Judicial independence: The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in dispute
- Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations
- Protection of intellectual property
- Military interference in rule of law and the political process
- Integrity of the legal system

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 122

Years: 1970-2010
N: 123   **n**: 1853 $\overline{N}$: 45 $\overline{T}$: 15

fi_sm — Access to Sound Money (Current)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'high annual money growth', 'high variation in the annual rate of inflation', 'high inflation rate', and 'restricted foreign currency bank accounts' and 10 corresponds to 'low annual money growth', 'low or no variation in the annual rate of inflation', 'low inflation rate', and 'foreign currency bank accounts are permissible without restrictions'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average annual growth of real GDP in the last ten years
- Standard inflation variability in the last five years
- Recent inflation rate
- Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010
N: 143

Years: 1970-2010
N: 145   **n**: 2121 $\overline{N}$: 52 $\overline{T}$: 15

fi_sm_cl   Access to Sound Money (Chain-Linked)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'high annual money growth', 'high variation in the annual rate of inflation', 'high inflation rate', and 'restricted foreign currency bank accounts' and 10 corresponds to 'low annual money growth', 'low or no variation in the annual rate of inflation', 'low inflation rate', and 'foreign currency bank accounts are permissible without restrictions'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average annual growth of real GDP in the last ten years
- Standard inflation variability in the last five years
- Recent inflation rate
- Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 122

Years: 1970-2010
N: 124   **n**: 2000 $\overline{N}$: 49 $\overline{T}$: 16

fi_ftradeint   Freedom to Trade Internationally (Current)

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'increasing tax rate on international trade', 'slow import or export process', 'small trade sectors relative to the population and geographic size', 'exchange rate controls are present and a black-market exists', and 'restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners' and 10 corresponds to 'no specific taxes on international trade', 'swift import or export process', 'large trade sectors relative to the population and geographic size', 'no black-market exchange rate', and 'no restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- Taxes on international trade
- Regulatory trade barriers
- Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size
- Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate International capital market controls

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010
N: 143

Years: 1970-2010
N: 145   **n**: 2056 $\overline{N}$: 50 $\overline{T}$: 14

fi_ftradeint_cl   **Freedom to Trade Internationally (Chain-Linked)**

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'increasing tax rate on international trade', 'slow import or export process', 'small trade sectors relative to the population and geographic size', 'exchange rate controls are present and a black-market exists', and 'restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners' and 10 corresponds to 'no specific taxes on international trade', 'swift import or export process', 'large trade sectors relative to the population and geographic size', 'no black-market exchange rate', and 'no restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- Taxes on international trade
- Regulatory trade barriers
- Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size
- Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate International capital market controls

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2010
N: 121   **N**: 123   **n**: 1880 $\overline{N}$: 46 $\overline{T}$: 15

fi_reg   **Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business (Current)**

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'low percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks', 'high foreign bank license denial rate', 'private sector's share of credit is close to the base-year-minimum', 'deposit and lending rates is fixed by the government and real rates is persistently negative', 'high impact of minimum wage', 'widespread use of price controls throughout various sectors of the economy', and 'starting a new business is generally complicated' and 10 corresponds to 'high percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks', 'low foreign bank license denial rate', 'private sector's share of credit is close to the base-year-maximum', 'interest rates is determined primarily by market forces and the real rates is positive', 'low impact of minimum wage', 'no price controls or marketing boards', and 'starting a new business is generally easy'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- Credit Market Regulations
- Labor Market Regulations
- Business Regulations

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1970-2010
N: 143   **N**: 144   **n**: 2048 $\overline{N}$: 50 $\overline{T}$: 14

fi_reg_cl   **Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business (Chain-Linked)**

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'low percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks', 'high foreign bank license denial rate', 'private sector's share of credit is close to the base-year-minimum', 'deposit and lending rates is fixed by the government and real rates is persistently negative', 'high impact of minimum wage', 'widespread use of price controls throughout various sectors of the economy', and 'starting a new business is generally complicated' and 10 corresponds to 'high percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks', 'low foreign bank license denial rate', 'private sector's share of credit is close to the base-year-maximum', 'interest rates is determined primarily by market forces and the real rates is positive', 'low impact of minimum wage', 'no price controls or marketing boards', and 'starting a new business is generally easy'. The index consists of the following indicators:

- Credit Market Regulations
- Labor Market Regulations
- Business Regulations

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2010
N: 122   **N**: 123   **n**: 1887 $\overline{N}$: 46 $\overline{T}$: 15

Fish and Kroenig

http://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/person_detail.php?person=236   (2013-02-25)

(Fish and Kroenig 2009)

The Parliamentary Powers Index

fk_ppi   **Parliamentary Powers Index**

The Parliamentary Powers Index assesses the strength of the national legislature. The index, based on 32 underlying dummy variables, gauges the legislature's sway of the executive, its institutional autonomy, its authority in specific areas, and its institutional capacity.

The data was generated by means of international an survey of experts, a study of secondary sources, and analyses of constitutions and other relevant documents

The variable ranges from 0 (least powerful) to 1 (most powerful). The score is calculated by summing up the number of powers that the national legislature possesses and dividing it by 32. For example, a country with a national legislature that possesses 16 of the 32 parliamentary powers has a PPI of .50.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2009   **Years**: N/A
N: 157   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

Gleditsch

http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html   (2013-01-27)

(Gleditsch 2002)

Expanded Trade and GDP Data

gle_imp   **Total Import**

Amounts to the total import of a country, in millions of current year US dollars, estimated as the sum of all dyadic import figures to that country using the imputation technique described above.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-2000
N: N/A   **N**: 200   **n**: 7410 $\overline{N}$: 140 $\overline{T}$: 37

200

gle_exp   **Total Export**

Amounts to the total export of a country, in millions of current year US dollars, estimated as the sum of all dyadic export figures to that country using the imputation technique described above.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-2000

N: N/A   **N**: 200   **n**: 7410 $\overline{N}$: 140 $\overline{T}$: 37

---

gle_trade   **Total Trade**

Amounts to the sum of import and export of a country, in millions of current year US dollars, estimated as the sum of all dyadic import and export figures of that country using the imputation technique described above.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-2000

N: N/A   **N**: 200   **n**: 7410 $\overline{N}$: 140 $\overline{T}$: 37

---

gle_pop   **Population (1000's)**

Size of the population in 1000's.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1950-2004

N: N/A   **N**: 204   **n**: 8098 $\overline{N}$: 147 $\overline{T}$: 40

201

gle_gdp   **GDP per Capita**
In order to fill in gaps in the Penn World Table's mark 5.6 and 6.2 data (see below: Heston, Summers & Aten), Gleditsch has imputed missing data by using an alternative source of data (the CIA *World Fact Book*), and through extrapolation beyond available time-series. This is his estimate of GDP per Capita in US dollars at current year international prices.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1950-2004
N: N/A   **N**: 204   **n**: 8098 $\overline{N}$: 147 $\overline{T}$: 40

gle_rgdp   **Real GDP per Capita**
This is the estimate of real GDP per Capita in constant US dollars at base year 2000, based on the imputation technique described above.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1950-2004
N: N/A   **N**: 204   **n**: 8098 $\overline{N}$: 147 $\overline{T}$: 40

Bormann & Golder
https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/elections.html   (2013-02-01)
(Bormann & Golder 2013)

Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World
Updated version of Golder's (2005) *Democratic Electoral Systems* (*DES*) dataset. Extending the temporal scope of the original dataset by including all legislative and presidential elections that took place in democratic states from 2001 through 2011. In addition to significantly expanding the size of the *DES* dataset, it offers a simplified classification scheme for electoral systems.

gol_adm   **Average District Magnitude**

The average district magnitude in an electoral tier. This is calculated as the total number of seats allocated in an electoral tier divided by the total number of districts in that tier. For example, tier1_avemag is 135/17 = 7:94 in the 2005 legislative elections in Denmark, because 135 seats were allocated across 17 districts in the lowest electoral tier.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 117   **N**: 133   **n**: 1282 $\overline{N}$: 19 $\overline{T}$: 10

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gol_dist   **Districts**

The number of electoral districts or constituencies in the lowest electoral tier for the lower house of the legislature.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 118   **N**: 133   **n**: 1290 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 10

---

gol_enep   **Effective Number of Electoral Parties**

The effective number of electoral parties (Source: Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 106   **N**: 123   **n**: 1188 $\overline{N}$: 18 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_enepo   **Effective Number of Electoral Parties (Others)**
The percentage of the vote going to parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official electoral results.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 106   **N**: 123   **n**: 1184 $\bar{N}$: 18 $\bar{T}$: 10

gol_enep1   **Effective Number of Electoral Parties1**
The effective number of electoral parties once the 'other' category has been "corrected" by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 107   **N**: 132   **n**: 1190 $\bar{N}$: 18 $\bar{T}$: 10

gol_enpp   **Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties**
The effective number of parliamentary (legislative) parties (Source: Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 112   **N**: 129   **n**: 1242 $\bar{N}$: 19 $\bar{T}$: 10

gol_enppo   **Effective # of Parliamentary / Legislative Parties (Others)**

The percentage of seats won by parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official election results.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011
N: 111

Years: 1946-2011
N: 128   **n**: 1225 $\overline{N}$: 19 $\overline{T}$: 10

---

gol_enpp1   **Effective Number of Parliamentary / Legislative Parties1**

The effective number of parliamentary (legislative) parties once the 'other' category has been "corrected" by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011
N: 111

Years: 1946-2011
N: 128   **n**: 1225 $\overline{N}$: 19 $\overline{T}$: 10

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gol_enpres   **Effective Number of Presidential Candidates**

The effective number of presidential candidates (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2007-2011
N: 65

Years: 1946-2011
N: 70   **n**: 671 $\overline{N}$: 10 $\overline{T}$: 10

205

gol_est   Electoral System Type

The basic type of electoral system used in the elections.

(1)   Majoritarian
(2)   Proportional
(3)   Mixed

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 118   **N**: 134   **n**: 1296 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_inst   Institution

A country's regime type at the end of the given year. The data for this variable come from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), which Bormann & Golder updated through 2011.

(1)   Parliamentary democracy
(2)   Semi-presidential democracy
(3)   Presidential democracy
(4)   Civilian dictatorship
(5)   Military dictatorship
(6)   Royal dictatorship.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 118   **N**: 134   **n**: 1321 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_legel Legislative Elections

Indicates the number of elections for the national lower chamber of the legislature held in that year.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 118   **N**: 134   **n**: 1321 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_est_spec Detailed Electoral System Type

A detailed indication of the type of electoral system used in the election.

(1)   Single-Member-District-Plurality (SMDP)
(2)   Two-Round System (TRS)
(3)   Alternative Vote (AV)
(4)   Borda Count (BC)
(5)   Block Vote (BV)
(6)   Party Block Vote (PBV)
(7)   Limited Vote (LV)
(8)   Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV)
(9)   List Proportional Representation (List PR)
(10)   Single Transferable Vote (STV)
(11)   Mixed Dependent (or Mixed Member Proportional)
(12)   Mixed Independent (or Mixed Parallel)

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 118   **N**: 134   **n**: 1298 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_mix **Mixed Type**

The type of mixed electoral system that is being used (Massicotte and Blais, 1999).

(1) Coexistence
(2) Superposition
(3) Fusion
(4) Correction
(5) Conditional

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2007-2011 **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 31 **N**: 33 **n**: 233 $\overline{N}$: 4 $\overline{T}$: 7

gol_mt **Multi-Tier Type**

A dichotomous variable that indicates whether different electoral tiers are linked (1) or not (0). Electoral tiers are linked if the unused votes from one electoral tier are used to allocate seats in another electoral tier, or if the allocation of seats in one electoral tier is conditional on the seats received in a different electoral tier.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2006-2011 **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 118 **N**: 134 **n**: 1305 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_nos **Number of Seats**

The total number of seats in the lower house of the national legislature.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2006-2011 **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 118 **N**: 134 **n**: 1299 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_pest   Presidential Electoral System Type

The electoral formula used in the presidential elections.

(1)   Plurality
(2)   Absolute Majority
(3)   Qualified Majority
(4)   Electoral College
(5)   Alternative Vote

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 65   **N**: 69   **n**: 673 $\overline{N}$: 10 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_pr   PR Type

The electoral formula used in an electoral tier.

(1)   Single-Member-District-Plurality (SMDP)
(2)   Two Round Majority-Plurality
(3)   Two Round Qualified Majority
(4)   Two Round Majority Runoff
(5)   Alternative Vote (AV)
(6)   Borda Count (BC)
(7)   Modified Borda Count (mBC)
(8)   Block Vote (BV)
(9)   Party Block Vote (PBV)
(10)   Limited Vote (LV)
(11)   Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV)
(12)   Hare quota
(13)   Hare quota with largest remainders
(14)   Hare quota with highest average remainders
(15)   Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
(16)   Hagenbach-Bischoff quota with largest remainders
(17)   Hagenbach-Bischoff quota with highest average remainders
(18)   Droop quota
(19)   Droop quota with largest remainders
(20)   Droop quota with highest average remainders
(21)   Imperiali quota
(22)   Imperiali quota with largest remainders
(23)   Imperiali quota with highest average remainders
(24)   Reinforced Imperiali quota
(25)   D'Hondt
(26)   Sainte-Laguë

(27)   Modified Sainte-Laguë
(28)   Single Transferable Vote

Note: In the original data -88 indicates that there is no single value for this particular variable. For example, the legislative elections in France in 1951 and 1956 used two different electoral rules in the first electoral tier depending on the result in a given constituency. We have decided to recode this as missing.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 118

Years: 1946-2011
N: 134   **n**: 1303 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_preel   Presidential Election

A dichotomous variable that takes on the value 1 if the election is presidential and 0 if the election is legislative.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 118

Years: 1946-2011
N: 134   **n**: 1321 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 10

gol_upseat   Upper Seats

The number of legislative seats allocated in electoral districts above the lowest electoral tier.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 115

Years: 1946-2011
N: 131   **n**: 1242 $\overline{N}$: 19 $\overline{T}$: 9

gol_uptier   **Upper Tier**

The number of legislative seats allocated in electoral districts above the lowest electoral tier.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2011

N: 115   **N**: 131   **n**: 1242 $\overline{N}$: 19 $\overline{T}$: 9

Gerring, Thacker & Moreno

http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/research/articles-and-data/   (2013-02-01)

(Gerring et al 2005)

Centripetal Democratic Governance

gtm_centrip   **Centripetalism**

Sum of Unitarism (gtm_unit), Parliamentarism (gtm_parl), and Proportional Representation (gtm_pr).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1960-2000

N: N/A   **N**: 145   **n**: 2871 $\overline{N}$: 70 $\overline{T}$: 20

gtm_centrip2   **Centripetalism (weighted)**

The variable is a moving weighted sum of Unitarism (gtm_unit), Parliamentarism (gtm_parl), and Proportional Representation (gtm_pr), beginning in 1901 and ending in 2000. For details, see Gerring et al (2005).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1960-2000

N: N/A   **N**: 145   **n**: 2871 $\overline{N}$: 70 $\overline{T}$: 20

gtm_unit   Unitarism
Average of Nonfederalism and Nonbicameralism.

Nonfederalism is coded as:
(0)   Federal (elective regional legislatures plus conditional recognition of subnational authority)

(1)   Semifederal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government).

(2)   Non-federal.

Nonbicameralism is coded as:
(0)   Strong bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power; the two houses are incongruent).

(1)   Weak bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power, though not necessarily a formal veto; the two houses are congruent).

(2)   Unicameral (no upper house or weak upper house).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1960-2001
N: N/A   **N**: 164   **n**: 3576 $\overline{N}$: 85 $\overline{T}$: 22

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gtm_parl   Parliamentarism
The parliamentary/presidential distinction is conceptualized as a continuum with two dimensions: (a) the *degree of separation* (independence) between president and parliament (unity = parliamentary, separation = presidential) and, if there is any separation at all, (b) the *relative power* of the two players (the more power the president possesses, the more presidential is the resulting system). This complex reality is captured with a three-part coding scheme:

(0)   Presidential
(1)   Semi-presidential
(2)   Parliamentary

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1960-2001
N: N/A   **N**: 164   **n**: 3576 $\overline{N}$: 85 $\overline{T}$: 22

gtm_pr   **Proportional Representation**

The centripetal theory of democratic governance emphasizes the following three features of an electoral system: (a) district magnitude (M), (b) seat allocation rules (majoritarian or proportional), and (c) candidate selection rules. The centripetal ideal type is defined by M>1, proportional seat allocation rules, and party-controlled candidate selection. This is the *closed-list-PR* electoral system. Other systems are ranked lower in this coding according to their deviation from this ideal type. Thus, the coding for the list-PR variable is as follows:

(0)   Majoritarian or Preferential-vote
(1)   Mixed-member majority or Block vote
(2)   Closed-list-PR

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1960-2001
N: 165   **n**: 3577 $\overline{N}$: 85 $\overline{T}$: 22

Grimes

http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/publications/workingpapers/2008/   (2013-02-01)
(Grimes 2008)

Civil Society Organizations

Grimes has collected the data on the number of civil society organizations from CIVICUS, a global network of civil society organizations active in the area of social and economic development. The directory is compiled for the development community and does not purport to be an exhaustive register of all organizations.

gr_cso   **Development Civil Society Organizations**

Grimes has tried to validate the data by comparing it to the results of a comprehensive analysis conducted at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civil Society Studies of a much smaller subset of countries (Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003).Though the latter employs a broader definition of civil society and measures civil society as the proportion of a country's workforce active in civil society, the Johns Hopkins and CIVCUS measures correlate respectably (Pearson's r=0.63, p<0.001, N=35).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2008   **Years**: N/A

N: 190   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\bar{N}$: N/A $\bar{T}$: N/A

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gr_csopop   **CSOs per Population**

Number of civil society organizations per million inhabitants. Population data was taken from Gleditsch. For more information on the construction of the variable, see gr_cso above.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2008   **Years**: N/A

N: 169   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\bar{N}$: N/A $\bar{T}$: N/A

Henisz

http://mgmt5.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/POLCON/ContactInfo.html   (2013-04-09)

(Henisz 2000)

The Political Constraints Data

Measures political risk focusing on political constraints.

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h_polcon3   **Political Constraints Index III**

This index measures the feasibility of policy change, i.e. the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. The index is composed from the following information: the number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, counting the executive and the presence of an effective lower and upper house in the legislature (more branches leading to more constraint); the extent of party alignment across branches of government, measured as the extent to which the same party or coalition of parties control each branch (decreasing the level of constraint); and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch, measured as legislative fractionalization in the relevant house

(increasing constraint for aligned executives, decreasing it for opposed executives). The index scores are derived from a simple spatial model and theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and thus less feasibility of policy change. Note that the coding reflects information as of January 1 in any given year. Henisz (2002) uses this index to demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 186   **N**: 201   **n**: 9441 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 47

h_polcon5   Political Constraints Index V

This index follows the same logic as Political Constraints Index III (h_polcon3) but also includes two additional veto points: the judiciary and sub-federal entities. Note that the coding reflects information as of January 1 in any given year. Henisz (2000) uses this index to measure the impact on cross-national growth rates of a government's ability to provide credible commitment.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1960-2012
N: 171   **N**: 191   **n**: 7927 $\overline{N}$: 150 $\overline{T}$: 42

h_l1   Legislative Chamber

Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an effective legislative chamber (based on information from Polity's Executive Constraints, p_xconst).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 186   **N**: 201   **n**: 9615 $\overline{N}$: 144 $\overline{T}$: 48

215

h_l2   2nd Legislative Chamber

Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an effective second legislative chamber, namely, where h_l1=1 and records on the composition of a second chamber exist - where that chamber is elected under a distinct electoral system *and* has a substantive (not merely delaying) role in the implementation of fiscal policy.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 184   **N**: 199   **n**: 9557 $\overline{N}$: 143 $\overline{T}$: 48

h_j   Independent Judiciary

Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an independent judiciary (based on information from Polity's Executive Constraints, p_xconst) and - where available - on ICRG's index of Law & Order).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 168   **N**: 185   **n**: 7815 $\overline{N}$: 117 $\overline{T}$: 42

h_f   Independent Sub-Federal Unit

Dummy variable coded 1 if there are independent sub-federal units (states, provinces, regions etc.) that impose substantive constraints on national fiscal policy.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 184   **N**: 199   **n**: 8484 $\overline{N}$: 127 $\overline{T}$: 43

216

h_alignl1   Alignment Executive/Legislative Chamber (lower)

Dummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the lower legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the lower legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 159   **N**: 182   **n**: 6263 $\overline{N}$: 93 $\overline{T}$: 34

h_alignl2   Alignment Executive/Legislative Chamber (upper)

Dummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the upper legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the upper legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 38   **N**: 61   **n**: 1639 $\overline{N}$: 24 $\overline{T}$: 27

h_alignl1l2   Alignment Lower/Upper Legislative Chamber

Dummy variable indicating alignment between the legislative chambers, coded 1 when the same party or a coalition of parties (when available) control a majority in both legislative chambers.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 38   **N**: 60   **n**: 1628 $\overline{N}$: 24 $\overline{T}$: 27

h_lflo   Legislative Fractionalization (lower)

Legislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the lower legislative chamber will be from different parties.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1946-2012

N: 182   **N**: 196   **n**: 7566 $\bar{N}$: 113 $\bar{T}$: 39

h_lfup   Legislative Fractionalization (upper)

Legislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the upper legislative chamber will be from different parties.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1946-2012

N: 41   **N**: 68   **n**: 1826 $\bar{N}$: 27 $\bar{T}$: 27

Heritage Foundation

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hf_efiscore   Economic Freedom Index

The Economic Freedom index uses 10 specific freedoms, some as composites of even further detailed and quantifiable components:

- Business freedom (hf_business)
- Trade freedom (hf_trade)
- Fiscal freedom (hf_fiscal)
- Freedom from government (hf_govt)
- Monetary freedom (hf_monetary)
- Investment freedom (hf_invest)
- Financial freedom (hf_financ)
- Property rights (hf_prights)
- Freedom from corruption (hf_corrupt)
- Labor freedom (hf_labor)

Each of these freedoms is weighted equally and turned into an index ranging from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum economic freedom. Although changes in methodology have been undertaken throughout the measurement period, continuous backtracking has been used to maximize comparability over time.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1994-2012
N: 177   **N**: 179   **n**: 2981 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 17

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hf_business   Business Freedom

The business freedom score encompasses 10 components, all weighted equally, based on objective data from the World Bank's *Doing Business* study (in 2005-2006; previously other data sources were being used):

- Starting a business - procedures (number)
- Starting a business - time (days)
- Starting a business - cost (% of income per capita)
- Starting a business - minimum capital (% of income per capita)
- Obtaining a license - procedures (number)
- Obtaining a license - time (days)
- Obtaining a license - cost (% of income per capita)
- Closing a business - time (years)
- Closing a business - cost (% of estate)
- Closing a business - recovery rate (cents on the dollar)

Each of these raw components is converted into a scale graded from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of business freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009-2012

N: 180

Years: 1994-2012

N: 182   **n**: 2986 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 16

hf_trade   Trade Freedom

The trade freedom score is based on two inputs:

- The trade-weighted average tariff rate
- Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)

Weighted average tariffs is a purely quantitative measure and accounts for the basic calculation of the score. The presence of NTBs in a country affects its trade freedom score by incurring a penalty of up to 20 percentage points, or one-fifth of the maximum score. The country's trade freedom ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of trade freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009-2012

N: 178

Years: 1994-2012

N: 180   **n**: 2984 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 17

hf_fiscal   Fiscal Freedom

Fiscal freedom is composed of three quantitative components in equal measure:

- The top tax rate on individual income
- The top tax rate on corporate income
- Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP

In scoring the fiscal freedom factor, each of these numerical variables is weighted equally as one-third of the factor. This equal weighting allows a country to achieve a score as high as 67 percent based on two of the components even if it receives a score of 0 percent on the third. The country's fiscal freedom ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represent the maximum degree of fiscal freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1994-2012
N: 177   **N**: 179   **n**: 2982 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 17

hf_govt   Freedom from Government

Scoring of the freedom from government factor is based on two components:

- Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP
- Revenues generated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and property as a percentage of total government revenue.

Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is weighted as two-thirds of the freedom from government factor score, and revenue from SOEs is weighted as one-third. In cases where SOE data does not exist, the data is excluded from the factor score. The country's freedom from government ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of freedom from government.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2012   **Years**: 1994-2012
N: 178   **N**: 181   **n**: 2983 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 17

221

hf_monetary   Monetary Freedom

The score for the monetary freedom factor is based on two components:

- The weighted average inflation rate for the three most recent years
- Price controls.

The weighted average inflation (WAI) rate for the three most recent years serves as the primary input into an equation that generates the base score for monetary freedom (MF). The extent of price controls is then assessed as a penalty of up to 20 percent subtracted from the base score. The country's monetary freedom ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of monetary freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2012   **Years**: 1994-2012

N: 178   **N**: 181   **n**: 2985 $\bar{N}$: 157 $\bar{T}$: 16

hf_invest   Investment Freedom

This factor scrutinizes each country's policies toward foreign investment, as well as its policies toward capital flows internally, in order to determine its overall investment climate. The country's investment freedom ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 represent the maximum degree of investment freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2012   **Years**: 1994-2012

N: 178   **N**: 181   **n**: 2985 $\bar{N}$: 157 $\bar{T}$: 17

hf_financ   Financial Freedom

The financial freedom factor measures the relative openness of each country's banking and financial system by determining: the extent of government regulation of financial services; the extent of state intervention in banks and other financial services; the difficulty of opening and operating financial services firms (for both domestic and foreign individuals); and government influence on the allocation of credit. The country's financial climate is measured as an overall score between 0 and 100, where 100 represent the maximum degree of financial freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2012
N: 178

Years: 1994-2012
N: 180   **n**: 2984 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 17

hf_prights   Property Rights

This factor scores the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also accounts for the possibility that private property will be expropriated. In addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The less certain the legal protection of property is and the greater the chances of government expropriation of property are, the higher a country's score is. The country's property rights score ranges from 0 and 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of protection of property rights.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 177

Years: 1994-2012
N: 179   **n**: 2983 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 17

223

hf_corrupt   Freedom from Corruption

This factor relies on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which measures the level of corruption in 152 countries, to determine the freedom from corruption scores of countries that are also listed in the *Index of Economic Freedom*. The CPI is based on a 10-point scale in which a score of 10 indicates very little corruption and a score of 0 indicates a very corrupt government. In scoring freedom from corruption, the authors convert each of these raw CPI data to a 0-100 scale by multiplying the CPI scores by 10.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2012
N: 180

Years: 1994-2012
N: 182   **n**: 2987 $\overline{N}$: 157 $\overline{T}$: 16

hf_labor   Labor Freedom

The new labor freedom factor is a quantitative factor based on objective data from the World Bank's *Doing Business* study. It provides reliable cross-country data on regulations concerning minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoffs, severance requirements, and measurable regulatory burdens on hiring, hours, and so on. Specifically, four quantitative components are equally weighted as 25 percent of the labor freedom factor:

- Minimum wage
- Rigidity of hours
- Difficulty of firing redundant employees
- Cost of firing redundant employees

The country's labor freedom score ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 represent the maximum degree of labor freedom.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2012
N: 179

Years: 2004-2012
N: 180   **n**: 1509 $\overline{N}$: 168 $\overline{T}$: 8

Hadenius, Teorell & Wahman

Authoritarian Regimes Data Set

The Authoritarian Regimes Dataset, version 5.0, is a comprehensive dataset over authoritarian regimes in the world between 1972-2010. The dataset enables researchers and practitioners to distinguish between different authoritarian regime types, follow global trends in authoritarianism and study the specific institutional trajectories of a particular country or set of countries.

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ht_regtype   Regime Type

This typology of authoritarian regimes is based on a distinction between three modes of political power maintenance (probably the three most widely used throughout history): hereditary succession (lineage), corresponding to *monarchies*; the actual or threatened use of military force, corresponding to *military* regimes; and popular elections, designating electoral regimes. Among the latter we distinguish among *no-party* regimes (where all parties are prohibited), *one-party* regimes (where all but one party is prohibited), and *limited multiparty regimes* (where multiple parties are allowed but the system still does not pass as democratic); a subtype of these regimes where no parties are present, although not being prohibited, are coded "partyless" regimes. A subtype of military regimes are coded "rebel regimes", where a rebel movement has taken power by military means. We also code hybrids (or amalgams) combining elements from more than one regime type, as well as several minor types of regimes: "theocracies", "transitional" regimes, "civil war", foreign "occupation", and a residual "other" category. Using the mean of the Freedom House and Polity scales (fh_ipolity2), the line between democracies and autocracies is drawn at 7.5. This threshold value was chosen by estimating the mean cutoff point separating democracy from autocracy in five well-known categorical measures of democracy: those of Przeworski et al. (2000), Mainwaring et al. (2001), and Reich (2002), together with Freedom House's and Polity's own categorical thresholds for democracy.

(1)	Limited Multiparty
(2)	Partyless
(3)	No-Party
(4)	Military
(5)	Military No-Party
(6)	Military Multiparty
(7)	Military One-party
(8)	One-Party
(9)	Other
(16)	One-Party Monarchy
(17)	Monarchy
(18)	Rebel Regime
(19)	Civil War
(20)	Occupation
(21)	Theocracy
(22)	Transitional Regime
(23)	No-Party Monarchy
(24)	Multiparty Monarchy
(25)	Multiparty Occupied
(100)	Democracy

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009
N: 186

Years: 1972-2010
N: 197   **n**: 6644 $\overline{N}$: 170 $\overline{T}$: 34

ht_regtype1   Regime Type (Collapsed)

A simplified, collapsed version of *ht_regtype*, where all monarchical regimes with amalgams (*ht_regtype* =16, 17, 23 or 24) are treated as monarchies, all military regimes with sub-types and amalgams (*ht_regtype*=4, 5, 6, 7 or 18) are treated as military regimes, and multiparty regimes with sub-types are treated as multiparty regimes (*ht_regtype*=1 or 2). Only pure noparty (*ht_regtype*=3) and one-party (*ht_regtype*=8) regimes are treated as no-party and one-party regimes, respectively. The minor types (*ht_regtype*=9, 19, 20, 21, 22 or 25) are treated as other.

(1)   Monarchy
(2)   Military
(3)   One party
(4)   Multi-party
(9)   No-party
(99)   Other
(100)   Democracy

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009
N: 186

Years: 1972-2010
N: 197   **n**: 6644 $\overline{N}$: 170 $\overline{T}$: 34

ht_partsz   **Size of Largest Party in Legislature (in Fractions)**

Counts the largest parties' number of seats divided by the legislative assemblies' total number of seats expressed in fractions. In countries with a two-chamber parliament the lower house is counted.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1972-2010
N: 186   **N**: 197   **n**: 6440 $\bar{N}$: 165 $\bar{T}$: 33

ht_partsz1   **Size of Largest Party in Legislature (in Fractions), Zero for One-Party Regimes**

Codes all one-party regimes as 0 instead of 1 as is done in *ht_partsz*, otherwise this variable corresponds to the former variable *ht_partsz.* When the degree of "dominantness" of the largest party *within multiparty regimes* is to be controlled for, this variable should be used.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1972-2010
N: 186   **N**: 197   **n**: 6440 $\bar{N}$: 165 $\bar{T}$: 33

Hadenius & Teorell

(Hadenius & Teorell. 2005)   (2013-03-04)

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ht_region   The Region of the Country

This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with the partial exception of category 5 below) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow:

(1)   Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia)
(2)   Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)
(3)   North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus)
(4)   Sub-Saharan Africa
(5)   Western Europe and North America (including Australia &New Zeeland)
(6)   East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia)
(7)   South-East Asia
(8)   South Asia
(9)   The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zeeland)
(10)   The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 193   **N**: 211   Country Constant Variable

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ht_region2   The Region of the Country (alternative)

To flag some of the most contested cases, we have in the alternative variable, ht_region2, coded Cyprus (considering the Greek majority of their population) as belonging to category (5), Haiti (considering their non-Spanish colonial legacy and membership in Caricom) as belonging to category (10), and Mongolia (considering their post-communist legacy) as belonging to category (1).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 193   **N**: 211   Country Constant Variable

ht_colonial   Colonial Origin

This is a tenfold classification of the former colonial ruler of the country. Following Bernard et al (2004), we have excluded the British settler colonies (the US, Canada, Australia, Israel and New Zeeland), and exclusively focused on "Western overseas" colonialism. This implies that only Western colonizers (e.g. excluding Japanese colonialism), and only countries located in the non-Western hemisphere "overseas" (e.g. excluding Ireland & Malta), have been coded. Each country that has been colonized since 1700 is coded. In cases of several colonial powers, the last one is counted, if it lasted for 10 years or longer. The categories are the following:

(0)   Never colonized by a Western overseas colonial power
(1)   Dutch
(2)   Spanish
(3)   Italian
(4)   US
(5)   British
(6)   French
(7)   Portuguese
(8)   Belgian
(9)   British-French
(10)   Australian

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 193   **N**: 211   Country Constant Variable

Institutions and Elections Project

http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html (2013-01-29)
(IAEP 2013)

The objective of the data from the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) is to describe the formal institutions that are in place, even if practice does not comport with those formal rules. The data refers to the situation January 1st each year.

Please also note that according to the documentation of the data many of the cases "have more than one executive; [...] the executive referred to may be any one of the executives established in a country." We urge users to refer to the documentation at the IAEP web site for information about which executive each particular case refers to.

iaep_evp   **Executive Veto Power**
Does an executive have constitutional veto power over laws passed by the legislature?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4360 $\overline{N}$: 128 $\overline{T}$: 26

iaep_lvp   **Legislature Veto Power**
Does the legislature have the constitutional power to stop executive action, in effect a legislative veto?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4253 $\overline{N}$: 125 $\overline{T}$: 25

iaep_lcre   **Legislature Can Remove Executive**
According to the constitution, can the legislature remove an executive from office?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4390 $\overline{N}$: 129 $\overline{T}$: 26

iaep_ecdl   **Executive Can Dissolve Legislature**
According to the constitution, can an executive dissolve the legislature?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4354 $\overline{N}$: 128 $\overline{T}$: 26

iaep_lrit   **Legislature's Ratification of International Treaties**
Does the legislature have the constitutional authority to ratify international treaties negotiated by an executive?

(0)   No authority
(1)   One chamber approval necessary
(2)   Both chambers' approval necessary

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 167   **n**: 4174 $\overline{N}$: 123 $\overline{T}$: 25

iaep_epmf   **Executive Power over Military Force**

Does an executive have the power to use military force abroad without legislative approval?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 168   **n**: 4295 $\bar{N}$: 126 $\bar{T}$: 26

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iaep_eccdt   **Executive Can Change Domestic Taxes**

Can an executive change domestic taxes (excluding import/export tariffs) without legislative approval?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 169   **n**: 4198 $\bar{N}$: 123 $\bar{T}$: 25

---

iaep_lap   **Legislature Approves Budget**

Does an executive have to secure legislative approval for the budget?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 168   **n**: 4348 $\bar{N}$: 128 $\bar{T}$: 26

iaep_cc   **Constitutional Court**

According to the constitution, does the country have a national constitutional court? In some cases, a council with the powers of a constitutional court may exist, though it may not be part of the formal judiciary. In such cases, this non-judicial council with the powers of a constitutional court is coded as the constitutional court.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4851 $\overline{N}$: 143 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_aecc   **Appointments / Elections to Constitutional Court**

Are members of this court (see iaep_cc) appointed or elected? "Elected" here refers to a popular election. Elections by legislative bodies are considered appointments.

(1)   Appointed
(2)   Elected

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 144   **n**: 3158 $\overline{N}$: 93 $\overline{T}$: 22

iaep_rmcc   **Removal of Members of Constitutional Court**
Can members of this court (see iaep_cc) be removed?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 137   **n**: 2821 $\overline{N}$: 83 $\overline{T}$: 21

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iaep_wrmcc   **Who Removes Members of Constitutional Court**
If members of the court can be removed, by whom? Here, the term "court itself" may refer to another
court in the judiciary, not necessarily the constitutional court itself.

(1)   Legislature
(2)   Executive
(3)   Requires both legislature and executive action
(4)   Vote of general public
(5)   Court itself

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 112   **n**: 2136 $\overline{N}$: 63 $\overline{T}$: 19

iaep_alcc   **Appointment for Life to Constitutional Court**

Are members of the court are appointed for life?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1972-2005
N: 132   **n**: 2777 $\overline{N}$: 82 $\overline{T}$: 21

---

iaep_ccrea   **Constitutional Court Rules on Executive Actions**

Can the court can rule on executive actions?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1972-2005
N: 136   **n**: 2939 $\overline{N}$: 86 $\overline{T}$: 22

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iaep_ccrla   **Constitutional Court Rules on Legislative Actions**

Can the court can rule on legislative actions?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1972-2005
N: 141   **n**: 3045 $\overline{N}$: 90 $\overline{T}$: 22

iaep_ufs   Unitary or Federal States

This variable examine the relationship between the central and regional governments, those which are immediately below the central government. We focus exclusively on states or provincial levels of government, municipalities are not coded.

Is the government structure a:

(1)   Unitary system
(2)   Confederation
(3)   Federal system

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4920 $\overline{N}$: 145 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_arr   Appointment of Regional Representatives

This variable examine the relationship between the central and regional governments, those which are immediately below the central government. We focus exclusively on states or provincial levels of government, municipalities are not coded.

In practice, do regions or provinces:

(1)   Appoint, elect or otherwise choose their own representatives autonomous from decisions by the central government

(2)   Have their administrators appointed by the central government

(3)   No regional/provincial governments

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4808 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 28

iaep_nee   **National Elections for an Executive**

Does the country hold national elections for an executive? We consider national elections to involve subjecting the executive to some form of popular plebiscite. This electoral process may or may not bear any relationship to the ultimate appointment of the executive. Executive council elections that select an executive are not considered national elections.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4959 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_nel   **National Elections for an Legislature**

Does the country hold national elections for the legislature We consider national elections to involve subjecting the members of the legislature to some form of popular plebiscite. While seats may be divided into districts, we consider national elections to occur when district-wide elections are organized at the national level.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4908 $\overline{N}$: 144 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_nr   **National Referendum**

Does the country hold national elections on referendum items?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 169   **n**: 4669 $\overline{N}$: 137 $\overline{T}$: 28

---

iaep_eml   **Executive is Member of Legislature**

Is there an executive who is also a member of the legislature (like a prime minister, for example)? We consider membership in the legislature if either an explicit rule exists which requires an executive to maintain a seat in the legislature, or if practice and/or convention determines membership.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 162   **n**: 4487 $\overline{N}$: 132 $\overline{T}$: 28

iaep_ise   **Independence of Selection of Executive**

Is there an executive chosen independently of the legislature (like a president, for example)? If these processes that select the executive is distinct from that which selects the legislature, then we consider the two to be independent. The selection processes, moreover, can involve different – albeit competing or complimentary – forms of selection.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4939 $\overline{N}$: 145 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_ae   **Appointment of Executive**

Is there an executive appointed either by a PM (that is, an executive who is also a member of the legislature) or a president (an independently selected executive)?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4919 $\overline{N}$: 145 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_d   Dictator

A dictator is defined in terms of political independence, route to power and path to removal. Webster's dictionary defines a dictator as a ruler who is unconstrained by law. IAEP conceive of a dictator as someone who rules without the normal set of political constraints, and whose support and continued rule is guaranteed by coercion, either the actual resort to force or the threat to do so. That is, a dictator rules without voluntary support of a wide selectorate, his or her ability to remain in power is a function of the coercive capability to do so, and he or she may have come to power through coercion. In some instances a monarch falls into the category of dictator, but not always. If a monarch's ability to retain power is a function of his or her coercive capability, then he or she might be a dictator. But if a monarch rules by virtue of some form of public acclamation or consent, then he or she does not act as a dictator. To a very large degree IAEP are judging the type of rule based on observed behavior rather than legal label. In the common vernacular we know a dictator when we see one, and we know this because of how they act, or how prior actions determined their current position. In determining whether a ruler is a dictator, consider the following questions:

- How is the executive chosen? In practice, is the executive self-selected by means of coercion?
- How does the executive maintain power? Is coercion the primary method of governance and retaining his/her position?
- How can the executive be removed? Would removal likely require overcoming executive coercion and therefore involve violence?

Considering these rules, is there an executive who is a dictator?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1972-2005
N: 170   **n**: 4959 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_pnlc　　　　　　　**Party Nomination of Legislature Candidates**

Does party nomination (party list, convention, etc.) establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

(0)　　　　　No
(1)　　　　　Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Years: N/A　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 170　　**n**: 4972　　$\overline{N}$: 146　　$\overline{T}$: 29

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iaep_pvelc　　　　　　　　**Party Vote Establish Legislature Candidates**

Do members of party vote (primary) establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

(0)　　　　　No
(1)　　　　　Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Years: N/A　　　　　　　　　**Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A　　　　　　　　　　**N**: 170　　**n**: 4972　　$\overline{N}$: 146　　$\overline{T}$: 29

241

iaep_snlc   **Self-Nomination of Legislature Candidates**
Does self-nomination establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4972 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

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iaep_pselc   **Petition Signatures Establish Legislature Candidates**
Do petition signatures establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4972 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_enlc   **Executive Nomination of Legislature Candidates**

Does executive nomination establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4972 $\bar{N}$: 146 $\bar{T}$: 29

iaep_pnec   **Party Nomination of Executive Candidates**

Does party nomination (party list, convention, etc.) establish how the field of candidates who stand for executive elections is determined.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4972 $\bar{N}$: 146 $\bar{T}$: 29

243

iaep_pveec   **Party Vote Establish Executive Candidates**

Do members of party vote (primary) establish how the field of candidates who stand for executive elections is determined?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4972 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_snec   **Self-Nomination of Executive Candidates**

Does self-nomination establish how the field of candidates who stand for executive elections is determined?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4972 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_pseec **Petition Signatures Establish Executive Candidates**

Do petition signatures establish how the field of candidates who stand for executive elections is determined?

(0) No
(1) Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: N/A **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A **N**: 170 **n**: 4972 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_es **Electoral System**

What is the type of electoral system for legislative elections?

(1) Plurality (First past the post)
(2) Majority
(3) Proportional representation
(4) Mixed systems (combination of PR and either plurality or majority). This option includes situations in which a single chamber contains seats selected by different methods, or situations in which all of the seats in a chamber are chosen with the same method, but each chamber is selected through different methods.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: N/A **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A **N**: 161 **n**: 4031 $\overline{N}$: 119 $\overline{T}$: 25

245

iaep_ee   **Election of the Executive**

Is the executive elected by:

(1)   Directly elected by public vote
(2)   Elected through legislative action by members of the legislature
(3)   Chosen through party process strictly by a party
(4)   Indirect public vote
(5)   Appointed

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 164   **n**: 4364 $\overline{N}$: 128 $\overline{T}$: 27

iaep_ese   **Electoral System for the Executive**

Election rules governing the determination of electoral outcomes for the executive: data on the electoral requirements for winning executive elections are recorded, specifically, the sorts of vote thresholds required for winners. If the executive is appointed or otherwise comes to power via non-electoral processes, it is coded as missing.

(1)   Majority rule (50% + 1) where run-offs are held, "majority rule" is selected, as the
             intention of a run-off election is to have one candidate receive a majority of the votes.
(2)   Plurality
(3)   No official, explicit, rule governing the outcome
(4)   Party leader of majority party/coalition in legislature automatically selected without
             additional process

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 143   **n**: 3327 $\overline{N}$: 98 $\overline{T}$: 23

iaep_pm5p   **Parties with More than 5 Percent**
How many parties hold at least 5% of seats in the legislature?

(1)   One
(2)   Two
(3)   More than two

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 162-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 162   **n**: 4002 $\overline{N}$: 118 $\overline{T}$: 25

iaep_bp   **Banned Parties**
Are there banned parties?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4868 $\overline{N}$: 143 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_ebbp   **Ethnicity Based Banning of Parties**

Does ethnic makeup determine the banning of parties?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1972-2005
N: 170   **n**: 4972 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

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iaep_rbbp   **Religion Based Banning of Parties**

Does religious affiliation determine the banning of parties?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1972-2005
N: 170   **n**: 4972 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

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iaep_basp   **Banning of "Anti-System" Parties**

Does an anti-system platform determine the banning of parties?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1972-2005
N: 170   **n**: 4972 $\overline{N}$: 146 $\overline{T}$: 29

iaep_npa   **No Parties Allowed**
Are no parties allowed?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4972 $\bar{N}$: 146 $\bar{T}$: 29

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iaep_osp   **Official State Party**
Is there an official state party?

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 4875 $\bar{N}$: 143 $\bar{T}$: 29

Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Electoral System Design
The initial data on electoral systems was gathered for the Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook published by International IDEA in 2005.

Political Finance Database
International IDEA's database on Political Finance is a leading source of comparative information on political finance regulations. It includes laws and regulations from 180 individual countries. The original IDEA database was created in 2003, and has since become the leading source of information on political finance regulation worldwide. A revised and updated version, with extended coverage to other areas, was released in 2012.

Note: We have coded "No, but specific limit" as "No" for the variables regarding ban on donations.

idea_esf   **Electoral System Design**

(1)   PR
(2)   Plurality/Majority
(3)   Mixed
(4)   Transition
(5)   Other
(6)   Unspecified

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 190   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_esl   **Electoral System for National Legislature**

(1)   List PR
(2)   Block Vote (BV)
(3)   Party Block Vote (PBV)
(4)   First Past the Post (FPTP)
(5)   Two-Round System (TRS)
(6)   Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)
(7)   Single Transferable Vote (STV)
(8)   Alternative Vote (AV)
(9)   Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)
(10)   Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) and List PR
(11)   Limited Vote (LV) / Block Vote (BV)
(12)   First Past the Post (FPTP) / (SNTV)
(13)   First Past the Post (FPTP) / Block Vote (BV)
(14)   First Past the Post (FPTP) / Party Block Vote (PBV)
(15)   Parallel
(16)   Transition
(17)   Modified Borda Count (Modified BC)
(18)   N
(19)   Unspecified

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A

250

N: 193   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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idea_esp   **Electoral System for the President**

(1)   Two-Round System (TRS)
(2)   Two-Round System (TRS) + (L)
(3)   List PR
(4)   First Past the Post (FPTP)
(5)   Supplementary Vote (SV)
(6)   Single Transferable Vote (STV)
(7)   Transition
(8)   Indirectly elected by the Parliament/Assembly/Legislature
(9)   Not Applicable

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 167   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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idea_bdac   **Ban on Anonymous Donations to Candidates**

Is there a ban on anonymous donations to candidates? To ensure that donations do not come from other banned sources and to increase transparency, anonymous donations to candidates are sometimes banned outright or banned over a certain level (critics argue that provisions for anonymous donations protects the right to privacy of donors).

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 143   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

251

idea_bdap **Ban on Anonymous Donations to Political Parties**

Is there a ban on anonymous donations to political parties? To ensure that donations do not come from other banned sources and to increase transparency, anonymous donations to political parties are sometimes banned outright or banned over a certain level (critics argue that provisions for anonymous donations protects the right to privacy of donors).

(0) No
(1) Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☐ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description
N: 163

Years: N/A
N: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_bdcc **Ban on Corporate Donations to Candidates**

Is there a ban on corporate donations to candidates? It is often discussed if corporations should be allowed to make donations to candidates, those in favor claim it is a matter of freedom of speech, those against argue that the influence of corporate interests over politics must be controlled.

(0) No
(1) Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☐ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description
N: 165

Years: N/A
N: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_bdcp   **Ban on Corporate Donations to Political Parties**

Is there a ban on corporate donations to political parties? It is often discussed if corporations should be allowed to make donations to political parties, those in favor claim it is a matter of freedom of speech, those against argue that the influence of corporate interests over politics must be controlled.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 170   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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idea_bdfc   **Ban on Foreign Donations to Candidates**

Is there a ban on donations from foreign interests to candidates? An important issue in many countries is to limit influence over national politics to forces within the country. Foreign interests such as governments, corporations, organizations and/or individuals may therefore be banned from making donations to political parties.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 164   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_bdfp   **Ban on Foreign Donations to Political Parties**

Is there a ban on donations from foreign interests to political parties? An important issue in many countries is to limit influence over national politics to forces within the country. Foreign interests such as governments, corporations, organizations and/or individuals may therefore be banned from making donations to political parties.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description
N: 169

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

idea_bdgcc   **Ban on Government Corporation Donations to Candidates**

Is there a ban on donations from corporations with government contracts or partial government ownership to candidates? A ban on donations from corporations with partial government ownership to candidates is often intended to stop indirect abuse of state resources, whereas banning contributions from companies with government contracts often seek to reduce the risk for quid-pro-quo donations.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description
N: 162

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_bdgcp   **Ban on Government Corporation Donations to Political Parties**

Is there a ban on donations from corporations with government contracts or partial government ownership to political parties? A ban on donations from corporations with partial government ownership to political parties is often intended to stop indirect abuse of state resources, whereas banning contributions from companies with government contracts often seek to reduce the risk for quid-pro-quo donations.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 168   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

idea_bdo   **Ban on Other Form Donation**

Is there a ban on any other form of donation? Some countries ban contributions from actors others than those included in the above questions – any such other bans are covered by this question.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 168   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_bdtc   **Ban on Trade Union Donations to Candidates**

Is there a ban on donations from Trade Unions to candidates? In some countries where corporations and trade unions are seen as more likely to donate to different candidates, it is argued that a ban on corporate donations should be combined with a ban on trade union donations.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 162   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

idea_bdtp   **Ban on Trade Union Donations to Political Parties**

Is there a ban on donations from Trade Unions to political parties? In some countries where corporations and trade unions are seen as more likely to donate to different political parties, it is argued that a ban on corporate donations should be combined with a ban on trade union donations.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 167   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_bsr   **Ban on Using State Resources in Favor/Against Political Parties or Candidates**

Is there a ban on state resources being given to or received by political parties or candidates (excluding regulated public funding)? To stop abuse of state (administrative) resources, some countries ban the giving of state resources to political parties or candidates, or banning political parties/candidates from receiving such funds.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description
N: 127

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_bvb   **Ban on Vote Buying**

Is there a ban on vote buying? One type of campaign spending banned in many countries is the buying (and selling of votes), in other words to offer or provide financial or material incentives for voters to vote in a certain way or to abstain from voting.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description
N: 170

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_frcc　　　　　　**Candidates have to Report their Finances (Campaigns)**

Do candidates have to report on their campaigns finances? To ensure transparency in campaign finance, some countries require that candidates submit special financial reports in relation to election campaigns.

(0)　　　　　　No
(1)　　　　　　Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　☐ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　　Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description　　　　　　**Years**: N/A
N: 171　　　　　　**N**: N/A　　**n**: N/A　　$\overline{N}$: N/A　　$\overline{T}$: N/A

---

idea_frpe　　　　　　**Political Parties have to Report their Finances (Elections)**

Do political parties have to report on their finances in relation to election campaigns? To ensure transparency in campaign finance, some countries require that political parties submit special financial reports in relation to election campaigns.

(0)　　　　　　No
(1)　　　　　　Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　☐ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　　Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description　　　　　　**Years**: N/A
N: 173　　　　　　**N**: N/A　　**n**: N/A　　$\overline{N}$: N/A　　$\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_frpr   Political Parties have to Report their Finances (Regularly)

Do political parties have to report regularly on their finances? To ensure transparency in political party finance, some countries require that political parties submit regular financial reports (such as quarterly or annually), whether or not an election has taken place during this period.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 172   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_ldc   Limit on the Donations to Candidates

Is there a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a candidate? To reduce the influence of wealthy benefactors in relation to the campaigns by candidates, some countries put specific limits on the maximum size of donations in relation to election campaigns.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 172   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_ldp   Limit on the Donations to Political Parties (Time-Period)

Is there a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party over a time period (not election specific)? To reduce the influence of wealthy benefactors over party politics, some countries limit the maximum size of donations. This can also help to reduce the risk of donors trying to avoid campaign contribution limits by making large donations well ahead of elections.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 174   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_ldpe   Limit on the Donations to Political Parties (Elections)

Is there a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party in relation to an election? To reduce the influence of wealthy benefactors particularly in relation to election campaigns, some countries put specific limits on the maximum size of donations in relation to election campaigns.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes
(2)   Regular limits apply

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 175   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_lsc   Limit on the Candidates' Spending

Are there limits on the amount a candidate can spend? To limit the advantage of candidates with more access to money, and sometimes to reduce overall spending on election campaigns, some countries limit the amount that candidates are allowed to spend.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description
N: 172

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_lsp   Limit on the Political Parties' Spending

Are there limits on the amount a political party can spend? To limit the advantage of political parties with more access to money, and sometimes to reduce overall spending on political party activities and election campaigns, some countries limit the amount that political parties are allowed to spend.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description
N: 176

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_mc   **Free or Subsidized Access to Media for Candidates**

Are there provisions for free or subsidized access to media for candidates? A form of indirect state assistance is to provide free or subsidized access to eligible candidates to (often state controlled) media. This is normally intended to help level the playing and allowing eligible candidates to make their message heard.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 168   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_mp   **Free or Subsidized Access to Media for Political Parties**

Are there provisions for free or subsidized access to media for political parties? A form of indirect state assistance is to provide free or subsidized access to eligible political parties to (often state controlled) media. This is normally intended to help level the playing and allowing eligible political parties to make their message heard.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 171   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_ofag   **Other Financial Advantages to Encourage Gender Equality in Political Parties**

Are there provisions for other financial advantages to encourage gender equality in political parties? Some countries use other types of financial measures to encourage gender equality within political parties. This can include earmarking of public funding to women's wings or for gender-related activities, or to reduce the nomination deposit for women candidates.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: See source description
N: 180

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_pfp   **Direct Public Funding of Political Parties**

Are there provisions for direct public funding to political parties? A key question in many countries is whether monetary assistance is provided from the State to political parties (public funding). It is argued that such support can help smaller parties make their voice heard, strengthen the capacity of political parties and to level the electoral playing field.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: See source description
N: 180

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_pfpg   **Public Funding of Political Parties Related to Gender Equality**

Is the provision of direct public funding to political parties related to gender equality among candidates? Some countries reduce the funding provided to political parties if they do not meet certain criteria regarding gender equality among their candidates, or provide additional state funding to political parties that meet such criteria.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes
(2)   Not Applicable

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 174   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

idea_rdid   **Political Parties/Candidates have to Reveal Identity of Donors**

Must reports from political parties and/or candidates reveal the identity of donors? Some argue that in the interest of transparency the identity or all those making donations must be revealed in financial transports, whereas see this as an invasion of privacy. In some cases a compromise is reached by demanding that the identity of donors is revealed if the donations exceed a certain value.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes
(2)   Not Applicable
(3)   Sometimes

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 168   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

idea_rip   **Information from Political Parties/Candidates have to be made Public**

Is information in reports from political parties and/or candidates to be made public? Even if political parties and/or candidates have to submit financial reports, full transparency is not achieved unless these reports (or the information therein) is made available to the public.

(0)   No
(1)   Yes
(2)   Not Applicable

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See source description   **Years**: N/A
N: 171   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

IHME

http://ghdx.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/   (2013-02-05)

(Gakidou et al. 2010)

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation – University of Washington

IHME provides rigorous and comparable measurement of the world's most important health problems and evaluates the strategies used to address them.

ihme_ayef   **Average Years of Education (Female)**

Average number of years of education of women aged 25 and older.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2009
N: 174   **N**: 177   **n**: 6150 $\overline{N}$: 154 $\overline{T}$: 35

ihme_ayem **Average Years of Education (Male)**
Average number of years of education of men aged 25 and older.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2009
N: 174   **N**: 177   **n**: 6150 $\overline{N}$: 154 $\overline{T}$: 35

Inter-Parliamentary Union
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world-arc.htm   (2013-01-31)
(IPU 2013)

Women in National Parliaments
IPU publish figures monthly and the figures here included are the latest available each year.

ipu_w_lower **Women in national parliament (lower house)**
Percentage women in single house or lower house.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2007-2010   **Years**: 1997-2012
N: 190   **N**: 194   **n**: 2822 $\overline{N}$: 176 $\overline{T}$: 15

ipu_w_upper **Women in national parliament (upper house)**
Percentage women in upper house or senate.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1997-2012
N: 78   **N**: 86   **n**: 1071 $\overline{N}$: 67 $\overline{T}$: 12

Johnson & Wallack

(Johnson & Wallack 2006)

Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote

This database updates, expands and (to some extent) corrects the electoral systems coding present-ed in Wallack et al. (2003). As in the original database, the underlying rationale for coding is derived from Carey & Shugart (1995) and it takes into account four dimensions of the electoral system: ballot, vote, pool, and district magnitude.

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jw_persr   Personalistic Tier

This variable ranks countries in increasing order of incentives to cultivate a personal vote accord-ing to their more personalistic tier (or tier with the greater incentives to cultivate a personal vote). The variable varies from 1 to 13, corresponding to the thirteen positions in Carey & Shugart's (1995) ranking. For example, a country with a ranking of 13 would have a tier with the highest possible rank of incentives to cultivate a personal vote, although that tier may only account for a minority or small fraction of its members.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 127   **n**: 2264 $\overline{N}$: 81 $\overline{T}$: 18

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jw_domr   Dominant or Populous Tier

This variable ranks countries in increasing order of incentives to cultivate a personal vote according to their most dominant or populous tier (or tier with the greater number of legislators). The variable varies from 1 to 13, corresponding to the thirteen positions in Carey & Shugart's (1995) ranking. For example, a country with a ranking of 1 would have a tier with the lowest possible rank of personal vote incentives, and that tier would account for the majority of the members in the assembly.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 126   **n**: 2234 $\overline{N}$: 80 $\overline{T}$: 18

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jw_smdballot   Party Control over Ballot – SMD (lower/only house)

Ballot for single-member district tiers in elections to the lower house.

The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order);

(1)   where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list);

(2)   where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates)..

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005

N: N/A   **N**: 71   **n**: 1084 $\overline{N}$: 39 $\overline{T}$: 15

jw_smdballot2   **Party Control over Ballot – SMD (upper house)**
Ballot for single-member district tiers in elections to the upper house.

The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order);

(1)   where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list);

(2)   where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 71   **n**: 1084 $\overline{N}$: 39 $\overline{T}$: 15

jw_mmdballot   **Party Control over Ballot – MMD (lower/only house)**

Ballot (coded as above) for multi-member district tiers in elections to the lower house.

The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order);

(1)   where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list);

(2)   where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 94   **n**: 1619 $\overline{N}$: 58 $\overline{T}$: 17

jw_mmdballot2   Party Control over Ballot – MMD (upper house)

Ballot for multi-member district tiers in elections to the upper house.

The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order);

(1)   where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list);

(2)   where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates)..

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005

N: N/A   **N**: 16   **n**: 297 $\overline{N}$: 11 $\overline{T}$: 19

271

jw_avgballot   **Party Control over Ballot (lower/only house)**

Country-level weighted averages of Party Control over Ballot – SMD (lower/only house) (jw_smdballot) and Party Control over Ballot – MMD (lower/only house) (jw_mmdballot), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of ballots for the average member sitting in the lower house.

The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order);

(1)   where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list);

(2)   where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 133   **n**: 2366 $\overline{N}$: 85 $\overline{T}$: 18

jw_avgballot2 Party Control over Ballot (upper house)

Country-level weighted averages of Party Control over Ballot – SMD (upper house) (jw_smdballot2) and Party Control over Ballot – MMD (upper house) (jw_mmdballot2), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus re-flects the value of ballots for the average member sitting in the upper house.

The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order);

(1)   where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list);

(2)   where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 24   **n**: 472 $\overline{N}$: 17 $\overline{T}$: 20

jw_indy   Ballot Access for Independent Candidates (lower/only house)

Equals 1 wherever independent candidates are legally allowed (even where the legal requirements are strict), and 0 otherwise. This complements the cases where the ballot variables above equal 1 or 2, since they are adjusted to capture *de facto* practice. jw_indy instead captures the *de jure* rules. A user could adjust the ballot variables above to be *de jure* if (s)he replaced values of 2 with values of 1 when jw_indy = 0. Refers to lower house elections.

The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order);

(1)   where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list);

(2)   where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 106   **n**: 1987 $\overline{N}$: 71 $\overline{T}$: 19

jw_indy2   Ballot Access for Independent Candidates (upper house)

Same as jw_indy, but for upper house elections.

The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order);

(1)   where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list);

(2)   where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 21   **n**: 423 $\overline{N}$: 15 $\overline{T}$: 20

jw_smdvote   **Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – SMD (lower/only house)**

Vote for single-member district tiers in elections to the lower house. The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where voters have only one vote for a party.

(1)   where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts).

(2)   where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1978-2005
N: 73   **n**: 1109 $\overline{N}$: 40 $\overline{T}$: 15

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jw_smdvote2   **Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – SMD (upper house)**

Vote (coded as above) for single-member district tiers in elections to the upper house.

The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where voters have only one vote for a party.

(1)   where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts).

(2)   where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1978-2005
N: 8   **n**: 129 $\overline{N}$: 5 $\overline{T}$: 16

jw_mmdvote **Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – MMD (lower/only house)**

Vote for multi-member district tiers in elections to the lower house.

The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where voters have only one vote for a party.

(1)   where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts).

(2)   where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 90   **n**: 1572 $\overline{N}$: 56 $\overline{T}$: 17

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jw_mmdvote2 **Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – MMD (upper house)**

Vote for multi-member district tiers in elections to the upper house. The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where voters have only one vote for a party.

(1)   where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts).

(2)   where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 16   **n**: 297 $\overline{N}$: 11 $\overline{T}$: 19

jw_avgvote   **Candidate- or Party-specific Voting (lower/only house)**

Country-level weighted averages of Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – SMD (lower/only house) (jw_smdvote) and Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – MMD (lower/only house) (jw_mmdvote), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of votes for the average member sitting in the lower house.

The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where voters have only one vote for a party.

(1)   where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts).

(2)   where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 131   **n**: 2344 $\overline{N}$: 84 $\overline{T}$: 18

jw_avgvote2   **Candidate- or Party-specific Voting (upper house)**
Country-level weighted averages of Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – SMD (upper house) (jw_smdvote2) and Candidate- or Party-specific Voting – MMD (upper house) (jw_mmdvote2), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of votes for the average member sitting in the upper house.

The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where voters have only one vote for a party.

(1)   where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts).

(2)   where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1978-2005
N: 24   **n**: 472 $\overline{N}$: 17 $\overline{T}$: 20

jw_smdpool   **Sharing of Votes among Candidates – SMD (lower/only house)**

Pool for single-member district tiers in elections to the lower house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district;

(1)   where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5% or less of a legislature's membership;

(2)   where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 73   **n**: 1109 $\overline{N}$: 40 $\overline{T}$: 15

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jw_smdpool2   **Sharing of Votes among Candidates – SMD (upper house)**

Pool for single-member district tiers in elections to the upper house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district;

(1)   where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5% or less of a legislature's membership;

(2)   where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 8   **n**: 129 $\overline{N}$: 5 $\overline{T}$: 16

jw_mmdpool **Sharing of Votes among Candidates – MMD (lower/only house)**

Pool for multi-member district tiers in elections to the lower house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district;

(1)   where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5% or less of a legislature's membership;

(2)   where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1978-2005
N: 94   **n**: 1599 $\bar{N}$: 57 $\bar{T}$: 17

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jw_mmdpool2 **Sharing of Votes among Candidates – MMD (upper house)**

Pool for multi-member district tiers in elections to the upper house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district.

(1)   where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5% or less of a legislature's membership.

(2)   where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1978-2005
N: 17   **n**: 303 $\bar{N}$: 11 $\bar{T}$: 18

281

jw_avgpool   **Sharing of Votes among Candidates (lower/only house)**

Country-level weighted averages of Sharing of Votes among Candidates – SMD (lower/only house) (jw_smdpool) and Sharing of Votes among Candidates – MMD (lower/only house) (jw_mmdpool), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of the pooling of votes for the average member sitting in the lower house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district;

(1)   where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5% or less of a legislature's membership;

(2)   where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 135   **n**: 2371 $\overline{N}$: 85 $\overline{T}$: 18

jw_avgpool2   **Sharing of Votes among Candidates (upper house)**

Country-level weighted averages of Sharing of Votes among Candidates – SMD (upper house) (jw_smdpool2) and Sharing of Votes among Candidates – MMD (upper house) (jw_mmdpool2), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of the pooling of votes for the average member sitting in the upper house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives):

(0)   where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district.

(1)   where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5% or less of a legislature's membership.

(2)   where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 24   **n**: 472 $\overline{N}$: 17 $\overline{T}$: 20

jw_mcand   **District Magnitude of Average Legislator (lower/only house)**

In keeping with the emphasis on the incentives faced by individual legislators, this variable measures the district magnitude considering the viewpoint of the average legislator in the lower house. It is scored as a weighted average of the various district sizes, where weights are computed as the number of legislators running in the district of each magnitude divided by the total number of seats. For example: A country with 300 seats divided among one national district with 200 members and 100 single-member districts has a magnitude for the average legislator of [(200*200) + (100*1)]/300, which yields a figure of 133.67.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 124   **n**: 2136 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 17

jw_mcand2   **District Magnitude of Average Legislator (upper house)**

This is the district magnitude of the average legislator in the upper house.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 43   **n**: 654 $\overline{N}$: 23 $\overline{T}$: 15

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jw_mdist   **Average District Magnitude (lower/only house)**

This is the standard magnitude of the average district in the lower house. For example: A country with 300 seats divided among one national district with 200 members and 100 single-member districts would have an average district magnitude (jw_mdist) of 2.97 (i.e. 300/101).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 161   **n**: 3097 $\overline{N}$: 111 $\overline{T}$: 19

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jw_mdist2   **Average District Magnitude (upper house)**

This is the average district magnitude in the upper house.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 29   **n**: 566 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 20

jw_bicameral   **Bicameral System**

Dummy variable. 1 if bicameral system.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 172   **n**: 3726 $\overline{N}$: 133 $\overline{T}$: 22

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jw_election   **Year of Election (lower/only house)**

Dummy variable. 1 if year of election to lower house.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 152   **n**: 2265 $\overline{N}$: 81 $\overline{T}$: 15

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jw_election2   **Year of Election (upper house)**

Dummy variable. 1 if year of election to upper house.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 26   **n**: 420 $\overline{N}$: 15 $\overline{T}$: 16

285

jw_legsize   **Number of Coded Legislators (lower/only house)**

The number of legislators coded in the dataset. These may not account for the total number of legislators if there are appointed legislators that have no electoral rules to code.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 155   **n**: 2704 $\overline{N}$: 97 $\overline{T}$: 17

---

jw_legsize2   **Number of Coded Legislators (upper house)**

The number of legislators coded in the dataset. These may not account for the total number of legislators if there are appointed legislators that have no electoral rules to code.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 32   **n**: 556 $\overline{N}$: 20 $\overline{T}$: 17

---

jw_multiround   **Runoff Elections**

The variable indicates whether there are run-off elections. These are usually for SMDs with abso-lute majority requirements. Where jw_multiround is equal to 1, voters have more than a single vote to cast, albeit votes occur on separate election days.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 111   **n**: 2087 $\overline{N}$: 75 $\overline{T}$: 19

286

jw_multitier   **Multi Tier (lower/only house)**

Indicates whether there are two or more tiers to the legislature.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 138   **n**: 2417 $\overline{N}$: 86 $\overline{T}$: 18

---

jw_multitier2   **Multi Tier (upper house)**

Equals 1 wherever there are multiple allocation tiers, regardless of whether they are the result of mixed member systems that incorporate different members under different rules, or systems that have upper tiers within a single electoral system to compensate for disproportionality in lower tiers.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 28   **n**: 492 $\overline{N}$: 18 $\overline{T}$: 18

---

jw_oneparty   **Single Party System**

Dummy variable. 1 if single-party system.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 2481 $\overline{N}$: 124 $\overline{T}$: 20

jw_parallel   **Tiers allocated in Parallel**

Coded 1 if multiple tiers are elected in parallel fashion, 0 when they are elected in (at least some-what) compensatory fashion. Is coded only when jw_multitier = 1.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 21   **n**: 256 $\overline{N}$: 9 $\overline{T}$: 12

---

jw_propn   **Seats from a National District (lower/only house)**

The proportion of legislators that are elected via a national tier.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 170   **n**: 3421 $\overline{N}$: 122 $\overline{T}$: 20

---

jw_propn2   **Seats from a National District (upper house)**

This is the proportion of coded legislators that are elected via a national tier. This is often (but not always) similar to the proportion elected via multi-member districts (jw_propmmd): some electoral systems have proportional representation based on regional multimember districts as well as national tiers (e.g. Hungary).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 67   **n**: 1104 $\overline{N}$: 39 $\overline{T}$: 16

jw_propsmd   **Seats from Single-Member Districts (lower/only house)**

Proportion of seats from Single-Member Districts.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 155   **n**: 2700 $\overline{N}$: 96 $\overline{T}$: 17

---

jw_propsmd2   **Seats from Single-Member Districts (upper house)**

This is the proportion of coded legislators elected in single-member districts.

Note: In the original data for Kyrgyzstan, propsmd2=60 in 1997-1999 and propsmd2=45, 2000-2004. We have decided to replace these figures with missing values.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 23   **n**: 421 $\overline{N}$: 15 $\overline{T}$: 18

---

jw_propmmd   **Seats from Multi-Member Districts (lower/only house)**

Proportion of seats from Multi-Member District (lower/only house).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 155   **n**: 2740 $\overline{N}$: 98 $\overline{T}$: 18

289

jw_propmmd2   **Seats from Multi-Member Districts (upper house)**

This is the proportion of coded legislators elected in multi-member districts.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: N/A

N: N/A

Years: 1978-2005

N: 26   **n**: 478 $\overline{N}$: 17 $\overline{T}$: 18

---

jw_propcoded   **Proportion Coded Legislators (lower/only house)**

Shows the proportion of total legislators (elected and non-elected) that are included in the database (i.e. those that are elected).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: N/A

N: N/A

Years: 1978-2005

N: 171   **n**: 3542 $\overline{N}$: 127 $\overline{T}$: 21

---

jw_propcoded2   **Proportion Coded Legislators (upper house)**

This is the proportion of the total number of legislators (elected and non-elected) that are coded.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: N/A

N: N/A

Years: 1978-2005

N: 52   **n**: 873 $\overline{N}$: 31 $\overline{T}$: 17

jw_tiervote   **Tiervote (lower/only house)**

Equals 1 when citizens are given a separate vote for deputies in each legislative tier.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005

N: N/A   **N**: 11   **n**: 2141 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 19

---

jw_tiervote2   **Tiervote (upper house)**

Equals 1 when citizens are given a separate vote for deputies in each legislative tier.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005

N: N/A   **N**: 18   **n**: 363 $\overline{N}$: 13 $\overline{T}$: 20

---

jw_rank   **Rank Vote (lower/only house)**

Equals 1 in two circumstances: where voters may rank order candidates according to preference, or where citizens have multiple preference votes for multiple candidates, even if they may not specifically rank the candidates. Otherwise, jw_rank is equal to zero. Refers to lower house elections.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005

N: N/A   **N**: 90   **n**: 1783 $\overline{N}$: 64 $\overline{T}$: 20

jw_rank2   **Rank Vote (upper house)**

Same as jw_rank, but for upper house elections.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1978-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 21   **n**: 423 $\overline{N}$: 15 $\overline{T}$: 20

La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny

http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html   (2013-02-07)

(La Porta et al 1999)

The Quality of Government

Data used in the article "The Quality of Government".

lp_legor   **Legal origin**

Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial code of each country. There are five possible origins:

(1)   English Common Law
(2)   French Commercial Code
(3)   Socialist/Communist Laws
(4)   German Commercial Code
(5)   Scandinavian Commercial Code

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 193   **N**: 211   Country Constant Variable

lp_lat_abst   Latitude

The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 1).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset

☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 193

Years: 1946-2012
N: 211   Country Constant Variable

lp_catho80   Religion: Catholic

Catholics as percentage of population in 1980.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset

☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 193

Years: 1946-2012
N: 211   Country Constant Variable

lp_muslim80   Religion: Muslim

Muslims as percentage of population in 1980.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset

☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 193

Years: 1946-2012
N: 211   Country Constant Variable

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

lp_protmg80   Religion: Protestant

Protestants as percentage of population in 1980.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009
N: 193

Years: 1946-2012
N: 211   Country Constant Variable

lp_no_cpm80   Religion: Other Denomination

Percentage of population belonging to other denominations in 1980. Defined as 100 – lp_catho80 – lp_muslim80 – lp_protmg80.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009
N: 193

Years: 1946-2012
N: 211   Country Constant Variable

Melander

(Melander 2005)   (2013-02-13)

Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse

Data used in the article *Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse*.

---

m_femlead   Female State Leader

Female leaders during the 20th century defined as "the president, prime minister, or any other decision maker who is essentially the 'decision maker of last resort'". Original source: Caprioli & Boyer (2001), Melander has extended the data using the information available in Schemmel (2004).

(0)   Male leader
(1)   Female leader

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1965-2002
N: 178   **n**: 5600 $\overline{N}$: 147 $\overline{T}$: 31

Maddison

http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.html   (2013-02-11)

(Bolt & van Zanden 2013)

New Maddison Project Database

The Maddison Project has launched an updated version of the original Maddison dataset in January 2013. The update incorporates much of the latest research in the field, and presents new estimates of economic growth in the world economic between AD 1 and 2010. The new estimates are presented and discussed in Bolt and Van Zanden (2013).

---

mad_pop   Population (thousand)

Population (1000's at mid-year).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 190

Years: 1946-2009
N: 198   **n**: 9045 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 46

---

mad_gdp **GDP levels (million)**

GDP levels in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. (The Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset [Back?](#)

Years: 2008 **Years**: 1946-2008
N: 153 **N**: 158 **n**: 7435 $\overline{N}$: 118 $\overline{T}$: 47

mad_gdppc1500 **GDP per Capita, year 1500**

GDP per Capita in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. (The Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☐ Time-Series Dataset [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description **Years**: N/A
N: 30 **N**: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

mad_gdppc1600 **GDP per Capita, year 1600**

GDP per Capita in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. (The Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☐ Time-Series Dataset [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description **Years**: N/A
N: 27 **N**: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

mad_gdppc1700   **GDP per Capita, year 1700**

GDP per Capita in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. (The Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 30   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

mad_gdppc1820   **GDP per Capita, year 1820**

GDP per Capita in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. (The Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 49   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

mad_gdppc1900   **GDP per Capita, year 1900**

GDP per Capita in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. (The Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 36   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

mad_gdppc   **GDP per Capita**

GDP per Capita in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. (The Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   **Back?**

Years: 2008   **Years**: 1946-2008

N: 153   **N**: 158   **n**: 7433 $\overline{N}$: 118 $\overline{T}$: 47

Pippa Norris

http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm   (2013-01-29)

(Norris 2009)

no_ce   **Classification of Executives**

(1)   Parliamentary Monarchy
(2)   Presidential Republic
(3)   Mixed Executive
(4)   Monarchy
(5)   Military State

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   **Back?**

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2004

N: N/A   **N**: 191   **n**: 5073 $\overline{N}$: 154 $\overline{T}$: 27

no_ef   **Electoral Family**

Classification of the electoral system.

(1)   Majoritarian
(2)   Combined (mixed)
(3)   Proportional
(4)   No competitive elections

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2004
N: N/A   **N**: 193   **n**: 5482 $\overline{N}$: 166 $\overline{T}$: 28

---

no_ufs   **Unitary or Federal State**

(1)   Unitary
(2)   Hybrid unions
(3)   Federal

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-2004
N: N/A   **N**: 193   **n**: 5562 $\overline{N}$: 169 $\overline{T}$: 29

Persson & Tabellini

http://didattica.unibocconi.eu/myigier/index.php?IdUte=48805&idr=4243&lingua=eng&comando=Apri   (2013-02-13)

(Persson and Tabellini 2003)

The Economic Effects of Constitutions

Persson and Tabellini only include countries of democratic rule in their sample. To be included in the cross-section, an average of the Freedom House indices for civil liberties and political rights (fh_cl and fh_pr) lower than an average of 5 for the 1990-1998 period is required. For the 1960- 1998 panel data, Persson and Tabellini include country-years that obtain a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p_polity2) (For details, see Persson and Tabellini 2003, 74- 77).

pt_federal   Federal Political Structure

Dummy variable. 1 if the country has a federal political structure and 0 otherwise.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1960-2012

N: N/A   **N**: 63   **n**: 2186 $\bar{N}$: 56 $\bar{T}$: 35

pt_maj   Majoritarian Electoral Systems

Dummy variable, 1 if the lower house is selected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1960-1998

N: N/A   **N**: 63   **n**: 2118 $\bar{N}$: 54 $\bar{T}$: 34

pt_pindo   Ballot Structure 2

Continuous measure of the ballot structure defined as the proportion of legislators in the lower house elected individually or on open lists. Computed as 1 – list/pt_seats*clist, where list is the number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems and clist is a dummy variable for closed party lists.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1960-1998

N: N/A   **N**: 63   **n**: 2186 $\bar{N}$: 56 $\bar{T}$: 35

pt_pres   Forms of Government

Dummy variable, 1 for presidential regimes and 0 otherwise. Only regimes in which the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in power (even if an elected president is not the chief executive, or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes. Most semi-presidential and premier-presidential systems are classified as parliamentary.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1957-2012
N: N/A   **N**: 204   **n**: 6518 $\bar{N}$: 172 $\bar{T}$: 32

Heston, Summers & Aten

https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php   (2013-02-04)

(Heston, Summers & Aten 2012)

Penn World Table

In Penn World Table the users are offered two different series of data for China. "China Version 1" uses the official growth rates for the whole period. "China Version 2" uses the recent modifications of official Chinese growth rates. We have chosen to include China Version 1.

pt_er   Exchange Rate

The amount of local currency units per US dollar.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 8417 $\bar{N}$: 138 $\bar{T}$: 44

pwt_rgdpch   Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)

pwt_rgdpch is a chain index obtained by first applying the component growth rates between each pair of consecutive years, t-1 and t (t=1951 to 2000), to the current price component shares in year t-1 to obtain the DA growth rate for each year. This DA growth rate for each year t is then applied backwards and forwards from 1996, and summed to the constant price net foreign balance to obtain the Chain GDP series.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 8016 $\overline{N}$: 131 $\overline{T}$: 42

pwt_csg   Consumption Share of GDP (%)

Growth rate of real GDP per capita.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 8020 $\overline{N}$: 131 $\overline{T}$: 42

pwt_gsg   Government Share of GDP (%)

The share of government spending as a percentage of GDP.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 8020 $\overline{N}$: 131 $\overline{T}$: 42

pwt_isg   Investment Share of GDP (%)

The share of investment as a percentage of GDP.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 8020 $\bar{N}$: 131 $\bar{T}$: 42

pwt_openk   Openness to Trade, Constant Prices

Exports plus Imports divided by real GDP per capita. This is the constant price equivalent of the pwt_openc variable and is the total trade as a percentage of GDP.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 8016 $\bar{N}$: 131 $\bar{T}$: 42

pwt_openc   Openness to Trade, Current Prices

Same as pwt_openk, but in current prices.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 8020 $\bar{N}$: 131 $\bar{T}$: 42

pwt_pop   **Population (Thousands)**

Population, thousands.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 8543 $\overline{N}$: 140 $\overline{T}$: 45

Teorell, Dahlström & Dahlberg

http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogexpertsurveydata/   (2013-01-29)

(Teorell et al 2011)

The QoG Expert-Survey

The QoG Survey is a data set on the structure and behavior of public administration, based on a web survey. The dataset covers key dimensions of quality of government, such as politicization, professionalization, openness, and impartiality.

Included in the QoG dataset are three indexes, each based on a group of questions from the survey. When constructing the indexes we excluded countries with less than three responding experts. (Two indexes are listed below. The third index is listed in the "What It Is" section.)

The confidence interval variables give the higher and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval.

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

qs_proff   **Professional Public Administration (PPA)**

qs_proff_cih   **PPA – Confidence Interval (High)**

qs_proff_cil   **PPA – Confidence Interval (Low)**

The index measures to what extent the public administration is professional rather than politicized. Higher values indicate a more professionalized public administration. It is based on four questions from the survey:

Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today:

- When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job?
- When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants decide who gets the job?
- The top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials?
- Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector?

The scale for each question is 1-7 (from "hardly ever" to "almost always").

The index is constructed by first taking the mean for each responding expert of the four questions above. The value for each country is then calculated as the mean of all the experts' means. (If one or more answers are missing, these questions are ignored when calculating the mean value for each expert. The scales of the second and third questions are reversed so that higher values indicate more professionalism).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 105   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

qs_closed   **Closed Public Administration (CPA)**

qs_closed_cih   **CPA – Confidence Interval (High)**

qs_closed_cil   **CPA – Confidence Interval (Low)**

The index measures to what extent the public administration is more closed or public-like, rather than open or private-like. Higher values indicate a more closed public administration. It is based on three questions from the survey:

Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today:

- Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system?
- Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one stays a public sector employ-ee for the rest of one's career?

To what extent would you say the following applies today to the country you have chosen to submit your answers for?

- The terms of employment for public sector employees are regulated by special laws that do not apply to private sector employees?

The scale for the first two questions is 1-7 (from "hardly ever" to "almost always"). The scale for the third question is 1-7 (from "not at all" to "to a very large extent").

The index is constructed by first taking the mean for each responding expert of the three ques-tions above. The value for each country is then calculated as the mean of all the experts' means. (If one or more answers are missing, these questions are ignored when calculating the mean value for each expert).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 47   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

Roeder

Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization

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r_roberts   Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization

Measures probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Reprint from the index published in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274). Original source: Roberts (1962).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 49   **N**: 53   Country Constant Variable

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r_muller   Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization

Measures probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Reprint from the index published in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274). Original source: Muller (1964).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 99   **N**: 108   Country Constant Variable

r_atlas   Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization

Measures probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Reprint from the index published in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274). Original source: Atlas Narodov Mira (1964).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 118   **N**: 129   Country Constant Variable

r_elf61   Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1961

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group, where the latter is defined without collapsing any sub-groups in the sources. (For original sources, see Roeder 2001).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 136   **N**: 150   Country Constant Variable

r_elf85   Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1985

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group, where the latter is defined without collapsing any sub-groups in the sources. (For original sources, see Roeder 2001).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2012
N: 166   **N**: 177   Country Constant Variable

Ross

Oil and Gas Dataset

The original data are based on information about the volume and value of oil and natural gas production in all countries from 1932 to 2009 (included in QoG dataset from 1946). To calculate the total value of production, the volume is multiplied by the world price for oil or gas. Since these are world prices for a single (benchmark) type of oil/gas, they only approximate the actual price – which varies by country according to the quality, the terms of contracts, the timing of the transactions, and other factors.

Note: These figures do not tell us how much revenues were collected by governments or companies – only the approximate volume and value of production.

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ross_oil_prod   Oil Production (in Metric Tons)

Oil production in metric tons.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 170   **N**: 177   **n**: 8073 $\overline{N}$: 122 $\overline{T}$: 46

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ross_oil_value   Oil Production Value (in 2009 Dollars)

Value of oil production in 2009 dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1946-2011
N: 170   **N**: 177   **n**: 8073 $\overline{N}$: 122 $\overline{T}$: 46

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
ross_oil_price   **Constant Price of Oil (in 2000 Dollars / Barrel)**

Constant oil price per barrel in 2000 dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009
N: 170

Years: 1946-2011
N: 177   **n**: 8711 $\overline{N}$: 122 $\overline{T}$: 46

ross_oil_exp   **Oil Exports (in 1000's Barrel / Day)**

Oil export in 1000's of barrel per day.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2008-2009
N: 170

Years: 1984-2010
N: 171   **n**: 4135 $\overline{N}$: 153 $\overline{T}$: 24

ross_oil_netexp   **Net Oil Export Value (in Constant 2000 Dollars)**

Value of oil net export in constant 2000 dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2008-2009
N: 170

Years: 1984-2010
N: 171   **n**: 4131 $\overline{N}$: 153 $\overline{T}$: 24

ross_oil_netexpc   Net Oil Export Value per Capita (in Constant 2000 Dollars)

Value of net oil export per capita in constant 2000 dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009
N: 170

Years: 1984-2010
N: 171   **n**: 4131 $\overline{N}$: 153 $\overline{T}$: 24

ross_gas_prod   Gas Production (in Million Barrels of Oil Equiv.)

Gas production in million barrels of oil equivalents.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 170

Years: 1955-2011
N: 177   **n**: 7753 $\overline{N}$: 136 $\overline{T}$: 44

ross_gas_value   Gas Production Value (in 2009 Dollars)

Value of gas production in 2009 dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 170

Years: 1955-2011
N: 177   **n**: 7753 $\overline{N}$: 136 $\overline{T}$: 44

ross_gas_price   Constant Price of Gas (in 2000 Dollars / mboe)
Constant gas price in 2000 dollars per million barrels of oil equivalent.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1955-2011
N: 170   **N**: 177   **n**: 8057 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 46

ross_gas_exp   Gas Export (in Billion Cubic Feet)
Gas export in billion cubic feet.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1990-2011
N: 170   **N**: 171   **n**: 3656 $\overline{N}$: 166 $\overline{T}$: 21

ross_gas_netexp   Net Gas Export Value (in Constant 2000 Dollars)
Value of net gas export in constant 2000 dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1990-2011
N: 170   **N**: 171   **n**: 3656 $\overline{N}$: 166 $\overline{T}$: 21

ross_gas_netexpc   **Net Gas Export Value per Capita (in Constant 2000 Dollars)**

Value of gas export per capita in constant 2000 dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1990-2011
N: 170   **N**: 171   **n**: 3656 $\overline{N}$: 166 $\overline{T}$: 21

Solt

The Standardized World Income Inequality Database

A custom missing-data algorithm was used to standardize the United Nations University's World Income Inequality Database; data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study served as the standard.

solt_ginet   **Gini Household Disposable Income**

Estimate of Gini index of inequality in equivalized (square root scale) household disposable income, using Luxembourg Income Study data as the standard.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1960-2010
N: 88   **N**: 169   **n**: 4194 $\overline{N}$: 82 $\overline{T}$: 25

solt_ginmar   Gini Household Gross Income

Estimate of Gini index of inequality in equivalized (square root scale) household gross (pre-tax, pre-transfer) income, using Luxembourg Income Study data as the standard.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1960-2010
N: 88   **N**: 169   **n**: 4129 $\overline{N}$: 81 $\overline{T}$: 24

solt_redist   Estimated % Reduction Gross Income Inequality

Estimated percentage reduction in gross income inequality: the difference between the solt_ginmar and solt_ginet, divided by solt_ginmar, multiplied by 100.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1975-2010
N: 63   **N**: 86   **n**: 2023 $\overline{N}$: 56 $\overline{T}$: 24

Treisman

http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Pages/publishedpapers.html   (2013-01-31)
(Treisman 2007)

t_demyrs　　　　　　　**Years of Democracy**

The number of consecutive years since 1930 the system had been democratic as of 2000, as classified by Beck et al. (2001). Note this is adapted from Beck et al.'s variable "tensys", which just measured tenure of the system, whether democratic or authoritarian. Democracies are those with a 6 or higher on Beck et al.s Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (dpi_eipc).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　☐ Time-Series Dataset　　　　**Back?**

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: N/A
N: 171　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: N/A　　**n**: N/A　　$\overline{N}$: N/A　　$\overline{T}$: N/A

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t_alldem　　　　　　　**Democratic All Year from 1930 to 1995**

Countries democratic all years from 1930 to 1995, by classification of Beck et al. 2001, coded 1 (0 otherwise). Democracies are those with a 6 or higher on Beck et al.'s Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (dpi_eipc).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　☐ Time-Series Dataset　　　　**Back?**

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: N/A
N: 171　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: N/A　　**n**: N/A　　$\overline{N}$: N/A　　$\overline{T}$: N/A

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t_paper　　　　　　　**Newspaper per 1000 inhabitants in 1996**

Newspapers per 1000 inhabitants, as of 1996.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　☐ Time-Series Dataset　　　　**Back?**

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: N/A
N: 134　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: N/A　　**n**: N/A　　$\overline{N}$: N/A　　$\overline{T}$: N/A

t_tvsets   **Television sets per 1000 inhabitants in 1997**

Television sets per 1000 inhabitants, as of 1997.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 140   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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t_fed   **Classified as a Federation**

Countries classified as federations by Elazar (1995) plus Ethiopia, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which became federal after the article, coded 1 (0 otherwise).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 190   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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t_subrev   **Subnational share of Revenues**

Subnational share of revenues, average for 1995-2000 as percent of total revenues.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 60   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

t_subexp   **Subnational share of Expenditures**

Subnational share of expenditures, average for 1995-2000, available years, as percent of total expenditures.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 61   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

t_fuel   **Mineral Fuels in Manufacturing Exports**

Percentage of mineral fuels in manufacturing exports as of 2000.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 140   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

t_yot   **Year Opened to Trade**

The year a country opened for trade according to Sachs and Warner (1995). Coded as the two last digits of the year in question (e.g. 1950 coded as 50). If the country had not opened in 1994 it is coded as 100.

A country is defined as having an open trade policy if none of these following conditions apply:

(1)   Nontariff barriers (NTBs) covering 40 percent or more of trade.
(2)   Average tariff rates of 40 percent or more.
(3)   A black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20 percent or more relative to the official exchange rate, on average, during the 1970s or 1980s.
(4)   A socialist economic system (as defined by Kornai).
(5)   A state monopoly on major exports.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 133   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\bar{N}$: N/A $\bar{T}$: N/A

UNDP

Human Development Report

undp_gii   **Gender Inequality Index**

The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects gender-based disadvantage in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market—for as many countries as data of reasonable quality allow. The index shows the loss in potential human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in these dimensions. It varies between 0—when women and men fare equally—and 1,where one gender fares as poorly as possible in all measured dimensions.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2011   **Years**: 1995-2011
N: 146   **N**: 148   **n**: 495 $\bar{N}$: 29 $\bar{T}$: 3

UNESCO Institute for Statistics

Gross Enrollment Rate Data

All values given are gross enrollment rate (GER). GER is defined as the number of pupils enrolled at a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for the same level of education. For the tertiary level, the population used is the five-year age group following on from the secondary school leaving age. Gross enrollment rate can be over 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged pupils/students because of early or late entrants, and grade repetition. In this case, a rigorous interpretation of GER needs additional information to assess the extent of repetition, late entrants, etc.

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une_preef Pre-Primary Education Enrollment, Female

The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the pre-primary education for the female population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012
N: 167   **N**: 184   **n**: 3677 $\overline{N}$: 86 $\overline{T}$: 20

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une_preem   Pre-Primary Education Enrollment, Male

The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the pre-primary education for the male population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012
N: 167   **N**: 184   **n**: 3675 $\overline{N}$: 85 $\overline{T}$: 20

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
une_preet Pre-Primary Education Enrollment, Total
The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the pre-primary education for the total population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012
N: 169   **N**: 189   **n**: 4271 $\overline{N}$: 99 $\overline{T}$: 23

une_pef   Primary Education Enrollment, Female
The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the primary education for the female population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012
N: 180   **N**: 191   **n**: 5441 $\overline{N}$: 127 $\overline{T}$: 28

une_pem   Primary Education Enrollment, Male
The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the primary education for the male population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012
N: 180   **N**: 191   **n**: 5439 $\overline{N}$: 126 $\overline{T}$: 28

une_pet   **Primary Education Enrollment, Total**

The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the primary education for the total population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012
N: 180   **N**: 191   **n**: 5775 $\overline{N}$: 134 $\overline{T}$: 30

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une_sef   **Secondary Education Enrollment, Female**

The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the secondary education for the female population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012
N: 171   **N**: 190   **n**: 4523 $\overline{N}$: 105 $\overline{T}$: 24

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une_sem   **Secondary Education Enrollment, Male**

The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the secondary education for the male population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012
N: 171   **N**: 190   **n**: 4533 $\overline{N}$: 105 $\overline{T}$: 24

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
une_set   **Secondary Education Enrollment, Total**

The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the secondary education for the total population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012

N: 173   **N**: 191   **n**: 5052 $\overline{N}$: 117 $\overline{T}$: 26

---

une_tef   **Tertiary Education Enrollment, Female**

The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the tertiary education for the female population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012

N: 148   **N**: 184   **n**: 3331 $\overline{N}$: 77 $\overline{T}$: 18

---

une_tem   **Tertiary Education Enrollment, Male**

The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the tertiary education for the male population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012

N: 148   **N**: 186   **n**: 3637 $\overline{N}$: 85 $\overline{T}$: 20

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
une_tet   **Tertiary Education Enrollment, Total**

The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in the tertiary education for the total population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012

N: 152   **N**: 187   **n**: 4267 $\overline{N}$: 99 $\overline{\tau}$: 23

---

une_ppepre   **Percentage of Private Pre-Primary Enrollment, Total**

The percentage of private enrollment in the pre-primary education for the total population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012

N: 157   **N**: 178   **n**: 3136 $\overline{N}$: 73 $\overline{\tau}$: 18

---

une_ppep   **Percentage of Private Primary Enrollment, Total**

The percentage of private enrollment in the primary education for the total population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2012   **Years**: 1970-2012

N: 165   **N**: 179   **n**: 3289 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{\tau}$: 18

une_ppes   Percentage of Private Secondary Enrollment, Total

The percentage of private enrollment in the secondary education for the total population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2011

N: 152

Years: 1998-2012

N: 171   **n**: 1338 $\bar{N}$: 89 $\bar{T}$: 8

United Nations Statistics Divisions

National Accounts

unna_er   Exchange rate

Amount of local currency per US dollar. The exchange rates are IMF-based, but for some countries and years price adjusted rates of exchange are used. These where calculated by the United Nations Statistics divisions when there appeared to be a serious disparity between real GDP growth and growth when GDP was converted to US dollars using the IMF-based rates. This applied mainly to countries with fixed exchange rate regimes and countries going through a period of high inflation (e.g. transition countries from 1990-1995) but their exchange rates were not adjusted adequately to reflect changes in their prices relative to the US prices.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009

N: 191

Years: 1970-2011

N: 199   **n**: 7215 $\bar{N}$: 172 $\bar{T}$: 36

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

unna_gdp **Real GDP**
GDP at constant 2005 prices in US dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2007-2009
N: 191

Years: 1970-2011
N: 199   **n**: 7209 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 36

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unna_pop **Population**
Number of inhabitants.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009
N: 191

Years: 1970-2011
N: 199   **n**: 7217 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 36

University of Texas Inequality Project

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utip_ehii   **Estimated Household Income Inequality**

In order to provide a more reliable and consistent measure of household income inequality, Galbraith and Kum (2004) estimate GINI coefficients through an equation whereby the Deininger and Squire (1996) high quality dataset (ds_gini) is regressed on: a measure of manufacturing pay inequality (utip_ipi); the ratio of manufacturing employment to population; and three dummies for data sources of the Deininger and Squire (1996) measures (income vs. expenditure, gross vs. net of taxes, household vs. personal unit of analysis). Apart from providing substantially enhanced coverage, Galbraith and Kum (2004) argue that this estimated income inequality measure produces better comparability both across countries and over time.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   _Back?_

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1963-2002
N: N/A   **N**: 151   **n**: 3249 $\overline{N}$: 81 $\overline{T}$: 22

---

utip_ipi   **Industrial Pay Inequality**

Based on data on pay across industrial categories in the manufacturing sector compiled by the United Nations International Development Organization (UNIDO), Galbraith and Kum (2003) compute this measure of pay inequality. The measure consists of the between-groups component of Theil's T statistic, where groups are defined using a two or three digit code of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). Larger values indicate greater manufacturing pay inequality.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   _Back?_

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1963-2003
N: N/A   **N**: 155   **n**: 3242 $\overline{N}$: 79 $\overline{T}$: 21

Vanhanen

(Vanhanen 2003)

Index of Power Resources

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van_urban   Urban Population (%)

Urban population as a percentage of total population. Note that comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with caution as the concept of urbanity has changed over time and to some extent varies from country to country.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

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van_nagric   Non-Agricultural Population (%)

Non-agricultural population as a percentage of total population (derived by subtracting the percentage of agricultural population from 100). Note that comparisons across time must be interpreted with caution as the population concept has to some extent changed over time.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

---

van_occup   **Index of Occupational Diversification**

The arithmetic mean of Urban Population % (van_urban) and Non-Agricultural Population % (van_nagric).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

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van_students   **Students**

The number of students at universities or other higher education institutions per 100,000 inhabit-ants of the country. For the data covering 1946-79, Vanhanen has applied a time lag of one decade, which means that the data for the 1960s, for example, actually concerns the 1950s. For this time period, the lack of statistical data also means that the number of students has had to be estimated in numerous cases. Moreover, the concept of higher education has become wider over time, including other types of educational institutions than universities. The data covering 1980- 99 is more reliable, although the definitions of 'universities and other degree-granting institutions' vary. In other words, comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with caution.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

328

van_studentsp   Students (%)

The percentage of Students (%) has been calculated in two different ways: before the year 1980 the value 1000 of van_students is set equivalent to 100%, whereas between the years 1980-1999 the value 5000 of the same variable is set equivalent to 100%. This means that since 1980 five times more students have been needed to reach the same percentage as in the period 1946-79. In combination with the comments made above (see van_student), comparisons across time and space must obviously be interpreted with caution.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

van_literates   Literates (%)

Literates as a percentage of adult population. Note that comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with caution as the concept of literacy has changed over time and to some extent varies from country to country.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

van_knowdist   Index of Knowledge Distribution

The arithmetic mean of Students % (van_studentsp) and Literates % (van_literates).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

van_familyf   Family Farms (%)

The area of family farms as a percentage of total cultivated area or total area of holdings. Family farms refer to holdings that are mainly cultivated by the holder family and that are owned by the cultivator family or held in owner-like possession. The upper hectare limit and other criteria of family farms vary from country to country and over time. Moreover, the data for the 1980s is based on information from 1960-80, and for the 1990s mostly from 1980 but also from the 1970s and the 1960s. In other words, comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with great caution.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

van_decent   Decentralization of Non-Agricultural Economic Resources

This indicator, theoretically ranging from 0 (minimum) to 100 (maximum decentralization), has been measured in two ways. For the 1980s, it is based on a combination of the public sector's, foreign-owned enterprises' and big private enterprises' share of productive capacity or of employment in the nonagricultural sectors of the economy (or in its most important sector); the indicator is then computed as the inverse of this combined percentage. For the 1990s, another measure was used: first each country's economic system was categorized as being centrally planned, public sector dominated, market oriented with concentrated ownership, or market oriented with diversified ownership; then the degree of concentration of ownership within each category was determined. Both measurement approaches are in large part based on Vanhanen's own estimations. In other words, comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with great caution.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1988-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 179   **n**: 317 $\overline{N}$: 29 $\overline{T}$: 2

330

van_distec   **Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources**

The arithmetic mean of Family Farms % (van_familyf) and Decentralization of Non-Agricultural Economic Resources (van_decent).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

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van_powres   **Index of Power Resources (multiplicative)**

Measures the level of dispersion of economic, intellectual, and organizational—or, for short, power—resources in society. Computed as the product of Index of Occupational Diversification (van_occup), Index of Knowledge Distribution (van_knowdist) and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (van_distec), divided by 10.000, to range from 0 (low) to 100 (high relative distribution of power resources).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998
N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

van_mean   **Index of Power Resources (additive)**

Measures the level of dispersion of economic, intellectual, and organizational—or, for short, power—resources in society. Computed as the product of Index of Occupational Diversification (van_occup), Index of Knowledge Distribution (van_knowdist) and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (van_distec), divided by 10.000, to range from 0 (low) to 100 (high relative distribution of power resources).

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1948-1998

N: N/A   **N**: 182   **n**: 700 $\overline{N}$: 14 $\overline{T}$: 4

World Bank

http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators   (2013-01-24)

(World Bank WDI 2013)

World Development Indicators

The primary World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially-recognized international sources. It presents the most current and accurate global development data available.

wdi_aid   **Net Development Assistance and Aid (Constant USD)**

Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Net official aid refers to aid flows (net of repayments) from official donors to countries and territories in part II of the DAC list of recipients: more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and certain advanced developing countries and territories. Official aid is provided under terms and conditions similar to those for ODA. Part II of the DAC List was abolished in 2005. The collection of data on official aid and other resource flows to Part II countries ended with 2004 data. Data are in constant 2009 U.S. dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1961-2010

N: 142   **N**: 168   **n**: 6821 $\overline{N}$: 126 $\overline{T}$: 37

wdi_aidcu **Net Development Assistance and Aid (Current USD)**

Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Net official aid refers to aid flows (net of repayments) from official donors to countries and territories in part II of the DAC list of recipients: more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and certain advanced developing countries and territories. Official aid is provided under terms and conditions similar to those for ODA. Part II of the DAC List was abolished in 2005. The collection of data on official aid and other resource flows to Part II countries ended with 2004 data. Data are in current U.S. dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1961-2010
N: 142   **N**: 168   **n**: 6281 $\overline{N}$: 126 $\overline{T}$: 37

wdi_gdpc **GDP per capita, PPP (constant international $)**

GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1980-2011
N: 179   **N**: 181   **n**: 5082 $\overline{N}$: 159 $\overline{T}$: 28

wdi_gni   **GNI, Atlas method (current US$)**

GNI, Atlas method (current US$)

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1962-2011
N: 187   **N**: 193   **n**: 6761 $\overline{N}$: 135 $\overline{T}$: 35

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wdi_gnipc   **GNI per Capita, Atlas method (current US$)**

GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank. This applies a conversion factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences in rates of inflation between the country, and through 2000, the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). From 2001, these countries include the Euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1962-2011
N: 187   **N**: 193   **n**: 676 $\overline{N}$: 135 $\overline{T}$: 35

334

wdi_gdpcu   GDP (current US$)

GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1961-2011
N: 188   **N**: 193   **n**: 7388 $\overline{N}$: 145 $\overline{T}$: 38

wdi_gdp   GDP, PPP (constant international $)

PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1980-2011
N: 179   **N**: 181   **n**: 5085 $\overline{N}$: 159 $\overline{T}$: 28

335

wdi_area   **Land Area**

Land area is a country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water bodies includes major rivers and lakes.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1961-2010
N: 191   **N**: 196   **n**: 7904 $\overline{N}$: 158 $\overline{T}$: 40

---

wdi_dn   **Daily newspapers (per 1,000 people)**

Daily newspapers refer to those published at least four times a week and calculated as average circulation (or copies printed) per 1,000 people.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1997-2005
N: N/A   **N**: 124   **n**: 590 $\overline{N}$: 66 $\overline{T}$: 5

---

wdi_pl   **Phone lines**

Telephone lines are fixed telephone lines that connect a subscriber's terminal equipment to the public switched telephone network and that have a port on a telephone exchange. Integrated services digital network channels and fixed wireless subscribers are included.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1965-2010
N: 190   **N**: 194   **n**: 6197 $\overline{N}$: 135 $\overline{T}$: 32

wdi_inet **Internet users (per 100 people)**

Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2008-2010
N: 190

Years: 1965-2011
N: 192   **n**: 3536 $\overline{N}$: 75 $\overline{T}$: 18

wdi_fe **Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports)**

Fuels comprise SITC section 3 (mineral fuels).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 161

Years: 1962-2011
N: 186   **n**: 5183 $\overline{N}$: 104 $\overline{T}$: 28

wdi_oame **Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports)**

Ores and metals comprise the commodities in SITC sections 27 (crude fertilizer, minerals nes); 28 (metalliferous ores, scrap); and 68 (non-ferrous metals).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2006-2010
N: 162

Years: 1962-2011
N: 185   **n**: 5361 $\overline{N}$: 107 $\overline{T}$: 29

wdi_me   Merchandise exports (current US$)

Merchandise exports show the f.o.b. value of goods provided to the rest of the world valued in current U.S. dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 186

Years: 1961-2011
N: 191   **n**: 7753 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 41

wdi_gini   Gini Index

Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011
N: 85

Years: 1978-2011
N: 155   **n**: 819 $\overline{N}$: 24 $\overline{T}$: 5

wdi_isl20   Income share held by lowest 20%

Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011

N: 85

Years: 1978-2011

N: 155   **n**: 822 $\overline{N}$: 24 $\overline{T}$: 5

wdi_megdp   Military expenditure (% of GDP)

Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since that would require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. (For example, military budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one part of government to another.)

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010

N: 151

Years: 1988-2011

N: 164   **n**: 3241 $\overline{N}$: 135 $\overline{T}$: 20

wdi_mege   **Military expenditure (% of government expenditure)**

Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since that would require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. (For example, military budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one part of government to another.)

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1990-2011
N: 110   **N**: 136   **n**: 1552 $\overline{N}$: 71 $\overline{T}$: 11

wdi_pop   **Population**

Population, total refers to the total population.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1961-2011
N: 191   **N**: 196   **n**: 8178 $\overline{N}$: 160 $\overline{T}$: 42

340

wdi_tds   **Total Debt Service (% of GNI)**

Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2011
N: 126   **N**: 129   **n**: 4242 $\overline{N}$: 101 $\overline{T}$: 33

---

wdi_urban   **Urban population (% of total)**

Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1961-2012
N: 191   **N**: 198   **n**: 8373 $\overline{N}$: 161 $\overline{T}$: 42

---

wdi_wip   **Women in Parliament (%)**

Women in parliaments are the percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held by women.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2010   **Years**: 1990-2012
N: 189   **N**: 192   **n**: 2934 $\overline{N}$: 128 $\overline{T}$: 15

wdi_tot   **Terms of Trade**

Net barter terms of trade index is calculated as the percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes, measured relative to the base year 2000. Unit value indexes are based on data reported by countries that demonstrate consistency under UNCTAD quality controls, supplemented by UNCTAD's estimates using the previous year's trade values at the Standard International Trade Classification three-digit level as weights. To improve data coverage, especially for the latest periods, UNCTAD constructs a set of average prices indexes at the three-digit product classification of the Standard International Trade Classification revision 3 using UNCTAD's Commodity Price Statistics, interna-tional and national sources, and UNCTAD secretariat estimates and calculates unit value indexes at the country level using the current year's trade values as weights.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1980-2011
N: 183   **N**: 185   **n**: 3806 $\overline{N}$: 119 $\overline{T}$: 21

---

wdi_ttr   **Total Trade (% of GDP)**

Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1961-2011
N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6938 $\overline{N}$: 136 $\overline{T}$: 38

wdi_exp   **Exports (% of GDP)**

Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1961-20

N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6938 $\overline{N}$: 136 $\overline{T}$: 38

---

wdi_imp   **Imports (% of GDP)**

Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1961-2011

N: 174   **N**: 185   **n**: 6939 $\overline{N}$: 136 $\overline{T}$: 38

Geddes, Wright & Frantz

http://dictators.la.psu.edu/   (2013-02-15)

(Geddes et al 2013)

New Data on Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions

Data to identify and analyze autocracy-to-autocracy transitions.

wr_regtype   Regime Type

Variable on regime type. Classes are:

(1)   Indirect military
(2)   Military
(3)   Military-Personal
(4)   Monarchy
(5)   Oligarchy
(6)   Party
(7)   Party-Military
(8)   Party-Military-Personal
(9)   Party-Personal
(10)   Personal

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1946-2010
N: 63   **N**: 115   **n**: 3344 $\overline{N}$: 69 $\overline{T}$: 37

wr_nonautocracy   Non-Autocracy

Variable on what substituted the autocracy. Classes are:

(1)   Democracy
(2)   Foreign-Occupied
(3)   Not-Independent
(4)   Provisional
(5)   Warlord
(6)   Warlord/Foreign-occupied

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1946-2010
N: 94   **N**: 115   **n**: 3344 $\overline{N}$: 51 $\overline{T}$: 29

WYG (WHAT YOU GET)

Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm   (2013-01-22)
(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003)

The Logic of Political Survival Data Source
This index reflects an attempt to measure how far nations have come from the state of nature, which Hobbes (in Leviathan, 1651) describes as a state where life is short, nasty, solitary, poor and brutish.

Note: Cases that could not be clearly identified has been dropped.

---

bdm_hobbes   Hobbes Index
To capture these miseries of life, the Hobbes index ranges from 0 to 100 by combining cross-national indicators of the number of deaths per capita (short), the presence of civil liberties (nasty), media communications (solitary), national income (poor), and the annual experience with civil war, revolution, and international war (brutish). Higher values indicate a longer distance from the state of nature.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-1993
N: N/A   **N**: 141   **n**: 1455 $\overline{N}$: 66 $\overline{T}$: 10

---

bdm_short   Short
The yearly number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-1999
N: N/A   **N**: 183   **n**: 2628 $\overline{N}$: 94 $\overline{T}$: 14

bdm_nasty   **Nasty**

The Freedom House index of civil liberties.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: N/A

N: N/A

Years: 1972-1999

N: 167   **n**: 4037 $\overline{N}$: 144 $\overline{T}$: 24

---

bdm_solitary   **Solitary**

The number of Radios per capita.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: N/A

N: N/A

Years: 1972-1993

N: 195   **n**: 3533 $\overline{N}$: 161 $\overline{T}$: 18

---

bdm_poor   **Poor**

The logarithm of per capita income.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: N/A

N: N/A

Years: 1972-1999

N: 170   **n**: 3806 $\overline{N}$: 136 $\overline{T}$: 22

346

bdm_brute   **Brutish**
The annual experience with civil war, revolution, and international war.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1972-1997
N: N/A   **N**: 196   **n**: 4280 $\overline{N}$: 165 $\overline{T}$: 22

Environmental Performance Index
<u>http://epi.yale.edu/downloads</u>   (2013-01-23)
(Esty et al 2008)

Note: In many cases the EPI variables lack actual observations and rely on imputation. Please refer to the original documentation on more information about this.

---

epi_epi   **Environmental Performance Index**
The Environmental Performance Index is a composite index that measures how well countries succeed in reducing environmental stresses on human health and promoting ecosystem vitality and sound natural resource management. It is built on the 22 variables below.

The index ranges theoretically between 0 and 100, where higher values indicate a better environmental performance.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2000-2010
N: 132   **N**: 132   **n**: 1446 $\overline{N}$: 131 $\overline{T}$: 11

epi_acsat   Access to Sanitation

Access to adequate sanitation measures the percentage of a country's population that has access to an improved source of sanitation. "Improved" sanitation technologies are: connection to a public sewer, connection to septic system, pourflush latrine, simple pit latrine, ventilated improved pit latrine. The excreta disposal system is considered adequate if it is private or shared (but not public) and if hygienically separates human excreta from human contact. "Not improved" are: service or bucket latrines (where excreta are manually removed), public latrines, latrines with an open pit. The total population of a country may comprise either all usual residents of the country (de jure population) or all persons present in the country (de facto population) at the time of the census. For purposes of international comparisons, the de facto definition is recommended.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2008   **Years**: 2000-2008
N: 170   **N**: 182   **n**: 525 $\overline{N}$: 58 $\overline{T}$: 3

epi_agsub   Agricultural Subsidies

This indicator seeks to evaluate the magnitude of subsidies in order to assess the degree of environmental pressure they exert. The NRA is defined as the price of their product in the domestic market (plus any direct output subsidy) less its price at the border, expressed as a percentage of the border price (adjusting for transport costs and quality differences).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 2000-2010
N: 40   **N**: 81   **n**: 525 $\overline{N}$: 58 $\overline{T}$: 3

epi_aze **Critical Habitat Protection**
Percentage of the total AZE site area that is within protected areas.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009
N: 78

Years: 2000-2010
N: 78 **n**: 858 $\overline{N}$: 78 $\overline{T}$: 11

epi_chmort **Child Mortality**
Probability of dying between a child's first and fifth birthdays per 1,000 children aged 1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009
N: 180

Years: 2000-2010
N: 180 **n**: 1966 $\overline{N}$: 179 $\overline{T}$: 11

epi_co2cap **Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions per Capita**
The ratio has been calculated using the Sectoral Approach CO2 emissions and population data from the IEA.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009
N: 134

Years: 2000-2009
N: 134 **n**: 1334 $\overline{N}$: 133 $\overline{T}$: 10

epi_co2gdp   **Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions per GDP**

This ratio has been calculated using the Sectoral Approach CO2 emissions and the GDP using purchasing power parities data from the IEA.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2000-2009

N: 134   **N**: 134   **n**: 1334 $\overline{N}$: 133 $\overline{T}$: 10

---

epi_co2kwh   **Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions per Electricity Generation**

Carbon dioxide emissions per kilowatt hour represents the ratio of CO2 emissions to the electricity generated by thermal power plants separated into electricity plants and CHP plants, as well as production by nuclear and hydro (excluding pumped storage production), geothermal, etc. (IEA documentation).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2000-2009

N: 134   **N**: 134   **n**: 1334 $\overline{N}$: 133 $\overline{T}$: 10

---

epi_forcov   **Forest Cover Change**

The 2012 EPI measures the change in area between time periods (2005 to 2010 for the most recent time period), and considers the target to be no change. Thus, countries that are actively afforesting are not explicitly rewarded, but countries that are losing forest cover are penalized.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2000-2010

N: 186   **N**: 187   **n**: 554 $\overline{N}$: 39 $\overline{T}$: 3

epi_forgrow   **Forest Growing Stock**

Growing stock is a volumetric measure that measures the cubic meters of wood over bark of all living trees more than X cm in diameter at breast height. The definition of X may vary by country.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2010   **Years**: 2000-2010
N: 141   **N**: 149   **n**: 427 $\overline{N}$: 39 $\overline{T}$: 3

---

epi_forloss   **Forest Loss**

The indicator represents the loss of forest area owing to deforestation from either human or natural causes, such as forest fires.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2000-2010
N: 171   **N**: 171   **n**: 1865 $\overline{N}$: 170 $\overline{T}$: 11

---

epi_fsoc   **Fish Stocks Overexploited**

This is the fraction of species that are fished in each country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that are overexploited or collapsed. The definition of overexploited is catches that are less than 50% and greater than 10% of the maximum catch over the time series and the definition of collapsed is catches less than 10% of the maximum catch over the time series.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006   **Years**: 2000-2008
N: 146   **N**: 146   **n**: 1014 $\overline{N}$: 145 $\overline{T}$: 7

epi_indoor   Indoor Air Pollution

Solid fuels include biomass fuels, such as wood, charcoal, crops or other agricultural waste, dung, shrubs and straw, and coal. The use of solid fuels in households is associated with increased mortality from pneumonia and other acute lower respiratory diseases among children as well as increased mortality from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and lung cancer (where coal is used) among adults (WHO 2007).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2008   **Years**: 2000-2008

N: 164   **N**: 178   **n**: 463 $\bar{N}$: 51 $\bar{T}$: 3

epi_mpaeez   Marine Protection

The percentage of each country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ, 0-200 nautical miles) that is under protection by a marine protected area (MPA).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2000-2010

N: 151   **N**: 151   **n**: 1651 $\bar{N}$: 150 $\bar{T}$: 11

epi_pacov   Biome Protection

The weighted percentage of biomes under protected status, where the weight is determined by the relative size of biomes within a country. Countries are not rewarded for protecting beyond 17% of any given biome (i.e., scores are capped at 17% per biome) so that higher levels of protection of some biomes cannot be used to offset lower levels of protection of other biomes.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009   **Years**: 2000-2010

N: 193   **N**: 193   **n**: 2108 $\bar{N}$: 192 $\bar{T}$: 11

epi_pm25   Particulate Matter

These data are derived from a model that was parameterized by MODIS Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) data. The model covered all areas south of 60 degree North latitude and north of 60 degree South latitude.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009

N: 153

Years: 2002-2009

N: 153   **n**: 1216 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 8

epi_pops   Pesticide Regulation

The indicator examines the legislative status of countries on one of the landmark agreements on POPs usage, the Stockholm Convention, and also rates the degree to which these countries have followed through on the objectives of the conventions by limiting or outlawing the use of certain toxic chemicals.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009

N: 193

Years: 2000-2010

N: 193   **n**: 2109 $\overline{N}$: 192 $\overline{T}$: 11

epi_renew   Renewable Electricity

The percentage of the total renewable electricity net generation in total electricity net generation.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009

N: 134

Years: 2000-2009

N: 134   **n**: 1334 $\overline{N}$: 133 $\overline{T}$: 10

epi_so2cap   **Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Emissions per Capita**
Sulfur dioxide emissions per capita represents the ratio of SO2 emissions to population.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 2000-2010
N: 133   **n**: 768 $\overline{N}$: 133 $\overline{T}$: 6

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epi_so2gdp   **Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Emissions per GDP**
Sulfur dioxide emissions per GDP represents the ratio of SO2 emissions to GDP in 2005 constant international prices PPP.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 2000-2005
N: 133   **n**: 796 $\overline{N}$: 133 $\overline{T}$: 6

---

epi_tceez   **Coastal Shelf Fishing Pressure**
This is the catch from trawling and dredging gears divided by the EEZ area by country and year.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2006
N: 151

Years: 2000-2006
N: 151   **n**: 1042 $\overline{N}$: 149 $\overline{T}$: 7

epi_watsup   **Access to Drinking Water**
The percentage of a country's population that has access to an improved source of drinking water.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008   **Years**: 2000-2008
N: 169   **N**: 204   **n**: 6518 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 32

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jrauch/research_bureaucracy.html   (2013-01-28)
(FAO 2010)

FAO Statistics

fao_fcc05_10   **Forest Cover Change 2005-2010 (Annual %)**
The average annual rate of change (%) 2005-2010 of forest cover.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 187   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

fao_fcc00_05   **Forest Cover Change 2000-2005 (Annual %)**
The average annual rate of change (%) 2000-2005 of forest cover.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 188   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

fao_fcc90_00   **Forest Cover Change 1990-2000 (Annual %)**

The average annual rate of change (%) 1990-2000 of forest cover.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 187   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

<u>http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/en</u>   (2013-01-28)

(FAO 2008)

FAO Statistics

The data shows the volume of fish caught measured in tons, and excludes other aquatic animals and plants. The data is divided by capture and aquaculture, and marine and inland waters. Capture for all purposes are included: commercial, recreational etc.

fao_fpic   **Fish Production, Inland Capture**

Inland captured fish production, in tons.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 159   **N**: 170   **n**: 6072 $\overline{N}$: 100 $\overline{T}$: 36

fao_fpmc   Fish Production, Marine Capture

Inland captured fish production, in tons.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2007-2009   **Years**: 1950-2010
N: 85   **N**: 98   **n**: 3315 $\overline{N}$: 54 $\overline{T}$: 34

fao_fe   Fish Export (Tons)

Fish exports, in tons.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1976-2009
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 5222 $\overline{N}$: 154 $\overline{T}$: 27

fao_fi   Fish Import (Tons)

Fish imports, in tons.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1976-2009
N: 185   **N**: 190   **n**: 5222 $\overline{N}$: 154 $\overline{T}$: 27

357

Fund for Peace

Failed States Index

The FSI focuses on the indicators of risk and is based on thousands of articles and reports that are processed by our CAST Software from electronically available sources.

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ffp_fsi   Failed States Index

The Failed States Index includes an examination of the pressures on states, their vulnerability to internal conflict and societal deterioration. The country ratings are based on the total scores of 12 indicators:

Social Indicators

(1)   Mounting Demographic Pressures.
(2)   Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies.
(3)   Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Griev-ance or Group Paranoia.
(4)   Chronic and Sustained Human Flight.

Economic Indicators

(5)   Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines.
(6)   Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline.

Political Indicators

(7)   Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State.
(8)   Progres-sive Deterioration of Public Services.
(9)   Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights.
(10)   Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State".
(11)   Rise of Factionalized Elites;
(12)   Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors.

For each indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0-120.

Note: We have treated Israel/West Bank as missing.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 2005-2012
N: 177   **N**: 179   **n**: 1278 $\overline{N}$: 160 $\overline{T}$: 7

OECD

The Gender, Institutions and Development Database

The OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database contains comparative data on gender equality. It has been compiled from secondary sources as well as from in-depth reviews of country case studies.

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gid_fptw   Female Professional and Technical Workers (%)

Women's share of positions defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) which includes physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals (and associate professionals), life science and health professionals (and associate professionals), teaching professionals (and associate professionals) and other professionals and associate professionals. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2006   **Years**: N/A
N: 112   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

gid_rfmi   Ratio of Female to Male Income

The ratio of the estimated female to male earned income. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2006   **Years**: N/A
N: 59   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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
gid_whp   **Women in High Positions (%)**

The share of women's positions defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), which includes legislators, senior government officials, traditional chiefs and heads of villages, senior officials of special-interest organizations, corporate managers, direc-tors and chief executives, production and operations department managers and other department and general managers. (Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006.).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006   **Years**: N/A
N: 60   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

gid_wip   **Women in Parliament (%)**

The percentage of women in parliament. The data refers to single house, or the weighted average of both upper and lower house, where relevant. (Source: UNDP Human Develoment Report.).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2008   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 116   **N**: 116   **n**: 1316 $\overline{N}$: 69 $\overline{T}$: 11

Holmberg

http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working_papers/2007_6_Holmberg.pdf   (2013-02-27)

(Holmberg 2007)

The Good Society Index

---

hg_gsi   **Good Society Index**

The Good Society Index builds on three basic premises. First, the index consists of birth and deaths of human beings as well as the quality of life of people. The second premise is that the Good Society Index should adhere to *lex parsimoniae*, that is to the principle of Ockham's razor, meaning that a model should use a minimum number of explanatory variables. Third, the index measures subjective as well as objective characteristics. Subjective and objective indicators need to be combined, neither is sufficient as of its own. Given these three premises the Good Society Index is operationally constructed using:

- Infant mortality data from the WHO
- Life expectancy data from the WHO
- Life satisfaction data from the World Values Survey

The three indicators all carry the same weight. Furthermore, the index is based on ranks, not on rates, which means that the countries' rank orders are utilized to build the composite index. The rank orders of each country have been summed and divided by three to yield an index value that in theory can vary between 1 (top nation on the Good Society Index) and 71 (bottom country). A top index value of 1 and a bottom value of 71 thus tell us that these specific countries are closest and furthest away respectively from the good society among the investigated nations. But the figures do not tell how close or how far away from the maximum good society the countries are. The index is not continuous, it is a rank order scale.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   *Back?*

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2007   **Years**: N/A
N: 70   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

IHME

http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/   (2013-02-05)

(Rajaratnam et al. 2010; Hogan et al. 2010)

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation – University of Washington

IHME provides rigorous and comparable measurement of the world's most important health problems and evaluates the strategies used to address them.

---

ihme_nm   Neonatal Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Births)

Probability of death from birth to age 1 month, expressed as deaths per 1,000.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2010
N: 186   **N**: 189   **n**: 6755 $\overline{N}$: 165 $\overline{T}$: 36

ihme_pnm   Postneonatal Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Births)

Probability of death between age 1 month to 1 year, expressed as deaths per 1,000.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2010
N: 186   **N**: 189   **n**: 6755 $\overline{N}$: 165 $\overline{T}$: 36

ihme_fmort   Under-5 Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Live Births)

Probability of death from birth to age 5, expressed as deaths per 1,000 live births.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1970-2009
N: 174   **N**: 177   **n**: 6150 $\overline{N}$: 154 $\overline{T}$: 35

ihme_mmr   **Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 Live Births)**
Number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live Births.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008   **Years**: 1980-2008
N: 180   **N**: 181   **n**: 4834 $\overline{N}$: 167 $\overline{T}$: 27

UCDP/PRIO

http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Old-Versions/3-2005b/   (2013-04-22)
(UCDP 2013)

Armed Conflict Dataset Version 3-2005

The UCDP/PRIO Conflict Database is a free resource of information on armed conflicts of the world. The project records all armed conflicts following the definitions of Uppsala Conflict Data Program. All variables in the database follow strict definitions presented in a codebook (see http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php).

Classifications of armed conflicts:
- Minor armed conflict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period.
- Intermediate armed conflict: More than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle-related deaths, but fewer than 1000 per year.
- War: At least 1000 battle-related deaths per year.

ucdp_type1   Extrasystemic armed conflict

These conflicts occur between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory.

(0)   No extra-state conflict
(1)   Extra-state minor armed conflict
(2)   Extra-state intermediate armed conflict
(3)   Extra-state war.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1946-2004
N: N/A   **N**: 186   **n**: 7771 $\overline{N}$: 132 $\overline{T}$: 42

ucdp_type2   Interstate armed conflict

These conflicts occur between two or more states.

(0)   No interstate conflict
(1)   Interstate minor armed conflict
(2)   Interstate intermediate armed conflict
(3)   Interstate war.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1946-2004
N: N/A   **N**: 186   **n**: 7771 $\overline{N}$: 132 $\overline{T}$: 42

ucdp_type3   Internal armed conflict

These conflicts occur between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states.

(0)   No internal conflict
(1)   Internal minor armed conflict
(2)   Internal intermediate armed conflict
(3)   Internal war

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1946-2004
N: 186   **n**: 7771 $\overline{N}$: 132 $\overline{T}$: 42

ucdp_type4   Internationalized internal armed conflict

These conflicts occur between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention from other states.

(0)   No internationalized internal conflict
(1)   Internationalized internal minor armed conflict
(2)   Internationalized internal intermediate armed conflict
(3)   Internationalized internal war

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A
N: N/A

Years: 1946-2004
N: 186   **n**: 7771 $\overline{N}$: 132 $\overline{T}$: 42

ucdp_count   **Number of Conflicts**

The number of conflicts in which the government of the country is involved.

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1946-2004
N: N/A   **N**: 186   **n**: 7771 $\overline{N}$: 132 $\overline{T}$: 42

ucdp_loc   **Conflict Location**

Consists of four indicators:

(0)   Country is not listed as location of a conflict
(1)   Country is listed as location of a minor armed conflict
(2)   Country is listed as location of an intermediate armed conflict
(3)   Country is listed as location of a war

☐ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A   **Years**: 1946-2004
N: N/A   **N**: 186   **n**: 7770 $\overline{N}$: 132 $\overline{T}$: 42

UNDP

Human Development Report

undp_hdi   **Human Development Index**

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2010   **Years**: 1980-2011
N: 185   **N**: 185   **n**: 1848 $\overline{N}$: 58 $\overline{T}$: 10

Veenhoven

http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl   (2013-02-22)

(Veenhoven 2013)

World Database of Happiness

wdh_ygm80_83   **Years in Good Mood (1980-1983)**

Life-expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey assessments of affect balance, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 19   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wdh_ygm90_91   Years in Good Mood (1990-1991)

Life-expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey assessments of affect balance, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 36   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wdh_ylh80_83   Years Lived Happy (1980-1983)

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective happiness, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 19   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wdh_ylh90_91   Years Lived Happy (1990-1991)

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective happiness, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 44   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wdh_ylh90_95   Years Lived Happy (1990-1995)

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective happiness, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 45   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wdh_ylh90_98   Years Lived Happy (1990-1998)

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective happiness, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 60   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wdh_yls80_83   Years Lived Satisfied (1980-1983)

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective life satisfaction, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 20   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

369

wdh_yls90_91   **Years Lived Satisfied (1990-1991)**

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective life satisfaction, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 38   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wdh_yls90_95   **Years Lived Satisfied (1990-1995)**

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective life satisfaction, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 40   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wdh_yls90_98   **Years Lived Satisfied (1990-1998)**

Life expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective life satisfaction, where the latter is scaled to range from 0-1.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 53   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

370

World Bank

World Development Indicators
The primary World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially-recognized international sources. It presents the most current and accurate global development data available, and includes national, regional and global estimates.

---

wdi_gdpgr   **GDP Growth (%)**
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009
N: 187

Years: 1961-2011
N: 194   **n**: 7198 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 37

---

wdi_gdpcgr   **GDP per Capita Growth (%)**
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009
N: 187

Years: 1961-2011
N: 193   **n**: 7140 $\overline{N}$: 140 $\overline{T}$: 37

wdi_pb2   Population Below $2 a Day (%)

Population below $2 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $2.00 a day at 2005 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2006-2011

N: 85

Years: 1978-2011

N: 124   **n**: 799 $\overline{N}$: 24 $\overline{T}$: 6

wdi_pb125   Population Below $1.25 a Day (%)

Population below $1.25 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 a day at 2005 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2006-2011

N: 85

Years: 1978-2011

N: 124   **n**: 799 $\overline{N}$: 24 $\overline{T}$: 6

wdi_pbpl   Population Below National Poverty Line (%)

National poverty rate is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2006-2012

N: 90

Years: 1957-2012

N: 204   **n**: 6518 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 32

wdi_lifexp Life Expectancy at Birth (years)

Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009-2012
N: 185

Years: 1961-2012
N: 193 **n**: 7912 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 41

wdi_mort Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)

Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009
N: 191

Years: 1961-2011
N: 195 **n**: 7780 $\overline{N}$: 153 $\overline{T}$: 40

wdi_fmort Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)

Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009
N: 191

Years: 1961-2011
N: 195 **n**: 7780 $\overline{N}$: 153 $\overline{T}$: 40

wdi_hiv   Prevalence of HIV (% of population ages 15-49)

Prevalence of HIV refers to the percentage of people ages 15-49 who are infected with HIV.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009-2011   **Years**: 1990-2011

N: 147   **N**: 148   **n**: 3158 $\overline{N}$: 144 $\overline{T}$: 21

wdi_hec   Health expenditure per capita, PPP (constant international $)

Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditures as a ratio of total population. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not include provision of water and sanitation. Data are in international dollars converted using 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) rates.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1995-2011

N: 187   **N**: 188   **n**: 2964 $\overline{N}$: 174 $\overline{T}$: 16

wdi_prhe   Private Health Expenditure (% of GDP)

Private health expenditure includes direct household (out-of-pocket) spending, private insurance, charitable donations, and direct service payments by private corporations.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009   **Years**: 1957-2012

N: 187   **N**: 204   **n**: 6518 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 32

wdi_puhe   Public Health Expenditure (% of GDP)

Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009

N: 187

Years: 1995-2010

N: 188   **n**: 2960 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 16

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wdi_the   Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP)

Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditure. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not include provision of water and sanitation.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009

N: 187

Years: 1995-2010

N: 188   **n**: 2966 $\overline{N}$: 185 $\overline{T}$: 16

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wdi_gbds   Government budget deficit/surplus (% of GDP)

Cash surplus or deficit is revenue (including grants) minus expense, minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. In the 1986 GFS manual nonfinancial assets were included under revenue and expenditure in gross terms. This cash surplus or deficit is closest to the earlier overall budget balance (still missing is lending minus repayments, which are now a financing item under net acquisition of financial assets).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2010

N: 121

Years: 1990-2011

N: 148   **n**: 7780 $\overline{N}$: 153 $\overline{T}$: 40

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wdi_cgd Central government debt (% of GDP)

Debt is the entire stock of direct government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on a particular date. It includes domestic and foreign liabilities such as currency and money deposits, securities other than shares, and loans. It is the gross amount of government liabilities reduced by the amount of equity and financial derivatives held by the government. Because debt is a stock rather than a flow, it is measured as of a given date, usually the last day of the fiscal year.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset [Back?](#)

Years: 2007-2010
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
Years: 1990-2011
N: 106   **n**: 1117 $\overline{N}$: 51 $\overline{T}$: 11

wdi_gr Government revenue (% of GDP)

Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales. Grants are also considered as revenue but are excluded here.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset [Back?](#)

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
Years: 1990-2011
N: 149   **n**: 1869 $\overline{N}$: 149 $\overline{T}$: 13

wdi_tr Tax revenue (% of GDP)

Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social security contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative revenue.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2009
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
Years: 1990-2011
N: 150   **n**: 1893 $\overline{N}$: 86 $\overline{T}$: 13

wdi_gew   Compensation of employees (% of expense)

Compensation of employees consists of all payments in cash, as well as in kind (such as food and housing), to employees in return for services rendered, and government contributions to social insurance schemes such as social security and pensions that provide benefits to employees.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1990-2011

N: 121   **N**: 147   **n**: 1745 $\overline{N}$: 79 $\overline{T}$: 12

wdi_ge   Government Expense (% of GDP)

Expense is cash payments for operating activities of the government in providing goods and services. It includes compensation of employees (such as wages and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1990-2011

N: 121   **N**: 149   **n**: 1772 $\overline{N}$: 81 $\overline{T}$: 12

wdi_gce   Government Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP)

General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption) includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1961-2011

N: 169   **N**: 180   **n**: 6638 $\overline{N}$: 130 $\overline{T}$: 37

wdi_co2   CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)

Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009
N: 186

Years: 1961-2009
N: 190   **n**: 7454 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 39

wdi_epc   Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)

Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009
N: 134

Years: 1961-2010
N: 137   **n**: 4904 $\overline{N}$: 98 $\overline{T}$: 36

wdi_eu   Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)

Energy use refers to use of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in international transport.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2009
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
Years: 1961-2011
N: 169   **n**: 5120 $\overline{N}$: 100 $\overline{T}$: 30

wdi_fw   **Annual freshwater withdrawals (% of internal resources)**

Annual freshwater withdrawals refer to total water withdrawals, not counting evaporation losses from storage basins. Withdrawals also include water from desalination plants in countries where they are a significant source. Withdrawals can exceed 100 percent of total renewable resources where extraction from nonrenewable aquifers or desalination plants is considerable or where there is significant water reuse. Withdrawals for agriculture and industry are total withdrawals for irrigation and livestock production and for direct industrial use (including withdrawals for cooling thermoelectric plants). Withdrawals for domestic uses include drinking water, municipal use or supply, and use for public services, commercial establishments, and homes. Data are for the most recent year available for 1987-2002.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2011   **Years**: 1967-2011
N: 169   **N**: 169   **n**: 815 $\overline{N}$: 18 $\overline{T}$: 5

wdi_aas   **Access to Adequate Sanitation (% of population)**

Access to improved sanitation facilities refers to the percentage of the population with at least adequate access to excreta disposal facilities that can effectively prevent human, animal, and insect contact with excreta. Improved facilities range from simple but protected pit latrines to flush toilets with a sewerage connection. To be effective, facilities must be correctly constructed and properly maintained.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1990-2010
N: 179   **N**: 183   **n**: 3567 $\overline{N}$: 170 $\overline{T}$: 19

379

wdi_iws   **Access to Improved Water Source (% of population)**

Access to an improved water source refers to the percentage of the population with reasonable access to an adequate amount of water from an improved source, such as a household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected well or spring, and rainwater collection. Unimproved sources include vendors, tanker trucks, and unprotected wells and springs. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20 liters a person a day from a source within one kilometer of the dwelling.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](Back)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1990-2010
N: 178   **N**: 185   **n**: 2619 $\overline{N}$: 172 $\overline{T}$: 20

wdi_ase   **Agriculture's share of Economy (% of GDP)**

Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](Back)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1961-2011
N: 169   **N**: 182   **n**: 6069 $\overline{N}$: 119 $\overline{T}$: 33

wdi_ise   **Industry's share of Economy (% of GDP)**

Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1961-2011
N: 170   **N**: 182   **n**: 6060 $\overline{N}$: 119 $\overline{T}$: 33

wdi_sse   **Services' share of Economy (% of GDP)**

Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include value added in wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and real estate services. Also included are imputed bank service charges, import duties, and any statistical discrepancies noted by national compilers as well as discrepancies arising from rescaling. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The industrial origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1961-2011
N: 169   **N**: 181   **n**: 6023 $\overline{N}$: 118 $\overline{T}$: 33

381

wdi_brd   **Battle-Related Deaths**

Battle-related deaths are deaths in battle-related conflicts between warring parties in the conflict dyad (two conflict units that are parties to a conflict). Typically, battle-related deaths occur in warfare involving the armed forces of the warring parties. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities, and all kinds of bombardments of military units, cities, and villages, etc. The targets are usually the military itself and its installations or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians being killed in crossfire, in indiscriminate bombings, etc. All deaths, military as well as civilian, incurred in such situations, are counted as battle-related deaths.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1989-2010
N: 37   **N**: 87   **n**: 666 $\overline{N}$: 30 $\overline{T}$: 8

wdi_idp   **Internally Displaced Persons (low estimate)**

Internally displaced persons are people or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of armed conflict, or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an international border.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 2001-2010
N: 23   **N**: 185   **n**: 6939 $\overline{N}$: 136 $\overline{T}$: 38

wdi_eodb   Ease of Doing Business

Ease of doing business ranks economies from 1 to 185, with first place being the best. A high ranking (a low numerical rank) means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business operation. The index averages the country's percentile rankings on 10 topics covered in the World Bank's Doing Business. The ranking on each topic is the simple average of the percentile rankings on its component indicators.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2011   **Years**: 2011-2012

N: 180   **N**: 181   **n**: 360 $\overline{N}$: 180 $\overline{T}$: 2

wdi_trsb   Time Required to Start a Business (days)

Time required to start a business is the number of calendar days needed to complete the procedures to legally operate a business. If a procedure can be speeded up at additional cost, the fastest procedure, independent of cost, is chosen.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: 2009-2011   **Years**: 2003-2012

N: 180   **N**: 181   **n**: 1711 $\overline{N}$: 171 $\overline{T}$: 9

wdi_fdi   **Foreign Direct Investments, Net Inflows (% of GDP)**

Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1970-2011
N: 184   **N**: 187   **n**: 5879 $\overline{N}$: 140 $\overline{T}$: 31

---

wdi_fr   **Fertility Rate (Births per Woman)**

Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2007-2012   **Years**: 1961-2012
N: 187   **N**: 194   **n**: 7919 $\overline{N}$: 152 $\overline{T}$: 41

384

wdi_gris   **Gender Ration in School (%)**

Gender parity index for gross enrolment ratio. Primary & Secondary combined is the ratio of female gross enrolment ratio for primary and secondary to male gross enrolment ratio for primary and secondary. It is calculated by dividing the female value for the indicator by the male value for the indicator. A GPI equal to 1 indicates parity between females and males. In general, a value less than 1 indicates disparity in favor of males and a value greater than 1 indicates disparity in favor of females.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2011   **Years**: 1970-2012

N: 167   **N**: 188   **n**: 4406 $\overline{N}$: 102 $\overline{T}$: 23

---

wdi_infl   **Inflation (%)**

Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2008-2009   **Years**: 1961-2011

N: 187   **N**: 194   **n**: 7195 $\overline{N}$: 141 $\overline{T}$: 37

---

wdi_rir   **Real interest rate (%)**

Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1961-2011

N: 146   **N**: 175   **n**: 4255 $\overline{N}$: 83 $\overline{T}$: 24

wdi_ue   **Unemployment (% of total labor force)**

Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and unemployment differ by country.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2010   **Years**: 1980-2010
N: 121   **N**: 169   **n**: 2345 $\overline{N}$: 76 $\overline{T}$: 14

---

wdi_lue   **Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)**

Long-term unemployment refers to the number of people with continuous periods of unemployment extending for a year or longer, expressed as a percentage of the total unemployed.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2006-2009   **Years**: 1980-2010
N: 47   **N**: 62   **n**: 1029 $\overline{N}$: 33 $\overline{T}$: 17

Hausmann, Tyson & Zahidi

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2012.pdf   (2013-04-22)

(Hausmann et al 2012)

The Global Gender Gap Report 2012

Through the *Global Gender Gap Report* series, the World Economic Forum has been quantifying the magnitude of gender-based disparities and tracking their progress over time.

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wef_gend   Gender Gap Index

All scores are reported on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1 representing maximum gender equality. The study measures the extent to which women have achieved full equality with men in five critical areas:

- Economic participation
- Economic opportunity
- Political empowerment
- Educational Attainment
- Health and well-being

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2009-2012   **Years**: 2006-2012

N: 135   **N**: 135   **n**: 886 $\overline{N}$: 127 $\overline{T}$: 7

World Economic Forum
http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform/ (2013-03-05)
(Schwab 2012)

Global Competitiveness Report

---

wef_gci   **Global Competitiveness Index**

Global Competetiveness Index consists of a weighted average of many different components, each measuring a different aspect of competitiveness. These components are grouped into 12 pillars of competitiveness:

- Institutions
- Infrastructure
- Macroeconomic environment
- Health and primary education
- Higher education and training
- Goods market efficiency
- Labor market efficiency
- Financial market development
- Technological readiness
- Market size
- Business sophistication
- Innovation

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_gdp   **GDP (US$ billions)**

Gross domestic product in billions of current US dollars. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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
wef_pop **Population (millions)**

Total population in millions. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☐ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011 **Years**: N/A
N: 142 **N**: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_gdpc **GDP per Capita (US$)**

Gross domestic product per capita in current US dollars. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☐ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011 **Years**: N/A
N: 142 **N**: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_gdpp1 **GDP (PPP) as Share of World GDP**

Gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity as a percentage of world GDP. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☐ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011 **Years**: N/A
N: 142 **N**: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_gdpp2   **GDP (PPP)**

Gross domestic product valued at purchasing power parity in billions of international dollars. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_ptp   **Public Trust in Politicians**

How would you rate the level of public trust in the ethical standards of politicians in your country? [1 = very low; 7 = very high]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_wgs   **Wastefulness of Government Spending**

How would you rate the composition of public spending in your country? [1 = extremely wasteful; 7 = highly efficient in providing necessary goods and services]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_gsibp   **Government Services for Improved Business Performance**

To what extent does the government in your country continuously improve its provision of services to help businesses in your country boost their economic performance? [1 = not at all; 7 = extensively]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 137

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_qoi   **Quality of Overall Infrastructure**

How would you assess general infrastructure (e.g., transport, telephony, and energy) in your country? [1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by international standards]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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
wef_ qroad   **Quality of Roads**

How would you assess the roads in your country? [1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by international standards]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_qrail   **Quality of Railroad Infrastructure**

How would you assess the railroad system in your country? [1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by international standards]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 122   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_qport   **Quality of Port Infrastructure**

How would you assess the port facilities in your country? [1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = well developed and efficient by international standards]. For landlocked countries, the question is as follows: How accessible are port facilities? [1 = extremely inaccessible; 7 = extremely accessible]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_qair   **Quality of Air Transport Infrastructure**

How would you assess passenger air transport infrastructure in your country? [1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by international standards]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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
wef_aas   **Available Airline Seat kms/Week (millions)**

Scheduled available airline seat kilometers per week originating in country (in millions). Year 2012.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_elec   **Quality of Electricity Supply**

How would you assess the quality of the electricity supply in your country (lack of interruptions and lack of voltage fluctuations)? [1 = insufficient and suffers frequent interruptions; 7 = sufficient and reliable]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_mobile   **Mobile Telephone Subscriptions (Per 100 Population)**

Number of mobile telephone subscriptions per 100 population. Year 2011 or most recent year available.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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
wef_tele   **Fixed Telephone Lines (Per 100 Population)**

Number of active fixed telephone lines per 100 population. Year 2011 or most recent year available.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description   **Years**: N/A

N: 142   **N**: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_gbb   **Government Budget Balance (%)**

General government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A

N: 142   **N**: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_gns   **Gross National Savings (%)**

Gross national savings as a percentage of GDP. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A

N: 140   **N**: N/A **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_infl   **Inflation (%)**
Annual percent change in consumer price index (year average). Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_gd   **General Government Debt (%)**
Gross general government debt as a percentage of GDP. Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_ccr   **Country Credit Rating**
Expert assessment of the probability of sovereign debt default on a 0–100 (lowest probability) scale.
March 2012.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 141   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_bim　　　　　**Business Impact of Malaria**

How serious an impact do you consider malaria will have on your company in the next five years (e.g., death, disability, medical and funeral expenses, productivity and absenteeism, recruitment and training expenses, revenues)? [1 = a serious impact; 7 = no impact at all]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　☐ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012　　　　　　　　**Years**: N/A
N: 73　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: N/A　　**n**: N/A　　$\overline{N}$: N/A　　$\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_cm　　　　　**Malaria Cases (Per 100,000 population)**

Number of malaria cases per 100,000 population. Year 2009.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　☐ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2009　　　　　　　　　　**Years**: N/A
N: 76　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: N/A　　**n**: N/A　　$\overline{N}$: N/A　　$\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_bit　　　　　**Business Impact of Tuberculosis**

How serious an impact do you consider tuberculosis will have on your company in the next five years (e.g., death, disability, medical and funeral expenses, productivity and absenteeism, recruitment and training expenses, revenues)? [1 = a serious impact; 7 = no impact at all]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　☐ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012　　　　　　　　**Years**: N/A
N: 142　　　　　　　　　　　　　**N**: N/A　　**n**: N/A　　$\overline{N}$: N/A　　$\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_ct   **Tuberculosis Cases (Per 100,000 Population)**
Number of tuberculosis cases per 100,000 population. Year 2010.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2010   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_bihiv   **Business Impact of HIV / AIDS**
How serious an impact do you consider HIV/AIDS will have on your company in the next five years
(e.g., death, disability, medical and funeral expenses, productivity and absenteeism, recruitment and
training expenses, revenues)? [1 = a serious impact; 7 = no impact at all]. Years 2011–12 weighted
average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_chiv   **HIV Prevalence (%)**
HIV prevalence as a percentage of adults aged 15–49 years. Year 2009 or most recent year available.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included
in Time-Series Data

Years: See variable description **Years**: N/A
N: 135   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_imort   **Infant Mortality (Deaths Per 1,000 Live Births)**

Infant (children aged 0–12 months) mortality per 1,000 live births. Year 2010.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2010
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_lifexp   **Life Expectancy (Years)**

Life expectancy at birth (years). Year 2010.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2010
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

---

wef_qpe   **Quality of Primary Education**

How would you assess the quality of primary schools in your country? [1 = poor; 7 = excellent – among the best in the world]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_qes   **Quality of the Educational System**

How well does the educational system in your country meet the needs of a competitive economy? [1 = not well at all; 7 = very well]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_ias   **Internet Access in Schools**

How would you rate the level of access to the Internet in schools in your country? [1 = very limited; 7 = extensive]. Years 2011–12 weighted average

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_ilc   **Intensity of Local Competition**

How would you assess the intensity of competition in the local markets in your country? [1 = limited in most industries; 7 = intense in most industries]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012
N: 142

Years: N/A
N: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_md   **Extent of Market Dominance**

How would you characterize corporate activity in your country? [1 = dominated by a few business groups; 7 = spread among many firms]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_eet   **Extent and Effect of Taxation**

What impact does the level of taxes in your country have on incentives to work or invest? [1 = significantly limits incentives to work or invest; 7 = has no impact on incentives to work or invest]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_tax   **Total Tax Rate (%)**

This variable is a combination of profit tax (% of profits), labor tax and contribution (% of profits), and other taxes (% of profits) Year 2011.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011   **Years**: N/A
N: 139   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_bd **Brain Drain**

Does your country retain and attract talented people? [1 = no, the best and brightest normally leave to pursue opportunities in other countries; 7 = yes, there are many opportunities for talented people within the country]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_wlf **Women in Labor Force (Ratio to Men)**

Ratio of women to men in the labor force. Year 2010.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2010   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

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wef_ci **Capacity for Innovation**

In your country, how do companies obtain technology? [1 = exclusively from licensing or imitating foreign companies; 7 = by conducting formal research and pioneering their own new products and processes]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Variable not included in Time-Series Data

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

401

wef_qsri   **Quality of Scientific Research Institutions**

How would you assess the quality of scientific research institutions in your country? [1 = very poor; 7 = the best in their field internationally]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

wef_uic   **University-Industry Collaboration in R&D**

To what extent do business and universities collaborate on research and development (R&D) in your country? [1 = do not collaborate at all; 7 = collaborate extensively]. Years 2011–12 weighted average.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☐ Time-Series Dataset   <u>Back?</u>

Years: 2011-2012   **Years**: N/A
N: 142   **N**: N/A   **n**: N/A $\overline{N}$: N/A $\overline{T}$: N/A

World Resources Institute
http://www.wdpa.org/Statistics.aspx (2013-02-25)
(World Resources Institute 2011)

The World Database on Protected Areas
Considers all nationally designated protected areas whose location and extent is known.

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wri_pa **Protected Areas: Percentage of Total Land Area**
Terrestrial area protected as percentage of terrestrial area.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2009 **Years**: 1990-2010
N: 188 **N**: 189 **n**: 3832 $\overline{N}$: 182 $\overline{T}$: 20

World Values Survey
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org (2013-02-05)
(World Values Survey 1981-2008)

In this section we have aggregated individual level World Values Survey data to the country level. The value of each observation is thus the country mean of the variable in question.

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wvs_module **WVS Module**
The variable denotes from which of the five WVS waves the observation comes. The waves were conducted the following years:

(1)	1981-1984
(2)	1989-1993
(3)	1994-1999
(4)	1999-2004
(5)	2004-2008

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008) **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56 **N**: 85 **n**: 170 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_a008   Feeling of Happines

Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?

(1)   Very happy
(2)   Quite happy
(3)   Not very happy
(4)   Not at all happy

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 56

Years: 1981-2008
N: 85   **n**: 169 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_a009   State of Health

All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is…

(1)   Very good
(2)   Good
(3)   Fair
(4)   Poor
(5)   Very poor

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 56

Years: 1981-2008
N: 85   **n**: 164 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_a062 How often discusses political matters

When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?

(1)   Frequently
(2)   Occasionally
(3)   Never

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 19811-2006
N: 4   **N**: 70   **n**: 117 $\overline{N}$: 5 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_a165 Most people can be trusted

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

(1)   Most people can be trusted
(2)   Can't be too careful

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56   **N**: 85   **n**: 170 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_a168   Do you think most people try to take advantage of you

Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

(1)   Would take advantage
(2)   Try to be fair

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1999-2006
N: 3   **N**: 40   **n**: 41 $\overline{N}$: 5 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_a170   How satisfied are you with your life

All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

(1)   Dissatisfied
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Satisfied

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56   **N**: 85   **n**: 168 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_a173   **How much freedom you feel**

Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means none at all and 10 means a great deal to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.

(1)   Not at all
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   A great deal

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56   **N**: 84   **n**: 164 $\overline{N}$: 164 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_c006   Satisfaction with the financial situation of household
How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?

(1)   Dissatisfied
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Satisfied

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 55   **N**: 84   **n**: 166 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e023   Interested in politics
How interested would you say you are in politics?

(1)   Very interested
(2)   Somewhat interested
(3)   Not very interested
(4)   Not at all interested

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56   **N**: 85   **n**: 165 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e150   How often follows politics in the news

How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers?

(1)   Every day
(2)   Several times a week
(3)   Once or twice a week
(4)   Less often
(5)   Never

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1999-2005
N: 2   **N**: 31   **n**: 31 $\overline{N}$: 4 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_b001   Would give part of my income for environment

I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution.

(1)   Strongly agree
(2)   Agree
(3)   Disagree
(4)   Strongly disagree

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 50   **N**: 62   **n**: 86 $\overline{N}$: 5 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_b002   Increase in taxes if extra money used to prevent environmental pollution

I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution.

(1)   Strongly agree
(2)   Agree
(3)   Disagree
(4)   Strongly disagree

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 50   **N**: 77   **n**: 138 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_b003   Government should reduce environmental pollution

I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution.

(1)   Strongly agree
(2)   Agree
(3)   Disagree
(4)   Strongly disagree

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 50   **N**: 62   **n**: 86 $\overline{N}$: 5 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_b008   **Environmental vs. economic growth**

Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?

 (1)   Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some losses of jobs.

(2)   Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.

Note: We have decided to recode "Other answer" as missing.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1994-2008
N: 55   **N**: 84   **n**: 144 $\overline{N}$: 10 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_b009   **Human & nature**

For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views:

(1)   Human beings should master nature
(2)   Humans should coexist with nature

Note: We have decided to recode "both", "neither" and "other answer" as missing.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1994-2005
N: 2   **N**: 58   **n**: 78 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 1

411

wvs_e033   Self-positioning in political scale

In political matters, people talk of the left and the right. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

(1)   Left
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Right

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 52   **N**: 81   **n**: 156 $\bar{N}$: 6 $\bar{T}$: 2

wvs_e035   Incomes more equal

The respondents were asked to place their views on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 meant complete agreement with the first statement and 10 meant complete agreement with the second statement. If their view fell somewhere in between, they could choose any number in between.

(1)   Incomes should be made more equal
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1989-2008
N: 55   **N**: 85   **n**: 159 $\overline{N}$: 8 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e036   Private ownership of business

The respondents were asked to place their views on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 meant complete agreement with the first statement and 10 meant complete agreement with the second statement. If their view fell somewhere in between, they could choose any number in between.

(1)   Private ownership of business and industry should be increased
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Government ownership of business and industry should be increased

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1989-2008
N: 52   **N**: 82   **n**: 154 $\overline{N}$: 8 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e037 Government more responsibility

The respondents were asked to place their views on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 meant complete agreement with the first statement and 10 meant complete agreement with the second statement. If their view fell somewhere in between, they could choose any number in between.

(1)   The Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 56

Years: 1989-2008
N: 85   **n**: 160 $\overline{N}$: 8 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e039   **Competition is good**

The respondents were asked to place their views on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 meant complete agreement with the first statement and 10 meant complete agreement with the second statement. If their view fell somewhere in between, they could choose any number in between.

(1)   Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1989-2008
N: 55   **N**: 81   **n**: 147 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e196   **How widespread is corruption**

How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?

(1)   Almost no public officials engaged in it
(2)   A few are
(3)   Most are
(4)   Almost all public officials are engaged in it

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1994-2004
N: 1   **N**: 50   **n**: 51 $\overline{N}$: 5 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_e069_01   Confidence: Churches

The respondents level of confidence in the churches.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 55

Years: 1981-2008
N: 163   **n**: 163 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_02   Confidence: Armed Forces

The respondents level of confidence in the armed forces.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 53

Years: 1981-2008
N: 80   **n**: 159 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_04   Confidence: Press

The respondents level of confidence in the press.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 55

Years: 1981-2008
N: 82   **n**: 163 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_05   Confidence: Labor Unions

The respondents level of confidence in the labor unions.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 55

Years: 1981-2008
N: 81   **n**: 161 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_06   Confidence: Police

The respondents level of confidence in the police.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 54   **N**: 81   **n**: 160 $\bar{N}$: 6 $\bar{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_07   Confidence: Parliament

The respondents level of confidence in the parliament.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 53   **N**: 80   **n**: 159 $\bar{N}$: 6 $\bar{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_08 **Confidence: Civil Services**

The respondents level of confidence in the civil services.

(1) A great deal
(2) Quite a lot
(3) Not very much
(4) None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Years: 2002-2006 **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 55 **N**: 81 **n**: 162 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

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wvs_e069_09 **Confidence: Social Security System**

The respondents level of confidence in the social security system.

(1) A great deal
(2) Quite a lot
(3) Not very much
(4) None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset Back?

Variable not included
in Cross-Section Data

Years: N/A **Years**: 1989-1991
N: N/A **N**: 12 **n**: 12 $\overline{N}$: 4 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_e069_10   Confidence: Television

The respondents level of confidence in the television.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 56   **N**: 83   **n**: 147 $\overline{N}$: 8 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_11   Confidence: Government

The respondents level of confidence in the government.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 54   **N**: 81   **n**: 145 $\overline{N}$: 8 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_12   Confidence: Political Parties

The respondents level of confidence in the political parties.

(1)	A great deal
(2)	Quite a lot
(3)	Not very much
(4)	None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008

N: 54   **N**: 81   **n**: 146 $\overline{N}$: 8 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_13   Confidence: Major Companies

The respondents level of confidence in the major companies.

(1)	A great deal
(2)	Quite a lot
(3)	Not very much
(4)	None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008

N: 55   **N**: 82   **n**: 161 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_14　　　　　　**Confidence: Environmental Organizations**

The respondents level of confidence in the environmental protection movement.

(1)　　　　　　A great deal
(2)　　　　　　Quite a lot
(3)　　　　　　Not very much
(4)　　　　　　None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　　Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)　　　　　　**Years**: 1994-2008
N: 55　　　　　　**N**: 81　　**n**: 140　　$\overline{N}$: 9　　$\overline{T}$: 2

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wvs_e069_15　　　　　　**Confidence: Women's Movement**

The respondents level of confidence in the women's movement.

(1)　　　　　　A great deal
(2)　　　　　　Quite a lot
(3)　　　　　　Not very much
(4)　　　　　　None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　　　Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)　　　　　　**Years**: 1994-2008
N: 55　　　　　　**N**: 81　　**n**: 140　　$\overline{N}$: 9　　$\overline{T}$: 2

423

wvs_e069_17   Confidence: Justice System

The respondents level of confidence in the justice system.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 53   **N**: 74   **n**: 125 $\overline{N}$: 4 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_18   Confidence: European Union

The respondents level of confidence in the European Union.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 32   **N**: 52   **n**: 78 $\overline{N}$: 4 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e069_19   Confidence: NATO

The respondents level of confidence in NATO.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2005
N: 1   **N**: 25   **n**: 29 $\overline{N}$: 2 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_e069_20   Confidence: United Nations

The respondents level of confidence in the United Nations.

(1)   A great deal
(2)   Quite a lot
(3)   Not very much
(4)   None at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1994-2008
N: 56   **N**: 83   **n**: 143 $\overline{N}$: 10 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e114   Having a strong leader

The respondents opinion about having a strong leader.

(1)   Very good
(2)   Fairly good
(3)   Bad
(4)   Very bad

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1994-2008
N: 54   **N**: 82   **n**: 142 $\overline{N}$: 9 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_e115   Having experts make decisions

The respondents opinion about having experts make the decisions.

(1)   Very good
(2)   Fairly good
(3)   Bad
(4)   Very bad

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1994-2008
N: 54   **N**: 82   **n**: 141 $\overline{N}$: 9 $\overline{T}$: 2

426

wvs_e116   **Having the army rule**

The respondents opinion about having the army rule.

(1)   Very good
(2)   Fairly good
(3)   Bad
(4)   Very bad

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 54

Years: 1994-2008
N: 82   **n**: 141 $\bar{N}$: 9 $\bar{T}$: 2

wvs_e117   **Having a democratic political system**

The respondents opinion about having a democratic political system.

(1)   Very good
(2)   Fairly good
(3)   Bad
(4)   Very bad

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 54

Years: 1994-2008
N: 82   **n**: 141 $\bar{N}$: 9 $\bar{T}$: 2

wvs_e120   In democracy, the economic system runs badly

The respondents view on the statement "In democracy, the economic system runs badly".

(1)   Agree strongly
(2)   Agree
(3)   Disagree
(4)   Strongly disagree

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 3

Years: 1994-2006
N: 65   **n**: 88 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_e121   Democracies are indecisive

The respondents view on the statement "Democracies are indecisive".

(1)   Agree strongly
(2)   Agree
(3)   Disagree
(4)   Strongly disagree

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 3

Years: 1994-2006
N: 65   **n**: 88 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_e122   Democracies aren't good at maintaining order

The respondents view on the statement "Democracies aren't good at maintaining order".

(1)   Agree strongly
(2)   Agree
(3)   Disagree
(4)   Strongly disagree

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1994-2006
N: 3   **N**: 66   **n**: 89 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_e123   Democracy may have problems but is better

The respondents view on the statement "Democracy may have problems but is better".

(1)   Agree strongly
(2)   Agree
(3)   Disagree
(4)   Strongly disagree

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: 2002-2006   **Years**: 1994-2006
N: 4   **N**: 65   **n**: 89 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 1

429

wvs_e124　　　　　　Respect for individual human rights

How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays (in our country)? Do you feel there is:

(1)　　　　　A lot of respect for individual human rights
(2)　　　　　Some respect
(3)　　　　　Not much respect
(4)　　　　　No respect at all

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)　　　　　**Years**: 1996-2008
N: 50　　　　　**N**: 72　　**n**: 97　　$\bar{N}$: 7　　$\bar{T}$: 1

wvs_e110　　　　　　Democracy is developing in our country

On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?

(1)　　　　　Very satisfied
(2)　　　　　Rather satisfied
(3)　　　　　Not very satisfied
(4)　　　　　Not at all satisfied

☑ Cross-Section Dataset　　　　　☑ Time-Series Dataset　　　　Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)　　　　　**Years**: 1996-2007
N: 2　　　　　**N**: 44　　**n**: 46　　$\bar{N}$: 4　　$\bar{T}$: 1

wvs_e125   Satisfaction with the people in national office

How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs?

(1)   Very satisfied
(2)   Fairly satisfied
(3)   Fairly dissatisfied
(4)   Very dissatisfied

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 2

Years: 1994-2005
N: 65   **n**: 87 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_e128   Country is run by big interest vs. all people

Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

(1)   Run by few big interests
(2)   Run for all people

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 4

Years: 1990-2007
N: 68   **n**: 98 $\overline{N}$: 5 $\overline{T}$: 1

431

wvs_f114   **Justifiable: Claiming Government Benefits**
The respondents view on whether the action can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

(1)   Never justifiable
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Always justifiable

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2012
N: 54   **N**: 83   **n**: 160 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_f115   **Justifiable: Avoiding a Fare on Public Transport**
The respondents view on whether the action can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

(1)   Never justifiable
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Always justifiable

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 53   **N**: 83   **n**: 157 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

432

wvs_f116   Justifiable: Cheating on Taxes

The respondents view on whether the action can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

(1)   Never justifiable
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Always justifiable

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 54

Years: 1981-2008
N: 82   **n**: 160 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

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wvs_f117   Justifiable: Someone Accepting a Bribe

The respondents view on whether the action can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

(1)   Never justifiable
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Always justifiable

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 55

Years: 1981-2008
N: 85   **n**: 165 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_sup **Support for democracy**

Democracy-scale according to Klingemann (1999): In the first step, we added up respondent's support of the statements "Having a democratic political system" and "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government". Support for these statements could be expressed in four categories: "very good" (code 3), "fairly good" (code 2), "fairly bad" (code 1) and "very bad" (code 0) in the first statement and "agree strongly" (code 3), "agree" (code 2), "disagree" (code 1) and "disagree strongly" (code 0) in the latter. People's support for these statements has been added up to a 0-to-6 scale, with 6 representing the highest support for democracy. In the second step, we added up people's support of the statements "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" and "Having the army rule". Analogous to the first step, this creates a 0-to-6 scale of support for autocracy. In the third step, we subtracted the "support for autocracy" scale from the "support for democracy" scale to create an overall index of "autocratic versus democratic support", ranging from –6 (maximum autocratic support) to +6 (maximum democratic support). In the fourth step, we calculated for each country the percentage of people scoring on at least +4 on this index (since from +4 onward you are closer to the maximum democratic support (+6) than to the neutral point (0)). Hence, we obtain the percentage of "solid democrats" for each country.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 4

Years: 1994-2006
N: 62 **n**: 86 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_org   Belong to organizations

Average number of organizations (0-14).

Which of the following organizations do you belong to or do voluntary work for?

- social welfare service for elderly
- church organization
- cultural activities
- labor unions
- political parties
- local political
- third world development or human rights
- conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights
- professional associations
- youth work
- sports or recreation
- women's group
- peace movement
- organizations concerned with health

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1999-2005
N: 1   **N**: 29   **n**: 29 $\bar{N}$: 4 $\bar{T}$: 1

wvs_vol   **Voluntary work for organizations**

Average number of organizations (0-14).

Which of the following organizations do you do voluntary work for?
- social welfare service for elderly
- church organization
- cultural activities
- labor unions
- political parties
- local political
- third world development or human rights
- conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights
- professional associations
- youth work
- sports or recreation
- women's group
- peace movement
- organizations concerned with health

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1999-2005
N: 1   **N**: 25   **n**: 25 $\overline{N}$: 4 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_theo   **Support for theocracy**

Support for theocracy is a 0-1 scale composed of four items. "How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following":

- "Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office" (agree coded high).
- "Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections" (agree coded low).
- "It would be better for [this country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office" (agree coded high).
- "Religious leaders should not influence government decisions" (agree coded low).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1999-2008
N: 48   **N**: 63   **n**: 81 $\overline{N}$: 8 $\overline{T}$: 1

wvs_act   **Political Action**

Average number of the following political actions that the respondents actually have carried out (0-5):
- Signing a petition
- Joining in boycotts
- Attending lawful demonstrations
- Joining unofficial strikes
- Occupying buildings or factories

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2006
N: 3   **N**: 63   **n**: 103 $\overline{N}$: 4 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_pm4   Post-Materialism 4-item index

The Post-Materialism indices measure the extent to which the respondent gives top priority to economic and physical security, on the one hand; or to autonomy and self-expression on the other. The Post-Materialism four-item index is based on the respondent's first and second choices in the following questions:

"People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the second most important?"

     I. Maintaining the order of the nation
     II. Giving people more say in important government decisions
     III. Fighting rising prices
     IV. Protecting freedom of speech

The first and third options tap materialist priorities, while the second and fourth options tap postmaterialist priorities. If both materialist items are given high priority, the score is "1"; if both postmaterialist items are given high priority, the score is "3"; if one materialist item and one postmaterialism item are given high priority the score is "2".

(1)   Materialist
(2)   Mixed
(3)   Postmaterialist

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 56

Years: 1981-2008
N: 84   **n**: 168 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_pm12   Post-Materialism 12-item index

The Post-Materialism twelve-item index is based on the respondents' views on what the aims of their country should be for the next ten years. The following items are postmaterialist priorities drawn from three questions. The score is the average number of these postmaterialist items that are given priority.

- Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities.
- Giving people more say in important government decisions.
- Protecting freedom of speech.
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society.
- Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money.

(0)   Materialist
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)   Postmaterialist

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 54

Years: 1989-2008
N: 82   **n**: 156 $\overline{N}$: 8 $\overline{T}$: 2

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wvs_gen   Gender Equality Scale

Gender Equality Scale is a 0-100 scale composed of five items:
- "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do," (agree coded low).
- "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women," (agree coded low).
- "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl," (agree coded low).
- "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?" (agree coded low).
- If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?" (disapprove coded low).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)
N: 56

Years: 1981-2008
N: 84   **n**: 169 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_rs   Religiosity Scale

Religiosity Scale is a 0-100 scale composed of six items:

- "Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are…a religious person, not a religious person, or a convinced atheist?" (% religious).
- "Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?" (% once a week or more).
- "How important is God in your life?" (% "very" scaled 6-10)
- "Do you believe in God?" (% Yes).
- "Do you believe in life after death?" (% Yes).
- "Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion?"

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56   **N**: 85   **n**: 169 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_selfexp1   Self-expression values I

Principal components factor index based on wvs_tol, wvs_pet, wvs_lib, wvs_trust and wvs_lifsat.

Note: Some inconsistencies found in the original data regarding wvs_tol (see below).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?]

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 51   **N**: 81   **n**: 143 $\overline{N}$: 8 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_selfexp2   **Self-expression values II**

Principal components factor index based on wvs_tol, wvs_pet, wvs_lib, wvs_trust, wvs_lifsat and wvs_rel.

Note: Some inconsistencies found in the original data regarding wvs_tol (see below).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 51   **N**: 81   **n**: 141 $\overline{N}$: 7 $\overline{T}$: 2

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wvs_selfexp3   **Self-expression values III**

Principal components factor index based on wvs_pet, wvs_lib, wvs_trust, wvs_happy and wvs_homo.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 51   **N**: 81   **n**: 151 $\overline{N}$: 5 $\overline{T}$: 2

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wvs_secrat   **Secular-rational values**

Principal components factor index based on wvs_rel, wvs_auton, wvs_abort, wvs_proud and wvs_auth.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 53   **N**: 85   **n**: 170 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_abort   **Justifiable: Abortion**

The respondents view on whether abortion can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

(1)   Never justifiable
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Always justifiable

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 54   **N**: 85   **n**: 164 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_homo   **Justifiable: Homosexuality**

The respondents view on whether homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

(1)   Never justifiable
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Always justifiable

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 52   **N**: 83   **n**: 160 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_auth   Respect for authority

I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?. Greater respect for authority.

(1)   Good
(2)   Don't mind
(3)   Bad

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 55   **N**: 85   **n**: 164 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_auton   Autonomy index

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?
(A)   Independence.
(B)   Determination
(C)   Religious faith
(D)   Obedience

(0)   Not mentioned
(1)   Important

Autonomy index is computed as (A+B)-(C+D), generating the following five-point scale:
(-2)   Obedience/Religious Faith
(-1)
(0)
(1)
(2)   Determination, perseverance/Independence

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56   **N**: 85   **n**: 164 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_happy **Happiness**

See variable wvs_a008 above.

(0) Not very happy/ Not at all happy
(1) Very happy/ Quite happy

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008) **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56 **N**: 85 **n**: 169 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_lib **Liberty and participation**

If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (Rank first and second choice).

- Maintaining order in the nation
- Give people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech

Respondents first and second priorities for "giving people more say in important government decisions" and "protecting freedom of speech" added to a four-point index, assigning 3 points for both items on first and second rank, 2 points for one of these items on first rank, 1 point for one of these items on second rank and 0 for none of these items on first or second rank.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008) **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56 **N**: 85 **n**: 169 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_lifsat   Life satisfaction

10-point rating scale for life satisfaction (=wvs_a170).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008

N: 56   **N**: 85   **n**: 168 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

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wvs_pet   Public self-expression

I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances, do it: Signing a petition.

- Have done
- Might do
- Would never do

"Have done" coded (1) and dichotomized against (0).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008

N: 55   **N**: 83   **n**: 161 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_ proud   **National pride**

How proud are you to be (NATIONALITY)?

(1)   Very proud
(2)   Quite proud
(3)   Not very proud
(4)   Not at all proud

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 55   **N**: 85   **n**: 167 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

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wvs_ rel   **Religiousness**

How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate - 1 means very important and 10 means not at all important.

(1)   Very
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)   Not at all

(In the original question (1) is not at all important and (10) very important).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   Back?

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56   **N**: 85   **n**: 164 $\overline{N}$: 6 $\overline{T}$: 2

wvs_ tol   Tolerance of diversity

On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?

(A)   People who have AIDS.
(B)   Homosexuals

(0)   Mentioned
(1)   Not mentioned

Scores added for neighbors with AIDS and homosexual neighbors to create a 0-2 scale (where 2 means tolerant).

Note: Some inconsistencies found in the original data. Two examples: In Iran only 0.5 percent in wave 4 mentioned that they would not like to have people with AIDS as neighbors while 86 percent in Iran in wave 5 mentioned this. This can be compared with Jordan where 95 percent in wave 4 mentioned that they would not like to have people with AIDS as neighbors. In Bangladesh only 4.9 percent of the people in wave 4 said that they would not like homosexuals as neighbors, while 83.7 percent said this in Bangladesh in wave 3.

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1990-2008
N: 52   **N**: 82   **n**: 148 $\bar{N}$: 8 $\bar{T}$: 2

wvs_ trust   Interpersonal trust

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

(0)   Need to be very careful
(1)   Most people can be trusted

(=wvs_a165 recoded).

☑ Cross-Section Dataset   ☑ Time-Series Dataset   [Back?](#)

Years: Fifth wave (2004-2008)   **Years**: 1981-2008
N: 56   **N**: 85   **n**: 170 $\bar{N}$: 6 $\bar{T}$: 2

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Appendix A

Country	Data from	Data to	Comment
Afghanistan	1946	2012	Independence from the UK 1919
Albania	1946	2012	Independence recognized by the Great Powers 1913
Algeria	1963	2012	Independence from France 1962
Andorra	1946	2012	Independence from the Crown of Aragon 1278
Angola	1976	2012	Independence from Portugal 1975
Antigua and Barbuda	1982	2012	Independence from the UK 1981
Argentina	1946	2012	Independence from Spain 1816
Armenia	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union recognized 1991
Australia	1946	2012	Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942
Austria	1955	2012	The State Treaty signed in Vienna 1955
Azerbaijan	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
Bahamas	1974	2012	Independence from the UK 1973
Bahrain	1972	2012	End of treaties with the UK 1971
Bangladesh	1971	2012	Independence from Pakistan 1971
Barbados	1967	2012	Independence from the UK 1966
Belarus	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
Belgium	1946	2012	Independence from the Netherlands recognised 1839
Belize	1982	2012	Independence from the UK 1981
Benin	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Bhutan	1946	2012	Monarchy established 1907
Bolivia	1946	2012	Independence from Spain recognized 1847
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	2012	Independence from Yugoslavia 1992
Botswana	1967	2012	Independence from the UK 1966
Brazil	1946	2012	Independence from the UK of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves recognized 1825
Brunei	1984	2012	Independence from the UK 1984
Bulgaria	1946	2012	Independence from Ottoman Empire 1909
Burkina Faso	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Burundi	1963	2012	UN Trust Territory ceased to exist 1962
Cambodia	1954	2012	Independence from France 1953
Cameroon	1960	2012	Independence from France 1960
Canada	1946	2012	Statute of Westminster 1931
Cape Verde	1976	2012	Independence from Portugal 1975
Central African Republic	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Chad	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Chile	1946	2012	Independence from Spain recognized 1844
China	1946	2012	Unification of China under the Qin Dynasty 221 BC
Colombia	1946	2012	Independence from Spain recognized 1819
Comoros	1976	2012	Independence from France 1975
Congo, Democratic Rep. of the	1960	2012	Independence from Belgium 1960
Congo, Republic of the	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Costa Rica	1946	2012	Independence from United Provinces of Central America 1847
Côte d'Ivoire	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Croatia	1992	2012	Independence 1991
Cuba	1946	2012	Independence from the United States 1902
Cyprus (-1974)	1961	1974	Independence from the UK 1960
Cyprus (1975-)	1975	2012	Division of the island 1974
Czech Republic	1993	2012	Dissolution of Czechoslovakia 1993
Czechoslovakia	1946	1992	Independence 1918, Liberation 1945
Denmark	1946	2012	Consolidation 8th century
Djibouti	1977	2012	Independence from France 1977
Dominica	1979	2012	Independence from the UK 1978

Dominican Republic	1946	2012	Independence from Spain 1865
Ecuador	1946	2012	Independence from Gran Colombia 1830
Egypt	1946	2012	Independence from the UK 1922
El Salvador	1946	2012	Independence from the Greater Republic of Central America 1898
Equatorial Guinea	1969	2012	Independence from Spain 1968
Eritrea	1993	2012	Independence from Ethiopia 1993
Estonia	1992	2012	Independence restored 1991
Ethiopia (-1992)	1946	1992	Empire of Ethiopia 1137
Ethiopia (1993-)	1993	2012	Eritrean independence 1993
Federated States of Micronesia	1987	2012	Independence from Compact of Free Association 1986
Fiji	1971	2012	Independence from the UK 1970
Finland	1946	2012	Independence from Soviet Russia recognized 1918
France (-1962)	1946	1962	French Republic 1792
France (1963-)	1963	2012	Algeria independence from France 1962
Gabon	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Gambia	1965	2012	Independence from the UK 1965
Georgia	1992	2012	Independence from Soviet Union 1991
Germany	1991	2012	Reunification 1990
Germany, East	1950	1990	Established 1949
Germany, West	1949	1990	Established 1949
Ghana	1957	2012	Independence from the British Empire 1957
Greece	1946	2012	Independence from the Ottoman Empire recognized 1830
Grenada	1974	2012	Independence from the UK 1974
Guatemala	1946	2012	Independence from the First Mexican Empire 1823
Guinea	1959	2012	Independence from France 1958
Guinea-Bissau	1975	2012	Independence from Portugal recognized 1974
Guyana	1966	2012	Independence from the UK 1966
Haiti	1946	2012	Independence recognized 1825
Honduras	1946	2012	Independence declared as Honduras 1838
Hungary	1946	2012	Secession from Austria-Hungary 1918
Iceland	1946	2012	Kingdom of Iceland 1918
India	1948	2012	Independence from the UK (Dominion) 1947
Indonesia	1950	2012	Independence from the Netherlands recognized 1949
Iran	1946	2012	Safavid Empire 1501
Iraq	1946	2012	Independence from the UK 1932
Ireland	1946	2012	The Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921
Israel	1948	2012	Independence from Mandatory Palestine 1948
Italy	1946	2012	Unification 1861
Jamaica	1963	2012	Independence from the UK 1962
Japan	1946	2012	National Foundation Day 660 BC
Jordan	1946	2012	League of Nation mandate ended 1946
Kazakhstan	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
Kenya	1964	2012	Independence from the UK 1963
Kiribati	1980	2012	Independence from the UK 1979
Kuwait	1961	2012	Independence from the UK 1961
Kyrgyzstan	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
Laos	1954	2012	Independence from France 1953
Latvia	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
Lebanon	1946	2012	Independence from France 1943
Lesotho	1967	2012	Independence from the UK 1966
Liberia	1946	2012	Independence from the American Colonization Society 1847
Libya	1952	2012	Released from British and French oversight 1951
Liechtenstein	1946	2012	Independence from German Confederation 1866
Lithuania	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991

Luxembourg	1946	2012	End of Personal Union 1890
Macedonia	1993	2012	Independence from Yugoslavia recognized 1993
Madagascar	1960	2012	Independence from France 1960
Malawi	1965	2012	Independence from the UK 1964
Malaysia (-1965)	1964	1965	Federation of Malaya, N Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore 1963
Malaysia (1966-)	1966	2012	Singapore separation from Malaysia 1965
Maldives	1966	2012	Independence from the UK 1965
Mali	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Malta	1965	2012	Independence from the UK 1964
Marshall Islands	1987	2012	Independence from Compact of Free Association 1986
Mauritania	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Mauritius	1968	2012	Independence from the UK 1968
Mexico	1946	2012	Independence from Spain recognized 1821
Moldova	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
Monaco	1946	2012	Franco-Monegasque Treaty 1861
Mongolia	1946	2012	Independence from Qin Dynasty 1911
Montenegro	2006	2012	Independence from Serbia and Montenegro 2006
Morocco	1956	2012	Independence from France och Spain 1956
Mozambique	1975	2012	Independence from Portuguese republic 1975
Myanmar	1948	2012	Independence from the UK 1948
Namibia	1990	2012	Independence from South Africa 1990
Nauru	1968	2012	Independence from UN Trusteeship 1968
Nepal	1946	2012	Kingdom declared 1768
Netherlands	1946	2012	Independence from the Spanish Empire 1815
New Zealand	1948	2012	Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947
Nicaragua	1946	2012	Independence from the Federal Republic of Central America 1838
Niger	1961	2012	Independence from France 1960
Nigeria	1961	2012	Independence from the UK 1960
North Korea	1949	2012	Division of Korea 1948
Norway	1946	2012	Dissolution of union with Sweden 1905
Oman	1946	2012	Imamate established 751
Pakistan (-1970)	1948	1970	Independence from the UK 1947
Pakistan (1971-)	1971	2012	Bangladesh independence from Pakistan 1971
Palau	1995	2012	Independence from Compact of Free Association with the United States 1994
Panama	1946	2012	Independence from Colombia 1903
Papua New Guinea	1976	2012	Independence from Australia 1975
Paraguay	1946	2012	Independence from Spain 1811
Peru	1946	2012	Independence from Spain recognized 1824
Philippines	1947	2012	Independence from the United States 1946
Poland	1946	2012	Reconstitution of Poland 1918
Portugal	1946	2012	Independence from Kingdom of Leon recognized 1143
Qatar	1972	2012	Independence from the UK 1971
Romania	1946	2012	Independence from the Ottoman Empire 1878
Russia	1992	2012	Russian Federation 1991
Rwanda	1963	2012	Independence from Belgium 1962
St. Kitts and Nevis	1984	2012	Independence from the UK 1983
St. Lucia	1979	2012	Independence from the UK 1979
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1980	2012	Independence from the UK 1979
Samoa	1962	2012	Independence from New Zealand 1962
San Marino	1946	2012	Independence from the Roman Empire 301
São Tomé and Príncipe	1976	2012	Independence from Portugal 1975
Saudi Arabia	1946	2012	Kingdom founded 1932
Senegal	1961	2012	Withdrawal from the Mali Federation 1960
Serbia	2006	2012	Independent republic 2006

Serbia and Montenegro	1992	2005	Established 1992, Dissolution 2006
Seychelles	1976	2012	Independence from the UK 1976
Sierra Leone	1961	2012	Independence from the UK 1961
Singapore	1966	2012	Separation from Malaysia 1965
Slovakia	1993	2012	Independence from Czechoslovakia 1993
Slovenia	1991	2012	Independence from Yugoslavia 1991
Solomon Islands	1979	2012	Independence from the UK 1978
Somalia	1961	2012	Union, Independence and Constitution 1960
South Africa	1946	2012	The Union of South Africa came into being 1910
South Korea	1948	2012	Division of Korea 1948
South Sudan	2012	2012	Independence 2011
Spain	1946	2012	Nation State 1812
Sri Lanka	1948	2012	Independence from the UK (Dominion) 1948
Sudan (-2011)	1956	2011	Independence from the UK and Egypt 1956
Suden (2012-)	2012	2012	South Sudandese independence 2011
Suriname	1976	2012	Independence from the Netherlands 1975
Swaziland	1969	2012	Independence from British mandate 1968
Sweden	1946	2012	Consolidation Middle Ages
Switzerland	1946	2012	Peace of Westphalia 1648
Syria	1946	2012	Independence from France 1946
Taiwan	1950	2012	Kuomintang retreat to Taiwan 1949
Tajikistan	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
Tanzania	1964	2012	Merger (Tanganyika, Zanzibar & Pemba) 1964
Thailand	1946	2012	Rattanakosin Kingdom 1782
Tibet	1946	1950	Independence from Qing Dynasty 1913
Timor-Leste	2002	2012	Independence from Indonesia 2002
Togo	1960	2012	Independence from France 1960
Tonga	1970	2012	Independence from British protection 1970
Trinidad and Tobago	1963	2012	Independence from the UK 1962
Tunisia	1956	2012	Independence from France 1956
Turkey	1946	2012	Secession from the Ottoman Empire 1923
Turkmenistan	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
Tuvalu	1979	2012	Independence from the UK 1978
Uganda	1963	2012	Independence from the UK 1962
Ukraine	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
United Arab Emirates	1972	2012	UK treaties ended 1971
United Kingdom	1946	2012	Acts of Union 1707
United States	1946	2012	Independence from the Kingdom of Great Britain recognized 1783
Uruguay	1946	2012	Independence from the Empire of Brazil recognized 1828
Soviet Union	1946	1991	Treaty of Creation 1922, Union dissolved 1991
Uzbekistan	1992	2012	Independence from the Soviet Union 1991
Vanuatu	1981	2012	Independence from France and the UK 1980
Venezuela	1946	2012	Independence from Gran Colombia recognized 1845
Vietnam	1977	2012	Reunification 1976
Vietnam, North	1955	1976	Geneva Accords. Partition of the Country. 1954
Vietnam, South	1955	1976	Geneva Accords. Partition of the Country. 1954
Yemen	1990	2012	Unification 1990
Yemen, North	1946	1989	Independence from Ottoman Empire 1918
Yemen, South	1968	1989	Independence from the UK 1967
Yugoslavia	1946	1991	The union of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and the Kingdom of Serbia est. 1918
Zambia	1965	2012	Independence from the UK 1964
Zimbabwe	1966	2012	The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of Rhodesia 1965

Appendix B

cname	ccodealp	ccode
Afghanistan	AFG	4
Albania	ALB	8
Algeria	DZA	12
Andorra	AND	20
Angola	AGO	24
Antigua and Barbuda	ATG	28
Argentina	ARG	32
Armenia	ARM	51
Australia	AUS	36
Austria	AUT	40
Azerbaijan	AZE	31
Bahamas	BHS	44
Bahrain	BHR	48
Bangladesh	BGD	50
Barbados	BRB	52
Belarus	BLR	112
Belgium	BEL	56
Belize	BLZ	84
Benin	BEN	204
Bhutan	BTN	64
Bolivia	BOL	68
Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	70
Botswana	BWA	72
Brazil	BRA	76
Brunei	BRN	96
Bulgaria	BGR	100
Burkina Faso	BFA	854
Burundi	BDI	108
Cambodia	KHM	116
Cameroon	CMR	120
Canada	CAN	124
Cape Verde	CPV	132
Central African Republic	CAF	140
Chad	TCD	148
Chile	CHL	152
China	CHN	156
Colombia	COL	170
Comoros	COM	174
Congo	COG	178
Congo, Democratic Republic	COD	180
Costa Rica	CRI	188
Cote d'Ivoire	CIV	384
Croatia	HRV	191
Cuba	CUB	192
Cyprus (-1974)	CYP	993
Cyprus (1975-)	CYP	196
Czech Republic	CZE	203
Czechoslovakia	CSK	200
Denmark	DNK	208
Djibouti	DJI	262
Dominica	DMA	212
Dominican Republic	DOM	214

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

cname	ccodealp	ccode
Ecuador	ECU	218
Egypt	EGY	818
El Salvador	SLV	222
Equatorial Guinea	GNQ	226
Eritrea	ERI	232
Estonia	EST	233
Ethiopia (-1992)	ETH	230
Ethiopia (1993-)	ETH	231
Fiji	FJI	242
Finland	FIN	246
France (-1962)	FRA	991
France (1963-)	FRA	250
Gabon	GAB	266
Gambia	GMB	270
Georgia	GEO	268
Germany	DEU	276
Germany, East	DDR	278
Germany, West	DEU	280
Ghana	GHA	288
Greece	GRC	300
Grenada	GRD	308
Guatemala	GTM	320
Guinea	GIN	324
Guinea-Bissau	GNB	624
Guyana	GUY	328
Haiti	HTI	332
Honduras	HND	340
Hungary	HUN	348
Iceland	ISL	352
India	IND	356
Indonesia	IDN	360
Iran	IRN	364
Iraq	IRQ	368
Ireland	IRL	372
Israel	ISR	376
Italy	ITA	380
Jamaica	JAM	388
Japan	JPN	392
Jordan	JOR	400
Kazakhstan	KAZ	398
Kenya	KEN	404
Kiribati	KIR	296
Korea, North	PRK	408
Korea, South	KOR	410
Kuwait	KWT	414
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	417
Laos	LAO	418
Latvia	LVA	428
Lebanon	LBN	422
Lesotho	LSO	426
Liberia	LBR	430
Libya	LBY	434
Liechtenstein	LIE	438

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

cname	ccodealp	ccode
Lithuania	LTU	440
Luxembourg	LUX	442
Macedonia	MKD	807
Madagascar	MDG	450
Malawi	MWI	454
Malaysia (-1965)	MYS	992
Malaysia (1966-)	MYS	458
Maldives	MDV	462
Mali	MLI	466
Malta	MLT	470
Marshall Islands	MHL	584
Mauritania	MRT	478
Mauritius	MUS	480
Mexico	MEX	484
Micronesia	FSM	583
Moldova	MDA	498
Monaco	MCO	492
Mongolia	MNG	496
Montenegro	MNE	499
Morocco	MAR	504
Mozambique	MOZ	508
Myanmar	MMR	104
Namibia	NAM	516
Nauru	NRU	520
Nepal	NPL	524
Netherlands	NLD	528
New Zealand	NZL	554
Nicaragua	NIC	558
Niger	NER	562
Nigeria	NGA	566
Norway	NOR	578
Oman	OMN	512
Pakistan (-1970)	PAK	997
Pakistan (1971-)	PAK	586
Palau	PLW	585
Panama	PAN	591
Papua New Guinea	PNG	598
Paraguay	PRY	600
Peru	PER	604
Philippines	PHL	608
Poland	POL	616
Portugal	PRT	620
Qatar	QAT	634
Romania	ROU	642
Russia	RUS	643
Rwanda	RWA	646
Samoa	WSM	882
San Marino	SMR	674
Sao Tome and Principe	STP	678
Saudi Arabia	SAU	682
Senegal	SEN	686
Serbia	SRB	688
Serbia and Montenegro	SCG	891

The QoG Standard Dataset 2013 – Codebook

cname	ccodealp	ccode
Seychelles	SYC	690
Sierra Leone	SLE	694
Singapore	SGP	702
Slovakia	SVK	703
Slovenia	SVN	705
Solomon Islands	SLB	90
Somalia	SOM	706
South Africa	ZAF	710
South Sudan	SSD	728
Spain	ESP	724
Sri Lanka	LKA	144
St Kitts and Nevis	KNA	659
St Lucia	LCA	662
St Vincent and the Grenadines	VCT	670
Sudan (-2011)	SDN	736
Sudan (2012-)	SDN	729
Suriname	SUR	740
Swaziland	SWZ	748
Sweden	SWE	752
Switzerland	CHE	756
Syria	SYR	760
Taiwan	TWN	158
Tajikistan	TJK	762
Tanzania	TZA	834
Thailand	THA	764
Tibet	XTI	994
Timor-Leste	TLS	626
Togo	TGO	768
Tonga	TON	776
Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	780
Tunisia	TUN	788
Turkey	TUR	792
Turkmenistan	TKM	795
Tuvalu	TUV	798
USSR	SUN	810
Uganda	UGA	800
Ukraine	UKR	804
United Arab Emirates	ARE	784
United Kingdom	GBR	826
United States	USA	840
Uruguay	URY	858
Uzbekistan	UZB	860
Vanuatu	VUT	548
Venezuela	VEN	862
Vietnam	VNM	704
Vietnam, North	VNM	998
Vietnam, South	VDR	999
Yemen	YEM	887
Yemen, North	YEM	886
Yemen, South	YMD	720
Yugoslavia	YUG	890
Zambia	ZMB	894
Zimbabwe	ZWE	716